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Incendiary Bombs

We had been using a Napalm-filled 100 lb. incendiary bomb since the early part of the war, but our first indication that another use for the agent was contemplated came with an unannounced truck convoy carrying 40,000 gallons of the stuff in 55-gallon drums.

Shortly afterward, we received a direction from Second Division Chemical Section HQ to try to develop a means of transferring the material, a gelled gasoline of about the consistency of Jello, with whatever equipment and facilities that were available to us on station. A demonstration meeting was scheduled a couple of weeks later at one of the installations, I forget where, to evaluate the resultant methods and decide on one for 8th AF SOP.

The Chemical Munitions section of our 806th Cml. Co. AO came up with a means of using the standard refueling pump, which was available in some quantities in each squadron supply, by modifying it with a very short intake pipe and a high pressure setting. The only problem was the high risk involved, since the gasoline-driven engine and pump had to be positioned directly over and in contact with the drum of highly inflammable napalm. The engines were, however, equipped with spark arresters, and to our knowledge never were the source of an accidental fire. This transfer method was adopted, and we conducted instruction seminars in its use at Shipdham for the entire 8th AF.

Napalm Napalm is a flammable, gasoline-based weapon invented in 1942. The name is a portmanteau word for naphthenic palmitic acids. It was developed during World War II by the United States. During World War I both the Allies and Germany used gasoline as a weapon in flamethrowers, but gasoline burns itself too quickly to be an effective incendiary device. A substance was needed which would produce a powerful and persistent fuel but would not consume itself too quickly. In 1942, researchers at Harvard University (led by Dr. Louis Fieser) and the U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Service found a rubber-less solution: mixing an aluminum soap powder of naphthalene and palmitate (naphthenic acid and palmitic acid, sodium palmitrate) with gasoline. This produced a substance which was highly flammable, yet slow burning. In World War II, incendiary bombs using napalm as their fuel were used against the German city of Dresden and during the firebombings of Japan.

Since napalm had not, at that time, been previously dropped from heavy bombers, Group Armament, with the assiatance of Group Ordnance and our Chemical Company, were asked to develop an operational system that would work. The Armament section of the 44th BG, headed by a seargeant whose name escapes me, first tried using the standard 400-gallon bay tanks, fitted with cable slings attached to the bomb racks, as droppable containers. Our Cml. section filled two of these tanks in place in the bay of a B-24 for a drop test over the Wash. The drop was not successful, the tanks becoming lodged in the bay opening, and the aircraft returned to the base and circled while all of us involved tried to determine if the plane could land safely. It was a close thing, but the plane did land after some anguished moments without the tanks jarring loose and exploding on contact with the ruwvay - an eventuality which was quite possible. This method was, of course, discarded.

After some experimentation it was determined to use 100-gallon paper mache wing tanks, positioned on the bay bomb racks much the same as a 1000 lb. GP bomb. As I recall, two on each side of the rack. One of the problems attendant with this system was the fact that filling procedure was limited to not more than a few hours prior to mission because these tanks soon became soaked through, flabby and unsafe to use. This necessitated a plan for filling a great number of tanks in a very short time on each station. Again, our 806th Cml. Munitions Section devised a plan, including the use of additional personnel recruited from Group Armament and Ordnance, for accomplishing the task in the few hours allotted us. Once again this plan was adopted and sent out as SOP for 8th AF.

Another problem connected with this sort of droppable container was the method of ignition on impact. This was accomplished by using a standard white phosphorous grenade set in the well of the tank, and fitted with a British All-Ways fuse in place of the usual spring-loaded detonator. Since these versatile little fuses were armed immediately upon the withdrawal of the arming wire and exploded upon an impact from any direction, it was necessary to devise an extremely long arming wire to unsure that the tanks were well clear of the bay before withdrawel. This was done by winding standard arming wire from a spool around a spindle attached to a breast drill. This formed a coil spring of the proper length, which was encased in a fuse can with the ends of the coil protruding from either end of the can through the holes punched in the top and bottom of the can. This encasing of the extremely long wire was a must to prevent tangling, and worked like a charm.

If my memory serves me well, I believe the load order came through about noon of the day preceding the mission. Things went quite smoothly in filling the wing tanks at the bomb dump and transporting them to the aircraft. It was perhaps midnight or shortly after when loading was completed, and an hour or so later before final checks on each load were made.

As a security measure to ensure ignition on a target, a percentage – I seem to remember it being 10% - of the aircraft on the mission were loaded with 500 lb. GP bombs. Only two Divisions carried napalm, the 2nd and 3rd. I am not sure if the 1st Division took part in the operation at all.

Many missions had been flown against this fortification on the point overlooking and dominating the port of Brest. All types of HE, including armor-piercing ordnance, had been used with no apparent success in dislodging the German occupants. Word was, that after this saturation raid using napalm, the Free French were able to walk in and occupy the fortification without firing a shot.

Edward L. Squires (44th). The 8th AF's Unique Use of Napalm. The Journal 2nd Air Division. Volume 43 Number 2, Summer 2004.

14-15 February 1945 Bombings Of Dresden

The reasons for and the nature and consequences of the bombing of Dresden, Germany, by Allied air forces on 14-15 February 1945 have repeatedly been the subject of official and semi-official inquiries and of rumor and exaggeration by uninformed or inadequately informed persons. Moreover, the Communists have with increasing frequency and by means of distortion and falsification used the February 1945 Allied bombings of Dresden as a basis for disseminating anti-Western and anti-American propaganda. From time to time there appears in letters of inquiry to the United States Air Force evidence that American nationals are themselves being taken in by the Communist propaganda line concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden.

At the outbreak of World War II, Dresden was the seventh largest city in Germany proper. With a population of 642,143 in 1939, Dresden was exceeded in size only by Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Leipzig, and Essen, in that order. Situated 71 miles E.S.E. from Leipzig and 111 miles S. of Berlin, by rail, Dresden was one of the greatest commercial and transportation centers of Germany and the historic capital of the important and populous state of Saxony. It was, however, because of its geographical location and topography and as a primary communications center that Dresden assumed major significance as a military target in February 1945, as the Allied ground forces moved eastward to crush the Germans into final defeat.

Specific military installations in Dresden in February 1945 included barracks and hutted camps and at least one munitions storage depot. Dresden was protected by antiaircraft defenses, antiaircraft guns and searchlights, in anticipation of Allied air raids against the city. The Dresden air defenses were under the Combined Dresden (Corps Area IV) and Berlin (Corps Area III) Luftwaffe Administration Commands.

On 8 February 1945 SHAEF (Air) informed the RAF Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces that Dresden was among a number of targets that had been selected for bombing because of their importance in relation to the movements of military forces to the Eastern Front. This action, based upon the authoritative recommendation of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, SHAEF (Air), and in turn based upon the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was in keeping with the procedural structure and authority set up in SHAEF for the conduct of aerial operations by Allied forces.

The American Eighth Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command together employed a total of 1299 bomber aircraft (527 from the Eighth Air Force, 722 from the RAF Bomber Command) for a total weight, on targets, of 3906.9 tons. Of this tonnage, 1247.6 tons were expanded by the Eighth Air Force, 2659.3 tons by the RAF Bomber Command. The Americans employed 953.3 tons of high explosive bombs and 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs--all aimed at the Dresden Marshalling Yards. The British employed 1477.7 tons of high explosive bombs and 1181.6 tons of incendiary bombs--all aimed against the Dresden city area. The American aircraft used H2X (radar) bombing method, with visual assists, and the British used the marker and visual method.

Dresden became a military target and of overriding importance as a primary communications center in the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex; as an important industrial and manufacturing center directly associated with the production of aircraft components and other military items, including poison gas, anti-aircraft and field guns, and small guns; and as an area containing specific military installations. The night raid by the RAF Bomber Command was intended to devastate the city area itself and thereby choke communications within the city and disrupt the normal civilian life upon which the larger communications activities and the manufacturing enterprises of the city depended. Further, the widespread area raid conducted by the British entailed bombing strikes against the many industrial plants throughout the city which were thus to be construed as specific targets within the larger pattern of the area raid. The Eighth Air Force raids, which were by daylight and followed, on the 14th and 15th February, the night raid of the British (13/14 February), were directed against rail activities in the city.

The RAF Bomber Command’s are raid on Dresden, conducted on the night of 13/14 February 1945, resulted in fires that did great damage to the city proper, particularly in the older and more densely built up areas. Early official Allied post-strike reports estimated that 85 per cent of the fully built-up city area was destroyed, that the old part of the city, which comprised the greater portion of the built-up areas was largely wiped out, that the majority of buildings in the inner suburbs was gutted, and that in the outer suburbs, few buildings were effected by the area bombing attack. Virtually all major public buildings appeared heavily gutted or severely damaged. Public utilities, and facilities such as slaughter houses, warehouses, and distribution centers, were severely affected. A very large number of the city’s industrial facilities were destroyed or severely damaged, with perhaps a four-fifth’s reduction in the productive capacity of the arms plants. Later British assessments, which were more conservative, concluded that 23 per cent of the city’s industrial buildings were seriously damaged and that 56 per cent of the non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings) had been heavily damaged. Of the total number of dwelling units in the city proper, 78,000 were regarded as demolished, 27,70 temporarily uninhabitable but ultimately repairable, and 64,500 readily repairable from minor damage. This later assessment indicated that 80 per cent of the city’s housing units had undergone some degree of damage and that 50 per cent of the dwellings had been demolished or seriously damaged.

The Eighth Air Force raids against the city’s railway facilities on 14 and 15 February resulted in severe and extensive damage that entirely paralyzed communications. The city’s passenger terminals and major freight stations, warehouses, and storage sheds were, when not totally destroyed, so severely damaged that they were unusable. Roundhouses, railway repair and work shops, coal stations, and other operating facilities, were destroyed, gutted, or severely damaged. The railway bridges over the Elbe river--vital to incoming and outgoing traffic--were rendered unusable and remained closed to traffic for many weeks after the raids.

Casualties among the Dresden populace were inevitably very heavy in consequence of the fires that swept over the city following the RAF area raid on the night of 13/14 February. In addition to its normal population, the city had experienced a heavy influx of refugees from the east and of evacuees from bombings in other areas, particularly from Berlin. The exact number of casualties from the Dresden bombings can never be firmly established. Contemporary British estimates were that from 8,200 to 16,400 persons were killed and that similar numbers of persons may have been seriously injured. Most of the latest German post-war estimates are that about 25,000 persons were killed and about 30,000 were wounded, virtually all of these being casualties from the RAF incendiary attack of 13/14 February. Although the latest available post-war accounts play up the “terroristic” aspects of the Dresden bombings, it is significant that they accept much lower casualty figures than those circulated by the Germans immediately after the raids and, from time to time, in the years immediately following the war. The most distorted account of the Dresden bombings--one that may have become the basis of Communist propaganda against the Allies, particularly against the Americans, in recent years--was prepared by two former German general officers for the Historical Division, European Command (U.S.A.) in 1948. In this account, the number of dead from the Dresden bombings was declared to be 250,000. That this figure may be the probable number of dead, multiplied by ten for the sake of exaggeration, becomes apparent by comparing the weight of the Dresden bombings of 14-15 February 1945 with the total tonnages expanded by the Allies against the six other largest German cities and by comparing the various estimates of the Dresden casualties with the best estimate of the total casualties suffered by the Germans from all Allied bombings during World War II.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that 305,000 persons were killed and 780,000 were wounded as the consequence of all Allied bombings against Germany in World War II, from a total Allied bomb expenditure of 3,697,473.59 It may therefore be presumed that the estimates of 25,000 dead and 30,000 wounded, as presented in most of the latest available German estimates of the Dresden bombings, are reasonable and acceptable.

Despite the lack of accurate statistics on the number of killed and wounded in the Dresden raid, as well as in other Allied bombings of German cities, it would appear from such estimates as are available that the casualties suffered in the Dresden bombings were not disproportionate to those suffered in area attacks on other German cities. The reports of the United States Bombing Survey give specific estimates of the dead for only four of the German cities which were subject to fire raids during area attacks.

Dresden Tuesday, February 13, 1945, Taylor. For decades it has been assumed that the Allied bombing of Dresden was a militarily unjustifiable act of retribution. But now, this completely new examination reveals that Dresden was a highly militarized city actively involved in the production of military armaments and communications. Incorporating firsthand accounts, contemporaneous press material and memoirs, and never-before-seen government records, this book proves unequivocally the very real military threat Dresden posed - and how a legacy of propaganda shrouded the truth for sixty years. "Genius… an absolutely magnificent work both of scholarship and of narration." - The Literary Review.

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