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United States Army Air Forces

Hitler built a fortress around Europe but he forgot to put a roof on it. Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Air bombardment as employed in World War II involved a major expenditure of manpower and national resources. The United States expended in excess of 43 billions of dollars to support its war effort in Europe through V-E Day. Thirty-five per cent of our war production was devoted to the air force. The Army Air Forces alone dropped 1,461,864 tons of bombs, flew 754,816 bomber sorties and 991,750 fighter sorties, and lost more than 18,000 planes and 79,265 men in action.

The air offensive against German economic resources was initiated by the Casablanca Directive of January 1943. This Directive, augumented by the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan in June 1943, called for the ". . . destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic structure and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for resistance is fatally weakened."

The first requirement for the success of the strategic bombing campaign was the destruction of the German Air Force. Bombing attacks, limited in scale by the number of bombers available for the operations, were launched against German aircraft production centers in July 1943. By December these attacks had delayed the German fighter program by three months.

Frequently the air force was diverted from the strategic bombing campaign to bomb targets of a more urgent nature. In August 1943 it was assigned to bomb V-1 and V-2 rocket sites. This campaign lasted 13 months during which time 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped or 9 per cent of the total tonnage dropped by the Allied Air Forces in the period.

The air force, strengthened by additional bombers and long-range fighter planes-the P-47 and P-51, began attacks in weight against the aircraft factories in February 1944. During Feb., 20-25, 3,636 tons of bombs were dropped on plants pro ducing 90 per cent of Germany's planes. The enemy estimated that 75 per cent of the buildings were either destroyed or damaged. In the succeeding weeks every known aircraft factory in Germany was bombed.

While the bombers were destroying the production centers, the fighters were destroying the existing planes and personnel. In 1943, 10,661 German single engine fighter planes were destroyed or damaged in excess of 10 per cent and this number rose to 16,150 in 1944. This double campaign proved disastrous to the German Air Force.

By the Spring of 1944 the Allies had control of the air and the Germans never regained it. From that time on, the German Air Force was unable to offer any effective opposition to the Allies. Lieutenant General Junck, commander of fighter defenses in the French invasion area, stated that on D-Day he had only 160 aircraft of which 80 were operational.

After air supremacy had been won and the success of the Normandy invasion assured, the heavy bombers were free to begin attacks on the economic centers that nourished the German war machine. Of the total bomb tonnage dropped on Germany, 72 per cent fell after July 1, 1944. The Survey found that these attacks achieved results up to, and in many cases beyond, expectations.

The oil industry was the next target selected for destruction. Oil was vital to the German war machine and had been a weak point in the supply system since the beginning of the war. In May and June 1944, the air force dropped 22,843 tons of bombs on German oil targets. The success of these attacks is evident in Reichminister of War Production Speer's report to Hitler on June 30, 1944: " . . . .The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 per cent by June 24 . If it is not possible to protect these plants we will be forced to curtail the flow of supplies to the Army in September, which will mean that from that time on there will be a terrible bottleneck which may lead to the most tragic consequences . . . . .

From May onward, consumption exceeded production and accumulated stocks of fuel were used up within six months. Speer stated that by December the Fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. By the end of hostilities it had been reduced to practically nothing.

The destruction of Germany's ability to produce fuel had a significant effect upon the operations of the German war machine. General Omar Bradley stated that: "With the defeat of the German gamble in the Ardennes (the Bulge), when the Allies were again in a position to resume the war of movement-in the East as in the West-lack of oil, which the strategic bombing campaign had enforced upon the enemy, told handsomely . . . . When the Allied break-throughs followed west of the Rhine in February, across the Rhine in March, and throughout Germany in April, lack of gasoline was the direct factor behind the destruction or surrender of vast quantities of tanks, guns, trucks, and of thousands upon thousands of enemy troops." Marshall Stalin stated the bombardment of oil also played an important part of the sweeping Russian victories on the Eastern front.

The destruction of synthetic oil plants had another significant effect upon the German war machine. The production of the two most important war chemicals-nitrogen and methanol-was technically intergrated in the synthetic oil centers. Nitrogen is the most important war chemical because all conventional military explosives and powders require nitric acid in some form. Methanol is necessary for the production of TNT and other high explosives. Ninety per cent of this chemical was produced in the synthetic oil plants destroyed by air attacks. Within two months after the beginning of the oil raids nitrogen production dropped sharply. By early 1945 the percentage of salt used in explosives increased from 40 to 70 reducing the power and effectiveness of shells.

Shortages of chemicals reduced ammunition production 20 per cent by the last half of 1944. In the last months of the war, German officers reported a general ammunition shortage on all fronts. From the evidence, all armament production would have come to a virtual standstill, even without the final victories of the armies, by May 1945.

In September 1944, the air forces turned to the destruction of the German transportation system. Prior to this every major ground operation was preceded and accompanied by air attacks on transportation designed to isolate the battlefield. These local attacks, while highly successful, were not designed to produce any decisive effects on the overall German economy. However, the heavier raids initiated in September in the Saar and progressing to the Cologne Plain and then to the entire country did produce a serious destruction in railway operations throughout western Germany.

After these raids, the German transportation system was unable to meet the demands for the supply of vital materials. By late November, shortages severfy impaired the production of practically all finished products. The capacity for economic traffic had been reduced to the point where a high level of production could not be sustained for any length of time. The destruction of transport facilities eliminated coal, which powered German economy, by the early months of 1945. The loss of coal and direct attacks on steel plants caused a permanent collapse of the steel industry.

The air attacks on aircraft, oil and transportation were the most important ones in effecting the economic emasculation of Germany. However, attacks were made on industries producing vehicles, tanks, submarines, machine tools, and electrical equipment. These industries, while never primary targets and not subjected to intense bombings, were substantially effected by the attacks. On March 15, 1945 Speer reported to Hitler that, "The German economy is heading for an inevitable collapse within 4-6 weeks."

Within six months after the beginning of sustained air attacks, the production of aviation gasoline was reduced 90 per cent. Within three months, steel production in the Rhur was reduced 80 per cent. Five months of attacks on transportation reduced carloading 75 per cent and practically eliminated coal. The chemical industry was rendered impotent by the oil attacks.

By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably and would have come to a virtual standstill in May; orderliness of effort was disappearing; and total disruption and disintergration were well on the way. Her armies were still in the field, but with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, they would have had to cease fighting-any effective fighting-within a few months.

The heavy bomber had reached into the heart of the country and destroyed the vital industries that supported the German war machine. Each aerial penetration into the heart of Germany was as truly an invasion as the landing of troops on her soil.

The dislocation of the Japanese war economy was accomplished by two means-blockade or counter shipping operations and strategic bombing operations. Japan's entire economy and ability to wage war was dependent upon imports for sustenance. The blockade of the home islands cut the flow of vital raw materials and the strategic air attacks destroyed the supplies on hand, wrecked the production facilities, and devasted the morale of the people.

In the first year of the war, the contribution of air power to the blockade was secondary-the main burden was borne by submarines. The primary objective of the air forces was to gain air superiority. Until November 1943, air attacks against shipping were almost exclusively a part of military and naval operations, with the greatest effort directed against enemy air and surface forces in the battle area. Advanced bases and air superiority brought the air forces into full partnership with the submarines in 1943. The result was a double strangulation of Japan's over-water movement.

The earliest strategic air operations of the war and the First attacks of any magnitude against Japanese economy were initiated by the Fourteenth Air Force in November 1943. These operations were directed against shipping in the Yangtze River since 91 per cent of Japan's iron ore imports came from this area. By July 1944, despite tremendous logistical problems, the Yangtze had been almost completely closed to iron ore shipments. This drastically curtailed the production of Japanese steel goods.

Air power played a decisive role in completing the blockade in the final year of the war. The seizure of bases astride the Japanese shipping routes made it possible for land-based planes to maintain a constant interdiction of water movement. Air attacks accounted for 50 per cent of the tonnage destroyed in the last year of combat.

By March 1945, the only water routes open to the Japanese were those in the Inland Sea. B-29s began a sustained mining campaign of this area on March 27, 1945-mining had been almost entirely an air activity since 1943. In 46 missions 12,000 mines were dropped which accounted for 770,000 tons of shipping sunk and 478,000 tons damaged. By July, traffic in the Shimonoseki Straits, through which 80 per cent of the Japanese merchant fleet passed, was reduced to a mere trickle.

The blockade, by preventing the importation of materials necessary for the manufacture of aluminum and magnesium, had practically eliminated metal aircraft production by the end of 1944. It produced the same effect upon the Japanese oil supply. Consumption over-balanced receipts from 1942 onward. After February, imports of oil ceased entirely due to the interdiction, principally by air operations, of southern shipping routes.

By the end of the war, 8,900,000 tons of the 10,100,000 tons of merchant shipping possessed by Japan, had either been sunk or put out of action. Submarine attacks on merchant shipping were mutually supported by long-range search and attack planes, mines, and carrier-based and land-based aircraft. Long-range planes found targets for submarines; convoys, which offered some protection against submarines, increased their vulnerability to air attacks; ships driven into congested harbors were easy targets for carrier strikes; and mines dropped by aircraft helped to drive ships out of shallow water into areas where submarines could operate.

The knock-out blow against Japan was begun in November 1944 by B-29s stationed in the Marianas Islands. Japanese economy, at this time, was in a state of slow strangulation. Heavy bombardment accelerated this decay to a relatively quick death.

The mission assigned to the B-29s was virtually the same as that given to the air force in Europe – "… to achieve the earliest possible progressive dislocation of the Japanese military, industrial, and economic system and to undermine the morale of the Japanese people to the point where their capacity and will to wage war is decisively weakened."

The first phase of direct bombing attacks on Japan-November 1944 to March 1945-was against targets whose destruction could be expected to weaken their capabilities to resist an amphibious assault. These attacks, made almost exclusively against aircraft factories, caused severe damage and forced a wide-scale dispersal program which further curtailed production.

The final phase of air attacks began an March 9, 1945 with low-level incendiary attacks against the principal Japanese industrial cities. In ten days, four of Japan's principal industrial centers were attacked and 32 square miles of their most important war industry destroyed. By August 15, the B-29s had bombed 66 major manufacturing centers, destroying 180 square miles of urban industrial area containing 600 war factories.

Physical damage to plant installations by air attacks reduced the productive capacity of Army ordnance plants 30 per cent; Naval ordnance, 28 per cent; merchant and naval shipyards, 15 per cent, and chemicals, 10 per cent. Air attacks destroyed 470,000 barrels of oil, 2 billion square yards of cloth, 2,510,000 dwelling units, 25 per cent of the emergency rice stocks, reduced fish consumption 35 per cent, and the overall caloric intake to 1,680 per capita.

The economic disintergration begun by the blockage was finished by the bombers. In the final analysis, however, the influence of the bomber offensive on Japan was not solely dependent upon the volume of arms denied the military forces. The air offensive was the major factor determining the time of Japan's surrender.

Japan could have been invaded and defeated without strategic bombing, but it would have been a costly operation. Victory was actually gained earlier and much cheaper than it could have been without the heavy air attacks. The bomber offensive against Japan not only destroyed their industrial capacity to wage war but it also destroyed the will of the people to continue the war. The heavy bomber brought the war home to the Japanese with a decisiveness that the man in the street could not fail to understand.

In Germany, the morale of the people had deteriorated under air attacks. By 1944 three-fourths of the people in Germany regarded the war as lost. The unchecked passage of fleets of Allied planes overhead produced a great conviction of Allied superiority.

The effects of air attacks on the morale of the Japanese people were more pronounced. A striking aspect of this was the pervasiveness with which its impact blanketed the entire island. Roughly onequarter of all the people in cities fled or were evacuated. These refugees, estimated at 8,500,000, helped to spread discouragement and dissatisfaction for the war throughout the homeland.

Just prior to surrender, 68 per cent of the Japanese people believed that Japan could not win the war. Over one-half of these attributed the principal cause to air attacks other than the atomic bombings. The atomic bombs, aside from the physical destruction caused, produced uncontrolled terror and horror on the people of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The effect on the Japanese populace however, was more restricted because of the lack of communications and understanding. One of the important factors inducing Japan's leaders to accept unconditional surrender was the realization that the armed forces could not protect the people from destruction by air attacks.

The unconditional surrender of Japan two and one-half months before the scheduled land invasion was an historic achievement. The effects of air power on the morale of the Japanese people end their industrial capacity indicates that the capabilities and potentialities of heavy bombardment had not been fully recognized and had not been given adequate weight in the conduct of the war against Japan. In fact, in Japanese state papers that as Few as 1,000 planes, equal in performance to the Japanese and stationed in the Philippines before the war, could have dissuaded the Japanese from attacking the United States.

In the Pacific and in Europe, control of the air was essential for the success of every major military operation. The significance of full control of the air must be emphasized. Evidence shows that no country can live long under the full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons. It is important to fully grasp the fact that enemy planes enjoying control of the sky overhead can be as disastrous to one's country as its occupation by physical invasion.

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