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Vietnam War

The War Makers

While the military is responsible for fighting a war, its civilian superiors not only wage war but also determine how it will be fought.

In their naive ignorance, anti-war activists during the Vietnam War came close to undermining one of the foundation stones of American democracy. If military personnel had followed their shouts to disobey the orders of their civilian superiors and refuse to go to Vietnam, civilian control of the military would have been destroyed, for if the military chooses which orders it will obey, the result is a military dictatorship.

The military did not order itself into Vietnam. It went in accordance with the orders of five duly elected presidents, each appointed by the U.S. Constitution as the nation's commander in chief. Vietnam was the war that five presidents "owned" -- and yet no president "owned." Called "Johnson's war" or "Kennedy's war," or even "Nixon's war," Vietnam was actually the bastard child of five presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, Jr. None of them owned the war in the traditional way that American presidents had owned earlier wars. But each of them, to a greater or lesser extent, shared in the responsibility for the Vietnam War.

President Eisenhower (1953-1961) refused to commit large numbers of Americans to Vietnam, but he did commit 900 American advisers, setting the precedent for American military involvement in that country. In his refusal to commit American troops to a ground war in Asia, Eisenhower exercised negative ownership. He did not want to own a war in Asia. He wanted to protect the "dominoes" -- the Southeast Asian countries that might fall, like dominoes, under Communist domination -- but not by exposing American troops to the carnage of a ground war.

During America's military involvement in Vietnam, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon had the most responsibility for the war. President Kennedy (1961-1963) increased Eisenhower's 900 military advisers to more than 16,000 and flirted with counterinsurgency and "limited war." President Johnson (1963-69) acted fast after the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and added a half-million Americans, but failed to press the military advantage earned at the 1968 Tet Offensive. President Nixon (1969-74) withdrew by turning the war over to the Vietnamese, breaking some of his predecessors' rules by permitting American forces to swat the enemy in over-the-border sanctuaries and by laying Christmas bombs on Hanoi. Nixon's decision to send Henry Kissinger to secret negotiations with North Vietnam was also a major departure from previous practice.

President Ford (1974-1977) refused to re-enter the war in 1975 when South Vietnam was falling to the Communists. He was willing to let the domino fall, regardless of the consequences to South Vietnam or its neighbors. Ford, in exercising his ownership of the war, refused to extend the contract. The Vietnamese were once again declared the owners, with all of the associated pitfalls. Ford's refusal to order American military aid to South Vietnam declared the Vietnam military policies of his four predecessors bankrupt.

The Vietnam War, under five different commanders in chief, became a patchwork of military strategy that America's military commanders in the field tried to hold together to fashion a win. The different personalities and politics of the presidents, along with their varying military strategies, led to an inconsistency in presidential philosophy and leadership that the U.S. military could not overcome. In brief, the foreign policy and Vietnam military strategies of the five Vietnam-era presidents were as follows:

Eisenhower:

Containment of communism through the threat of massive retaliation; reliance on nuclear weapons and "brinkmanship"; building of defensive alliances; summit conferences with world leaders. His goal was to lessen world tensions while maintaining America's military might and independence.

Minimal number of U.S. military advisers; intervention on a large scale only if by multinational coalition.

Kennedy:

Containment of communism through the threat of massive retaliation and "counterinsurgency"; preparation to fight "small wars"; exportation of American ideals through the Peace Corps (goodwill ambassadors). He hoped to increase democratic governments in the world while maintaining America's military might and independence.

Increase in the number of U.S. military advisers; counterinsurgency and plans for fighting a "limited war."

Johnson:

Continuation of Kennedy's foreign policy and overall military strategy while escalating American commitment in Vietnam. His goal was to enforce America's will in Vietnam while maintaining America's military might and independence.

Escalating the number of American troops to more than a half-million while fighting a restricted war until the enemy could be defeated by attrition.

Nixon:

Containment of communism through the threat of massive retaliation; "detente" with Communist nations to lessen international tensions; re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China; honorable with- drawal of the American military force from Vietnam. He hoped to decrease international tensions that existed between Communist and non-Communist nations while maintaining America's military might and independence.

Gradual withdrawal of American troops by turning the war over to South Vietnamese allies and instilling enough fear in the enemy through military technology to make the enemy agree to a negotiated settlement.

Ford:

Continuation of Nixon's foreign policy and overall military strategy while refusing to become militarily involved in Vietnam again, even though Nixon's negotiated peace agreement threatened renewed military action if that peace was broken. His goal was to refocus America's military while containing communism, other than in Southeast Asia, and maintaining America's military might and independence.

No military involvement in Vietnam.

Modern wars involve an extremely complex network of decisions. When the president is deciding whether to wage war or deciding how to wage war, a multitude of civilian advisers feed him information and recommendations. Such was certainly the case in the Vietnam War, a hotbed of political intrigue. Civilians directly influenced presidential decisions or made decisions that had enormous consequences on the battlefield. Those decisions most often came from the ambassador to South Vietnam, the secretary of defense and the national security adviser.

Over the long course of the Vietnam War, five civilian decision makers stand out as particularly influential. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., ambassador to South Vietnam in 1963-1964 and 1965-­1967, helped set the pattern of South Vietnamese political instability that damaged the war effort. Maxwell Taylor, ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964-­1965, influenced the United States to wage a limited war of "halt and go." Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense in 1961-1968, statistically quantified the war. Clark Clifford, secretary of defense in 1968, substituted his judgment for that of the president and the military, thereby subverting the goal of winning the war. Henry Kissinger, as national security adviser from 1969 to 1973, negotiated the end of American military involvement.

Lodge wanted responsible leadership in South Vietnam that could withstand the military aggression of North Vietnam. When leaders of a planned coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem informed Lodge in 1963 of their desire to overthrow Diem, the ambassador gambled that the coup would produce better leadership. He assured the leaders of the coup that the United States would not react unfavorably to their overthrow of Diem.

Although Diem had shortcomings as a leader, he had led South Vietnam for eight years and at the time of his death was attempting to deal with Buddhist factionalism. While Buddhist monks were having themselves doused with gasoline and set afire, Diem attempted to retain control of the government and the army. His methods at times were savage and less than democratic. Lodge wanted a more democratic South Vietnam that operated on consensus rather than force.

Lodge could have stopped the coup by either discouraging the coup leaders or informing Diem who was involved and letting him stop it. Lodge did neither, and the political instability that would dog South Vietnam for years to come was institutionalized.

While Lodge was away from South Vietnam in 1964-1965, Maxwell Taylor filled the post of ambassador. Although now a civilian, Taylor had been a professional soldier, with a distinguished record in both World War II and Korea. He had become chief of staff of the Army in 1955 and served four years in that capacity. He was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1962 until he became ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964.

Taylor was President Kennedy's favorite general, and both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were in need of military expertise. Taylor, as the "insider" with military expertise, played a key roll in the military strategy that evolved during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. His strategy was "incremental" rather than "massive." Vietnam was a "little war" where advisers and limited bombing could hold the enemy in check without resorting to massive retaliation. Taylor was the foot-dragging general who wanted to take a limited amount of military action to forestall a Communist takeover of South Vietnam, but did not want to get bogged down in a ground war of massive proportions like the United States had fought in Korea. His effort to contain the enemy without massive force became a contradiction that created a war of attrition.

Between 1961 and 1964, Taylor made fact-finding trips to Vietnam at the request of the president. Taylor was willing to up the ante, but he was never willing to try to win the pot. The Joint Chiefs usually wanted to "hard charge," but it was Taylor's policy of limited war -- stop and go -- that prevailed throughout the Vietnam War. Taylor wanted a manageable little war. But Vietnam proved to be neither manageable nor little.

As the war spun out of control, Taylor's influence waned, and the focus of civilian decision making shifted to the secretary of defense. As Secretary of Defense, McNamara started under Kennedy as a cheerleader for the war. He tried to run the war the way he had run the Ford Motor Company. By the time he was eased out by Johnson in early 1968, he had become a turncoat, seeking to undermine Johnson's support of the war.

Rattling facts and figures, rapidly flipping charts and wielding a pointer with complete confidence, McNamara had urged America on during the early part of its involvement. It was only a matter of technology, units of energy and production quotas, according to McNamara. Place the right amount of force on the battlefield to counter the drag of the other side, schedule man-hours in accordance with the production desired, and voilà a finished product -- a North Vietnam tamed of its aggres- sive tendencies and a South Vietnam that was independent, democratic and grateful to the United States.

Statistics and production units could only carry so far in Vietnam. McNamara's statistics, combined with Taylor's foot-dragging gradualism, were a recipe for prolonged conflict. When the stats and gradualism didn't do the job and sucked the United States into a seemingly bottomless quagmire, McNamara had a change of heart and became convinced that it was his duty to get America out of a war that he now believed could not be won. His change of heart probably came at the end of 1965, when he advised President Johnson to seek a compromise solution through negotiations. McNamara said that at least 600,000 Americans would be needed to give the war a satisfactory outcome, and that even that number would not guarantee success. He urged Johnson to stop American airstrikes for three or four weeks to give the North Vietnamese a chance to save face and reach a diplomatic settlement.

McNamara remained secretary of defense for more than two more years. Although he served as "captain of the team," he was committed to a diplomatic solution rather than victory. It can only be conjectured what effect this had on the team's "coach," President Johnson. The captain did not quit, and the coach did not fire him. The war ground on, quantified to Johnson and the American public on McNamara's flip charts. Mercifully, McNamara finally left the job, not sure whether he had left on his own or had been fired. He had gone into office a believer and had left as an "infidel."

Clark Clifford, who replaced McNamara as secretary of defense on March 1, 1968, was a nonbeliever when he took office, but he never bothered to tell his old and trusted friend Lyndon Johnson that important fact when he accepted the position. In March 1968 President Johnson needed all the support he could get, and that was why Clifford was chosen; yet Clifford's belief that the war could not be won rendered him incapable of giving Johnson the support needed to stay the course in Vietnam.

Bombarded by bad news from the media, defeatism from his own staff and a gloomy call for 206,000 more troops to add to the half-million already in Vietnam, Johnson lost his resolve. Clifford, who could have encouraged the course, instead plunged the dagger that killed the Johnson presidency.

With the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, the thrust of civilian decision making shifted from the secretary of defense to the national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Nixon, seeking an end to the war without the disquieting wrath of the protesters and media, sent Kissinger to negotiate behind closed doors. While the military struggle in Vietnam continued in village, city, rice paddy and highland, Kissinger sat eyeball to eyeball with North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris.

To obtain an agreement, Kissinger was more inclined to blink than the North Vietnamese. Nixon tried to bolster his negotiator by giving orders and sending messages not to retreat while stiffening the meaning by trying to terrorize the enemy through military tactics. But in the end it was Kissinger who gave in, not the enemy. The crucial point on which Kissinger retreated was allowing North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South.

Nixon had little chance to maintain his peace because Watergate soon enveloped him. As Nixon drowned in Watergate, South Vietnam had to rely on itself to stay afloat. Although the United States left South Vietnam generously supplied with military hardware, both Nixon and South Vietnam sank.

Vietnam

Lodge, Taylor, McNamara, Clifford and Kissinger played key roles in defining America's involvement in Vietnam, but there were a host of other civilian decision makers who influenced the American involvement. Perhaps the most often seen by the American public was Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1961-1968).

Rusk was there from the beginning of the Kennedy administration, and his experience in foreign affairs extended back in a distinguished career. It was Rusk's nature and conviction to be a loyal supporter of presidential policy and a team player. He was neither a headline grabber nor a grabber of other people's turf. He was content to advise and consent, letting the more flashy members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations fight for prominence and dominance in the Vietnam War.

The Bundy brothers, William and McGeorge, were a part of the Kennedy brain trust. William Bundy, assistant secretary of defense (1961-1964) and assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (1964-1968), was instrumental in drafting the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Four days after the resolution, William Bundy advised President Johnson to "achieve maximum results for minimal risks." William Bundy encouraged the use of force, but when it got down to specifics, he was a gradualist.

Bundy "Mac", as national security adviser (1961-1966), was also reluctant to use more force than necessary. In March 1968, at the critical juncture of the Vietnam War, he was in a group of "wise men," convened by Clark Clifford. Clifford had assembled the group as part of his plan to convince Johnson to withdraw from Vietnam, though there were several members of the 14-person group who were there to give lip service to continuing military involvement. Mac Bundy urged withdrawal.

Paul Warnke helped turn McNamara against the war. Coming to the Defense Department as a general counsel in 1966, he became assistant secretary of defense a year later. Imbued with a mission to stop the war, he proselytized McNamara. McNamara's replacement, Clifford, was Warnke's next target, and again he was successful. Warnke was able to help Clifford bring about the downfall of the Johnson presidency in March 1968.

Melvin Laird, who served as secretary of defense between 1969 and 1972, coined the term "Vietnamization." Feeling that the war should become "de-Americanized," he helped Nixon formulate the policy of gradual withdrawal that was officially initiated on June 8, 1969.

The names of other civilian decision makers ring out from the Vietnam era: W. Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, Walter Rostow, George Ball, Ellsworth Bunker, Graham Martin, Frederick Nolting and Cyrus Vance. Perhaps the civilian decision makers tried to do the best they could, but it wasn't good enough. They put too many names on a wall that contains none of their own.

John Dellinger. The War Makers. TheHistoryNet. Vietnam.

Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War In an in-depth, insider's view of the Vietnam War, the former Secretary of State describes America's involvement in Southeast Asia, the events of the war, the long and difficult peace negotiations, the domestic unrest over the war, and the diplomats, politicians, military leaders, and others who became part of history.

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