Home : America At War : The War In Korea :

June Thru July, 1950

The story of the War in Korea, as told by General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, in his periodic reports to the Security Council of the United Nations. They tell the complete. story of the war in Korea. Slight editorial changes have been made in the text to maintain continuity of narrative.

An ammunition loaded jeep gets ready to dash across an open area as troops pin down the enemy.

At 4 A.M. (Korean time) on Sunday, June 25, 1950, the North Korean Army launched a completely unprovoked invasion of the Republic of Korea. North Korean infantry crossed the 38th Parallel, led by Soviet-made tanks, in an estimated number of 300. The main attack was down the Pochon-Uijongbu-Seoul corridor. Simultaneously, attacks were launched in fhe Ongjin Peninsula to the west, against Chunchon, in the eastern mountains, and down the east coast road. The latter included amphibious landings at several points down the coast. The North Korean Air Force covered the amphibious landings and attacks on Kimpo Airfield, near Seoul. The size of the attack, the fact that it covered the principal areas along the 38th Parallel, the amount and character of materiel involved, and the use of amphibious landings indicated clearly that the invasion had been carefully planned long in advance. This conclusion was further supported by reports which had filtered through over a period of months regarding the gradual movement of North Korean troops southward toward the dividing parallel, including an estimated 25,000 Korean troops which had formerly fought with the Chinese Communist Armies in Manchuria.

The character and disposition of the Republic of Korea Army indicated that they did not expect this sudden attack. This fact was supported by a report of an observation team of the United Nations Commission on Korea, made along the 38th Parallel and dated June 24, 1950. This report stated that the team of observers "had, in the course of a two-weeks inspection, been left with the impression that the Republican Army was organized entirely for defense and (was) in no condition to carry out a large-scale attack against the forces in the north." The observers found that the Republic of Korea forces were disposed in depth all along the 38th Parallel with no concentration of troops at any point; that a large number of ROK troops were actively engaged in rounding up guerrillas and were, in any case, entirely lacking in armor, heavy artillery, and air support necessary to carry off an invasion of North Korea. These facts controverted completely the North Korean broadcast from Pyongyang, late in the morning of June 25, that ROK had initiated an attack across the border and that North Korean forces had been ordered to repulse the attack.

The North Korean invaders were reported to have committed initially 4 divisions of infantry, 2 brigades of border constabulary, supported by approximately 300 Soviet-made T34 and T70 tanks, and ample heavy artillery. Their air force had complete control of the air and was at the time estimated to be composed of 100-150 Sovietmade combat planes. The total strength of the North Korean forces was placed at between 90,000 and 100,000, organized in approximately 7 divisions and 5 brigades, well trained by Soviet "advisors" and equipped chiefly with excellent Soviet materiel.

Opposed to these were an approximate 96,000 ROK troops, organized in 8 divisions, but without armor or heavy artillery and with only 16 trainers as an air force; a force designed for preserving internal security only. In the light of the above facts, it is apparent that the attack upon the Republic of Korea was a carefully-planned, full-scale invasion in force. From the attack to the fall of Seoul, on June 28, the North Korean forces struck southward across the 38th Parallel in four major drives:

1. To the west, a border constabulary brigade attacked in the Ongjin Peninsula against approxi. mately one ROK regiment and was reported, on June 26, in control of the area. However a considerable number of ROK men escaped by sea;
2. One North Korean division, plus 40-50 tanks, captured Kaesong on the afternoon of June 25, and later pushed south through Munsan toward Seoul. Another North Korean force of from 8,000 to 10,000 men, plus more than 50 tanks, drove down the Pochon-Uijongbu corridor toward Seoul;
3. A division of North Korean troopssupported by heavy artillery and tanks, struck south toward Chunchon; and
4. Along the east coast, a border constabulary brigade, reinforced to approximately 10,000, attacked Kangnung and carried out two amphibious landings farther south.

The North Korean attack was initially opposed by 5 ROK divisions located in, or north, of Seoul. They were armed with rifles, machine-guns, and other light infantry weapons. Taken completely by surprise, and facing greatly superior equipment, they fought desperately but were forced to withdraw gradually. Another ROK division, hastily brought up from the south, was badly mauled in the fighting on June 26. An official report on June 20 indicated that the Republican forces had suffered a high percentage of casualties and had lost considerable equipment in the hurried withdrawal.

On June 28, the United States Air Force, operating pursuant to the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, began air operations against the North Korean invaders in support of ROK forces, and later struck at military targets north of the 38th Parallel with a view to disrupting lines of communications and supplies of the invading forces.

Seoul was in the hands of the North Korean forces by June 29. The badly decimated Republican forces re-formed south of the Han River and, with U.S. Air Force assistance, sought to delay the North Korean advance. By sheer weight of numbers and materiel they were forced back step by step until, on July 2 (Korean time), the town of $uwon, 20 miles south of Seoul, was reported in North Korean hands.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of U.N. recommendations, U.S. ground forces were committed to the area for stabilization of the front. On July 5, a very small U.S. force made contact with the invaders south of Suwon. On July 7, on the recommendation of the United Nations Security Council, a unified command was established and I was designated by the President of the United States as Commanding General of the forces of the members of the United Nations.

The first U.S. troops were small in number and were committed as a holding force only. They were followed by additional supporting forces as rapidly as these could be transported to the battle line. Facing odds at times as high as 20 to one, our Army troops, ably supported by tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force and Navy, and our Australian friends, distinguished themselves in the most difficult of military operations: a delaying action.

Under the protection of this delaying action, the United Command forces were steadily strengthened. Under the combined impact of ground, air, and naval forces, the progress of the invasion was slowed while the enemy suffered severe losses on sea and land which curtailed his supply and transportation capabilities. Naval forces available to oppose the aggression at the outset of the invasion consisted of a small ROK Coast Guard. United States and other forces proceeded to the operational areas and, by virtue of overwhelming superiority, eventually established a patrol of both coasts of Korea. These forces took the necessary actions to prevent movement by sea of forces and supplies for use in operations against the Republic of Korea including ingress and egress of merchant vessels to and from Korean ports. United Nations naval forces covered some of the initial necessary evacuations, rendered logistic support and, by operating against North Korean waterborne forces, denied the Communist invaders the logistic support of their forces by sea.

Naval units proceeded to accomplish the waterlift of troops and supplies to Korea, patrol by naval aircraft of water and coastal areas, escort duties, and coastal patrol functions. Harassing fire from naval units on both coasts shelled targets susceptible to naval gunfire, breached roads, and generally interfered with enemy communications. Naval units attacked North Korean water traffic where found, and destroyed approximately one-third of the vessels available to North Korean naval forces.

A new phase of naval operations began on July 3, with the first aircraft carrier air strike. This struck on the west coast of North Korea, north of the 38th Parallel. Subsequent carrier strikes on the east coast of Korea were made by British and United States units. The first amphibious landing by U.N. forces was accomplished on the east coast of Korea on July 17. At that time, the naval situation found both coasts of Korea covered by naval forces of the United Command. Harassing fire and fire-support missions were being carried out by these forces. Patrols and reconnaissance were being conducted by naval patrol planes over coastal and water areas. Logistic support of men, equipment and supplies by transport continued with escort.

It was inspiring to witness the rapidity with which various member states contributed to the naval forces assisting in the restoration of peace in Korea. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, and France dispatched vessels to support the U.N.'s effort to cut off supplies for the invading hordes from north of the 38th Parallel. In carrying out this work, shore bombardments were conducted where and as necessary to interdict the supply of Communist troops which had moved into the portion of Korea governed by the Republic of Korea, under the aegis of the United Nations. Valuable service also was rendered by a British naval unit in the rescue from the water of airmen who had been compelled to abandon their airplanes. The Coast Guard of the ROK rendered invaluable service in providing for the security of the shoreline. Naval air provided by the United Kingdom contributed in a major way in the support of landing operations at Pohang Dong.

Upon the request of the Security Council of the United Nations for assistance to defend the Republic of Korea against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in the area immediately available were those United States and British Commonwealth occupation forces under my command in the occupation of the Japanese Islands. But before committing these forces in response to the United Nations Security Council's resolution, they had to be regrouped and reequipped from standards for peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suitable for combat in Korea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment and supplies, from their various occupation stations in Japan, by combination of motor, rail, water and air transportation to Korea. Even so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately available and therefore had to be rushed to Korea from the United States - a distance of one-third of the way around the globe. Assistance for the defense of the ROK, both men and materials, had to be transported over corresponding distances from member Nations of the U.N. rendering such assistance.

The well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the size of their force, their logistical support, and their ability to continue to press the attack account for the degree of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the ROK not only had been forced to submit to the time and place selected by the aggressor, but had to depend upon assistance from nations peacefully disposed and lying not merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away.

From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers of enemy personnel and equipment, it was now apparent that the North Korean aggressors had available to them resources far in excess of their internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the aggressor, combined to give the enemy a strength that could not be overcome until the forces of the United Command achieved the effect of superiority in weapons and manpower. The task was not a small one when viewed in comparison with the potential resources of the aggressor force.

By July 20, main enemy columns, each of approximately division strength, reinforced by tanks, were contacted and identified at the following points; 4th North Korean Division, northwest of Taejon; 2nd North Korean Division, southeast of Changju; 15th North Korean Division, 15 miles southeast of Chongju; 5th North Korean Division, north of Yongju; and there were unidentified elements north of Yongdok. The enemy Ist, 3rd, and 6th Divisions, also identified by this date, were either in reserve, regrouping, or enroute to other battle areas. The battlefront was not a continuous line, but consisted rather of a series of columns, of battalion or regimental size, probing main roads and mountain trails in an effort to penetrate U.N. positions. The greatest concentration was massed for the drive toward Taejon with decreasing strength toward the east. The enemy forces on the east coast were separated from those to the west by rugged mountains. However, in the mountainous area from Yongyang south to Yongchon, there were an estimated 1,500 guerrillas. The guerrillas often intermingled with refugees and became one of the major security problems of the campaign.

In the Taejon sector the enemy employed two and possibly three divisions with tank support. The delaying force in this area was the U.S. 24th Division and elements of the U.S. 25th Division. This delaying force executed a planned withdrawal to Yongdong on July 21. The position at Yongdong was held for four days, showing an increased U.N. strength. Nevertheless, the enemy was able to muster such superior forces that he penetrated our flanks and forced the withdrawal of the delaying force to Hwangwan on July 26, and to Kumchon on July 30. Meanwhile, the 6th North Korean Division, which had garrisoned Seoul, was reported, on July 23, to have moved south in the direction of Chonju. With the bth Division echeloned to the rear, the 4th North Korean Division initiated a major strategic envelopment to the south against weak militarized police forces of the Republic of Korea.

Driving virtually unopposed toward the western and south ports, the enemy seized Mok Po, Kwangju, Amwon, and Chinan on July 24. The enveloping force then shifted direction of movement to the east toward the vital ports of Masan and Pusan. Yosu and Hadong were taken on July 27 and, by July 28, enemy forces reached eastward to Kochang and, to the north, extended the line to Muju. This major development was possible to an enemy who employed at least 9 divisions against a U.N. ensemble of only 3 U.S. divisions and 4 ROK divisions, all under strength.

East of Taejon, in the sector opposing the forces of the ROK, enemy progress was less rapid. The 15th North Korean Division, driving down the Chungju-Hamchang axis, was reinforced on July 28 by the 1st North Korean Division. These enemy forces continued making local advances until they reached the outskirts of Hamchang. East of the Hamchang area, enemy forces believed to be from the 5th North Korean Division finally occupied Yongju by July 24, and thereafter made no appreciable progress during this period. On the east coast the action was initially fluid with alternating withdrawals and advances in the vicinity of Yongdok. By July 26, the 5th North Korean Division was positively identified in the east coast area, and by the 29th, Yongdok was in enemy hands. Infiltration and guerrilla operations in rear areas, which initially constituted some annoyance, were materially reduced by the end of July.

On July 31 there were 11 enemy divisions identified on the line of contact with the possibility of two or three additional formations. The enemy dispositions formed a discontinuous line from Chinju in the south, northward through Kochang, Hwanghan, and Hamchang, and eastward through Yongju to Yongdok, with the greatest concentration of divisions in the central part of the line. However, the wide envelopment in the south and southwest continued as the enemy action of major significance. The general pattern of enemy strategy, predicated on superiority of forces and armament, was a double envelopment; in the north via Hamchang, and in the southwest via Kochang-Chiju, while maintaining pressure in the center to prevent displacement of U.N. forces.

As yet no army forces of the member Nations, other than the United States, had arrived in Korea. ROK forces had been reorganized into two corps and had been resupplied with U.S. equipment. They had progressed admirably. In addition, the Republican forces had demonstrated by limited attacks and determined defensive operations that they were doing, and would continue to do their utmost in defense of their country. Their withdrawals were more to preserve continuity of the battle front than because of enemy pressure. U.S. and ROK army forces, with their increased artillery and larger caliber rockets, were proving that they could meet and destroy the North Korean tanks.

Naval forces were considerably augmented by the addition of several U.S. and British units and a few units from other nations. Eight nations were now represented by naval forces and assistance: Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. Up to this time the bulk of shipping necessary for the conduct of the war had been provided by the U.S. Naval forces which maintained a continuous and effective patrol of the North Korean ports and coastlines. Carrier air strikes of increasing frequency ranged from strategic targets in the north to battlefield targets in close support of the ground movement. A patrol on both coasts, directed primarily toward interception of enemy shipping to the south, had effectively stopped all coastal water movement of enemy troops and supplies. Shore bombardments, as requested by infantry units on the east coast, proved to be very effective in destroying military targets, harassing the enemy at night, and disrupting coastal land communications.

When returning to our bases for logistic support, patrol ships performed additional tasks of convoying and escorting shipping to and from Pusan. Naval units particiated in the evacuation of the sick and wounded from Korea to locations of security and better care in Japan. The accomplishment of these continuing tasks resulted in relatively minor interference or resistance by the enemy in the form of aerial strafing or bombardment by shore-based artillery. There was no naval interference by the enemy.

U.S. light bombers and U.S. Australian and ROK fighters continually attacked targets in close support of ground troops, including attacks on tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, and bridges. U.S. medium bombers attacked and destroyed the Chosen explosives manufacturing plant at Konan. Several marshalling yards were disrupted and many railroad and highway bridges were cut, thereby reducing and delaying the flow of supplies to North Korean forces. Due to the heavy air attacks on rail and highway traffic in daylight, the North Korean forces resorted to moving practically all traffic at night. This was countered by increased night attacks on concentrations of traffic. A considerable number of U.S. fighter aircraft were brought to Japan by the U.S. Navy carrier, Boxer, to augment the fighters previously available. Canadian troop carrier aircraft joined the U.S. Military Air Transport Service operations in carrying men, supplies, and materials to the Far East. Although a few enemy sorties were flown, enemy air activity was negligible.

The false and inflammatory Communist propaganda, which had been so largely responsible for the continuing disunity among Koreans, had now become an increasing menace because of the disruption of normal press and radio facilities throughout the Republic of Korea. To combat this propaganda, U.N. Command Headquarters' leaflets and radio broadcasts utilized that most powerful of weapons: the truth. Two and one-half hours of broadcasts were beamed to Korea daily, and more than 25,000,000 leaflets were dropped by aircraft. In addition to the latest factual news reports, citizens and soldiers of North Korea, and of the Republic, were informed of the steps taken by the U.N. to restore peace. The leaflets and broadcasts were designed to reveal to North Koreans the duplicity of their leaders and to bring encouragement to the South Koreans.

Summarizing the operations of U.N. forces for the period up to July 31: Army operations were, basically, planned withdrawals and delaying actions to gain time. The buildup of the forces continued at an accelerated rate. The reorganization of the ROK forces and their resupply with U.S. equipment enabled them to make limited attacks and a determined defense. Infiltration and guerrilla operations in rear areas were materially reduced. Naval forces were augmented by additional combat ships. A continuous and effective naval patrol of North Korean ports and coastlines was being maintained. Carrier air strikes of increasing frequency ranged from strategic targets in the north to battlefield support of the ground movement. Shore bombardments on the east coast proved very effective. Numerous marshalling yards had been disrupted and many railroad and highway bridges cut.

The ground fighting continued to be of a most savage character. The tenacity and valor of our heavily outnumbered forces rivaled the almost fanatical determination of the enemy. The whole operation had assumed the character of a major campaign in which all United Nations Command forces were conducting themselves admirably. I cannot speak too highly of the splendid cooperation and the perfect coordination not only within, but between, the defense contingents of the various nationalities that comprised the United Nations forces.

Veterans of Foreign Wars. The Initial Phase: The Invasion To July 31 By General Douglas MacArthur. : 1950-1953 Macarthur Reports. Veterans' Historical Book Service Inc, USA. 1951.

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