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September, 1950

U.S. troops force North Korean stragglers from a bunker where they had remained hidden for hours before surrendering.

On the first day of September the North Korean high command, employing 13 infantry divisions, two new tank regiments, and elements of a previously identified command division, launched their strongest offensive to date against the United Nations position in Korea. This comprehensive attack, which constituted one of the enemy's major efforts, initially struck hard at U.N. positions south of Tikson and, within two days, had extended over the entire U.N. perimeter. His initial effort, in the south, was unsuccessful. At the southern end of the front the enemy 6th and 7th Divisions had been driven back 3,000 yards to their original position by September 3, through determined counterattacks of the U.S. 25th Division supported by other U.N. forces. Thereafter, despite constant attacks, North Korean forces made no advances in this sector.

Farther north, in the Naktong River area between Hyonpung and the Nam River, the enemy 2nd, 4th, 9th and IOth Divisions, plus armored elements, began a general offensive eastward over the Naktong which scored initial advances of 6,000 to 8,000 yards against bitter resistance by U.N. forces. By September 5, however, the enemy had lost the initiative, and was compelled to give ground under heavy pressure from U.N. forces. By the end of the month the enemy retained only a 2- to 3-mile strip east of the Naktong River.

The enemy 3rd and 13th Divisions achieved gains of similar magnitude (6,000-8,000 yards) along the Taegu salient, from September 4 to 11, in some of the heaviest fighting of the war. By that date, U.N. forces had absorbed the drive on Taegu, and began to register slow progress against strong enemy resistance. In the Sinnyong sector, the ROK 8th Division had gained about 3,000 yards by September 4. During the series of heavy, but indecisive, engagements which followed U.N. forces blocked further enemy advances.

The British 27th Infantry Brigade joined U.N. forces in the defense of the Naktong River line on September 7. This unit had assumed its proportionate share of the U.N. operations in that sector, and was engaged in defensive operation and systematic police action to eliminate small enemy parties in the rear areas.

In the Haeson-Angang sector, near the eastern flank of the U.N. perimeter, the North Korean 12th and 15th Divisions posed a most serious threat temporarily. Initiating heavy attacks near Kigye on September 3, enemy forces penetrated to within 4 miles of Kyongju by September 5, though the threat to Kyongju was vitiated by U.N. counterattacks the next day. On September 8, the enemy occupied the important town of Yongchon, but was driven out almost immediately by prompt aggressive action of ROK Army units. At his farthest advance the enemy had seized an area almost 10 miles deep and 15 miles wide in this sector, seriously threatening U.N. communications. However, beginning on September 11, ROK and U.S. Army units conducted vigorous counterattacks and advanced up to 6 miles on the west flank of the pocket, relieved pressure on Yongchon and Kyongju, and threatened the North Korean force in turn with encirclement.

On the east coast, the North Korean 5th Division, after yielding some ground to U.N. attacks, resumed the offensive on September 4. This offensive, coordinated with the North Korean 12th and 15th Divisions' penetration on the west of Pohang-dong, necessitated a withdrawal of ROK Army units holding Pohang-dong. Following their withdrawal these same ROK Army units counterattacked and established a firm line 2 miles south of Pohang-dong.

The most significant gains were made initially along the north and west flanks where enemy forces drove to within 7 miles of Taegu, pene• trated the lateral road net between Yongchon and Kyongju and seized Pohang Dong. By September 12, however, the momentum of the attacks was largely spent and the enemy was compelled to fall back in the face of counterattacking U.N. forces. This abortive effort had cost the enemy an estimated 10,000 casualties without any significant losses to U.N. forces either in territory or in combat effectiveness. At the middle of September, the U.N. perimeter ran northward from Yulchi on the south coast, to the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, thence north, parallel with, and 2 miles east of the Naktong River to Hyonpung; thence along the river for 15 miles, and northeast through Sin-dong in a broad arc extending eastward below Haeson and Angang to the east coast at a point 2 miles south of Pohang Dong.

U.N. naval forces continued to demonstrate their versatility of application by sustaining with undiminished intensity all operational tasks un. dertaken. During the enemy's major attack across the Naktong River, commencing early in September, naval aircraft were almost entirely engaged in an all-out effort in close support of the ground troops for several days until the attack was effectively reduced. Thereafter, naval aircraft resumed their missions against North Korean targets in addition. A concentrated effort was made especially against transportation facilities, arsenals, military warehouses and supply dumps, and troop concentrations wherever located. Naval surface units continued coastal bombardment missions on an increasing scale until continuous day and night firing on the east coast military targets became habitual.

At sea along the Korean coast a very large number of enemy small craft were destroyed, including small transports and freighters, trawlers, junks and, barges carrying North Korean military personnel and supplies. Difficulty of identification of water-borne craft engaged in military operations continued to be a problem. In some cases the enemy forced native fishing operations to his use, and it was reported crews were shot if seen conversing with U.N. ships conducting investigations. Nevertheless, every effort was made to confine destruction of small craft to those conducting military operations. Enemy opposition to naval forces was insufficient to hamper U.N. naval operations.

Hostile aircraft were observed on several occasions but exerted no influence in the course of operations. It was a certainty that no difficulties would be experienced with the North Korean Air Force unless it procured planes from sources outside North Korea. Any future significant air action by North Korea would be a measure of the assistance given to her in open contravention of the actions and intent of the U.N. anti-aircraft artillery fire was increasing somewhat both in volume and in accuracy.

A review of the accomplishments of the U.N. air effort from June 25 through September 15 revealed that, while sustaining losses of approximately 100 aircraft, more than 28,000 combat missions had been flown. The greater part of these had been in direct support of U.N. ground units. More than 10,000 noncombat missions had been flown in support of the U.N. effort. The bomb tonnage delivered to strategic and tactical military targets by the U.S. Far East Air Force medium bombers exceeded 17,000 tons.

The U.N. Command had emphasized both the pronouncement made to the civilian communities that military targets would be attacked by air, and the warning to civilians to vacate the immediate zone of such targets. There had been, and there remained, the capability of the U. N. air forces to completely devastate the urban areas of North Korea, but with assiduous care destruction of the civilian population was avoided, and only targets of military significance were attacked.

Among these targets were the following: Pyongyang arsenal, the largest in North Korea, producing over half the arms and ammunition (exclusive of that from outside sources) employed by the enemy, was about 70 per cent destroyed. The ports and naval bases of Chinnampo and Wonsan received attacks in force. The largest integrated chemical combine in the Far East, contributing explosives, aluminum, and magnesium had been reduced by 80 per cent. Specific targets in the combine had been the Hungnam nitrogen fertilizer plant, the Hungnam chemical plant, and the Hungnam explosive plant. The oil refinery at Wonsan was about 95 per cent destroyed. Iron works at Chongjin and steel plants at Songjin and Kyomipo had been attacked with destruction varying from 30 to 90 per cent.

Operations of the Chinnampo smelter, largest producer in North Korea of copper, lead and zinc, had been sharply curtailed. In addition, at Chinnampo, an aluminum plant and one of the few North Korean magnesium producers had sustained 50 to 80 per cent destruction. Other similar targets had been and continued to be attacked.

Along the highway and railroad nets some 250 bridges had been rendered unusable by the dropping of at least one span of each. Important marshalling yards and railroad repair facilities in North Korea were from 25 to 80 per cent destroyed. Total daily sorties at one time exceeded 700. The smooth coordination of the total U.N. air efforts, with the overall ground effort, continued exemplary.

Since the first of September many additional North Korean prisoners were captured by U.N. forces. This brought the total number of prisoners in U.N. custody to more than 4,000. It became necessary to report again continued inhumane acts on the part of North Koreans. These atrocities followed the pattern of other North Korean killings. A strong enemy guerrilla force attacked and overpowered a group of 7 Americans who were operating a signal relay station, tied their hands together, and shot them in the back. All were left for dead. However, although seriously wounded, 2 victims survived.

Events of the last two weeks of September were decisive. The strategic concepts designed to win the war were rapidly proving their soundness through aggressive application by our ground, sea and air arms. The seizure of the heart of the enemy's distributing system in the Seoul area had completely dislocated his logistical supply to his forces in South Korea, and had quickly resulted in their disintegration. Caught between our northern and southern forces, both of which were completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy was thoroughly shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our combined combat activities.

The prompt junction of our two forces was dramatically symbolic of this collapse. Continuing operations would take full advantage of our initiative and unified strength to provide for the complete destruction of the enemy and his early capitulation.

The envelopment:

At dawn of September 15, the United States X Corps made an amphibious assault on the Inchon area. The first phase in this wide envelopment was seizure of Wolmi-do, a small island which dominates Inchon harbor. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th U. S. Marine Division surprised the North Koreans with a perfectly coordinated attack that secured the island in two hours fighting.

The second phase of this operation involved the securing of the Inchon peninsula. The Ist Marine Division and four ROK Marine battalions accomplished this feat with lightning-like blows that kept the North Korean 18th Division and garrison units off-balance and unable to collect their forces for co-ordinated action. Kimpo airfield, the largest in Korea, was cleared on September 17 and opened for U.N. operations the next day. Elements of the U.S. 7th Division, augmented by ROK army forces, were next brought into Inchon and rapidly took over the southern flank advancing speedily 10 miles to the south and securing Suwon.

The liberation of Seoul, and the denying to the North Koreans of road and rail lines in this communication hub, comprised the third phase of this operation. On September 19, the U.S. Ist Marine Division and two ROK Marine battalions crossed the Han River and started the attack on Seoul from the north. The remainder of the U.S. Ist Marine Division and the U.S. 7th Division enveloped Seoul from the southwest. The ROK 17th Regiment attacked through the center.

By this time the North Korean forces had been able to bring in reinforcements from the North Korean 9th Division that was on the Eighth Army front, and from scattered garrison and training units. The North Korean defense of Seoul was coordinated and fanatic, requiring the X Corps Commander to direct actual fighting with its hardships on civilian life and property. The liberation of the city was conducted in such a manner as to cause the least possible damage to civil installations. The third phase was completed on September 28 with only mop-up fighting continuing in the area. The President of Korea moved the Government of the ROK into Seoul on September 29.

The obstacles to this wide envelopment were not only the enemy opposition, but also the natural obstacles of poor beaches fronted by miles of mud flats, a narrow channel, and an extraordinary tidal range of over 29 feet. The success demonstrated a complete mastery of the technique of amphibious warfare, clockwork coordination, and co-operation between the units and services participating. There was nothing noteworthy about the North Korean opposition, but there could have been. The potential was there. The North Koreans were proceeding with the construction of coastal fortifications, dug-in tanks and guns of all calibers, beach defenses and mining operations. Had this envelopment been delayed for as much as a month, the enemy would have been ready and the assault, if possible, would have been more costly to U.N. units.

In coordination with the landing of X Corps at Inchon on September 15, the Eighth Army launched its main effort on September Ib. After reports of the successful landings at Inchon, the forces of Korean, British and U.S. Army troops attacked along their actual front against strong enemy resistance. Some of the most severe fighting of the entire war resulted. The North Korean forces had a tight ring around the U.N. forces in the Eighth Army area, and were pressing their attacks. U.N. forces had inflicted severe punishment on the attacking enemy. This ring around the U.N. forces, though strong, was by this time lacking in depth. The first few days of the main attack were replete with attacks and counterattacks meeting head on.

By September 18, the North Koreans began to give ground slowly around the entire Eighth Army front. By the 20th, U.N. forces were punching holes in the North Korean ring. The port of Pohang-dong on the east coast was retaken by the ROK 3rd Division.

The IX Corps, in the south with the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. 25th Division, and attached ROK units, got its attack rolling rapidly. In the Masan area, on the south coast, the enemy 6th and 7th Divisions had begun to yield ground by September 19. Within 4 days our forces had driven westward almost to Chinju, and during the next week the enemy had been displaced almost to Hadong.

The U.S. I Corps to the north, with the U.S. Ist Cavalry Division, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division, the ROK I st Division, and the British 27th Brigade crossed the Naktong River on the 19th, built up a firm bridgehead on the 20th, and then sprang from this bridgehead in a furious driving attack up the main Kumchon-Taejon axis pushing back the North Korean Ist, 3rd, 10th, and 13th Divisions about 35 miles west of their September 15 line. On the northern and western fronts, the enemy 8th, 12th and 15th Divisions resisted fiercely until September 22, when a series of precipitous withdrawals carried them more than 20 miles northward within 6 days.

The ROK I and II Corps on this front were responsible for this rapid progress. To keep the enemy continually on the move, these ROK units developed a leap-frog system with one regiment resting while another was driving. The enemy losses in personnel and equipment in this area were particularly heavy. At Uisong, more than 100 tons of rice and supplies, and most of the equipment of a division were captured.

In large, the enemy relinquished effective tactical control of nearly all ROK territory south of the 38th Parallel, while U.N. forces now controlled a territory 4 times greater than at the commencement of the Inchon landings. In his general retreat, the enemy suffered thousands of casualties and was forced to abandon large quantities of arms, ammunition, and equipment on all parts of the front. The loss of this materiel, which included field guns, tanks, trucks, and aircraft, further reduced the North Korean fighting potential. U.N. advanced positions on the north now marked a general line from Nakpung on the east coast, westward through Panwanggok, and Chungji, and north through Ansong, to tlne east of Seoul, and west to Kimpo on the coast. On the southwest, U.N. advanced positions followed a line from the vicinity of Hadong northwest through Tamyang, Kumje to Iri and north through Nonsan and Chochiwon to Paranjang, on the west coast.

The 12th Philippine Battalion Combat Team arrived on September 24 in the Eighth Army area and joined the U.N. forces. This contribution consisted of infantry, artillery, engineer, and supporting units. On September 25, a Swedish evacuation hospital arrived in Korea and started furnishing medical aid to U. N. forces. On September 28, the 3rd Battalion Australian Regiment arrived in Korea and joined U.N. forces.

On the 26th of September the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division in the Eighth Army main attack made a lightning thrust from the vicinity of Chongu and completed a juncture with the U.S. 7th Infantry Division of the X Corps, in the vicinity of the Suwon airfields. This brilliant Ist Cavalry advance of approximately 55 miles closed the trap on the North Korean forces that were occupying the southwest corner of Korea. While mopping-up fighting was still in progress in this area, all effective escape routes were closed, and the fate of the North Korean forces caught in the pocket was sealed.

Despite the seasonal typhoon winds and swollen seas encountered during this period, U.N. naval forces continued to apply their versatile land, sea, and air elements with increasing tempo. The most outstanding of their achievements against the enemy was the amphibious landing at Inchon, port of Seoul. The initial landings, made by U.S. Marines, were supported directly by Naval and Marine aircraft in co-ordination with gunfire support from cruisers and destroyers, followed by bombarding rocket ships.

The Marines aggressively seized their initial objectives and led the advance beyond Inchon. Succeeding troop units were immediately applied to the task of developing and expanding the poor unloading facilities of the port. Naval surface units remained on the scene of the landing to render gunfire support as needed, and to give anti-aircraft protection to the unloading and harbor activities. The U.S. battleship Missouri had just arrived in Korean waters in time for this operation after a spectacularly long trip, and instantly proved of enormous value with her great 16-inch guns. Noteworthy features of this amphibious operation were the Navy's clockwork coordination, strict adherence to schedule, and the overcoming of natural obstacles, especially in the extraordinary tidal conditions and limited maneuvering room for large vessels.

Also especially noteworthy of the varied naval operations and tasks was the "naval artillery" support afforded ground troops on the east coast. On repeated occasions, this heavy fire, directed from the air or by ground controllers, took such a toll of enemy troops and equipment as to inspire the hearty enthusiasm of our ground troops and, according to prisoner reports, substantially diminished the enemy's will to fight. The end of September found these east coast bombarding elements engaged in such thorough interdiction fire as to allow the enemy to escape northward over coastal routes only with heavy casualties and disorganization.

Problems of identification remained difficult, since many North Korean troops disguised themselves with white clothes over their uniforms, taking advantage of our continued efforts to protect innocent refugees along the highways. Such troops, while marching south toward Seoul, turned and walked north upon sighting U.N. aircraft.

A protected South Korean fishing sanctuary was established, and additional sanctuaries would be provided wherever practicable, and where North Korean water movement could be identified and then absolutely prevented. An effective patrol and close watch for shipping in and out of North Korean ports continued. Of particular interest was the introduction of enemy sea mines into the areas of naval operations. Many free-drifting, apparently Sovietmade, mines had been sighted at sea. A large number of them were exploded or sunk.

The greater part of the offensive power of all the U.N. air forces during this period had been devoted to attacks which were of immediate assistance to the rapidly advancing ground forces. Air assaults at Inchon, and on the battle front of the Eighth Army, successfully softened up enemy resistance just prior to the launching of the amphibious and main attacks. Advancing U.N. forces in all sectors were preceded by air attacks which materially reduced the enemy's defensive capabilities. Medium bomber aircraft, for the second time, joined the lighter aircraft in close support of ground forces when more than 40 B-29's struck enemy-held areas in front of the Eighth Army in the vicinity of Waegwan.

The interdiction program inaugurated in the early stages of the Korean campaign to inhibit reinforcement and resupply of the North Korean Army was intensified. The disrupted communication system now served to retard the withdrawal of the fleeing enemy and to prevent his removal of any heavy equipment. Attacks continued upon bridges and marshalling yards placed in partial operation by the North Koreans following their initial destruction. In order to effect the maximum delay to movements between bridges and marshalling yards, road and railroad beds were bombed between critical points. Abandoned vehicles and artillery attested to the inability of the enemy to move his equipment.

Several attacks were made upon military barracks and training areas in North Korea. A few additional industrial targets of military significance in Noroh Korea were bombed and operations were repeated against installations of this nature previously bombed when photographs indicated the possibility of their renewed functioning on a reduced scale.

Airfields available to the North Koreans remained under constant surveillance and, though improvements were constantly being made to the fields, enemy air activity remained negligible. Two aircraft, one of which was destroyed, made an abortive attack over the invasion fleet off Inchon.

Airlift operations into Korea were providing ground forces with an increasing daily resupply of critical equipment and personnel, and rapid evacuation of U.N. wounded personnel. One day's airlift totaled over 1,100 tons, including 2,000 passengers. Total daily sorties of U.N. aircraft of all types now occasionally exceeded 1,000.

In all air operations conducted under combat conditions, an ever-present danger of errors in navigation and target identification exists. The war in Korea was no exception. Recognizing from World War II experience that errors of this nature are a distinct possibility, the Air Commander first directed, on June 30, that all aircraft operating in North Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union. This directive was reiterated in operations orders and in messages to subordinate commands. Similar directives to U. N. Air Commanders were issued on July 3, August 14, and September 2. I re-emphasized to my commanders the seriousness of violating the Manchurian border, and again directed that the point be specifically and emphatically covered at all air crew briefings.

Subsequent to the X Corps landings at Inchon, and the Eighth Army's vigorous offensive in the Pusan perimeter area, large masses of North Korean Reds surrendered. On one day the number exceeded 6,000. More than 19,000 North Korean prisoners were captured by U.N. forces after September 15, bringing the total number of prisoners of war to more than 23,000.

A request by Mr. Frederick Bieri, the accredited delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, that he be permitted to purchase, on behalf of his organization, books, pamphlets and other reading material for the benefit of prisoners of war was granted. In accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention, the material provided was not censored by the U.N. Commander. Furthermore, Mr. Bieri was informed that prisoners of war were permitted to receive individual parcels or collective shipments containing foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies and articles of a religious, educational or recreational character which would enable them to pursue studies or cultural activities. The only limitations placed on such shipments were those deemed necessary by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Violations of the Laws of War continued to be reported by our forces in Korea. Two incidents were typical. The first concerned an unarmed American soldier who surrendered to the enemy on September 14, 1950. According to an eye witness account of the event, this soldier was held with his arms extended by enemy troops and then shot in the face a number of times with an automatic weapon. In the Chinju area, troops of the 25th Division discovered, on September 26, the bodies of 12 American prisoners of war who had had their hands tied behind their backs and then machine-gunned by North Koreans. Two other badly wounded American prisoners of war, being left for dead, survived this machine-gunning and returned to friendly hands. Both of these incidents were investigated by our field forces.

With the rapid advance of the U.N. forces, more and more emphasis had been focused on assisting the Republic of Korea in returning to normal government activities. The U.N. Command Public Health and Welfare Section continued to assist in maintaining liaison with the ROK government agencies in planning for continued relief, health and welfare activities. ROK civil officials and police followed closely the advance of the U.N. forces to expedite the return to normal living conditions and to re-establish governmental functions throughout the liberated areas. Movement of refugees to their homes in liberated areas had begun.

ROK Government officials organized government teams to include local and provincial civil administration, social welfare, public health, public utilities, and police activities in major cities and areas liberated by U.N. forces including Seoul and Inchon. Conservative estimates of refugees within the perimeter of U.N. forces at the time the offensive began were approximately 306,000. Korean medical teams were stationed in all the major refugee camps, or centered within clusters of smaller camps. Other isolated refugee camps were visited periodically by itinerant or temporary teams.

Medical supplies for the care of refugees had been almost completely exhausted prior to the arrival of personnel from the Public Health and Welfare Section of the U.N. Command. ROK civil agencies, with assistance from the Public Health and Welfare Section, inaugurated immunization and environmental sanitation programs. Medical suppiies were procured on an emergency basis and were distributed to assist in the health and welfare of refugees of Korea.

By Cabinet order, the Central Relief Committee was reconstituted as the Central Joint Committee for Relief consisting of the Ministers of Health, Social Affairs, Home Affairs, National Defense, and Director of the Office of Supply sitting for the ROK, and health welfare and supply officers of the Public Health and Welfare field organization in Korea. The functions of the Joint Committee were to establish requirements for direct relief supplies, allocate these supplies, and formulate policy concerning distribution of these supplies.

Stocks of medical supplies, imported prior to the outbreak of hostilities and warehoused in the Seoul-Inchon area for the civilian population, had been seized by the Communist military forces and utilized for their own purposes, thereby creating additional supply problems in the Seoul-Inchon area. Blankets and clothing remained critical relief items. Charcoal, lumber and building requirements for the Pusan-Taegu area had to be evaluated and called forward. Five ROK officials, including the vice-ministers of Health and Social Affairs, were dispatched on September 22 to the Inchon-Seoul area to evaluate needs and report to the central government of Korea.

The self-reliance of the refugees, and the spirit evidenced by them which indicated their ability to meet and overcome housing and other problems in the devastated areas were commendable. There was a strong desire among Koreans to measure up to the responsibilities insofar as their capabilities in manpower and other resources would permit. An agreement was executed by the U.S. and the ROK, on July 28, 1950, regarding expenditures in Korea by the forces under the U.N. Command.

Within a few hours after the U.N. landing at Inchon, radio broadcasts and leaflets were transmitting the news throughout Korea. The liberation of Seoul was reported with equal celerity. More than 74,000 leaflets were airdropped by U.N. forces. Soldiers and civilians of North Korea received 5,000,000 leaflets showing the military significance of the fall of Seoul, and calling on them to abandon futile resistance and prevent further bloodshed. Of the total number of prisoners interrogated, more than 16 per cent stated that they were influenced to surrender by the leaflets.

At the end of September, the situation could be summarized thus: A successful frontal attack and envelopment had completely changed the tide of battle in South Korea. The backbone of the North Korean Army had been broken and their scattered forces were being liquidated or driven north with material losses in equipment and men captured. The U.N. Command now comprised naval forces from 8 nations, ground forces from 5 nations, and air forces from 2 nations with advance elements of the third already arrived.

This global support and willingness to fight for U.N. principles must have been heartening to free men everywhere. The offers of assistance by members of the U.N. in personnel and relief supplies had been noted with deep appreciation by myself, and by the people of Korea. Continuing assistance by members of the U.N. during the coming months would immeasurably assist the Government of Korea in the prevention of widespread suffering of the war-victimized people of the Republic.

Veterans of Foreign Wars. Tide Turns: The Inchon Landing By General Douglas MacArthur. : 1950-1953 Macarthur Reports. Veterans' Historical Book Service Inc, USA. 1951.

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