Home : America At War :Vietnam WarThe War MakersWhile the military is responsible for fighting a war, its civilian superiors not only wage war but also determine how it will be fought.In their naive ignorance, anti-war activists during the Vietnam War came close to undermining one of the foundation stones of American democracy. If military personnel had followed their shouts to disobey the orders of their civilian superiors and refuse to go to Vietnam, civilian control of the military would have been destroyed, for if the military chooses which orders it will obey, the result is a military dictatorship. The military did not order itself into Vietnam. It went in accordance with the orders of five duly elected presidents, each appointed by the U.S. Constitution as the nation's commander in chief. Vietnam was the war that five presidents "owned" -- and yet no president "owned." Called "Johnson's war" or "Kennedy's war," or even "Nixon's war," Vietnam was actually the bastard child of five presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, Jr. None of them owned the war in the traditional way that American presidents had owned earlier wars. But each of them, to a greater or lesser extent, shared in the responsibility for the Vietnam War. President Eisenhower (1953-1961) refused to commit large numbers of Americans to Vietnam, but he did commit 900 American advisers, setting the precedent for American military involvement in that country. In his refusal to commit American troops to a ground war in Asia, Eisenhower exercised negative ownership. He did not want to own a war in Asia. He wanted to protect the "dominoes" -- the Southeast Asian countries that might fall, like dominoes, under Communist domination -- but not by exposing American troops to the carnage of a ground war. During America's military involvement in Vietnam, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon had the most responsibility for the war. President Kennedy (1961-1963) increased Eisenhower's 900 military advisers to more than 16,000 and flirted with counterinsurgency and "limited war." President Johnson (1963-69) acted fast after the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and added a half-million Americans, but failed to press the military advantage earned at the 1968 Tet Offensive. President Nixon (1969-74) withdrew by turning the war over to the Vietnamese, breaking some of his predecessors' rules by permitting American forces to swat the enemy in over-the-border sanctuaries and by laying Christmas bombs on Hanoi. Nixon's decision to send Henry Kissinger to secret negotiations with North Vietnam was also a major departure from previous practice. President Ford (1974-1977) refused to re-enter the war in 1975 when South Vietnam was falling to the Communists. He was willing to let the domino fall, regardless of the consequences to South Vietnam or its neighbors. Ford, in exercising his ownership of the war, refused to extend the contract. The Vietnamese were once again declared the owners, with all of the associated pitfalls. Ford's refusal to order American military aid to South Vietnam declared the Vietnam military policies of his four predecessors bankrupt. The Vietnam War, under five different commanders in chief, became a patchwork of military strategy that America's military commanders in the field tried to hold together to fashion a win. The different personalities and politics of the presidents, along with their varying military strategies, led to an inconsistency in presidential philosophy and leadership that the U.S. military could not overcome. In brief, the foreign policy and Vietnam military strategies of the five Vietnam-era presidents were as follows:
Modern wars involve an extremely complex network of decisions. When the president is deciding whether to wage war or deciding how to wage war, a multitude of civilian advisers feed him information and recommendations. Such was certainly the case in the Vietnam War, a hotbed of political intrigue. Civilians directly influenced presidential decisions or made decisions that had enormous consequences on the battlefield. Those decisions most often came from the ambassador to South Vietnam, the secretary of defense and the national security adviser. Over the long course of the Vietnam War, five civilian decision makers stand out as particularly influential. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., ambassador to South Vietnam in 1963-1964 and 1965-1967, helped set the pattern of South Vietnamese political instability that damaged the war effort. Maxwell Taylor, ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964-1965, influenced the United States to wage a limited war of "halt and go." Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense in 1961-1968, statistically quantified the war. Clark Clifford, secretary of defense in 1968, substituted his judgment for that of the president and the military, thereby subverting the goal of winning the war. Henry Kissinger, as national security adviser from 1969 to 1973, negotiated the end of American military involvement. Lodge wanted responsible leadership in South Vietnam that could withstand the military aggression of North Vietnam. When leaders of a planned coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem informed Lodge in 1963 of their desire to overthrow Diem, the ambassador gambled that the coup would produce better leadership. He assured the leaders of the coup that the United States would not react unfavorably to their overthrow of Diem. Although Diem had shortcomings as a leader, he had led South Vietnam for eight years and at the time of his death was attempting to deal with Buddhist factionalism. While Buddhist monks were having themselves doused with gasoline and set afire, Diem attempted to retain control of the government and the army. His methods at times were savage and less than democratic. Lodge wanted a more democratic South Vietnam that operated on consensus rather than force. Lodge could have stopped the coup by either discouraging the coup leaders or informing Diem who was involved and letting him stop it. Lodge did neither, and the political instability that would dog South Vietnam for years to come was institutionalized. While Lodge was away from South Vietnam in 1964-1965, Maxwell Taylor filled the post of ambassador. Although now a civilian, Taylor had been a professional soldier, with a distinguished record in both World War II and Korea. He had become chief of staff of the Army in 1955 and served four years in that capacity. He was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1962 until he became ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964. Taylor was President Kennedy's favorite general, and both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were in need of military expertise. Taylor, as the "insider" with military expertise, played a key roll in the military strategy that evolved during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. His strategy was "incremental" rather than "massive." Vietnam was a "little war" where advisers and limited bombing could hold the enemy in check without resorting to massive retaliation. Taylor was the foot-dragging general who wanted to take a limited amount of military action to forestall a Communist takeover of South Vietnam, but did not want to get bogged down in a ground war of massive proportions like the United States had fought in Korea. His effort to contain the enemy without massive force became a contradiction that created a war of attrition. Between 1961 and 1964, Taylor made fact-finding trips to Vietnam at the request of the president. Taylor was willing to up the ante, but he was never willing to try to win the pot. The Joint Chiefs usually wanted to "hard charge," but it was Taylor's policy of limited war -- stop and go -- that prevailed throughout the Vietnam War. Taylor wanted a manageable little war. But Vietnam proved to be neither manageable nor little. As the war spun out of control, Taylor's influence waned, and the focus of civilian decision making shifted to the secretary of defense. As Secretary of Defense, McNamara started under Kennedy as a cheerleader for the war. He tried to run the war the way he had run the Ford Motor Company. By the time he was eased out by Johnson in early 1968, he had become a turncoat, seeking to undermine Johnson's support of the war. Rattling facts and figures, rapidly flipping charts and wielding a pointer with complete confidence, McNamara had urged America on during the early part of its involvement. It was only a matter of technology, units of energy and production quotas, according to McNamara. Place the right amount of force on the battlefield to counter the drag of the other side, schedule man-hours in accordance with the production desired, and voilà a finished product -- a North Vietnam tamed of its aggres- sive tendencies and a South Vietnam that was independent, democratic and grateful to the United States. Statistics and production units could only carry so far in Vietnam. McNamara's statistics, combined with Taylor's foot-dragging gradualism, were a recipe for prolonged conflict. When the stats and gradualism didn't do the job and sucked the United States into a seemingly bottomless quagmire, McNamara had a change of heart and became convinced that it was his duty to get America out of a war that he now believed could not be won. His change of heart probably came at the end of 1965, when he advised President Johnson to seek a compromise solution through negotiations. McNamara said that at least 600,000 Americans would be needed to give the war a satisfactory outcome, and that even that number would not guarantee success. He urged Johnson to stop American airstrikes for three or four weeks to give the North Vietnamese a chance to save face and reach a diplomatic settlement. McNamara remained secretary of defense for more than two more years. Although he served as "captain of the team," he was committed to a diplomatic solution rather than victory. It can only be conjectured what effect this had on the team's "coach," President Johnson. The captain did not quit, and the coach did not fire him. The war ground on, quantified to Johnson and the American public on McNamara's flip charts. Mercifully, McNamara finally left the job, not sure whether he had left on his own or had been fired. He had gone into office a believer and had left as an "infidel." Clark Clifford, who replaced McNamara as secretary of defense on March 1, 1968, was a nonbeliever when he took office, but he never bothered to tell his old and trusted friend Lyndon Johnson that important fact when he accepted the position. In March 1968 President Johnson needed all the support he could get, and that was why Clifford was chosen; yet Clifford's belief that the war could not be won rendered him incapable of giving Johnson the support needed to stay the course in Vietnam. Bombarded by bad news from the media, defeatism from his own staff and a gloomy call for 206,000 more troops to add to the half-million already in Vietnam, Johnson lost his resolve. Clifford, who could have encouraged the course, instead plunged the dagger that killed the Johnson presidency. With the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, the thrust of civilian decision making shifted from the secretary of defense to the national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Nixon, seeking an end to the war without the disquieting wrath of the protesters and media, sent Kissinger to negotiate behind closed doors. While the military struggle in Vietnam continued in village, city, rice paddy and highland, Kissinger sat eyeball to eyeball with North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris. To obtain an agreement, Kissinger was more inclined to blink than the North Vietnamese. Nixon tried to bolster his negotiator by giving orders and sending messages not to retreat while stiffening the meaning by trying to terrorize the enemy through military tactics. But in the end it was Kissinger who gave in, not the enemy. The crucial point on which Kissinger retreated was allowing North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South. Nixon had little chance to maintain his peace because Watergate soon enveloped him. As Nixon drowned in Watergate, South Vietnam had to rely on itself to stay afloat. Although the United States left South Vietnam generously supplied with military hardware, both Nixon and South Vietnam sank.
Lodge, Taylor, McNamara, Clifford and Kissinger played key roles in defining America's involvement in Vietnam, but there were a host of other civilian decision makers who influenced the American involvement. Perhaps the most often seen by the American public was Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1961-1968). Rusk was there from the beginning of the Kennedy administration, and his experience in foreign affairs extended back in a distinguished career. It was Rusk's nature and conviction to be a loyal supporter of presidential policy and a team player. He was neither a headline grabber nor a grabber of other people's turf. He was content to advise and consent, letting the more flashy members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations fight for prominence and dominance in the Vietnam War. The Bundy brothers, William and McGeorge, were a part of the Kennedy brain trust. William Bundy, assistant secretary of defense (1961-1964) and assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (1964-1968), was instrumental in drafting the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Four days after the resolution, William Bundy advised President Johnson to "achieve maximum results for minimal risks." William Bundy encouraged the use of force, but when it got down to specifics, he was a gradualist. Bundy "Mac", as national security adviser (1961-1966), was also reluctant to use more force than necessary. In March 1968, at the critical juncture of the Vietnam War, he was in a group of "wise men," convened by Clark Clifford. Clifford had assembled the group as part of his plan to convince Johnson to withdraw from Vietnam, though there were several members of the 14-person group who were there to give lip service to continuing military involvement. Mac Bundy urged withdrawal. Paul Warnke helped turn McNamara against the war. Coming to the Defense Department as a general counsel in 1966, he became assistant secretary of defense a year later. Imbued with a mission to stop the war, he proselytized McNamara. McNamara's replacement, Clifford, was Warnke's next target, and again he was successful. Warnke was able to help Clifford bring about the downfall of the Johnson presidency in March 1968. Melvin Laird, who served as secretary of defense between 1969 and 1972, coined the term "Vietnamization." Feeling that the war should become "de-Americanized," he helped Nixon formulate the policy of gradual withdrawal that was officially initiated on June 8, 1969. The names of other civilian decision makers ring out from the Vietnam era: W. Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, Walter Rostow, George Ball, Ellsworth Bunker, Graham Martin, Frederick Nolting and Cyrus Vance. Perhaps the civilian decision makers tried to do the best they could, but it wasn't good enough. They put too many names on a wall that contains none of their own.
Beginning in 1961, U.S. and American trained South Vietnamese Navy commandos carried out raids and delivered agents into North Vietnam. The commandos initially employed motorized junks. While these craft had the advantage of being able to hide among the thousands of junks that plied Vietnam coastal waters, they were slow and vulnerable. In an effort to provide more capability to the commandos, on October 6, 1962, the Department of Defense directed the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral David McDonald, to provide any suitable craft that could be used in South Vietnam. The PTF 1 and PTF 2 were reactivated; their Packard engines were overhauled and quieting features were provided. The PTFs were armed with single 40-mm cannon forward and aft and two twin 20mm cannon. No torpedo gear was fitted. A Navy press release noted that the PTFs ". . . will be used for special operations with the Navy's Sea-AirLand Teams." The Sea-Air-Land Teams, better known as SEAL teams, are Navy units trained to conduct unconventional paramilitary operations and to train personnel of allied nations in these techniques. After being used in the United States to train SEALs, these first two PTFs were shipped to the U.S. base at Da Nang, South Vietnam. U.S. Navy crews operated the PTFs under the control of Special Operations Group (later Studies and Operations Group) 34. This unit, with headquarters in Saigon, was under the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the principal U.S. command in South Vietnam. The maritime operations of SOG 34 had the code name 34A. More fast patrol boats were needed to expand 34A operations. The decision was made to acquire Norwegian-built "Nasty" torpedo boats. The Norwegian design was considered one of the most advanced craft available, and while the Norwegian Navy had a long and successful history of operating with the U.S. Navy. The Nasty design had been developed as a private-venture MTB by the firm Norwegian Boat Services (Batservice Verft) and built in 1958. The Norwegian Navy adopted the design for series production, with the first boat, the Tjeld, being commissioned in June 1960. The Nasrys were built of double-layer mahogany sandwiching a layer of fiberglass, with laminated ash and oak for her keel and frames. They were just over 80 feet in length and were driven by two British-produced, Napier-Deltic diesel engines, and could drive the boats at about 45 knots. They were designed to carry four 21-inch torpedo tubes in addition to two 40-mm guns. Two 20-mm mounts were also installed. With the deletion of the torpedoes they could carry more personnel, rubber raiding craft, and other equipment. The Navy installed PTF armament and electronic equipment in the United States, and all were shipped to South Vietnam. Upon arrival "in country," U.S. Navy small boat specialists and SEALs additionally fitted 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and 57-mm recoilless rifles to the boats. For a brief period flame throwers were tested on the craft. Later virtually all PTFs were fitted with a tandem-mounted .50-caliber machine gun/81-mm mortar, which proved to be a particularly effective weapon. All PTFs would be capable of carrying torpedo launch racks and mines, but none of these weapons were ever fitted. Under the tutelage of the U.S. Navy, South Vietnamese naval commandos accelerated their 34A operations. The first large-scale raid began on the night of July 30, 1964, when six boats were available. That night the PTFs 2, 3, 5, and 6 departed Da Nang to assault the North Vietnamese offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. Just after midnight on July 31 the PTF 3 and PTF 6 closed with Hon Me to land sabotage teams. Without warning coastal gun batteries opened fire. The PTF 6 was hit and four South Vietnamese were injured. As the boats began to withdraw, a Chinese-built Swatow torpedo boat approached. The PTFs bombarded shore facilities for several minutes before fleeing southward, outracing the Swatow. The PTF 2 and PTF 5 successfully bombarded facilities on Hon Nieu island, and then raced back to Da Nang. The 34A operations continued, but with limited success. Meanwwhile, the U.S. Navy had begun the so-called Desoto patrols, cruises by destroyers into the Gulf of Tonkin to carry out electronic surveillance missions. These periodic forays - in international waters - sought out and recorded North Vietnamese radar emissions and radio transmissions. Senior U.S. Navy commanders suggested that the destroyers on Desoto patrols could be employed to coordinate the 34A operations by PTFs. General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. military commander in Vietnam, rejected the proposal, hoping to continue the deniability of U.S. involvement in the 34A operations, which were penetrating the three-mile territorial waters of North Vietnam, and actually putting agents and saboteurs ashore. The Navy commanders agreed and steps were taken to prevent interference and direct mutual support of the two operations. Thus the scene was set for the night of August 3-4, 1964, when PTFs again attacked two North Vietnamese islands in the Tonkin Gulf. This time the PTFs 1, 2, 5, and 6 bombarded the North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, about 90 miles north of the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. The PTF 2 had engine problems and turned back. The PTF 1 and 5 closed to the shore and bombarded the radar station before turning south for their base at Danang. The PTF 6 attacked the security station and, although it encountered a Swatow MTB, the PTF was easily able to escape back south. Meanwhile, the U.S. destroyer Maddox had commenced a Desoto patrol on July 31. On the morning of August 4, shortly after the South Viet namese PTF attack, the Maddox steamed into the northern end of the gulf. The Maddox was passing off the coast of Hon Me Island, 30 miles south of the North Vietnamese MTB base at Loc Chao, which South Vietnamese commandos had raided the night before, when the destroyer's radar detected the approach of three unidentified high-speed craft, obviously North Vietnamese MTBs. The North Vietnamese craft were sent out to attack the destroyer in the belief that she was directly supporting the PTF operation. The onrushing MTBs headed straight for the Maddox. Three 5-inch rounds fired by the Maddox failed to deter them. At a range of nearly 3 miles, two of the Communist boats each launched an 18-inch torpedo; both missed the Maddox, which was taking evasive action. The MTBs continued the attack, launching all six of their torpedoes. The U.S. destroyer returned the fire and reported that one North Vietnamese MTB was hit. While this engagement was in progress, four F-8E Crusader fighters, launched earlier from the U.S. aircraft carrier Ticonderoga on a training mission, were vectored to the area. Upon establishing contact with the Maddox and the embarked destroyer division commander, the Crusaders were ordered to attack the torpedo boats as they retired to the North. Armed with 20-mm cannon and Zuni unguided rockets, the fighters swung in over the North Vietnamese craft and made several attacks. The fliers reported that they had sunk a torpedo boat. Approximately three hours had passed from the initial contact by the Maddox's radar to the retirement of the American destroyer. U.S. estimates were that one MTB was sunk and two others heavily damaged. (Of the three Soviet-built P-4 MTBs that made the attack on the Maddox, the T-333, the command unit, was undamaged; the T-336 was slightly damaged with her commander killed; and the T-339 was damaged and dead in the water with her engines stopped but later restarted. The two damaged boats were beached to prevent sinking; all were repaired and returned to service.) By presidential order, the Maddox was joined by the destroyer Turner Joy. The carrier Constellation was routed to the Tonkin Gulf while planes from Ticonderoga maintained a daylight watch; during the night, the destroyers would retire to about 100 miles offshore to reduce the danger of night torpedo-boat attack. But on the night of August 4-5 the Maddox picked up five high-speed radar contacts, again identified as North Vietnamese torpedo boats. In the bad weather that covered the area, the U.S. destroyers never had visual contact with enemy PT-boats. There were radar contacts and then sonar contacts that were identified as torpedoes in the water. The Ticonderoga launched two A-1 Skyraider attack planes to provide air cover, but by midnight the torpedo boats had vanished from the radar screens. Several hundred rounds of 5-inch and 3-inch ammunition had been fired by the destroyers at unseen assailants. The senior officer embarked in the destroyers urged caution on senior U.S. commanders in Hawaii and Washington: "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonar men may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by the Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken." In reality, there was no North Vietnamese attack on the night of August 4-5; no North Vietnamese MTBs were at sea. Still, with reports of two unprovoked attacks on American men-of-war in international waters, the time for retaliatory action had come. President Johnson went on television to announce the actions he intended to take. He had planned the American response carefully. Johnson said, "Our response for the present will be limited and fitting.... We will seek no wider war. . . ." His remarks had been in coordination with the ongoing attack half a world away. "That reply is given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations." An hour before the President spoke the Constellation and Ticonderoga began launching 64 aircraft to strike four North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases. The area of coverage ranged from a small base at Quang Khe, 50 miles north of the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, to the large base at Hon Gay in the north. The carrier planes began attacking their targets about 1 P.M. local time. The attacking planes had damaged facilities at all four bases and destroyed or damaged an estimated 25 MTBs and gunboats - more than half of the North Vietnamese naval force. The cost was two aircraft shot down and two others damaged, with one pilot dead and one captured. The Gulf of Tonkin attacks - real and imagined - on the U.S. destroyers and the retaliatory raids against MTB bases became a key entry on the timeline of the Vietnam War. With the escalation of the conflict, the PTF missions into enemy waters continued. Details of their operations are still classified. Five of the boats were sunk in the combat operations, the PTFs 8, 9, 14, 15, and 16, all in 1966. (The veteran PTF 1 was intentionally sunk as a target in 1966 by a U.S. submarine torpedo, while the PTF 2 was sunk as a target by U.S. gunfire.) Back in the United States additional PTFs were being procured. The John Trumpy yacht yard in Annapolis, Maryland, which had built the prototype PT 811 (and which saw less service than any of the postwar prototypes) built the PTF 17 through PTF 22. Delivered in 1968-1969, the Trumpy PTFs were near-duplicates of the Nasty design, all capable of about 45 knots. Simultaneously, the Stewart Seacraft yard in Berwick, Louisiana, which built offshore oil-rig support craft, produced the PTF 23 through PTF 26. These boats, completed in 1968, had aluminum hulls almost 95 feet long. They were also fitted with Napier-Deltic engines, which drove them at about 40 knots. Their commercial name "Osprey" was often used by the Navy. A total of 26 PTFs were delivered to the U.S. Navy in the 1960s, primarily for use by commandos and in gunfire attack missions in the Vietnam War. Of those, 2 were former aluminum-hull PT boats, 14 were Nasty-class MTBs built in Norway, 6 were Trumpy-built Nastys, and the final 4 were Seacraft-built boats. Most saw combat. The political impact of the PTFs was significant - the 34A operations by PTFs in August 1964 led to major U.S. involvement in the Viet nam War; but, unlike their World War II predecessors, the PTFs had virtually no military impact on the war, a conflict that was lost by the United States from both political and military viewpoints. After the Vietnam War, 13 of the U.S. and Norwegian Nastys and the 4 Seacraft Ospreys were assigned to the Naval Reserve Force, the Navy's "weekend warriors." These PTFs were used by the reserves into the late 1970s. | ||||||||||
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