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Blue-Water Small Craft

Naval warfare takes place on the high seas (blue water navy). Usually, only large, powerful nations have competent blue water or deep water navies. In other wars, small craft (motor torpedo boats) fought near shore. MTBs were designed for high speed and manoeuvrability on the water to get close enough to launch their torpedoes at enemy vessels. With next to no armour, the boats relied upon their agility at high speed to avoid being hit by gunfire from bigger ships.

Beginning in 1961, U.S. and American trained South Vietnamese Navy commandos carried out raids and delivered agents into North Vietnam. The commandos initially employed motorized junks. While these craft had the advantage of being able to hide among the thousands of junks that plied Vietnam coastal waters, they were slow and vulnerable.

In an effort to provide more capability to the commandos, on October 6, 1962, the Department of Defense directed the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral David McDonald, to provide any suitable craft that could be used in South Vietnam. The PTF 1 and PTF 2 were reactivated; their Packard engines were overhauled and quieting features were provided. The PTFs were armed with single 40-mm cannon forward and aft and two twin 20mm cannon. No torpedo gear was fitted. A Navy press release noted that the PTFs ". . . will be used for special operations with the Navy's Sea-AirLand Teams."

The Sea-Air-Land Teams, better known as SEAL teams, are Navy units trained to conduct unconventional paramilitary operations and to train personnel of allied nations in these techniques. After being used in the United States to train SEALs, these first two PTFs were shipped to the U.S. base at Da Nang, South Vietnam. U.S. Navy crews operated the PTFs under the control of Special Operations Group (later Studies and Operations Group) 34. This unit, with headquarters in Saigon, was under the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the principal U.S. command in South Vietnam. The maritime operations of SOG 34 had the code name 34A.

More fast patrol boats were needed to expand 34A operations. The decision was made to acquire Norwegian-built "Nasty" torpedo boats. The Norwegian design was considered one of the most advanced craft available, and while the Norwegian Navy had a long and successful history of operating with the U.S. Navy.

The Nasty design had been developed as a private-venture MTB by the firm Norwegian Boat Services (Batservice Verft) and built in 1958. The Norwegian Navy adopted the design for series production, with the first boat, the Tjeld, being commissioned in June 1960.

The Nastys were built of double-layer mahogany sandwiching a layer of fiberglass, with laminated ash and oak for her keel and frames. They were just over 80 feet in length and were driven by two British-produced, Napier-Deltic diesel engines, and could drive the boats at about 45 knots. They were designed to carry four 21-inch torpedo tubes in addition to two 40-mm guns. Two 20-mm mounts were also installed. With the deletion of the torpedoes they could carry more personnel, rubber raiding craft, and other equipment.

The Navy installed PTF armament and electronic equipment in the United States, and all were shipped to South Vietnam. Upon arrival "in country," U.S. Navy small boat specialists and SEALs additionally fitted 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and 57-mm recoilless rifles to the boats. For a brief period flame throwers were tested on the craft. Later virtually all PTFs were fitted with a tandem-mounted .50-caliber machine gun/81-mm mortar, which proved to be a particularly effective weapon. All PTFs would be capable of carrying torpedo launch racks and mines, but none of these weapons were ever fitted.

Under the tutelage of the U.S. Navy, South Vietnamese naval commandos accelerated their 34A operations. The first large-scale raid began on the night of July 30, 1964, when six boats were available. That night the PTFs 2, 3, 5, and 6 departed Da Nang to assault the North Vietnamese offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. Just after midnight on July 31 the PTF 3 and PTF 6 closed with Hon Me to land sabotage teams. Without warning coastal gun batteries opened fire. The PTF 6 was hit and four South Vietnamese were injured.

As the boats began to withdraw, a Chinese-built Swatow torpedo boat approached. The PTFs bombarded shore facilities for several minutes before fleeing southward, outracing the Swatow. The PTF 2 and PTF 5 successfully bombarded facilities on Hon Nieu island, and then raced back to Da Nang.

The 34A operations continued, but with limited success. Meanwwhile, the U.S. Navy had begun the so-called Desoto patrols, cruises by destroyers into the Gulf of Tonkin to carry out electronic surveillance missions. These periodic forays - in international waters - sought out and recorded North Vietnamese radar emissions and radio transmissions. Senior U.S. Navy commanders suggested that the destroyers on Desoto patrols could be employed to coordinate the 34A operations by PTFs. General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. military commander in Vietnam, rejected the proposal, hoping to continue the deniability of U.S. involvement in the 34A operations, which were penetrating the three-mile territorial waters of North Vietnam, and actually putting agents and saboteurs ashore.

The Navy commanders agreed and steps were taken to prevent interference and direct mutual support of the two operations. Thus the scene was set for the night of August 3-4, 1964, when PTFs again attacked two North Vietnamese islands in the Tonkin Gulf. This time the PTFs 1, 2, 5, and 6 bombarded the North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, about 90 miles north of the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.

The PTF 2 had engine problems and turned back. The PTF 1 and 5 closed to the shore and bombarded the radar station before turning south for their base at Danang. The PTF 6 attacked the security station and, although it encountered a Swatow MTB, the PTF was easily able to escape back south.

Meanwhile, the U.S. destroyer Maddox had commenced a Desoto patrol on July 31. On the morning of August 4, shortly after the South Viet namese PTF attack, the Maddox steamed into the northern end of the gulf. The Maddox was passing off the coast of Hon Me Island, 30 miles south of the North Vietnamese MTB base at Loc Chao, which South Vietnamese commandos had raided the night before, when the destroyer's radar detected the approach of three unidentified high-speed craft, obviously North Vietnamese MTBs. The North Vietnamese craft were sent out to attack the destroyer in the belief that she was directly supporting the PTF operation.

The onrushing MTBs headed straight for the Maddox. Three 5-inch rounds fired by the Maddox failed to deter them. At a range of nearly 3 miles, two of the Communist boats each launched an 18-inch torpedo; both missed the Maddox, which was taking evasive action. The MTBs continued the attack, launching all six of their torpedoes. The U.S. destroyer returned the fire and reported that one North Vietnamese MTB was hit.

While this engagement was in progress, four F-8E Crusader fighters, launched earlier from the U.S. aircraft carrier Ticonderoga on a training mission, were vectored to the area. Upon establishing contact with the Maddox and the embarked destroyer division commander, the Crusaders were ordered to attack the torpedo boats as they retired to the North. Armed with 20-mm cannon and Zuni unguided rockets, the fighters swung in over the North Vietnamese craft and made several attacks. The fliers reported that they had sunk a torpedo boat. Approximately three hours had passed from the initial contact by the Maddox's radar to the retirement of the American destroyer. U.S. estimates were that one MTB was sunk and two others heavily damaged. (Of the three Soviet-built P-4 MTBs that made the attack on the Maddox, the T-333, the command unit, was undamaged; the T-336 was slightly damaged with her commander killed; and the T-339 was damaged and dead in the water with her engines stopped but later restarted. The two damaged boats were beached to prevent sinking; all were repaired and returned to service.)

By presidential order, the Maddox was joined by the destroyer Turner Joy. The carrier Constellation was routed to the Tonkin Gulf while planes from Ticonderoga maintained a daylight watch; during the night, the destroyers would retire to about 100 miles offshore to reduce the danger of night torpedo-boat attack. But on the night of August 4-5 the Maddox picked up five high-speed radar contacts, again identified as North Vietnamese torpedo boats. In the bad weather that covered the area, the U.S. destroyers never had visual contact with enemy PT-boats. There were radar contacts and then sonar contacts that were identified as torpedoes in the water.

The Ticonderoga launched two A-1 Skyraider attack planes to provide air cover, but by midnight the torpedo boats had vanished from the radar screens. Several hundred rounds of 5-inch and 3-inch ammunition had been fired by the destroyers at unseen assailants. The senior officer embarked in the destroyers urged caution on senior U.S. commanders in Hawaii and Washington: "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonar men may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by the Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken." In reality, there was no North Vietnamese attack on the night of August 4-5; no North Vietnamese MTBs were at sea.

Still, with reports of two unprovoked attacks on American men-of-war in international waters, the time for retaliatory action had come. President Johnson went on television to announce the actions he intended to take. He had planned the American response carefully. Johnson said, "Our response for the present will be limited and fitting.... We will seek no wider war. . . ." His remarks had been in coordination with the ongoing attack half a world away. "That reply is given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations."

An hour before the President spoke the Constellation and Ticonderoga began launching 64 aircraft to strike four North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases. The area of coverage ranged from a small base at Quang Khe, 50 miles north of the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, to the large base at Hon Gay in the north. The carrier planes began attacking their targets about 1 P.M. local time.

The attacking planes had damaged facilities at all four bases and destroyed or damaged an estimated 25 MTBs and gunboats - more than half of the North Vietnamese naval force. The cost was two aircraft shot down and two others damaged, with one pilot dead and one captured.

The Gulf of Tonkin attacks - real and imagined - on the U.S. destroyers and the retaliatory raids against MTB bases became a key entry on the timeline of the Vietnam War. With the escalation of the conflict, the PTF missions into enemy waters continued. Details of their operations are still classified. Five of the boats were sunk in the combat operations, the PTFs 8, 9, 14, 15, and 16, all in 1966. (The veteran PTF 1 was intentionally sunk as a target in 1966 by a U.S. submarine torpedo, while the PTF 2 was sunk as a target by U.S. gunfire.)

Back in the United States additional PTFs were being procured. The John Trumpy yacht yard in Annapolis, Maryland, which had built the prototype PT 811 (and which saw less service than any of the postwar prototypes) built the PTF 17 through PTF 22. Delivered in 1968-1969, the Trumpy PTFs were near-duplicates of the Nasty design, all capable of about 45 knots. Simultaneously, the Stewart Seacraft yard in Berwick, Louisiana, which built offshore oil-rig support craft, produced the PTF 23 through PTF 26. These boats, completed in 1968, had aluminum hulls almost 95 feet long. They were also fitted with Napier-Deltic engines, which drove them at about 40 knots. Their commercial name "Osprey" was often used by the Navy.

A total of 26 PTFs were delivered to the U.S. Navy in the 1960s, primarily for use by commandos and in gunfire attack missions in the Vietnam War. Of those, 2 were former aluminum-hull PT boats, 14 were Nasty-class MTBs built in Norway, 6 were Trumpy-built Nastys, and the final 4 were Seacraft-built boats. Most saw combat.

The political impact of the PTFs was significant - the 34A operations by PTFs in August 1964 led to major U.S. involvement in the Viet nam War; but, unlike their World War II predecessors, the PTFs had virtually no military impact on the war, a conflict that was lost by the United States from both political and military viewpoints. After the Vietnam War, 13 of the U.S. and Norwegian Nastys and the 4 Seacraft Ospreys were assigned to the Naval Reserve Force, the Navy's "weekend warriors." These PTFs were used by the reserves into the late 1970s.

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