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Tactics In Vietnam

Air Cavalry Pilot Figure

In the early years of the war, General William Westmoreland put American troops only in defensive positions in Vietnam. They were to protect aircraft, fuel depots, and fellow soldiers. This was called the enclave or fortress strategy. Chasing the enemy would be left to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

Westmoreland quickly saw that this strategy would not help end the war. ARVN officers were not always competent leaders. They trapped the enemy, only to let them slip away. So the general asked for and received more U.S. troops. Among the thousands of soldiers sent to Vietnam was an entirely new kind of combat unit called the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

The cavalry riding to the rescue has always been a favorite image from the American West. The Army liked the cavalry so much that it did not retire the last horse until after World War II! The 1st Cav, as it was known, combined an old idea with a new one. This 10,000-man unit's strength was mobility - moving quickly from one place to another. But instead of using horses, the Cav moved by air in helicopters that protected troops with machine guns and rockets. The helicopters let them fly into enemy territory, fight a battle, and as quickly fly out again. The chance to test this airborne cavalry came in November 1965 in a misty, jungle-filled area near the Cambodian border. The place was the Ia Drang River valley.

For months, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops had controlled rural central Vietnam. In October 1965, they attacked a Special Forces camp at Plei Me. The 1st Cavalry chased the enemy westward, deep into the valley. Lone U.S. aircraft sent over the valley drew enemy fire, and the pilots relayed enemy positions. Within minutes 1st Cav helicopters filled with troops were in the air. Often outnumbered, the cavalry units relied on surprise to give them an advantage while more troops were flown in. Terrible fighting, some of it hand-to-hand combat, continued night and day. For weeks, enemy troops, spotted from the air, were bombarded or chased and ambushed by U.S. airmobile soldiers.

Cavalry tactics, while effective, were not perfect. Several times, helicopter landing zones or LZs were "hot." This meant the men found themselves dropped into the middle of a large enemy force. These Cav soldiers could be shot to pieces minutes after the helicopters left. In many cases, artillery and air strikes prevented the Americans from being overrun. But other times the enemy was so close that planes or artillery fire were useless. Reinforcements sent to rescue soldiers pinned down by enemy fire had to watch for ambushes. The close-in fighting resulted in some American troops being hit by their own shells or bullets. By the end of November, after weeks of bitter skirmishes, enemy soldiers withdrew westward across the border into Cambodia.

The Ia Drang valley battles proved to be important for several reasons. North Vietnamese generals had wondered if their troops would run from American soldiers. In fact, they fought bravely. The NVA and Viet Cong lost 3,500 men, compared to 240 Americans reported dead. This showed that they were willing to take heavy losses in human life. U.S. soldier deaths and injuries, however, may not have been reported correctly in the early years of the war. That is because American officers were convinced that a favorable "kill ratio" (their dead versus our dead) was important. Numbers aside, any plan the enemy had had to divide South Vietnam by holding the Ia Drang valley had failed.

The battles also proved that the airmobile cavalry was a sound idea. After Ia Drang, the enemy returned to guerrilla fighting: hide and strike, hit and run. But cavalry soldiers could move in and out of the thick jungle where guerrilla fighters hid. They could drop amid the enemy and create confusion. The valley fighting also showed that the use of artillery and B-52 bombers, though successful, had its limits. Such massive firepower could level acres of enemy territory and kill many VC and NVA. Yet artillery and air strikes were dangerous to use if the enemy got too close to friendly forces.

Other battles were taking place as America sent thousands of troops to Southeast Asia. One was named Operation Cedar Falls. It was created to chase the Viet Cong out of hiding places close to Saigon. For years the enemy had used marshes, thick forests, rubber plantations, and small villages near the Saigon River as hiding places. Clearing the area of the enemy would remove Saigon's constant fear of attack and make such major U.S. sites as Tan Son Nhut airbase more secure.

Cedar Falls was a search-and-destroy mission, which meant that the enemy would be hunted until found and then wiped out. It began on the morning of January 8, 1967. The area under attack, called the Iron Triangle, had been hammered with thousands of tons of bombs before the first U.S. soldier entered. Every square foot was a target for bombs and shells except one village - a tiny place called Ben Suc. According to the plan, the VC would try to seek refuge in the village and be trapped there.

When the bombing stopped, hundreds of American troops landed in Ben Suc, surprising local residents. The U.S. had hoped to surprise the VC, too. While the villagers turned out to be pro-Viet Cong, there were very few enemy soldiers found among them. The biggest operation launched so far by the United States in Vietnam had yielded only a handful of frightened villagers.

Several Vietnamese who may or may not have been enemy soldiers were killed. Ben Suc was then bulldozed and burned to the ground. Americans believed they could move villagers to a new site and remove the influence of the Viet Cong in that way. This angered the villagers, who were no longer able to farm their land. As one Army officer sadly remarked, "If they weren't VC when we showed up, they were VC by the time we left." He realized that it was important to deprive the enemy of this village, where they received food and shelter. The officer also knew that destroying the village had made enemies of friend and foe alike.

But what had happened to the Viet Cong? According to all reports, they had been in the Iron Triangle a few hours before dawn on January 8. Shortly after Operation Cedar Falls ended, numerous Viet Cong were seen once again in the Iron Triangle. Where could they have gone?

The complete answer did not come until after the war, when Viet Cong soldiers showed reporters the incredible tunnel network they had dug in the area. These tunnels, which ran for miles a few feet below ground, saved the VC from destruction. Even though during the war the U.S. found 500 tunnels, some filled with rice, supplies, and enemy soldiers, this represented only a small fraction of the total tunnel area. The tunnels were checked by Army "tunnel rats," soldiers who bravely entered tiny earthen holes armed only with a pistol and a flashlight. Booby traps, snakes, insects, and enemy soldiers often awaited them. These tunnel mazes proved to be one of the decisive factors in the Vietnamese victory.

There were, of course, many other military operations. They came in all sizes. For example, the Marines chased two North Vietnamese Army divisions back across the demilitarized zone, the line separating North and South Vietnam. This was a huge operation, lasting more than two weeks in the summer of 1966. At the other extreme, a 1st Infantry Division operation involved finding a single sniper who shot at passing traffic from a small village.

From the soldier's point of view large operations had certain advantages. According to one infantryman, "We always felt the odds were better in a great big operation. It's tough to ambush a whole battalion [about 500 men]. Besides, in a big operation, the enemy always hid. I went on one operation that lasted two weeks. We didn't see one enemy soldier or hear one enemy rifle. That was OK."

The typical U.S. foot soldier was a member of a squad. There were six to ten members in the squad. Four squads made up a platoon. Four platoons of 25 to 40 men each made up a company. Four companies, 100 to 160 men each, made up a battalion. Four battalions made up a brigade that totaled 400 to 640 men each. Four brigades, with a total of 1,600 to 2,560 men, made up a division. Divisions had from 12,000 to 18,000 men. For every combat soldier there were several support personnel. These people in the division - supply specialists, clerks, cooks, medics - kept the fighters healthy, clothed, paid, and supplied in the field to battle the enemy.

Almost all U.S. soldiers in Vietnam wore lightweight nylon jungle fatigue clothing. These pants and shirts had big pockets. They were worn with socks and boots but often without underwear because of the heat. Too many layers of clothes could irritate the skin. The boots were black leather and olive nylon mesh. They had drain holes that helped keep feet dry. Soldiers also wore olive plastic helmet liners, which fit into olive-colored steel helmets. The liners and heavy helmets were sometimes left behind in favor of bandanas or beat-up, floppy jungle hats. Towels were sometimes worn around necks to soak up sweat and to keep straps holding heavy equipment from cutting into a man's shoulders.

Each soldier carried about 60 pounds of gear. Meals, called field rations, were hauled in small cardboard boxes. In the middle of nowhere, food was the highlight of the day. Inside each box was a can of bread; a can of fruit; and a can of ham and lima beans, beef stew, or some other main meal. Smaller tins contained peanut butter, jelly, or honey. Also in each box were matches, a pack of five cigarettes, plastic utensils, and toilet paper. Meals were heated in clever ways. A tiny chunk of a plastic explosive called C-4 was lighted and used as a cooking fire. Another method involved squirting a tin of peanut butter with insect repellent and setting it afire! Beer and soft drinks, carried warm in boot socks, often ended the meal.

Each man had one or two canteens of water, socks, a rain poncho, a short shovel for digging foxholes, plus hand grenades and ammunition. One man in each squad carried a larger gun, an M60 machine gun. This weapon fired bullets linked together in long belts. Several squad members had to carry belts of this machine-gun ammunition. Another squad member carried a stubby gun that fired grenades. This M-79 grenade launcher could shoot small explosives very accurately up to 300 yards.

Still another squad member hauled a radio on his back. Known as the radio-telephone operator, he stayed close to the squad leader, usually a sergeant. The platoon leader was a lieutenant, while a captain commanded the company. Everyone in the squad who did not carry an M-60 or M79 carried an M-16 rifle. This weapon weighed about six pounds and fired small bullets either one at a time or automatically out of a metal box called a clip. With their machine guns, grenade launchers and rifles, a squad of Vietnam-era soldiers could produce more firepower than a platoon of World War II troops.

The Viet Cong, on the other hand, usually carried no more than a few pounds into battle. Their "uniform" was often black silk, pajama-like shirts and trousers and sandals. In some cases the sandals were made out of pieces of car or truck tires! The North Vietnamese army had regular uniforms, and their battle kit items resembled those American troops carried.

The enemy's weapons were Soviet- or Chinese-made rifles, machine guns, grenades, and mortars, although they also captured many weapons from South Vietnamese troops and U.S. bases. Because they could hide food, ammunition, and other supplies in tunnels or villages, they did not need to carry much with them. They could travel faster and lighter than American or South Vietnamese troops and often could endure the heat and humidity better. Nevertheless, they did not have the firepower or troop numbers that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces could put into the field in any one place.

U.S. soldiers enjoyed a great many advantages over the enemy, but none as great as having artillery on their side. Artillery is a big gun that can fire shells for several miles. Americans often picked a spot in the middle of an operation to construct a fire base. This was an artillery base ringed with sandbag fortifications and stocked with several kinds of exploding shells. The most common artillery gun was the 105 mm howitzer, which could fire a shell at a target ten miles away. Four men worked each gun, with several howitzers at each fire base. Infantry troops guarded the base, because it was always a prime enemy target.

Artillery (and air strikes, for that matter) was called in by a forward observer or by some other leader sent out to find the enemy. The technique worked as follows: if the enemy was in a fortified position and artillery was needed, the forward observer used a map and a radio to tell the fire base where the enemy was located and what kinds of shells to use. Usually, the observer directed the artillery crew to fire behind the enemy, then told them how to adjust their guns to get the shells closer to the enemy. This technique was known as "walking" shells toward the target. If Americans faced being overrun by enemy troops, artillery could be called in right on top of the U.S. position.

The fire base also had an 81 mm mortar. This weapon was a short tube propped up with a tripod on a big metal base. When a shell was dropped down the tube, it fired as it hit the bottom. Mortars weighed about 100 pounds and could be carried by three men. They had a range of about three miles.

In contrast to the lightweight mortars, there were huge artillery guns at permanent bases and even larger guns on battleships offshore. Both were used if heavy fighting took place anywhere near their positions. When infantry units ran into fortified enemy positions, they sometimes used more precise weapons. One was the LAW (light antitank weapon). This was Vietnam's answer to the World War II bazooka. The LAW was a fiberglass tube with just one shell inside it. An aiming device and a trigger were attached to the tube. The weapon could be aimed and fired precisely at an enemy bunker. The tube was then thrown away.

While the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese could not match U.S. or South Vietnamese artillery strength, they made good use of their own mortars. Mortar attacks on airbases, infantry troops, villages, cities, convoys, and camps took their toll during the war. The cry "Incoming!" alerted everyone to an enemy mortar attack and sent troops scrambling for cover. North Vietnamese raids on U.S. and South Vietnamese ammunition dumps often kept enemy troops supplied in the field. As one U.S. sergeant remarked grimly, "We got every one of our stolen mortars back - one shell at a time."

Perhaps the greatest advantage on the North Vietnamese and VC side was their knowledge and use of the land and its people. Enemy troops knew the location of thousands of tunnels, swamps, rivers, villages, and other hiding places. They could camouflage themselves in the jungle or among the population. In the end, this advantage proved more effective than the sophisticated weapons and artillery of American and South Vietnamese forces.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong lost nearly every major battle against U.S and South Vietnamese troops, yet they continued to fight. Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong showed no signs of calling for an end to the conflict nor of accepting the division of Vietnam. By the end of 1967, some American advisers and military commanders began to fear the war might last longer and cost a great deal more than the leaders in Washington realized.

David K. Wright. Battles Large and Small. War in Vietnam. Regensteiner Publishing Enterprises, Inc., Chicago. 1989.

Winged Sabers The Air Cavalry in Vietnam. Lawrence Johnson III. The Air Cavalry troops who served in Vietnam were an unusually courageous and resourceful lot. Constantly facing death, they developed a bravado and camaraderie that made them a force to be reckoned with. This is a comprehensive, multi-faceted volume on the men, the machines, and the missions that shaped this unique group.

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