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Matterhorn Missions

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Dubbed Matterhorn, the plan called for B29s stationed in India to attack Japan from staging facilities in China, the closest base area to Japan then under Allied control. Matterhorn missions, scheduled to begin in the spring of 1944, would weaken Japan's war-making capability by striking vital industrial targets. Also, by inflicting punishment on the Japanese homeland, the B-29 raids would signal the ultimate triumph of the Allies. In this respect, Matterhorn missions would hopefully shore up the flagging morale of the Chinese Nationalist forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which many feared might soon collapse because of war weariness.

From the outset, the joint Logistics Committee of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff Planners of the JCS, and Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, commander of the China-based U.S. Fourteenth Air Force, argued that Matterhorn was logistically unfeasible. The operation called for a massive commitment of a new bomber in a theater - the ChinaBurma-India Theater (CBI) - that had a comparatively low priority in the Allied war effort, possessed excessively long supply lines, and had been pushed to the limit to meet its existing logistical requirements.

Calcutta, India, the theater's principal port, was choked with materiel slated for other Allied operations. Airfields to accommodate the B-29s would have to be built in India and China at a time when Allied service units were straining to complete a number of difficult construction projects, including the building of roads, docks, and bridges and the laying of pipelines. And the only supply line from India to China, the 1,200-mile "Hump" air route across the Himalayan Mountains, was already overtaxed by the demands of the Allied air and ground units that were fighting the Japanese in eastern China.

To minimize the B-29s' impact on the CBI's resources, Matterhorn was to be completely self-sustaining. Relying mostly on local labor, special airfields for the B-29s would be constructed in India and China. In addition, the XX Bomber Command, the AAF headquarters charged with carrying out Matterhorn, would be responsible for meeting all of its supply needs in India and for transporting its fuel, bombs, spare parts, and ammunition over the "Hump."

Despite the concerns of skeptics, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt saw Matterhorn as an opportunity to do something for Chinese morale, while General Henry "Hap" Arnold, AAF commander, viewed it as a way to further his dream of autonomous strategic air power. Contending that Matterhorn was "bold but entirely feasible," they won the support of Chiang and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Sextant Conference, held at Cairo, Egypt, in the fall of 1943. Combined Chiefs of Staff and JCS approval quickly followed.

Matterhorn began with the construction phase. In the case of India, the planners in the XX Bomber Command decided it would be most profitable to bring existing airfields and those being built up to B-29 specifications. Southern Bengal, because of its position vis-avis China with relative security from Japanese air attack, the port facilities at Calcutta, and good rail and road communications, was chosen as the base area. Eventually, the planners settled on the airfields located in the flatlands west of Calcutta at Dudhkundi, Piardoba, Kharagpur, Chakulia, and Kalaikunda, the latter to serve as a transport base. All had concrete runways, 6,000 feet long, that could be lengthened and strengthened to handle B-29s, which required runways of 8,500 feet capable of supporting 70 tons. When construction lagged, the airfield at Charra, which had handled Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers, was temporarily used for Matterhorn by extending its 6,000-foot runway with two 900 foot mats.

The first large part of the Indian bases to be completed was a pipeline system to carry gasoline to the airfields from a tanker terminal at Budge-Budge on the Hooghly River. It consisted of a six-inch pipeline strung 100 miles to Dudhkundi, four-inch pipelines running from Dudhkundi to the other airfields, and internal lines and storage tanks at each base. Four petroleum distribution companies began work on the system on January 15, and two months later they had gasoline flowing to the three airfields that were almost ready to receive the B29s. Later they finished the whole system.

Through the spring of 1944, work went ahead on the airfields on a schedule that was far in arrears of early plans. Chakulia and Kharagpur were the first to be operational, and by June 30 four airfields were ready, although all were not completed until September. By using the airfield at Charra, known to the Americans as "Hell's Half Acre" because of its sloping runway and intense heat, the XX Bomber Command was able to receive and house the initial combat groups as they arrived in their B-29s in April and May. The total cost of the five airfields was $20 million.

The forward bases for Matterhorn were placed near Chengtu, China, in Szechwan Province, about 200 miles northwest of Chungking, the Nationalist capital, and 1,900 miles from southern Japan. At this distance they were barely within the B-29's maximum range. While the Americans had bases in China closer to Japan, Chengtu was selected because of its greater security from Japanese air and ground attacks. In early 1944 it was decided, on the basis of the availability of materials and labor and the minimal amount of interference with the local irrigation system, that the Chengtu bomber airfields would be situated at Hsinching, Kiunglai, Kwanghan, and Pengshan. To protect them from Japanese air raids, five fighter airfields would also be constructed in the Chengtu area.

Notwithstanding the immense cost of the Chengtu airfields for the United States, many Chinese suffered financially. Landowners whose property was taken for the airfields had to sell at government prices and accept in payment currency that was rapidly depreciating in value because of inflation. Workers were paid about 25 Chinese dollars a day (nine cents in American money), barely enough for food. Many would have died of starvation if their families had not provided them additional food. In all likelihood a substantial sum of money that should have gone to landowners and workers ended up in the pockets of corrupt Chinese Nationalist officials. Americans were fearful these conditions would spark serious riots, but in general there were few disorders.

Transporting men and supplies from the United States to India for Matterhorn was a perplexing challenge. Matterhorn had the highest priority of any undertaking in the CBI in the last half of 1944. But the movement of men and supplies was handicapped by the long distance from the United States to India; the low priority accorded to the CBI in the allotment of Allied shipping; the high command's insistence on an early commitment of the B-29s, which left little time for readjusting the existing transportation schedules; and the requirement that Matterhorn not interfere materially with other projects in the CBI.

Most of the highest priority passengers and freight were to go to India by Air Transport Command (ATC) planes via Natal in Brazil, Khartoum in the Sudan, and Karachi in India, a trip that took six days with luck. Otherwise, most units and supplies were to be shipped by sea. For this purpose, the CCS assigned 20,000 troop spaces and 200,000 tons of cargo space to Matterhorn in the first six months of 1944, and at least 20,000 tons of tanker capacity per month beginning in April.

By Christmas 1943 shipping had been earmarked for all troops and supplies projected for Matterhorn through July 1944, although it was necessary to juggle shipping schedules at some expense to the movement of men and supplies for other CBI projects. Most of the troop transports sailed before the end of February 1944.

Some units went eastward across the Atlantic Ocean in convoys to North Africa, then were transported in British vessels across the Mediterranean Sea and through the Suez Canal to Bombay, India, and finally carried to Bengal by train. Other troops and most of the supplies went westward across the Pacific Ocean and around Australia, with the cargo ships going to Calcutta and the troop transports to Bombay because Calcutta was already overburdened and inefficiently operated. It took most units eight to 10 weeks to get from their American embarkation ports to their Bengal stations. Despite the lengthy trip, almost 22,000 men were on hand in the CBI for Matterhorn by May.

The overseas movement of the B-29s was to begin on March 10, 1944. Under the plan, 150 B-29s of the 58th Bomb Wing would leave the United States in daily increments of nine or 10 planes. A five-day trip covering 11,530 miles was scheduled by way of Salina, Kansas, to Gander Lake, Newfoundland (2,580 miles); Gander Lake to Marrakesh, Morocco (2,700 miles); Marrakesh to Cairo (2,350 miles); Cairo to Karachi (2,400 miles); and Karachi to Calcutta (1,500 miles). If everything went well, all of the bombers would be at their stations in India by March 31.

The schedule was too optimistic. The problems involved in getting a new type of aircraft prepared for combat in a theater halfway around the world, especially since many of the maintenance groups had already started their own trip to India, were too great for the planes to be ready on time. As a result, when Arnold arrived at Salina on March 9 and asked how many B-29s would leave the next day, he was told none. Immediately, he issued a flurry of orders to ensure that all 150 B-29s would be on their way by April 15, and during the next month the so-called "Battle of Kansas" went into overdrive as the crews and civilian workers battled time, fatigue, confusion, and cold weather to meet Arnold's deadline.

On March 26, the first contingent of B-29s left Salina; it reached India on April 2. Others soon followed, and by April 15 a total of 32 B29s had arrived at their stations. A week later, the loss of several planes to accidents along the way prompted the AAF to ground all B-29s that were en route until the accidents could be investigated. After it was determined that most of them occurred due to engine failure, some of which could be attributed to the penchant of the R-3350 to overheat in hot weather, flights resumed on April 29 and thereafter proceeded more rapidly. Over the next months modifications were made to the R-3350 to correct the overheating problem, but they were only partially successful. Meanwhile, by the second week of May, all but nine of the original 150 B-29s were either on hand in India or momentarily expected. Through the rest of 1944 and early 1945, 255 additional B-29s were dispatched to India, so that by the end of March 1945, when Matterhorn was closed down, 405 B-29s had been committed to the operation.

The defense of the airfields in India was a minor concern. They were situated at the extreme range of Japanese bombers, and the U.S. Tenth Air Force and the Royal Air Force had sufficient fighter strength to provide adequate protection. The Chengtu airfields were more vulnerable to Japanese air attack, and the Matterhorn plan called for 150 fighters to be assigned to their defense. Because the Fourteenth Air Force was already short of fighters, the CCS transferred two Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighter groups from Italy to China and reequipped them with Republic P-47 Thunderbolt fighters that had to come from the United States. By ordinary surface shipment, the P-47s would not reach India until May, so at the AAF's request, the U.S. Navy diverted two escort carriers from the Atlantic-Mediterranean run to transport 100 P-47s from the Mediterranean to India, tying up the carriers for two and a half months. Another 50 went by regular transport.

The delayed departure of the fighter groups from Italy because of the exigencies of the Anzio operation, the time to transport the P47s to India, and the need for several weeks of transitional training for the pilots slowed the final deployment of the fighter groups until the middle of July. Their late arrival did not create any significant difficulty, however, for Japanese air attacks against Chengtu were less intensive than expected.

No logistical aspect of Matterhorn was more exasperating than the transport of gasoline and supplies from India to Chengtu. Everything that was sent to China had to be flown over the "Hump." Because the ATC was already straining to ferry its monthly quota of 10,000 tons to China for other CBI projects, Matterhorn had been planned to be self-supporting. Using its own transports flying from Assam and its B29s flying from Calcutta, the XX Bomber Command would carry all of its own cargo to China. For this purpose, 20 of the precious B29s were stripped of their armament except for the tail guns and converted into tankers to fly in the dearly needed fuel. The remaining B-29s were used to haul other supplies.

In flying the "Hump" route, AAF crews had to deal with some of the most difficult flying conditions that any airmen confronted during World War II. To get over the "Hump" the planes had to climb to an altitude of 25,000 feet, the highest air transport route in the world, and then contend with the fierce weather conditions of the Himalayan region, including below-zero temperatures that would often ice their wings, violent updrafts and downdrafts that could cause a sudden loss of control, snowstorms, and dense cloud formations.

The "Hump" flights exacted a heavy toll in crashed planes and men killed. During the early months of 1944, the XX Bomber Command lost 12 B-29s and six C-46s that had been assigned to it by the ATC. Despite the dangers, the combat planes and transports continued to carry the XX Bomber Command's fuel and supplies to China. In May, they airlifted 1,950 tons, two-thirds carried by C-46s. As the weeks passed, the total improved, and in July the XX Bomber Command set a record for monthly deliveries with a lift of 3,000 tons. By the end of 1944, the B-29s had flown more than 1,400 transport trips over the Himalayas, and because of the hazards, their crews were given mission credit for each sortie.

The transport of fuel and supplies to Chengtu was a costly and time-consuming operation. Depending on weather, at its worst the B-29 burned 12 gallons of gasoline to transport one gallon to Chengtu; at its best, the ratio was two to one. Moreover, it took seven trips back and forth across the "Hump" for a B-29 to move enough fuel to the Chinese staging bases for one B-29 to participate in one mission against Japan.

Each B-29 required 7,000 gallons of gasoline to fly from Chengtu to Japan, and by June 1944 the XX Bomber Command had ferried enough gasoline and supplies across the "Hump" to carry out a combat mission against Japan. Following a practice run mounted from India on June 5 against railway shops at Bangkok, Thailand, the B-29s struck the steel works at Yawata on the northern coast of Kyushu Island on June 15. The mission consumed so much fuel, however, that during the next six weeks the XX Bomber Command could fly only one relatively insignificant mission out of Chengtu.

Even though a record total of 3,000 tons of fuel was airlifted to China during July, a severe shortage of fuel continued to plague the Chengtu-based missions. As a result, in July the XX Bomber Command was able to launch only 115 combat sorties, less than half of the effort it was expected to make.

The Matterhorn raids continued into the first three months of 1945. Altogether 49 missions were flown against targets in Japan, China, Formosa, and Southeast Asia. The missions staged out of Chengtu, however, represented only a minimum effort. Even with the aid of the ATC, the XX Bomber Command could not bring enough fuel and supplies to China to enable the Superfortresses to be effective. A typical longrange mission against Japan took four days - one day to fly from India to China, one day in China to get organized, one day to fly the mission, one day to return to India. Counting the days required to get fuel and supplies to China, this meant that the XX Bomber Command could fly at most only one combat mission a week. At this rate Matterhorn was unprofitable.

Disappointed by these results, Arnold relieved Wolfe in July 1944, leaving Brig. Gen. LaVerne Saunders in temporary command of the XX Bomber Command until LeMay arrived in late August as Wolfe's replacement. LeMay had orders to produce results, but his hard-driving leadership made little difference. "Up to October 1," he recalled, "35 percent of our total B-29 flying time was consumed in cargo operations to the Chengtu area," wearing down the B-29s and restricting the flight time that could be devoted to combat and training missions.

At the same time, Matterhorn was proving to be a tremendous logistical drain on other operations in the CBI. From February to October 1944, the ATC had to fly 17,931 tons over the "Hump" for the XX Bomber Command, seriously cutting into the operations of the Fourteenth Air Force and Chinese forces. Both had their hands full attempting to contain Ichigo, a major Japanese offensive in eastern China, and there was not enough fuel and supplies arriving in China to support to contain Ichigo and support the B-29s.

While the XX Bomber Command was struggling with its logistics, American forces captured the Marianas chain in the summer of 1944 and quickly transformed it into a major base for a massive B-29 assault against Japan. There no longer seemed any reason to continue Matterhorn in light of its logistical problems. Matterhorn raids against targets in Southeast Asia were carried out until the end of March 1945, but beginning in February, the XX Bomber Command's units were gradually withdrawn from the CBI and sent to the Marianas. By May 1945, the last of the B-29s were out of the CBI.

Matterhorn had no significant impact on the defeat of Japan. Only 10 of its 49 missions were actually carried out against targets that fit into its original conception, and their meager results did little to justify the cost. Matterhorn may have contributed to the Chinese will to resist the Japanese, although at best this result was fleeting.

Besides failing to meet its objectives, Matterhorn created severe logistical complications for the CBI that were more than the theater could handle. Matterhorn competed with the Fourteenth Air Force and Chinese forces for the limited capacity of the "Hump" airlift; absorbed a goodly portion of the shipping space allotted to the theater; increased congestion at the port of Calcutta; diverted service troops and supplies from other CBI projects; and, through the expenditure of large sums of money to build the airfields at Chengtu, accelerated the destructive inflationary spiral of the Chinese currency that was already sapping the support Chiang could command from the Chinese people. Despite a tremendous investment of transport, men, equipment, and supplies, Matterhorn, as LeMay later put it, was doomed by its "utterly absurd" logistical foundation.

John Kennedy Ohl teaches history at Mesa Community College in Mesa, Arizona. He has contributed to numerous journals and magazines and published three books. Operation Matterhorn. WWII History. November 2006.

Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII In World War II, the United States mounted a military effort of unprecedented magnitude and complexity. With more than 11 million soldiers to be armed, fed, clothed, and transported, logistics - including the design, procurement, distribution, and movements of supplies and the transportation of troops - became big business. General Brehon B. Somervell, a brilliant military-industrial manager, led the army's wartime logistical operation. Sometimes criticized as a big spender, he understood well the decisive role of superior material and mobility. As America's chief wartime logistician, he demanded ample supplies for the troops, at the right place at the right time. A graduate of West Point, Somervell served his country in both the military and civilian arenas. As head of the Works Progress Administration in New York City, he won recognition for his effective management; later, he helped prepare the nation for war by building training camps and munitions plants. At the height of his career, as head of the War Department Services of Supply - known later as the Army Service Forces - Somervell was responsible for the supply and administration of the army within the United States and the support of troops overseas. He also was the War Department's principal logistical advisor and troubleshooter. In these ways, Somervell played a vital role in the mobilization of forces and powerfully influenced the United States' conduct of the war. In this much-needed biography, Ohl illuminates the centrality of logistics in the Allied path to victory over the Axis powers and also shows how the interaction of military, political, and business leaders during the war helped to shape national policy. Ohl baseshis study on exhaustive research in the National Archives, on manuscript collections, and on oral histories and interviews. Supplying the Troops will appeal especially to those interested in military logistics and history, economic history, and the World War II era.

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