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The Fleet Sails For Guadalcanal

Guadalcanal and the Solomons were no part of American war plans at the time of Pearl Harbor. What attracted the strategists' attention to them was the Japanese South Pacific advance, threatening the Allied line of communications with Australia. As early as March 1942 Admiral King had urged an offensive drive from bases in the New Hebrides through the Solomon Islands and along the New Guinea coast to the Bismarck Archipelago.

Because the Japanese were rapidly consolidating their position in the southern Solomons, the formal directive was issued by the joint Chiefs of Staff on July 2, 1942; the operation, code-named WATCHTOWER, was set to begin August 1. When intelligence reports showed that the Japanese had begun to build an airfield on the large island of Guadalcanal, next to Tulagi, that island too was added to the list of objectives.

When Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley learned in late June of the impending operation, his amphibious assault force, the First Marine Division, was still at sea on its way to New Zealand. Its most experienced regiment, the Seventh Marines, had been sent to Samoa in April. The division was not combat-loaded. Its commander, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, had been assured by Admiral King that he need not expect a combat mission before 1943. Almost nothing was known of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Solomons beyond scattered reports from coastwatchers and a few old records in Australia.

It was the contest for resources which dominated - and to a large extent continued to dominate - American decision making in the war against Japan. "They were fighting for men and supplies," recalled a Marine officer who served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time. "The money was insignificant. You could get all the money you wanted but there were just so much supplies in the U.S." For King, as for MacArthur, a major campaign in the South Pacific represented a bureaucratic success - but King, like MacArthur, was soon to be discomfitted by the "concrete aspects of the problem"

Both King and Nimitz expected Ghormley to command WATCHTOWER in person. Unfortunately, they had not bothered to explain this to Ghormley. His directives from Nimitz and King were sufficiently ambiguous to allow him to conclude that he was to exercise only broad general command and not direct operational command of the actual invasion. When the transports carrying the marines sailed with their escorts from Wellington, New Zealand, Ghormley remained ashore at his new headquarters in Noumea.

Off the tiny island of Koro in the Fijis, the Guadalcanal invasion fleet came together on July 25 for the first time: seventy-six warships and auxiliaries from Australia, from Pearl Harbor, from New Zealand, from as far away as San Diego. Three of the navy's four remaining carriers were there, together with a brand new battleship and a division of cruisers from the Royal Australian Navy under Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, the victor of the Coral Sea and Midway, was in tactical command. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, fresh from Washington where he had been one of Admiral King's top strategists, commanded the Amphibious Force South Pacific - the transports and cargo ships carrying the First Marine Division (reinforced by a regiment from the Second Marine Division and other units) and their gear.

The principal commanders came aboard Fletcher's flagship Saratoga the following day to discuss the impending operation. Fletcher was openly skeptical about the undertaking. He implied that Turner and the rest of King's armchair strategists in Washington who had planned it - had had no real fighting experience. Turner responded in kind. His chief of staff, Captain Peyton, "'was amazed and disturbed by the way these two admirals talked to each other. I had never heard anything like it.'"

Fletcher was most concerned about taking his precious carriers within range of Japanese air bases and carriers. The carriers represented three-quarters of the navy's fighting strength in that category and no replacements could be expected for the next nine months. Two days was all the time that Fletcher believed he could keep his carriers in an exposed position supporting the landings. The navy had come a long way from Nimitz's confident observation that "because of the superiority of our personnel and equipment" the U.S. could afford to accept adverse odds in battle with the Japanese. Fletcher had seen what Japanese pilots could do at Coral Sea and Midway.

Turner and Marine Commander Vandegrift vehemently protested the decision to pull out after two days, pointing out that it would take a minimum of four days to get all the troops and their equipment ashore, but Fletcher refused to budge. Ghormley might have resolved the impasse, but he was far away at Noumea. So Fletcher's decision stood. After a brief rehearsal at Koro, which Vandegrift later described as "a complete bust," the fleet sailed for Guadalcanal.

On that island, and on neighboring Tulagi, the Japanese defenders remained unaware of the American approach almost until the moment high explosive shells from Crutchley's cruisers and destroyers came roaring down on them like freight trains. The few Japanese on Guadalcanal, mostly construction troops, fled into the jungle. But on Tulagi and the neighboring islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo the marines encountered stiff, although brief, resistance. All three islands, as well as the nearly completed airfield on Guadalcanal, were in American hands by the end of the second day, August 8.

By that time Admiral Fletcher was growing increasingly nervous about possible threats to his carriers from the large number of enemy planes he believed to be in the area. The whereabouts of the four Japanese carriers which had survived Midway were also unknown. At six in the evening of the eighth, Fletcher decided he could wait no longer. He radioed Admiral Ghormley:

Fighter strength reduced from 99 to 78. In view of large number of enemy torpedo planes and bombers in this area, I recommend the immediate withdrawal of my carriers. Request tankers be sent forward immediately as fuel running low.

Then, without waiting for a reply, he immediately set course for home.

Admiral Turner, with the transports off Guadalcanal, was amazed and angered by Fletcher's withdrawal twelve hours earlier than planned. He considered it little better than desertion, and most historians have agreed with him. Samuel Eliot Morison points out that Fletcher's seventy-eight fighters were still more than the Americans had had at the beginning of the Midway battle, his ships had sufficient fuel for several days more, and "his force could have remained in the area with no more severe consequence than sunburn."

Despite the fact that his cruiser covering force had been practically wiped out in the Battle of Savo Island, Turner elected to continue unloading until noon on the ninth, enabling the marines to bring ashore a few more essential items. Yet when Turner's ships disappeared over the horizon the leathernecks' supply situation was far from opulent. They lacked radar, radio equipment, barbed wire, and construction equipment; moreover, they had only about four days' supply of ammunition. During the first six weeks the marines were limited to two very spare meals a day.

Among the marines "there was a lot of talk about Bataan." "We had no idea what was going to happen," recalled one Marine officer; "we were all wondering where our planes were. The Navy had left, their carriers had left. We didn't have a thing there. "'It was about this time,'" recalled a veteran sergeant, "’that the men began to knock off a lot of their letter writing.'" "It was very galling to us to sit on Guadalcanal and listen to the radio at night," recalled Clifton B. Cates, who commanded the First Marines; "we would sit there and listen to these people make a statement, well, they hoped we could hold Guadalcanal. One Army Air Forces general even said it was foolish to try."

Despite all this, Vandegrift had one priceless asset: the airstrip on Guadalcanal, which the marines had named Henderson Field, after Major Lofton Henderson who had led the Marine dive-bombers at the Battle of Midway. This field, which had been nearly finished by the Japanese, was rushed to completion utilizing captured equipment. On August 15 four fast destroyer-transports slipped into Guadalcanal with aviation gasoline, bombs, and a party of aircraft technicians. Five days later the first planes arrived: nineteen fighters and twelve dive-bombers flown in from the escort carrier Long Island. Control of the air over Guadalcanal gave the Americans a decisive advantage in the weeks of hard fighting which lay ahead.

The Japanese were slow to react to the American seizure of Guadalcanal. Their army was preoccupied with its offensive in New Guinea and had little interest in the Solomons. Until the American invasion, the Japanese army was not even aware that the navy was building an airfield on Guadalcanal. The Army General Staff, which had never been informed about the full extent of the navy's losses at Midway, expected no American offensive until the latter half of 1943. The army believed that the Americans were merely conducting a largescale raid, and the apparent abandonment of the Marines on Guadalcanal following the Savo Island battle simply reinforced their confidence. The Americans left on the island, Imperial General Headquarters reported, totalled about 2,000 men; their "morale was low"; and many were attempting to escape to Tulagi. Recapture of the island should not prove difficult, but because of the airfield it should be undertaken without delay.

The Seventeenth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Hyakutaka Harukichi, with headquarters at Rabaul, was given the responsibility for clearing the Americans off Guadalcanal. Hyakutaka collected about 6,000 troops for the operation. Long before they could all be transported to the island, however, his advanced force-a 1,000-man combat team known as the Ichiki Force after its commander Colonel Ichiki Kiyono - had landed at Taivu to the east of Henderson field on August 18. From there it launched an ill-conceived attack on the marine perimeter along the Ilu River and was practically annihilated.

"We have the bull by the tail and the bull doesn't like it," wrote Admiral Ghormley to Nimitz four days after the marines landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. He expected that the Japanese would soon "try to land an expedition against our positions in the Tulagi area and I want [our] carriers to hit their ships which carry that expedition toward their objective." The Japanese move Ghormley anticipated got under way a few days after the Ilu River fight: on August 23 the Japanese attempted to run in more troops in a convoy covered by ships of the Combined Fleet.

Intelligence reports pointing to a big Japanese operation in the Solomons brought Admiral Fletcher's carriers hurrying up from the south. On August 24 they exchanged blows with the Japanese striking force in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. The Japanese aim was to sink Fletcher's carriers while providing protection for their convoy of reinforcements. The big carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku would engage the American fleet while a detachment of heavy cruisers and the light carrier Ryujo attacked Henderson Field. American scouting planes discovered the Ryujo group first and Fletcher threw most of his planes into an attack on that small carrier, which was sunk. This left Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake's two big carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku unmolested. They flung their entire complement of bombers and torpedo planes at Fletcher's carriers; one of Kondo's attack groups failed to find the Americans, however, and the other scored three hits on the carrier Enterprise but failed to sink her.

Both carrier forces now retired, but the Japanese troops for Guadalcanal were still at sea in the transport Kinryu Maru, escorted by the destroyers of Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo's Reinforcement Force - dubbed "The Tokyo Express" by the marines. On the morning of August 25, marine dive-bombers from Henderson Field found Tanaka's force, put a bomb through Tanaka's flagship Jintsu, and reduced the Kinryu Maru to a wreck. A destroyer closed with the transport to take off her crew and the troops. Just then a squadron of B-17s from Espiritu Santo appeared. These high-level bombers were justly famous for making few hits at sea, but this time they were lucky. Three bombs hit the Japanese destroyer, sending her to the bottom and forcing Tanaka to retreat back up the Slot.

A pattern of action now ensued which was to continue for the next two months. Both sides attempted to supply and reinforce their forces on Guadalcanal. American control of Henderson Field enabled the Americans to dominate the sea around the island during daylight hours but the Japanese, despite occasional painful losses, managed to run in troops and supplies via Tanaka's Tokyo Express under cover of darkness. After delivering their reinforcements, the warships of the Tokyo Express usually bombarded Henderson Field, making life miserable for the marines and sometimes forcing the curtailment of air operations by damage to aircraft or ground facilities. Japanese attempts to interfere with American reinforcements and American attempts to derail the Tokyo Express often resulted in major air and naval battles.

To the Americans and Japanese on Guadalcanal, it may at times have seemed as if the opposing troops were simply skirmishing with each other and that the real enemy was the jungle. Thick tropical rain forest covered most of the island, a fantastic tangle of vines, creepers, ferns, roots, and giant hardwoods; this reduced overland movement to a mile or two a day - and visibility to a few yards. The jungle was the domain of giant ants, three-inch wasps, spiders, leeches, and above all, the malarial mosquito, which often inflicted more casualties than the enemy. The constant dampness and humidity produced fungus and skin infections in abundance, while the smallest lapse in sanitation was likely to produce a virulent form of dysentery that rendered men too weak to move. The marines lived in tents or muddy dugouts and ate canned C-rations or dehydrated meats and vegetables, supplemented by captured Japanese rice. Few ate well - but their diet was rich and varied compared to the Japanese, who were sometimes reduced to eating coconuts, roots, and moss.

Primitive living, the poor condition of the airfield, a lack of spare parts, shortages of fuel and ammunition, and intermittant night bombardments by the Japanese made flying from Henderson a nightmare for the pilots of Marine Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger's "Cactus Air Force." (Cactus was the Allied code-name for Guadalcanal.) Of the dive-bomber pilots in Marine Air Group Twenty-three, the first to operate from Guadalcanal, "only one would eventually be able to walk to the plane that carried him away from Henderson Field."

Thirty days was estimated as about the maximum a flyer could spend on Guadalcanal and still be physically and psychologically able to fly. The planes were used up even faster: at times Geiger had less than a dozen operational aircraft to throw against the Japanese. But a steady flow of reinforcements-supplemented by navy planes from sunk or disabled carriers and some Army Air Force fighters - kept the Cactus Air Force in business.

Marine Wildcat fighters were no match for Zeros; the Army Air Force P-40s were even worse. In altitude, rate of climb, and maneuverability they were simply not in the same league. Yet the Japanese had problems too. Their Zeros, fighting at the end of a long flight from Rabaul, could remain over the target only a few minutes; they were further handicapped by having to carry belly fuel tanks. Employing hit-and-run tactics similar to those of General Chennault in China, the American flyers were able to run up an impressive score against Japanese raiders.

At the end of August Tanaka's Tokyo Express, taking advantage of the dark moonless nights, was able to bring in almost 6,000 men under the command of Major General Kawaguchi Kiyotake. By this time the Japanese high command had begun to take Guadalcanal seriously. General Horii's forces in New Guinea were halted almost within sight of Port Moresby: their orders were to dig in and prepare to hold Kokoda and Buna. Reinforcements intended for Papua were diverted to Guadalcanal, which had now become "the pivotal point of operational guidance."

General Kawaguchi's orders were to reconnoiter the airfield and determine whether it was possible to attack it with his present strength or whether reinforcements were needed. Without bothering to reconnoiter, Kawaguchi decided to attack. The battle that ensued was one of the crucial battles of the Guadalcanal campaign.

Attacking from the south of Henderson Field, Kawaguchi's troops attempted to overrun and outflank the marine perimeter on a low ridge about 1,000 yards from the airstrip. The position, which soon received the appropriate label "Bloody Ridge," was defended by men of the elite Raider and Parachute battalions under Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Edson. Twelve times during the night of September 13 Kawaguchi's men, supported by heavy mortar fire, hurled themselves against the marine lines, shouting banzais and occasionally "Marine You Die!" in passable English. The marines answered with obscenities and a hail of automatic weapons fire. Marine howitzers dropped shells on the attacking Japanese as close as 200 yards from the defenders' lines.

Slowly, Edson's companies pulled back to the final knoll of the ridge. There they held. The last Japanese charges ended in bloody failure; daybreak saw the ridge littered with corpses. Subsequent attacks against the marines' right flank west of the airfield were easily repulsed. The broken remnants of the Kawaguchi force staggered back into the jungle. There were no marine units strong enough to pursue them. One-fifth of all the Marines engaged were killed or wounded. Of Kawaguchi's men, less than half survived.

Ronald H. Spector. : The American War with Japan. The Free Press. 1985.

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