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1943: The Critical Year

An alert crew aboard a tank of the 752nd Tank Battalion.

Wars are fought by soldiers, but suffered by civilians; they are planned by generals, but plotted by politicians. Allied strategy in World War II was conceived by three remarkable but very different politicians, representing three almost incompatible traditions. However, their differences were subsumed by their overwhelming desire for victory. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was a democrat, firmly rooted in the meritocratic traditions of the United States. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was an aristocrat and a staunch defender of Britain's imperial heritage. General Secretary Josef Stalin was a despotic ruler of a strictly orthodox and viciously oppressive communist regime. However, despite countless differences, trials, and tribulations, these men forged a joint plan which was central to the Allied victory. What has been termed Roosevelt and Churchill's "special relationship" developed throughout the war, making the alliance between Britain and the U.S.A. stronger and deeper. And, at least on a populist level, "Uncle Joe" Stalin was admired; the deeds of his Red Army much more so. Even conservative politicians spoke glowingly of "our brave Soviet comrades."

A measure of the level of co-operation between the three Allies, or the "Grand Alliance," as Churchill called them, was Roosevelt and Stalin's reluctant agreement to Churchill's strategy for the European war. The British, seriously mauled by the German army in France in 1940, were reluctant to challenge the Wehrmacht until Hitler's panzer divisions had been seriously weakened by attritional tactics. The Americans, however, were eager to let their vast resources make the telling blow in northern Europe, and the Soviets felt that they were carrying by far the greater part of the burden in terms of men and machines on the Eastern Front (which they were) and that a second front should be opened immediately in France.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, it was Churchill's view that prevailed. The Second Front would be launched in Italy, in what Churchill described as Hitler's "soft underbelly." It was the cautious option, and Churchill may well have been right, but the decision almost certainly extended the war by many months. The "Mediterranean Strategy," as it was called, planned for a strike at Italy through Sicily in 1943, as soon as the Germans and Italians had been removed from North Africa, followed by an invasion in northern France in 1944.

Two other agreements at Casablanca were crucial to the outcome of the war. First, it was determined that the Allies would pursue the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan as their ultimate military objective. This was significant, if only because it underlined the deep-seated ideological background of the war. Fascist states were engaged in a relentless war of terror against the Allies; for that, they were going to have to suffer total defeat. Second, it was agreed that a combined bomber offensive be launched against Germany. The British would bomb at night, the Americans by day. These raids would form part of the terrible price that Germany would pay for its part in the aggression of its fascist rulers and supporters.

In the Pacific, the "long road" to total victory was something of a misnomer. There were no roads, only vast expanses of ocean and jungle. Victory would come only after naval supremacy had brought control of the vast distances, and only after G.Ls and Marines had cleared the Japanese defenders from the jungles of the ocean's countless islands. Then roads - and, more importantly, airstrips - could be built by the indefatigable U.S. Navy construction battalions, the Seabees.

Following fierce fighting on Guadalcanal and New Guinea by U.S. and Australian forces, the Allied offensive in the Pacific began in June 1943, in the central Solomon Islands. It took many months of fighting, but slowly and surely headway was made. By November, New Georgia, Vella Lavella, Choiseul, and the Treasury Islands had been retaken. Over a thousand American troops died on New Georgia alone. The battle on Bougainville was a much more prolonged affair: not until August 1945 did the last Japanese garrison of 24,000 men surrender. U.S. forces in the Solomons campaign were very ably assisted by men from New Zealand and Australia. Island hopping - beach by beach, jungle by jungle, and naval encounter by naval encounter - would be the relentless pattern for the Pacific Campaign.

The Allies' strike at Hitler's "soft underbelly" began on the morning of July 10, 1943, on the Italian island of Sicily. Operation Husky was a combined force of over 180,000 men and over 2,500 ships. Generals Patton and Montgomery were the Allies' principal commanders, two men with formidable reputations and talents, but not known for their generosity towards their rival commanders.

Airborne support landings were hampered by strong winds, hut the assaults on the beaches went much better. American forces landed between Licata and Cape Scaramia on Sicily's southwest coast. British and Commonwealth forces landed in the southeast, between Pozallo and Syracuse.

The ensuing battle involved some Allied bickering and stiff resistance from high-quality German units, and progress was slower than expected. But, significantly, Benito Mussolini fell from power on July 25, an indication of the lack of commitment to the Axis cause in the hearts of the Italian people. This led Hitler to rethink his strategy, and on August 11 the Germans began a tactical withdrawal from the island. As many as 40,000 German troops escaped, together with a large force of Italians; the Germans later formed the backbone of even stiffer resistance on the Italian mainland.

The Allies crossed the straits of Messina on September 3 and landed further up the coast at Salerno on September 9. By then the Italians had formally surrendered, but the campaign was far from over. Hitler was moving sixteen divisions into Italy. There was going to be nothing "soft" about his underbelly. His army would fight for every inch of ground. And most of the ground was mountainous and hard; any low ground available became difficult with the rains of winter. The attritional battle wore on into 1944, before significant breakthroughs were made north of Naples.

1943 also represented the turning point in the protracted struggle for the lines of supply between North America and Britain which, somewhat misleadingly, has been called the Battle of the Atlantic. A "battle" was never really fought; it was more a "war" for control of the high seas. 1943 was the critical year.

In order for Britain to be fortified in its defense against Hitler in Europe, the North Atlantic was crucial. Vast quantities of food, weapons, and equipment had to be transported in large convoys under naval protection. British and U.S. naval and aerial power meant that the most potent weapon available to Germany in attempting to cut Allied supplies was the German submarine, the U-boat. At the beginning of the war, and certainly until 1943, they were a terrifying menace, sinking millions of tons of shipping. They hunted in "wolfpacks," surfaced, and picked off their targets with ruthless efficiency.

But Admiral Karl Donitz, who directed the U-boat fleet, had one major problem: he never had enough boats. Perhaps his greatest opportunities came in 1940 and 1941, but he had only twenty-seven vessels in 1940, and twenty-one in February 1941. With operational constraints, the number of boats at sea offering a real threat to shipping could dip into single figures. By the time the number of craft increased dramatically, in late 1942, it was probably too late, but only because of the horrible game of statistics called attritional war. Throughout 1942, Allied shipping losses had been appalling: over 8 million tons, mostly sunk by U-boats. But by early 1943 the U.S.A. could produce more merchant ships than the U-boats could sink. With cold calculation, the Allies determined that they could afford to lose two ships for every U-boat. The harsh statistics of war soon began to tell.

More sophisticated radar and a breakthrough by Allied intelligence in cracking the U-boats' communication cipher allowed the wolfpacks to be detected. This coincided with the deployment of better long-range air cover, to close the gap in air protection between North America and Europe. Whereas the U-boats had previously been able to operate unseen, and practically unchallenged, they themselves were now targets: nearly a hundred were lost in the first five months of 1943, fortyseven in May alone. At the end of the month, Donitz withdrew his beleaguered boats and crews to port, their potency all but gone.

The aerial war against Germany also moved into a critical phase in 1943, with the beginning of the Allies' Combined Bomber Offensive. The objective had been set at the Casablanca Conference: "The progressive, destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." These were the plain, unemotional words of military planners, but their impact on the German population was to be catastrophic. They also required Allied aircrews to pay a heavy price in making them effective.

In March, R.A.F. Bomber Command launched a massive raid, involving over 440 bombers, on Essen in the Ruhr industrial area of Germany. Even bigger raids on Hamburg in late July, by the R.A.E by night and the U.S.A.A.F. by day, caused colossal damage. Over 40,000 civilians were killed, many in a "firestorm" created on the night of July 27, when an area of over eight square miles was incinerated in a cauldron of fire. The intense heat created high winds as the air rushed to feed the flames. Many people hiding in cellars were suffocated through lack of oxygen.

In August and September, the R.A.F. raided Berlin and the eighth U.S.A.A.F. attacked Rosenburg and Schweinfurt. British losses over Berlin were substantial - 126 bombers lost from a total of 1,647 - but American losses were even worse: 147 of the 376 planes dispatched were lost. In a second raid by the U.S.A.A.E in October, 60 planes out of 291 were lost and 142 damaged. Such losses were unacceptable, and bombing was suspended until early 1944. But the Allies had given Germany a taste of what was to come, especially when, in March 1944, the P-51 Mustang was deployed as a long-range fighter to protect the bombers.

More and more Axis conquests were liberated during 1943. The Red Army's tanks had triumphed in the mighty armored Battle of Kursk and, by the end of the year, the Soviets had retaken Orel and Kharkov (August), Smolensk (September), and Kiev (November).

Towards the end of the year the Pacific campaign moved into the Central Pacific region, beginning with assaults on Makin and Tarawa islands, in the Gilbert and Ellis Islands, on November 20. Heavy naval bombardment preceded the attack, followed by amphibious landings by U.S. Marines. Although fiercely defended, Makin fell in a few days. But the situation on Tarawa was altogether different. There the Japanese had 3,000 elite marines of their own, dug in in heavily reinforced positions, and thousands more Imperial Army troops. The naval bombardment did little to soften them up. When the U.S. Marines went ashore, they faced not only withering fire but also a shallow approach to the beach, which meant that many of their landing craft could not reach the shore. The men had to wade several hundred yards waist-deep in water, under a hail of enemy fire. Almost a thousand of them died, but they exacted a terrible price from the Japanese. Slowly and inexorably, the defenders were cleared from their bunkers with grenades and flame-throwers. Of the estimated 20,000 defenders, only a handful came out alive, many perishing in last-ditch banzai charges.

1943 was the beginning of the long road back to victory. But the Sicilian and Italian battles, the losses of aircrew over Germany (well over 50,000 American and 50,000 British by the end of the war), and the price paid by the Marines in capturing tiny islands in the Pacific, all brought home to the American public the reality of war. The stark casualty figures, coupled with the pressures of the domestic war economy - now in full swing - emphasized that the United States was the fulcrum on which the outcome of the war pivoted; and that it would be a fight to the finish.

Stewart Binns & Adrian Wood. 1943: The Long Road Back. . Sevenoaks Limited. 2001.

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