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August, 1950

Ground troops fighting in Korea had more to contend with than the enemy. At times the mountainous terrain of the country proved to be as deadly as the foe. Battalions often stretched out over an 8,000 yard fron, contrary to the teaching of military texts which state that a battalion front should not exceed 1,000 yards. Officers daily encountered problems unsolved by textbooks and not taught at Fort Benning. Keeping the enemy from infiltrating through the thin lines was almost impossible.

Enemy action during the period to August 15. was characterized by a rapid follow-up of United Nations withdrawals and a tightening of the squeeze of the lodgment area in southeastern Korea. Two major penetrations of United Nations positions were effected and maintained, and a third potential penetration loomed as the result of a progressive enemy concentration.

Along the south coast, enemy forces drove through Chinju on August I and contained a twopronged attack in the direction of Masan, with two major units, the North Korean 4th and bth Divisions. The deepest penetration in this sector was reached on the bth of the month when North Korean forces were stopped eight miles west of Masan by a U.N. counter-offensive. Task Force Kean launched the first U.N. attack in this sector at 6:30 A.M. on August 7. This force consisted of the 25th Infantry Division, the 5th Regimental Combat Team, the Ist Provisional Marine brigade, and a ROK force of battalion size. The purpose of this attack was to remove the southern threat to the Pusan base and secure suitable defense areas. The attack progressed smoothly and efficiently with minimum losses to U.N. fowes. All units reached their objectives by August 13 after having advanced about 20 miles. This attack not only secured the southern approaches to the beachhead, but also showed that the North Korean forces would not hold under attack. The "withdrawal" of some of the North Korean 6th Division units became a full retreat. To the north of this sector, in the early part of August, the operations of U.N. forces followed the trend reported previously. Units were on extended fronts of 15-30 miles per division with light liaison only possible between units. Penetration and infiltration could not be prevented and a strategic withdrawal became necessary. On the bth of the month, the enemy selected his crossing site at a bend in the river 8 miles south of Pugong-ni. Crossings began on the night of the 6th, and by the 8th the enemy had pushed one regiment into the bridgehead in the face of repeated local counterattacks. By the 14th the enemy had pushed probably the bulk of his division into this bridgehead at great cost in casualties.

In the central part of the sector, generally astride the Kumchon-Taegu axis, the enemy drove hard against Kumchon from three directions on August I, and then promptly followed the planned U.N. withdrawals from the area. The enemy used his front-line pre-war divisions in this area, the veteran Ist, 2nd, and 3rd. The significance of these dispositions is best portrayed in a comparison of frontages: the ROK Ist Division held a front of 12 miles while its neighbor to the south, the Ist Cavalry Division covering Taegu, held a front of 28 miles, in a disposition of regiments abreast along the river front. This discrepancy of numerical and tactical strength, which was critical from the beginning of the campaign, improved slightly but never to a point of security for the U.N. forces. They were compelled to continue the fight at great odds.

By the 4th of the month the enemy closed on the Naktong River line opposite Waegwan and again, as in the south, began probing for a crossing site. Twenty miles southwest of Taegu a small enemy force filtered across the river and disappeared into the hills before it could be destroyed. Northwest of Taegu, at Waegwan, the enemy pushed two battalions across the Naktong on the 8th of the month. The next day the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and 1st ROK divisions attacked and forced the enemy to evacuate the remnants of this force to the west bank of the river. When the enemy deployment terminated, an estimated 5 divisions were employed in this sector, and by the middle of August there were indications of a general concentration of forces across the river from Waegwan in preparation for heavy assault.

Against the northern part of the line the enemy drove down the Chungju-Taegu axis and the Yonju-Andong axis with a total of 3 divisions, the 8th, 13th, and 15th. Under this attack, and to preserve the continuity of the line with the withdrawal of U.S. forces described above, it was necessary to direct the I and II ROK Corps to withdraw to better defensive positions. The ROK Army withdrawal was conducted in an orderly fashion on the successive nights of August 2-3 and 3-4. Hamchang and Andong were secured by the enemy on the 3rd, and the parallel drives continued against the stiffening resistance of the ROK forces in this sector. Three enemy regiments concentrated in an attack from Yonggi-dong on the 9th, and drove as far as Kunwi, 25 miles north of Taegu. However, they were forced to withdraw in the face of U.N. counter-attacks on August 11 to a general line through Uisong.

On the east coast, the town of Yongdok changed hands twice during this time. On August 3 the enemy lost the town to attacking forces of the 3rd ROK Division, but by the 10th he had built up his forces in the area sufficiently to retake the town and drive a few thousand yards south. Inland from the Yongdock-Pohang-dong axis an enemy force of two regiments, later identified as elements of the 12th Division, filtered through the rugged mountain trails over a period of days. By August 9 this force reached the general vicinity of Kigye, 10 miles west of Pohangdong, and by the 12th had entered Pohang-dong and had driven within mortar range of the U.N. airfields in that vicinity. By August 10 this threat was considered sufficiently serious to again readjust ROK and some U.S. Army forces. This readjustment resulted in another local withdrawal to the line: Kunwi, Kusan-dong, Changsa-dong.

The hard-pressed enemy 4th Division retained its bridgehead across the Naktong River west of Yongsan. On the east flank the enemy continued to draw off U.N. forces to the east by his deep penetration to Pohang-dong, and slowly concentrated his forces northwest of Taegu, poised for a final drive to Taegu and Pusan. Enemy committed forces now consisted of 12 fully identified divisions with a possibility of 2 additional. In the enemy rear areas a large troop concentration was reported near the northeastern border of Korea, indicating possible recruitment of Koreans from southeastern Manchuria.

Augmentation of U.N. forces in Korea by this time included the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, the 1st provisional Marine Brigade, the 5th Regimental Combat team from Hawaii, and an increase in U.S. combat and service support units. A material number of U.S. tank units were arriving and would soon be ready to enter combat. The ROK Army continued to improve its organization and combat effectiveness. Several new infantry regiments that had been undergoing training were ready and committed to combat. The ROK Army was showing determination and gallantry, and developing increased tactical skill and'maneuverability. There were still no U.N. ground units assisting the ROK except U.S. Army and Marine units which continued their gallant and effective action although heavily outnumbered.

The information I had received on the size and type of units offered by member Nations showed a united and determined spirit in the nations of the U.N. to repel the invader of the ROK that was gratifying. Contributions must be forthcoming without delay if the threat to international security is to be resolved promptly.

United Nations naval forces, now comprising warships from 8 nations, were operating under the control of the United Nations Naval Commander, Vice Admiral C. T. Joy. The coordinated efficiency of this command was an exemplary operation in proving the ability of the U.N. to quickly assemble their naval strength in distant areas and to operate jointly with great effectiveness. Such a coordination of naval strength by so many nations in an area so far distant from home naval bases was unparalled in history. United Nations Naval Forces were virtually unhampered by the enemy. On August 2 a duel between an enemy shore battery and a destroyer cost the enemy his shore battery.

Since the enemy was apparently forcing civilian labor to his use, problems of identification became difficult. At sea the enemy was using every available craft, but U.N. forces, in close coordination with the South Korea Navy, were making every effort toward proper identification in order to allow continuance of innocent fishing. On land, civilians were carrying supplies in donkey and pushcarts which burned and exploded when strafed. The enemy hid vast quantities of military equipment in civilian dwellings, resulting in the necessity to fire and destroy such dwellings. However, the problem of avoiding the killing of innocent civilians and damages to the civilian economy was continually present and was given my personal attention. U.N. forces were urgently endeavoring to restrict destruction to the established military forces of the invader.

U.S. Far East Air Force medium bombers struck heavy blows at North Korean industrial targets of military significance and at the North Korean transportation system. The Korean manufacturing complex, the largest in the Far East, and the oil refinery at Wonsan, were extensively damaged by successive attacks. The marshalling yards in Pyongyang, Wonsan, and Seoul were repeatedly attacked, as were yards of less consequence.

A heavy toll of North Korean troops and materiel strength was being taken by the Far East Air Force light bombers and fighters, and by Royal Australian Air Force fighters in close ground support action. From 300 to 500 sorties were now flown daily by U.N. Air Forces, and the intensity of night intruder missions by fighters and light bombers was stepped up with gratifying results. Against U.N. air activity the enemy still refused to send his diminishing air force aloft in strength greater than one or 2 planes at a time.

To the middle of August a total of 464 North Korean prisoners had been taken by U.N. forces. This brought the total collected to date to 719. I extended the proclamation I issued as Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. Forces in the Far East with regard to treatment of prisoners so that it now applied to all forces of the United Nations Command. I accepted Mr. Frederick Bieri, International Red Cross, as an accredited delegate to my command under provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war. Mr. Bieri had been provided logistic support in Korea and given full opportunity to carry out his mission. Mr. Bieri's reports show clearly that the orders for compliance with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention were being carried out. His reports prove to the world that the discipline and treatment of prisoners of war were excellent in the United Nations Command prisoner of war collecting points, enclosures, and camps.

United Nations radio broadcasts and airdropped leaflets were the only major channels of accurate information still open to the Korean people. An additional 2,230,000 leaflets and news sheets, making a grand total of 27,230,000 had been dropped by aircraft over North Korean and occupied territory, and regular broadcasts totalling 21/2 hours continued daily. Civilians were warned daily to move away from military targets that must be bombed. North Korean soldiers were being informed of the humane treatment guaranteed them as prisoners of war, and encouraged to lay down their arms. Despite Communist tactics of terror and intimidation to prevent reception of these leaflets and radio messages, there was increasing evidence of their effectiveness among those to whom the Communists had so ruthlessly denied access to the truth.

By the middle of August, U.N. Army Forces were still outnumbered and hence were required to conduct some strategic withdrawals. The U.N. base area had been correspondingly reduced, and the fluid conditions of the ground combat had been considerably stabilized. During this period the cohesion displayed by U.N. forces of this Command had proven the validity of the U.N. concept for peace. My gravest concern was for a prompt build-up of the outnumbered ground forces of this command.

From mid-August to the end of that month, the North Korean forces, still operating with 12 divisions, concentrated on preparations for renewed offensive activity despite heavy blows and serious local losses inflicted by U.N. forces. The enemy gradually reinforced units opposite the extreme flanks and center of the U.N. perimeter and, through the application of gradually increasing pressure along the entire northern front, had achieved moderate local gains. Front lines now ran generally from Tongyong on the south coast northward to the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, thence north along the Naktong River to a point several miles north of Waegwan, thence generally eastward through the Kunwi area to the Kigye area continuing to the east coast north of Pohang-dong.

In the east coast sector, the North Korean 12th division was driven back by attacks of the ROK I Corps which regained Pohang and Kigye on August 18. By the 26th, the enemy's 5th Division entered action and, together with the 12th Division, renewed the attack, retook Kigye, and pushed U.N. forces back to a line 2 miles north of Pohang. Kigye was again retaken by the ROK Army on August 29, but was lost to the North Koreans the next day.

Concurrently, the principal enemy effort was directed against the Taegu salient and, by August 28, had scored moderate gains along the northern part of the arc in the zone of action of the ROK II Corps. The enemy Ist and 13th Divisions forced U.N. defenders back several thousand yards, taking Kumhwa in their most extensive advance. In repeated local attacks, the enemy 8th Division took Uihong on August 27. The 2nd and 3rd North Korean Divisions near Waegwan were increasingly active, though no major effort was in evidence as yet. The net enemy gains, however, represented only local effort of no decisive character.

Operations in this northern and eastern sector were primarily by ROK Army units, intermittently supported by U.S. units. The 6th, 8th, Capital, 3rd and Ist ROK Divisions had been in battle continuously since the war began against an enemy with initial favorable odds in mass and armor. Though operating on extended frontages of 16 to 20 miles, these divisions maintained their tactical unity and their current recovery and performance was most gratifying.

In a wide bend of the river south of Tukson, the enemy IOth Division had held a bridgehead in an inactive state since mid-August. This penetration, estimated at one to two enemy regiments, was being effectively contained by U.N. forces by the end of August. Farther south, near the confluence of the Nam and the Naktong Rivers, attacks by the U.S. 24th Division and the Marines eliminated a major penetration of the Naktong defense line on August 18. Here the enemy 4th Division was decisively defeated, lost its bridgehead, and was thrown westward across the Naktong River, suffering very heavy losses in both personnel and equipment.

At the southern end of the front, in the Chinju-Haman corridor, the North Korean 6th Division, having been severely mauled in early August, cautiously restored contact with U. N. forces, beginning August 16, along the north-south line 2 miles west of Haman. By August 19 this division, augmented by two regiments probably of the 7th Division, initiated a series of sharp probing attacks which continued to engage the attention of defending forces, though they netted the enemy small gains on the ground. One mountain, Sobuk-San, changed hands several times. Meanwhile, the large volume of rear area troop and vehicular movements indicated that the enemy intended to maintain strong pressure on this front which represented the greatest threat to the U.N. base of Pusan. Prisoners from the North Korean 6th Division reported that two of the three organic regiments were composed of troops who previously served in the Chinese Communist armies.

U.N. naval forces still encountered only slight resistance by the enemy, and control of the seas continued with guaranteed safe arrival in Korea of additional troops and supplies, and safe removal by sea of the sick and wounded. Further augmentation of naval forces continued; new units arriving were mostly from the U.S. Navy.

The entire naval organization was well integrated, functioning efficiently with United Nations Army and Air Force units. Islands in strategic locations had been seized. Carrier aircraft were simultaneously giving direct support to ground elements while striking strategic targets in North Korea. U.S. Marines participated with traditional valor and great effectiveness in important land operations in the southwestern sectors.

Enemy air strength continued to diminish until the end of August when a few minor single plane raids were staged. However", twin-engined bombers had been sighted on enemy airfields in both North and South Korea, leading to the belief that his air force had been strengthened by aircraft from outside Korea which were prepared to stage forward at an opportune time.

The combined air forces of the U.N. daily were producing a superior effort in support of ground forces. The air units of Australia, the ROK, the U.S. Navy and Marines, and the British Navy had joined the U.S. Air Force in the effective tactical support of all ground forces.

The enemy shunned exposure by day, concealing his supplies and reserves in homes, in schools and other public buildings. He drove his tanks and trucks through walls of simple peasant shelters so that he might avoid daylight detection. Enemy movement and attack by night were countered by ever expanding operations of night intruder aircraft. These planes, equipped with special devices, successfully harassed him by night, causing considerable reductions in his operations.

The enemy, massed across the Naktong River from Taegu on August 16, was subjected to the heaviest tactical assault yet mounted when medium bomber aircraft delivered more than 850 tons of bombs on the aggressor forces. Fighterbomber aircraft, roving the salient following the strike, found few targets remaining in the desolate area. Evidence continued to be gathered showing the depletion of stocks of munitions and supplies in the combat zone.

U.N. Air Forces dealt severe blows to war industries and transportation in Pyongyang, Hamchung, Hungnam, Wonsan, Songjin, Chinampo, Chongjin and Rashin confining their operations to military targets. The accusation that U.N. aircraft attacked the civilian populace had no basis in factuality.

Considering that the aggression by the North Korean forces was largely Communist-led, planned and inspired, it is appropriate to review evidence of material and technical assistance rendered to North Korea; specifically evidence of munitions which tlie Soviet Union had provided and was still providing for the North Korean forces, as well as evidence of trained military personnel which the Chinese Communist forces furnished. The U.S.S.R, domination of the northern portion of Korea began when the Soviet occupation authorities arbitrarily interpreted the 38th Parallel as a permanent delineation between two military zones. Immediately following the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, in September 1945, the Soviets began to organize a North Korean military force under the guise of a national police force or constabulary. This force, known as the North Korean People's Army, had from its inception been trained, supervised, and logistically supported by the Soviet Union.

The supply of munitions and equipment to North Korea, prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces in December 1948, was openly acknowledged by the Soviets. However, they claimed that all material being utilized in the war by North Korean forces was provided prior to their withdrawal, and that there had been no resupply from Soviet sources since that time.

Despite this Soviet claim, however, since the outbreak of the war a wide variety of definitely identified Soviet equipment captured from the North Koreans in battle bore the manufacturing date of 1949 or 1950. Obviously, dated material could not have been provided prior to December 1948, thereby further confirming the many reports received by my headquarters of Soviet delivery of munitions to North Korean forces during 1949 and 1950. Physical proof of such deliveries included photographs as well as the physical items forwarded to appropriate U.S. Army services. Among definitely identified items were a 7.62 mm. PPSH-41 sub-machine gun; an aircraft radio receiver type RSI-61-I; two types of hand grenades; and ammunition of varying types and caIibers.

To the end of August there had been no confirmation of direct or overt Chinese Communist participation in the Korean conflict; however, they had furnished substantial, if not decisive, military assistance to North Korea by releasing a vast pool of combat-seasoned troops of Korean ethnic origin which provided the means for expansion of the North Korean army. A substantial percentage of all prisoners-of-war so far interrogated had received training in Manchuria, or had performed active service with the Chinese Communist Army. At least half of the personnel, and particularly those officers and. non-commissioned officers in the North Korean 5th, 13th, and 15th Divisions, and in the 766th Independent Unit, had participated in training or combat action with the Chinese Communist Army. The latter returned many of these Korean troops to North Korea during the year prior to the invasion.

Approximately 140,000 Korean troops participated in training and combat action with the Chinese Communist forces, and at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea a probable aggregate of 40,000 to 60,000 Koreans trained by the Chinese Communists had been released and integrated into the North Korean Army to expand the initial divisions and constabulary brigades to a battle order of 13 to 15 divisions.

Treatment of United Nations prisoners taken by enemy forces had on occasion been characterized by extreme brutality. Positive evidence of murdering of prisoners with bound hands led me to issue a warning to the Commander-in-Chief of the North Korean forces on this subject. The first instance of this character was discovered on July 10, 1950, when U.N. troops retook lost ground and discovered dead American soldiers with their hands tied behind their backs obviously killed while captives, since all had been shot through the head.

A second was the murder of 36 American prisoners on the afternoon of August 17. Forty-one American soldiers serving the U.N. cause had been captured by an overwhelming Communist force on the morning of August 15. Immediately after their capture each prisoner was stripped of all means of identification and each man's hands were tied behind his back with telephone wire, or shoe laces taken from his boots. The men were held prisoner for 36 hours without food. At the end of this time the Americans were told to stand up whereupon they were sprayed by fire from the individual weapons of approximately 15-17 North Koreans. After the men had fallen to the ground, they were fired upon once again to insure that all were dead. After the North Korean soldiers had left the scene, 5 soldiers, still alive, were able to make their way back to the American lines. All victims in this massacre were members of the 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army.

In sharp contrast to the foregoing, Mr. Frederick Bieri, International Red Cross representative accredited to the U.N. forces in Korea, reported that, according to Korean standards, ROK treatment of prisoners-of-war was "perfect." More than 2,000 prisoners-of-war were taken by United Nations forces during the second half of August.

There existed a very high state of morale both among the civilian population in general, and in the government offices of the Republic of Korea. Although the area under control of the U.N. forces at this time had a great number of refugees, the latter were being assisted in every way possible to provide them with shelter and other necessities of life. A great measure of this assistance came voluntarily from such organizations as hacJ been established since June 25; for example: the Emergency Central Committee of the Korean Red Cross, organized by Dr. Helen Kim, an eminent educator in Korea. This organization comprised volunteer workers who assisted in the relocation of refugees, the distribution of food, and assistance to military casualties of the ROK Army. Another evidence of high morale wes the formation of a Patriotic Lr.ague to give all out assistance to the U.N. effort in Korea.

Government offices operated on a 24-hour basis, even at Cabinet and Ministerial levels, to cope with any situation that might arise. Other signs of the high morale of the people of Korea were indicated by the numerous "welcome" banners displayed in all communities and the spontaneous contributions of refreshments to U.N. troops.

In surveying the relief needs of Korea, it had been determined that the ROK was able, during the withdrawal (to the Pusan beachhead) to salvage sufficient food supplies to provide subsistence for individuals in the area under control of U.N. forces. However, it was now estimated that these stocks would be inadequate to provide even a minimum subsistence after the middle of September. Arrangements therefore were made, as an emergency measure to supply the ROK with 15,000 metric tons of rice and 5,000 metric tons of barley during the month of October. The ROK had adequate raw cotton on hand and in shipment for operation of the cloth producing facilities in the area until the end of December. Subsistence supplies were becoming a problem of immediate concern, but there was little doubt that the members of the United Nations would contribute as generously as they had militarily.

Veterans of Foreign Wars. Beachhead Secured: The August Campaign By General Douglas MacArthur. : 1950-1953 Macarthur Reports. Veterans' Historical Book Service Inc, USA. 1951.

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