Home : America At War : The War In Korea :

February Thru March, 1951

Pvt. Roy Ingle, of Sydney, Australia, steadies Sgt. Richard Drozdowski of Lackawana, New York. Artillery observers direct fire against enemy gun positions in the hills.

Having been unable to continue his general offensive, the enemy was, in the main, on the defensive by the end of January. Aggressive reconnaissance in force on the western front met only light to moderate resistance as far north as Suwon and Kumyangjang, and indicated that the enemy had apparently abandoned Ichon. At the same time, reports and air sightings indicated numerous small scale displacements of enemy forces northward in the area south of the Han River. The pattern of resistance became more uniform by January 29 as the U.N. offensive advanced to a general line 3 to 5 miles north of Suwon, Kumyangjang, and Ichon.

In the deep reentrant on the Yongwol-AndongUisong-axis, North Korean troops withdrew from positions to which they had infiltrated. They left about one division in the mountainous area east of Tanyang, and another astride the road between Andong and Yongju. The two divisions materially augmented a force of about 5,000 guerrillas, operating in the area east of Uisong. These two enemy regular units and guerrilla forces were relatively active, but broke contact and dispersed whenever they met superior U.N, forces. The guerrilla elements south and east of Uisong, on one occasion, extended their activities to the Yongdok area on the east coast. Some elements displaced southward into the Pohyan-San Mountain area, about 20 miles northwest to Pohang. Early in February, front lines ran generally eastward from Suwon, near the west coast, to Yoju, thence northeast to Hoengsong, southeast to Yongwol, and northeast to Nakpong on the east coast.

Numerous aerial engagements took place in the air over North Korea close to the Manchurian border. One of these involved about 60 planes. The superiority of U.N. planes, tactics, and pilots over those of the enemy was repeatedly proven in these encounters. The number of hostile aircraft destroyed mounted slowly but steadily.

There were indications of enemy intentions to use airfields in Korea but the fields in Manchuria remained their major bases. As many as 85 aircraft had been observed on Antung Airfield, just north of the Yalu River boundary. The Communists increased the number of single plane attacks on U.N. ground forces, but inflicted only negligible damage.

Reports were received that typhus had hit part of the Chinese armies in Korea. The cold weather added its toll of losses through frostbite, trench foot, and freezing. In addition, the enemy suffered extremely heavy combat casualties.

Our strategic plans to cope with the new situation created by Communist China's entry into the war continued to produce the desired results. By breaking contact and rapidly withdrawing to the south, after our November 24 advance ex= posed the secret Chinese Communist build-up south of the Yalu River, the enemy was forced to extend his supply lines over 300 miles. Each mile of this forward extension rendered him increasingly vulnerable to air attack. It correspondingly expanded our power to overcome the handicap of numerically superior ground forces and terrain favorable to infiltration by maneuver, and pro. portionately reduced our own logistical difficulties. Resulting from this more favorable balance, air and ground forces delivered major blows against the enemy, kept him off balance, and denied him extended enjoyment of the tactical initiative. Of possible greater significance was the exploding of the enemy propagandized myth of Communist military invincibility, and the clear demonstration that the Allied soldier crusading for freedom is more than a match for the Communist soldier fighting to serve neither ideal nor spiritual purpose.

Our operations were characterized by a most complete and effective coordination of combined arms - land, sea, and air. The spiritual and physical integration of the units and nationalities involved has had few parallels in military history. It was in every respect a unified command of high morale and marked battle efficiency. Every unit and individual was invincibly bound together by a singleness of high purpose.

On February 13, after visiting the western sector of the Korean battle front, I issued the following public statement: "What the future has in store in Korea continues to be largely dependent upon international considerations and decisions not yet known here. Meanwhile, the command is doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it. Our field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to weaken the enemy's supply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destructiveness of our air power, has worked well. In the development of this strategy the Eighth Army has achieved local tactical successes through maximum exploitation of the air's massive blows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies. But in the evaluation of these successes, sight must not be lost of the enemy's remaining potential for reinforcement and resupply. We must not fall into the error of evaluating such tactical successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat, just as many erred in assessing our strategic withdrawals in the face of Commun;st China's commitment to war as a decisive defeat inflicted upon us.

We are still engaged in a war of maneuver with the object of inflicting as heavy a punishment upon the enemy as possible, striving constantly to keep him off balance to prevent his obtaining and holding the tactical initiative, while at the same time avoiding the hazards inherent in his numerical superiority. The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved, and the relatively small force which could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such strategy could insure destruction of our forces piecemeal. Talk of crossing the 38th Parallel at the present stage of the campaign, except by scattered patrol action inci,dental to the tactical situation, is purely academic. From a military standpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority of our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in undeclared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage of sanctuary protection upon Chinese soil for his military potential against our counter-attack, before we can seriously consider conducting major operations north of that geographic line.

Meanwhile, however, the complete coordination of our land, sea, and air forces, and the consequent smooth synchronization of their combined operations, with each arm contributing its full part, continues to inflict terrific losses upon the enemy. General Ridgway is proving himself a brilliant and worthy successor to General Walker as commander of the Eighth Army. With Admiral Struble in command of the Fleet, and General Partridge in command of the Air, they comprise an ideal trio of field commanders.

Hard-driving U.N. forces scored advances of 12 to 25 miles along the entire front against stubbornly resisting enemy forces. South and east of Seoul, the North Korean I Corps and the Chinese Communist Thirty-eighth and Fiftieth Armies, in an aggregate of eight divisions, fought tenaciously in the Anyang, Kyongan, Yangpyong areas to protect the main approach to Seoul. U.N.forces took Anyang on February 7, and advanced 3 miles north of the town on the following day. The battered enemy in this area had been driven north across the Han River, and U.N, forces had taken possession of the Port of Inchon, Kimpo Airfield, and the south bank of the Han, to the south and west of Seoul. Enemy attempts to recross the river were repelled.

Heavy fighting continued throughout the period in the area south of Yangpyong. The Chinese Communist 38th Army was forced back 5 to 6 miles on both sides of the Yoju-Yangpyong axis, and sustained heavy casualties. However, enemy resistance remained firm to the south and east of Yangpyong. Meanwhile, the enemy was maintaining his Han River bridgehead between Seoul and Yangpyong.

In the central portion of the front, U.N. forces encountering light to moderate resistance, took Hoengsong and advanced 9 miles to the north by February II. On the night of February II12, the Chinese Communist 40th and bbfh Armies and the North Korean V Corps launched a heavy counter-offensive north of Hoengsong on a 10 mile front. The enemy penetrated our positions in several places, principally against ROK 3rd and 8th Divisions, achieved extensive infiltrations, and forced U.N. units to withdraw several thousand yards to a new defensive line south of the town. Our forces evacuated Hoengsong on February 13, and withdrew to the vicinity of Wonju for further operations.

In eastern Korea, enemy resistance was spotty as U.N. forces advanced up to 25 miles. Kangnung on the east coast was taken, and Chumunjin fell. By February 10, U.N. forces had advanced several miles northward toward the 38th Parallel. In the Uihong area, almost 100 miles south of the main front, U.N. forces continued vigourous action to suppress relatively strong North Korean remnants and guerrilla forces. In repeated engagements of battalion and regimental size, enemy forces invariably withdrew after a few hours of fighting.

Front lines at mid-February ran generally from Inchon on the west coast to Seoul, southeast to Kwanju, east to the Han River below Yangpyong, east to Wonju or north thereof, northeast to Kanpyong, and thence to Chumunjin on the east coast.

U.N. naval forces conducted patrol and reconnaissance operations which continued to deny to the enemy the waters surrounding Korea. Air and gunfire support was furnished by naval units which maintained station in extremely severe winter weather conditions. Heavy naval gunfire-support missions along both coasts blasted the enemy ahead of advancing U.N, ground forces, while U.N. naval and Marine air units contributed to the close air support effort and continued to strike against the enemy in the rear areas. The bombardment of the Kangnung area on the east coast, and of the Inchon area were particularly effective.

Check minesweeping operations and destruction of mines continued along the coasts of Korea to clear the waters used by gunfire-support ships and transports. Drifting mines constituted a constant menace to shipping in Korean waters and in the Japan Sea. This mine menace was highI'ighted by the sinking of a mine sweeper.

Air operations followed the previous pattern with the close integration of the air and ground efforts enjoying marked tactical success. Both on the main battle position and in U.N. rear areas, where guerrilla activities had been a source of annoyance, the offensive ground action served to increase the number of suitable air targets by forcing the enemy to concentrate and to reveal his location as he was driven from one area to another. Air drops of hundreds of tons of ammunition and other combat equipment granted many army units a flexibility contributing materially to tactical successes.

Armed reconnaissance aircraft continued sweeping the North Korean roads and railroads of vehicles and rolling stock, while destruction of bridges, marshalling yards, and tunnels rendered the enemy resupply problem a gigantic one. Relatively heavy southbound traffic through Hamhung in the northeastern sector received the brunt of attacks during several days early in February, and later the traffic in the western areas received the heavier effort.

Improved equipment and procedures increased substantially the effectiveness of not only the night sweeps along the lines of communications, but also the close support effort where the battle area could be brilliantly lighted by high candle power flares. Air engagements were few, the enemy refusing to operate except by sneak attack in areas other than those immediately adjacent to his Manchurian sanctuary.

Although cases of sickness had been reported, it is noteworthy that there had been no general outbreak of disease of epidemic proportion in the areas under U.N. control. Active measures were being taken to prevent such an occurrence. The DDT dusting program continued, and the immunization program was expanded to include typhus, small pox, and typhoid immunizations for the entire south Korean population (estimated at 20 million persons). Medical facilities were improved and reestablished. For example, four hospitals had been placed in operation on Cheju-Do. Sixteen U.N. member nations made generous contributions which, with those of voluntary relief agencies, totaled more than $14,500,000. Of this total, approximately $8,500,000 had been delivered to Korea.

Stubbornly resisting a vigorous U.N. offensive, enemy forces were pushed northward 7 to 16 miles on a 90-mile front extending from Seoul to Chonson. The enemy employed large numbers of tactical reserves, particularly in the Seoul-Hoengsonq area. This move was not only unsuccessful, but resulted in tremendous losses both in men and materiel. In this action the enemy's Han River bridgehead between Seoul and Yangpyong was eliminated, and he was forced to relinquish his deep salient between Wonju and Chonson by February 25. As a result, U.N. lines were now relatively straight and unbroken over the entire front. Heavy fighting continued in the Chipyong area to the end of the month, as U.N. forces advanced about 10 miles and drove a shallow salient into enemy lines 4 to 6 miles north and northeast of Chipyong. Strong enemy forces were driven out of Hoengsong but they continued to offer stubborn resistance to the north and west of the town. In the Pyongchang area, enemy forces held the initiative until February 20, and U.N. units made limited withdrawals from February Ib to 19. Heavy fighting took place 7 to 10 miles north of Checon, twelve miles east of Wonju, and in the area south of Chongson. After these strong local attacks were repulsed, U.N. units began vigorous offensive action, and by February 24 the enemy had retreated 10 to 17 miles. Minor clashes took place in the Kangnung area, near the east coast. Front lines at the end of February ran northeast from Inchon to the Han River along the Han to Yangpyong, east to Hoengsong and Chongson, and thence northeast to Kangnung.

Enemy lines of supply were repeatedly attacked between the Manchurian border and the front lines. The enemy's numerical advantage had been considerably offset by the constant chocking of his lengthy supply channels. Bridges and marshalling yards continued to be the focal points of the strangulation attacks, although dumps, tunnels, warehouses, and barracks were attacked whenever a degree of importance to the enemy was indicated. An increased number of vehicles and trains provided remunerative targets. Several enemy multi-plane attacks by MIG-15s on small bomber formations and single planes resulted in negligible damage.

The liberation of additional South Korean areas necessitated an increase in the number of civil assistance teams, and the availability of Ibcal governmental officials to reinstitute civil government. Action was being taken to dispatch a newly formed civil assistance team to the province of Cholla Namdo, and to augment teams whose area of responsiblity had increased. Government officials and police agencies were alerted for a reentry into the respective areas. Return of refugees to their home communities was permitted whenever practicable. However, military operations and the condition of liberated areas precluded movement of refugees to the north.

As I pointed out on my last inspection of the Korean battle front, I was entirely satisfied with' the situation at the front where the enemy suffered a tactical reverse of measurable proportion. His losses, among the bloodiest of modern times, were sustained by Communist China's finest troops, and it will be difficult to adequately replace them. The enemy found it an entirely different problem fighting 350 miles from his base than when he had his "sanctuary" in his immediate rear, with our air and naval forces practically zeroed out. He was paying now for the illusion, so falsely but effectively propagandized when Communist China initiated undeclared war, that he had decisively defeated these same forces.

Progress of the campaign continued to be satisfactory, with all three Services - Army, Navy and Air - performing well their completely coordinated tactical missions. Designed to meet abnormal military inhibitions, our strategic plan, involving constant movement to keep the enemy off balance with a corresponding limitation upon his initiative, remained unaltered. Our selection of the battle area furthermore had forced him into the military disadvantage of fighting far from his base and permitted greater employment of our air and sea arms against which he had little defense. There had been a resultant continuing and exhausting attrition upon both his manpower and supplies. There should be no illusions in this matter, however. In such a campaign of maneuver, as our battle lines shifted north the supply position of the enemy would progressively improve, just as inversely, the effectiveness of our air potential would progressively diminish, thus in turn causing his numerical ground superiority to become of increasing battlefield significance.

Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the limitation upon our freedom of counter offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines could not fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves. The exact place of stabilization was of necessity a fluctuating variable, dependent upon the shifting relative strengths of the forces committed. It would constantly move up or down.

Suffering heavy casualties, the enemy conducted vigorous delaying actions, as steady U.N. pressure pushed him northward six to eight miles on the central front extending about 70 miles from the Pukhan River area east of Seoul to Hajinbu, near the east coast. Concomitantly U.N. forces observed extensive troop and vehicular movement to the hostile rear, disclosing enemy efforts to augment and redeploy his reserve forces in the vicinity of the Hongchon River, and in the areas north of Hongchon and Seoul. Additional Chinese Communist and North Korean units were steadily displacing southward, principally along the eastern axis into the Kumhwa-HwachonChunchon-Chorwon area, and depleted front line units were receiving large numbers of badly needed replacements. Enemy reserve forces available for immediate employment on the front included at least four Chinese Communist Armies and at least one North Korean Corps.

Enemy forces offered strong resistance through March 10. Fighting was particularly heavy on both sides of the Pukhan River, near its confluence with the Han, but by March 12, resistance had diminished and became generally light over the entire front.

Vigorous U.N. operations had substantially reduced the strength of organized Communist guerrilla elements operating in U.N. rear areas. In particular, the large guerrilla force built around the 10th North Korean Division suffered severe losses in the area 15 miles west of Ulchin, near the east coast. Remnants of this force moved northward toward Samchok, their offensive capacity drastically reduced. Guerrilla forces elsewhere had been relatively inactive and were believed to be breaking up into smaller bands in order to elude U.N. forces.

The hospital ship Jutlandia, contributed by Denmark, reported for operations in March and constituted a most valuable and welcome addition to the U.N. naval forces combatting aggression in Korea. Enemy jet fighters in flights of 15 to 25 ineffectively challenged U.N. air supremacy several times over North Korea. U.N. medium bombers sustained slight damage but the score of downed and damaged aircraft remained well in the favor of U.N. forces. The enemy jets restricted their operations to the northern part of Korea within easy access to the Manchurian border and to their Antung base visible to U.N. aircraft flying interdiction and counter air operations south of the Yalu River. Indicative of the relentless pressure being applied by the air echelon was the new high total of about 1,250 sorties flown in one day.

The void of reliable information concerning U.N. soldiers who had fallen into the hands of the enemy was another manifestation of the contempt in which the Communists apparently held the international laws of war. In spite of their statements to the U.N., we had no information indicating any compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention which require that a civilized nation render certain minimum reports on prisoners of war. The enemy consistently pursued a viciously misleading program wherein highly colored propaganda substituted for the official, confirmed data required by the Geneva Convention. The International Red Cross had not been permitted to establish liaison with U.N. prisoners held by the Communists nor to carry out other services usually provided by the Red Cross organization.

Our strategic plan, notwithstanding the enemy's great numerical superiority, was indeed working well and I had just directed a resumption of the initiative by our forces. All ranks of the U.N. international forces were covering themselves with distinction.

Veterans of Foreign Wars. The Road Back: South Korea Cleared Of Reds By General Douglas MacArthur. : 1950-1953 Macarthur Reports. Veterans' Historical Book Service Inc, USA. 1951.

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