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November Thru December, 1950

Infantrymen fire upon an abandoned North Korean village where enemy guerrillas were making a stand. They had to wait until nightfall to advance in order to avoid being easy targets.

Chinese Communist forces in significant strength moved across the Yalu River and attacked United Nations forces. This constituted an act of international lawlessness far exceeding that of mere brigandage. The course of operations of United Nations Forces in Korea had in consequence changed from that of pursuit of defeated and routed North Korean army remnants to that of a new campaign against a fresh enemy force.

On October 31, the dwindling North Korean forces appeared to be making a last desperate stand in the Unsan area. Elsewhere, they were steadily giving ground. However, on November I, elements of the 124th Chinese Communist (Chinese Communist forces) Division were identified on the front near Kotori, a few miles south of Chosin Reservoir. Within 10 days, through interrogation of prisoners from all Chinese units involved, elements of eleven more Chinese Communist forces divisions were identified on the forward areas. Of these, elements of 9 had taken up positions between Pakchon and Tockchon in the western sector, and Chinese Communist forces strength in the Kotori area had expanded to identified elements of 3 divisions. At the same time, United Nations aerial- reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in Manchuria, and into Korea.

Chinese Communist intervention had increased effective enemy strength by an estimated 300 per cent. By this action, the enemy made it necessary to integrate advanced elements into a continuous front on the western and central sectors, for coordinated large scale offensive action. During the period of the United Nations forces redeployment, the Communist forces were moderately aggressive, and mounted numerous small scale attacks at various points in the western and central parts of` the front. As United Nations forces resumed the offensive, the enemy displayed flexibility and resisted stubbornly at Pakchon, Wonni, and particularly at Tokchon.

In the widely extended east coast sector, no ' definite front lines existed. Of the 3 main axes of advance, the Communists interposed a strong defending force only on the approaches to the Chosin and Fusen Reservoirs. On the Pungsan-Kapsan axis, the North Korean Wonsan Brigade had retreated to Kapsan under steady United Nations pressure. The 507th North Korean Brigade, carrying out limited delaying actions, had been forced to displace 25 miles northward from Kilchu along the main east coast highway.

In reinforcement and resupply, the enemy was relatively safe from United Nations air interdiction, because he could move from the border to the front lines during the long winter hours of darkness. Front lines at mid-November ran generally from Pakchon, near the west coast, eastward to Tokchon, northeast to Kotori, and Kapsan, and thence eastward to Tajin.

The 29th British Infantry Brigade Group arrived in Korea on November 3, and the 21st Thailand Infantry Regiment arrived on November 7. United Nations Army combat forces in Korea now contained units from seven nations. The difference in language, equipment, supplies, and methods of operations were solved satisfactorily, and the cooperation between forces of different nations was excellent. One more Republic of Korea division was activated. Enemy guerrilla operations, conducted primarily by by-passed North Korean units, both in the immediate and deep rear areas, continued north of the 38th Parallel. Though by no means a serious factor, these forces were a constant menace to United Nations supply lines, extremely prejudicial to civil control, and required disproportionate numbers of United Nations troops for internal policing action. Conditions south of the 38th Parallel improved considerably, and the counter-guerrilla operations in that area now were being accomp!ished entirely by Republic of Korea forces.

Units of the Thailand Navy joined the United Nations naval forces in Korean waters, which forces now comprised naval units of nine member nations. Naval gunfire support and bombardment activity reached the lowest level of the Korean campaign, due to the growing lack of military targets within the radius of their guns. Enemy mines continued to engage a large share of attention of the United Nations naval forces. Shipping was able to dock at berths at Wonsan Harbor on November 5. Light draft vessels were able to enter Chinnampo Harbor on November 10. Minesweeping continued off Chinnampo and Hungnam with the prospect that both these important ports would be completely free of mines in the near future. To date over eighty drifting mines have been found and destroyed by United Nations naval forces. A large proportion of these drifting mines were live mines, in violation of international law.

The United Nations complete supremacy in the air was challenged for the first time during the Korean operations by modern high performance type jet aircraft. Russian-produced MIG-15s were engaged in combat over Korean territory on November I when United Nations planes now attacked in the Sinuiju area. There was a marked increase in the employment of enemy conventional type aircraft against United Nations air and ground forces, though so far they had constituted in the main no more than a nuisance factor. Comparative losses favored the United Nations forces despite operating factors favoring the enemy. The Communists were taking full advantage of the sanctuary afforded within the areas beyond the Manchurian border, respected by our forces. Aircraft were observed taking off from Antung to Manchuria, and proceeding to the attack south across the Yalu River. The interception of these planes between the border and the United Nations front lines was a difficult problem - so short a period of flight being involved. Combat damaged Communist planes which would certainly have been destroyed, had our forces been operating without restriction, found refuge in Chinese Communist territory. The superiority of United Nations pilots was nullified upon occasion when hard-pressed Communist fliers utilized the border to break off combat and improve their tactical position by gaining altitude, or by other maneuvers, and then returned to combat.

Planes attacking military objectives south of the border would draw anti-aircraft artillery fire from guns on the Manchurian side. This hostile action was conducted with impunity as a result of scrupulous efforts by United Nations forces to maintain the border inviolate. The Communists practiced this conscienceless derision of justice and peace from their bases of aggression, protected solely by a barrier imposed by the democracies' desire to prevent expansion of the arena of conflict. A South African air unit joined other United Nations air forces in the Far East. Aerial supply continued to contribute materially to both ground and air combat operations.

To present more clearly the situation facing the United Nations forces at this time, I present a resume of events since September. By the middle of October 1950, the United Nations forces held in prisoner of war enclosures more than 130,000 North Korean military personnel, and had killed or wounded an additional 200,000. Thus, the personnel of the North Korean forces were eliminated, their equipment was captured or destroyed, and all but the northern borders of Korea was held by United Nations forces. For all practical purposes, the conflict with the armed forces of the former North Korean regime had been terminated. Beginning in October 1950, Chinese Communists started moving into Korea and attempted to cover their moves by statements that it was individual, volunteer participation. It is perfectly clear that the Chinese started moving the mass of their forces to position for the invasion by the middle of September. The Chinese Communist forces were now invading Korea and attacking United Nations forces in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of volunteerism or other subterfuge now had the slightest validity. These irrefutable facts prove that the Chinese Communist regime had directed an invasion of Korea and an assault against the United Nations forces.

There were extensive operations by United Nations air forces of all types in sustained attacks on enemy lines of communications, supplies, and troop concentrations in conjunction with a regrouping and a re-supply of United Nations Army forces. On November 24, a general attack was launched by all available United Nations forces. The attack progressed satisfactorily for two days, at which time strong attacks, principally by Chinese Communist forces, required readjustment of United Nations forces and resuming defensive operations. The United Nations offensive successfully developed and revealed the strength and intentions of the Chinese Communists.

The enemy forces demonstrated considerable strategic and 'tactical skill. These forces, now predominantly Chinese Communist, surrendered every extensive area in the east coastal sector in the zone of operations of the U.S. X Corps. United Nations were virtually unchallenged within the great quadrangle marked by Chongjin, Hyesanjin, Chosin Reservoir, and Hungnam, except for strong pressure on United Nations units south and west of the reservoir. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division met only moderate opposition in its rapid advance to the Manchurian border at Hyesanjin, and Republic of Korea forces had similar success advancing beyond Chongjin on the east coast. However, in the west sector, Communist forces launched a strong offensive producing a collision with the United Nations general offensive of November 24.

In the west sector, on a line arching northward between Kasan and Tokchon, the enemy displayed little interest in combat from November 16 to 25, inclusive. In many instances, units advanced several miles without contacting the enemy, and United Nations patrols, ranging northward 5 to 8 miles, met only occasional resistance in the eastern part of the sector. On November 26 and 27, the enemy, apparently reinforced by several fresh Chinese Communist armies (Corps) from Manchuria, attacked all along the line, devoting his major effort to the United Nations Eighth Army right flank in the Tokchon area. These strong, sustained attacks, characterized by the usual Communist infiltrations and flanking tactics, forced advanced units on the United Nations Eighth Army left flank and center to displace 10 to 12 miles to a main line of resistance extending between Pakchon and Won-No. Powerful Communist thrusts north of Tokchon forced United Nations units back about 25 miles to the vicinity of Taepyong.

During the intense fighting in these sections, the enemy suffered heavy personnel losses as a result of maximum United Nations air and ground efforts. - However, such losses were no longer of crucial military importance, in view of the enemy's tremendous capacity for troop reinforcement from secure bases in Manchuria.

The enemy opposition on the right flank of the Eighth Army was now accepted as a major Chinese Communist force thrust which clashed with United Nations forces, and which involved elements of approximately 8 Chinese Communist divisions, while' holding operations on the remainder of the Eighth Army positions involved approximately b additional Chinese Communist divisions. As, part of this general Chinese Communist offensive, savage attacks were directed against United Nations forces in the general vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir with a Chinese force estimated at 6 to 8 divisions.

During the period November 24 to December I, the Chinese Communist forces were credited with having taken over direct responsibility for the entire front in North Korea, except for a short line of contact north of Chongjin on the east coast. The Chinese Communists reportedly had transferred most of the North Korean forces to Manchuria for retraining and re-equipping. The only significant military power now confronting United Nations forces in Korea was Communist China.

In reviewing the build-up of Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria and Korea, it is necessary to go back to June and July when the decision to move the Chinese Communist forces 4th Field Army to Manchuria was apparently made, and the actual redeployment of these forces implemented. In view of the situation in Korea at the time, the decision to deploy one field army to this critical area could conceivably be supported as tactically and strategically sound, and in the best interests of the Chinese Communists from a purely defensive viewpoint. However, the subsequent movement and employment of elements of the Chinese Communist forces 3rd Field Army, and possibly portions of the Chinese Communist forces I st Field Army, certainly could not be so justified. The vast quantities of personnel and materiel now poised along the Yalu River and aggressively employed against United Nations forces in Korea far exceeded the most elaborate requirements for the establishment of a purely dr,fensive structure along the Korean-Manchurian border. It was evident that the assembly of such an array of force could not have been effectively accomplished overnight. These factors, considered with other pertinent manifestations, certainly indicated that plans for the active and aggressive intervention in the Korean war were undoubtedly developed early in the summer.

Front lines at the end of November in the Eighth Army sector ran generally northeast from the mouth of the Chongchon River to Pakchon, east to Won-Ni, and thence southeast to Taepyong-Ni. In the U.S. X Corps sector on the east coast, no definite front lines existed. Points of contact demarcated a general line north from $achang to Hagaru and Yudem on the Chosin Reservoir, northeast to Samsu, and thence northeast to Chongjin on the east coast.

A Netherlands Army battalion arrived on November 22, and a French Army battalion arrived on November 29. These units joined the United Nations Forces in Korea which increased to nine the number of nations contributing Army Combat forces.

Communist guerrilla units, varying from a few hundred to several thousand men, were operating in isolated areas throughout the United Nations occupied portion of Korea. Nearly 30 per cent of the United Nations troops in Korea were employed against them in the essential tasks of protecting supply lines and the more vital urban centers. From November I to 21, for example, there were nearly 200 guerrilla raids and attacks. On November 18, carrierbased aircraft of Task Force 77 were attacked by eight to ten jet planes of Russian MIG-15 type operating from bases in Manchuria. One of these planes was destroyed and several others damaged. They all quickly avoided combat and, except for the one that was destroyed, took refuge over the border in Manchuria. In addition to carrying out interdiction strikes, carrier-based planes, plus Marine shore-based planes, furnished close air support to ground units in northeastern Korea.

United Nations minesweeping units continued the task of sweeping mines from the harbors essential to our operations, a long and tedious process. While still a source of great danger to United Nations shipping, the menace of mines has been reduced considerably. Channels leading to the harbors of Haeju, Chinnampo, Wonsan, Hamhung, Sonjin, Iwon, and Kojo were swept by our minesweeping units, and these ports were open to our shipping, in addition to ports previously available to us. Thousands of tons of supplies were entering these ports daily for onward routing over short overland hauls to U.N. units engaging the enemy to the north.

Air forces of 5 nations, continuing the offensive launched by the U.S. Far East Air Force in June, struck repeatedly at Communist forces and installations in the narrow band of North Korea controlled by the aggressor. The major part of the air effort comprised sorties in direct and close support of ground forces. Other than during occasional periods of bad weather, ground unit commanders could anticipate early response to their calls for assistance by air. The readily accessible sanctuary in Manchuria provided the enemy with an advantage that was almost impossible for our airmen to overcome despite our superiority in other respects.

Veterans of Foreign Wars. A New Invasion From The Manchurian Sanctuary By General Douglas MacArthur. : 1950-1953 Macarthur Reports. Veterans' Historical Book Service Inc, USA. 1951.

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