Home : America At War : The War In Korea :December, 1950 Thru January, 1951
In the face of Chinese Communist participation, detected early in November, it was imperative to discover the enemy's tactical and strategic intentions without delay. As a reaction to the United Nations Eighth Army advance of November 24, the Chinese Communists were forced prematurely to launch a large-scale offensive which was clear proof of their mounting tactical readiness and full decision for the offensive operations. No North Korean forces were employed in the massive enemy attack; it was an exclusive Chinese Communist operation. The Eighth Army right flank position, held by the ROK II Corps, was penetrated resulting in an untenable tactical disposition for other units of the Eighth Army. Withdrawal was forced by the overwhelming superiority of enemy numbers, moving in a position to strike the Eighth in the rear in the direction of Pyongyang. Thus the Eighth Army conducted deliberate planned withdrawals with unbroken cohesion, displaying skill by the field commanders, and gallantry by all forces. The X Corps was operating out of the east coast ports of Wonsan and Hamhung in an attack to the border. Its units were deployed on four lines of attack: The advance of the ROK 1 Corps along the northeastern coast which had passed Chongjin more than 200 miles from the base and less than 60 miles from the border at its eastern extremity; the northern advance of the 7th Infantry Division which had reached the border at Hyesanjin; the northwesterly advance of the U. S. Ist Marine Division which had passed Yudam-ni on the western side of the Chosin Reservoir; and the westerly advance of the 3d infantry Division out of Wonsan. The massive extent of the Chinese Communist attack forced the withdrawal of the X Corps. From three of its four lines of advance, this was effected without serious interference by the enemy. On December 4, however, a major enemy drive impinged against the troops in the Chosin Reservoir area. While the 1st Marines with one battalion at Singdong-ni, one at Koto-ri and one with the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at Hagaru-ri at the south end of the Chosin Reservoir, kept the supply road and route of withdrawal open, the 5th and 7th Marines withdrew under heavy and continuous enemy pressure from their advanced position at Yudam-ni to the division base at Hagaru-ri, 11 miles to the south. Meanwhile a task force consisting of two battalions of the 7th Infantry Division operating on the eastern side of the reservoir was attacked by an overwhelming number of Chinese Communist troops and withdrew across the frozen reservoir to join the Marines at Hagaru-ri. All elements to the northward having closed at Hagaru-ri on December 4, the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Infantry Division, on the morning of December 6, resumed the attack to the southward. The enemy attempted to block the withdrawal route and brought pressure upon the column from the rear and both flanks. The column, on December 7, reached the battalion holding the main supply route at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, a special task force from the 3d Infantry Division had moved north to Sudong-ni where it relieved the Ist Battalion, Ist Marines, which, in turn, attacked north to reopen the road to Koto-ri. On December 9, t!ze head of the column effected a juncture with this ha'r~la'ion. The following day, the leading elements of the column debouched from the mountains onto the coastal plain and entered the Corps defensive position. By niahtfall of December II, all elements had been withdrawn to that position and the concentration of the Corps was complete. In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Infantry Division marched and fought a distance of 60 miles in bitter cold along a narrow tortuous ice-covered road against opposition of from six to eight Chinese Communist divisions which suffered staggering losses. Success was due in no small part to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support. The basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly courage displayed by the personnel of the ground units who maintained their integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior forces, consistently held their positions until their wounded had been evacuated, and doggedly refused to abandon supplies and equipment to the enemy. Under cover of the Chinese Communist operations, North Korean units were known to be reorganizing and re-equipping, in some instances within the sanctuary of Chinese territory, and were in a position to augment the total Chinese Communist forces. These reconstituted North Korean forces were formed into a number of corps, four of which had been identified. A Greek infantry battalion arrived on December 9 and joined the United Nations forces in Korea. The following ten nations were now represented by army combat forces in Korea: Australia, Greece, France, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. At mid-December, front lines in the Eighth Army sector ran generally from Tosong-ni near the west coast, north along the Yeson River to Kumchon, northeast to Subyon-ni, southeast to Honchon and Kapyong, northeast to Chichen-ni, and thence southeast to Naepyong-ni. Front lines in the X Corps sector followed an arc of 15 miles radius centered on Hamhung. United Nations naval forces continued to deny enemy surface units movement in any of the waters surrounding Korea. Naval air and surface units supported Republic of Korea troops in their withdrawal from the Chongjin area to the $ongjin area. Surface units provided fire support covering the withdrawal of United Nations forces from the Wonsan area, a withdrawal which was accomplished with no loss of either personnel or equipment. Naval and Marine air units, both carrier and shore-based, provided close air support for troops throughout the area of northeast Korea. The close naval and Marine air support, furnished the Ist Marine Division and elements of the U. S. 7th Infantry Division in the Yudam-ni-Hagaru-ri Kotori area, pinned down enemy forces, decimated those that exposed themselves, and helped mightily in the successful withdrawal action. On December 5, all United Nations personnel in the port of Chinnampo were withdrawn by sea. A total of 6,700 personnel were involved. Military facilities were destroyed by gunfire following this withdrawal. Drifting mines were frequently sighted and destroyed on the high seas. The hazard of these mines was particularly acute on the east coast. Unitea Nations air forces threw the bulk of their effort into close support of ground forces cutting their way through overwhelming numbers of Chinese Communists The toll of the enemy taken by United Nations aircraft contributed in large measure to the successful move of our forces from the Chosin Reservoir to the Hamhung area despite the tremendous odds against them. Air support provided by the U. S. Marine Air Force and naval aircraft in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground forces commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of tactical air operations in history. One outstanding operation was the evacuation of wounded from the reservoir area prior to the successful withdrawal by the U.S. 1st Marine Division and elements of the 7th U. S. Division. The U.S. Far East Air Force, assisted by U.S. Marine and Royal Hellenic Air Force planes, lifted the sick and wounded from a small improvised air strip at the southern tip of Chosin Reservoir. Icy runways and icing conditions in the air, coupled with the mountains closely rimming the landing area, as well as hostile action, failed to prevent the success of this operation. The full import of the changed situation became evident. Interrogation of newly captured Chinese Communist prisoners of war revealed both the extent of the participation of this new enemy and his basic intentions. There was thus left no doubt that it had long been the plan of the Chinese Communist authorities to commit so much of their war resources in manpower and materiel as necessary to insure destruction of the United Nations command and prevent the United Nations from bringing order and unification to all of Korea. Our general attack of November 24 threw the surreptitious Chinese Communist buildup operations off balance, and prematurely exposed the decision of the Chinese Communist authorities to intervene - a decision not openly announced nor previously brought to light through political intelligence. The open intervention of Communist China, and the employment of its vast war resources against the relatively small United Nations Command, forced us to withdraw from our offensive operations designed to destroy remaining North Korean opposition, and to assume a posture of the defense. This was accomplished in complete order with all units intact and losses well within normal limits of combat experience. Communist centers of the world sought to propagandize the thought that our tactical operaions initiated on November 24 resulted in the United Nations Command being completely shattered. They sought to create the illusion of major tactical disaster-to point to the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean conflict as solely responsive to our own tactical decisions and movements. All of this was pure nonsense. The United Nations Command was in excellent shape with high morale, conspicuous self-confidence, and marked battle efficiency. It was in no sense a defeated command. The entry of Communist China into the Korean conflict - a risk inherent in our Korean operations from their very inception - was responsible alone to decisions long determined upon and given effect by the destruction of the North Korean satellite forces. The principal factor underlying the situation - that the United Nations Command now was opposed by the combined war resources of Communist China - had become somewhat obscured by this rash of propaganda tending to cloud the real issue. The United Nations Command, due to intervening circumstances, quite beyond its power to control, was unable to complete the execution of its prescribed mission. It was within its capabilities, however, to continue to inflict staggering losses upon this new enemy power and to cause an enormous and progressive attrition to the Chinese Communist forces in Korea. Apart from the continuation of our naval blockade and unremitting air interdiction of enemy troop and supply concentrations in North Korea, the period from December 16 to 31 was consumed by the United Nations Command with the readjustment of our ground positions along the Kaesong-Yongyong-Hwachon-Puypyongni defense line made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war. These tactical readjustments were conducted with great skill by local commanders and unparalleled coordination among the several areas. Political reassurances that the United Nations Command would not violate the international border were universally believed to have failed to convince the Chinese authorities. The free world wanted the integrity of our purpose fully understood and accordingly renewed assurances were publicly given by me as military commander, upon the resumption of our advance, that the Eighth Army would be returned to its home station in Japan just as soon as the Korean border area had been cleared of hostile elements. This but expressed our hopes - indeed the hopes of all men of good will - through reemphasis of our military objectives. Unfortunately in some quarters it was otherwise interpreted and my intent misrepresented. Our advance was the final test of Chinese intentions. Possibly of greatest political significance throughouf the tactical displacement operations was the avidity with which North Korean citizens sought sanctuary behind the United Nations lines. There was little doubt but that, given the opportunity, practically the entire North Korean population would have migrated south in a search of such sanctuary. Without the slightest hesitancy they made clear their complete aversion to Communist rule, and their fervent desire at whatever hazard for refuge within the protection of the United Nations. They welcomed our forces as liberators when we went in, and sought to withdraw with us when we withdrew. Historically, this exemplifed the popular dread of Communist tyranny - the reason such rule may only survive in a totalitarian police state. Following a series of probing attacks against United Nations forces deployed along the 38th Parallel, the enemy, on January I, initiated a general offensive directing his main effort due south toward Seoul, Kapyong in the west, and toward Yonju in the center. Employing his main force of 20 Chinese Communist infantry divisions, the enemy delivered heavy attacks against United Nations Forces to the north and northeast of Seoul, and achieved deep penetrations of 10 to 12 miles, which in conjunction with similar successes by the enveloping force in the Chunchon area, forced a general United Nations withdrawal. By January 4 the enemy had occupied Seoul, and the United Nations forces has displaced to a line south of the Han River. However, continued enemy success in the Wonju salient made this position untenable. On January 7 new United Nations defensive positions were established along a line extending from Pyongtaek northeast to Wonju. Thereafter, the enemy maintained only light patrol contact, and began deploying his assault forces along a parallel line extending 10 miles to the north through Osan and Yoju. An enemy force of eleven north Korean divisions, and elements of an unidentified Chinese Communist corps, undertook the main effort down the center of the peninsula, driving along and to the east of the Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon axis, which constitutes the principal North-South line of communications in this area. Taking advantage of superior numbers, strong guerrilla forces, and difficult terrain, the enemy maintained deep 20-to-30 mile penetrations of the thinly held United Nations lines east of the Chunchon-Chechon axis. This penetration enabled the enemy forces to drive repeatedly against the right flank of the main body of United Nations forces deployed to meet the large Communist forces concentrated to the west, and to impede the withdrawal of United Nations units to Wonju by assuming blocking positions in their immediate rear. From January 8 the enemy made strong efforts to drive United Nations forces out of the Wonju area, but met stubborn resistance in the form of counterattacks and suffered exremely high casualties. The enemy was relatively inactive in the east coastal sector, but Communist guerrilla forces were very active south of Yongwol, and particularly around Tanyang, a principal rail and road communications junction situated approximately 20 miles to the south. The 8,000-odd guerrilla troops in this general area were apparently working in close coordination with enemy troops on the front, and constituted the most formidable element of the enemy guerrilla forces which now totaled not less than 25,000. Front lines at mid-January ran generally from the west coast at Pyongtaek northeast to Wonju, southeast to Chechon, east to Yongwol, northeast to Chongson, and thence to Samchok on the east coast. United Nations surface vessels executed gunfire missions in close support of troops and inshore bombardments. Ships operating in the Yalu Gulf area were hampered by thick, broken ice. United Nations ground forces were provided intensive and uninterrupted close air support. Completing 200 consecutive days of operations, and 100,000 sorties, air units of the U. S. Far East Force, in conjunction with naval and U.S. Marine air elements, mounted the heaviest attacks of the Korean conflict during this period. Enemy troops, tanks, and artillery were the primary targets of aircraft on close support, armed reconnaissance, and intruder missions. North of the battle area, communications targets and airfields continued under attack. The problem of handling refugees who sought sanctuary within the area controlled by the United Nations forces increased daily. It was estimated that upward of a million refugees had migrated southward seeking protection. They filled the roads and impeded and delayed the movement of United Nations troops and supplies. Enemy agents were able to enter our lines disguised as refugees. In addition, enemy troops could approach our positions concealed amidst these masses of refugees, immune from air attack. Shelter, food, and clothing continued to be the most critical supply items in alleviating the suffering of refugees. The limited shelter available was definitely inadequate to provide minimum housing requirements. Daily air drops of United Nations leaflets were being made over enemy troop concentrations, both Chinese and North Korean. More than 184 million leaflets had now. been disseminated in Korea. Loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets were used to control the movement of civilian refugees fleeing from Communist terror. Radio broadcasts, both from Command Headquarters in Japan and from Korea, were bringing the Korean people on both sides of the fighting lines an accurate daily report of events with reassurance of continuing United Nations determination to work for the establishment of a free and united Korea. To avoid the premature publication of any information which might be helpful to the enemy, censorship had been established in Korea.
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