Home : World War II : The Navy In WWII :Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, USN, (1887-1947)
Marc Andrew Mitscher was born in Hillsboro, Wisconsin, on 26 January 1887. He attended elementary and secondary schools in Washington, D.C., and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June 1910. During the next half-decade, Mitscher served in armored cruisers, gunboats and destroyers, then received training as a pilot. Designated a Naval Aviator in June 1916, he served at Pensacola, Florida until 1917, when he was assigned to conduct experiments with shipboard catapults. Later in 1917 and in 1918, he served at Naval Air Stations, commanding those at Rockaway, Long Island, and Miami, Florida. In May 1919, he participated in the trans-Atlantic flight attempt of the seaplane NC-1. Mitscher undertook his first wartime operation by launching James A. "Jimmy" Doolittle's Army bombers against Tokyo and other Japanese cities from the Hornet on 18 April 1942. In June 1942 he was promoted to rear admiral, therefore entitled to command a carrier task group or major Naval air station. With the Hornet he participated in the Battle of Midway. In that battle, none but his torpedo planes found the enemy carriers, and all but one of them were destroyed. While the latter diverted enemy attention from other American fighters and dive-bombers, Adm. Raymond A. Sptuance took a dim view of his operations, which probably accounted for the delay in his being billeted as a commander of carrier task forces. Back he went to flying boats as Commander Patrol Wing Two in December 1942. Other shore billets that followed included his serving as Commander Air, Noumea (December 1942-March 1943), and ComAirSols (April-August 1943). Disliking the administrative work Noumea entailed, he got Adm. William F. Halsey to transfer this "fighting fool" to Guadalcanal. While there his aircraft supported Halsey's advance up the Solomons ladder and also shot down and killed the commander of Japan's Combined Fleet, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto. Mitscher barely survived a rough, dirty, and dangerous job; he came down with malaria and weighed but 115 pounds. To enable him to obtain badly needed rest, he was billeted as ComFleetAir, West Coast, to January 1944. Meanwhile, King and Halsey discussed who should become the new commander for the fast carriers of the Fifth Fleet because the incumbent, Rear Adm. Charles A. Pownall, had revealed a lack of aggressiveness. Mitscher had done well on Guadalcanal and was available. As yet, only Naval aviation pioneers Bellinger and Towers had obtained top administrative commands. Mitscher was the first to reach the top echelon of combat command when he was billeted as Commander Fast Carrier Task Forces, Pacific. In fairness to Pownall, it must be noted that he was given command of carrier task forces that would support amphibious operations in a Central Pacific drive before the techniques for multicarrier operations had been refined. Carriers had been used for striking only minor Japanese targets until Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, in March 1942, while striking LaeSalamaua, New Guinea, used two carriers protected by four cruisers and 10 destroyers and provided a model for combined carrier tactics that called for further experimentation. The separation of the two carriers used in the Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1942, may have contributed to the loss of one; and aviators demanded that only supporting ships capable of their speed operate with fast carriers. Not until new carriers came out in increased numbers in the fall of 1943, however, could experimentation continue. During a strike against Marcus Island on 1 September 1943, Pownall tested the first multicarriet task force in combat and was the first to have battleships attached. His three carriers had a single ring of escorts and depended for defense not upon maneuver, as in the past, but upon concentrated CAP and massed proximityfused antiaircraft (AA) fire. Tactics for a single task group but also for two, three, or four task groups had been worked out by a board he headed. However, during the Marcus strike he revealed his lack of aggressive leadership and incensed aviators by his hesitancy to rescue downed pilots. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, nevertheless chose him as his overall carrier commander. His first mission would be to attack Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts, and then Wake. While doing so he would test the efficiency of two light carriers in company and also formations comprised of six carriers, three groups of two each, and two groups of three each. These worked well. Unfortunately, the Gilberts operation called for neutralizing Japanese air on Tarawa and also attacking the Japanese fleet if it left Truk. Moreover, both Admiral Spruance, commanding, and Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, his amphibious commander, wanted carriers tied down to the beaches as offshore artillery - and Pownall agreed with them rather than with those who would use them in part to strike Japanese air in the Marshalls. Further, Nimitz ordered that carrier groups would operate independently while striking separated targets. In the end, a formation of four carrier task groups used for the first time in the Pacific proved the efficiency of coordinated tactics upon which Mitscher would build because Pownall, again revealing a lack of aggressiveness during his strike against the Marshalls, jeopardized the safety of his force. The result was his replacement by Mitscher. On 6 January 1944, Mitscher was given temporary command of Pownall's old TF 50, redesignated TF 58, which included six fleet carriers and six light ones, 700 aircraft including detachments of night-fighting F4Us, eight battleships, four AA cruisers, and 35 destroyers. His permanent command of it would rest upon his performance in the assault on the Matshalls. While riding a carrier as a guest, Mitscher was responsible for deploying TF 58 as a whole, for designating its missions and setting forth policies and procedures to his task group commanders, who would relay them down the line. He was also the primary air adviser to the fleet commander. He preferred a small to a large staff because cooperation would be enhanced, action would be quicker, and less valuable space would be used. He evaluated operation plans for their value rather than by the pound and kept them flexible, changing them whenever the enemy changed tactics. While he kept his carriers tactically concentrated in multicarrier forces, he authorized their commanders to operate independently within broad limits of the doctrines he established. Concentration reduced the need for CAP for the carriers and their supporting ships. Whereas certain task group commanders, especially Rear Adm. Joseph J. "Jocko" Clark, argued that the more carriers in a group the better, for less CAP would be needed, he preferred that groups be comprised of four of them - three fleet carriers and a light one-because more than that number would lack the air space needed and complicate communications. Mitscher pleased aviators because he understood warfare, people, and aviation. If he spoke softly and said little, he never feared danger. He kept attack plans simple enough for tired and harassed pilots to read and understand and obtained photographic intelligence about targets whenever possible. He told subordinates what to do but not how to do it, thus releasing their initiative. If a man fouled up, he got rid of him; if he performed well, he needed no instruction; if he improved matters, he praised him, and, if circumstances warranted, recommended an award for him. Unable to debrief all pilots, he talked with his task group commanders and his and their air group commanders and flight leaders about their operations, sought especially to learn if pilots suffered from combat fatigue, and asked for recommendations for improvement. To ease their task he maintained radio and radar silence until his force was sighted by the enemy, provided standardized target and intelligence charts, and positioned radar picket ships forward of the force. If he could avoid it, he would not launch or recover aircraft in darkness, and he would go to extreme lengths to save a damaged ship and rescue downed pilots, as by using Dumbos (lifeguard PBYs) and having TBFs drop life rafts to them. He therefore inspired a personal devotion and following particularly among junior officers unequaled by any other Naval aviator. For the Marshalls operation, Mitscher directed that his pilots strafe revetments first, then planes on aprons and runways, and tangle with Zeros only if attacked. They cleared the air of enemy aircraft and shipping before the initial landings were made. None of his ships was attacked, and he lost very few planes. He had established the basic pattern of air operations to be followed for the rest of the war and justified his becoming the permanent commander of the fast carrier task forces. He would as circumstances called for refine the basic pattern. In certain cases, where amphibious forces were not involved and the target was beyond the reach of friendly land-based air, as at Truk, he used his force to neutralize enemy air. He then sent deck-load strikes of fighters, divebombers, and torpedo bombers so staggered as to provide a continuous flow over the target. In addition to this "blanket," he sent night fighters to keep the enemy awake and prevent his sending early morning strikes against him. Even Pownall admitted that the defensive tactics heretofore used by carriers, as at the Gilberts, had been superseded by the strategic mission of destroying enemy air power so that it could not interfere with projected operations." Mitscher had proved that carriers could operate round the clock and that his planes had an all-weather capability - yet had much to learn about night fighters. Rather than use night fighters from each carrier, he eventually assigned several carriers to night fighting duty. In any event, on 21 March 1944 he became a vice admiral and was appointed Commander, Fast Carrier Forces, Pacific Fleet. In addition to receiving ever-increasing numbers of carriers and fast battleships, Mitscher was also aided by the issue to the fleet of such improved aircraft as the F6F and F4U, which could down the Zero. If he did not conceive using a single fighter director for his force, the use of radar picket destroyers, and radar-fitted TBFs for fighter direction and rescue, he adopted these measures. Although he at first resented having to take a surface officer as his chief of staff, in Arleigh Burke he found a truly capable and loyal colleague who lifted many burdens from his shoulders. Several times Mitscher proposed more daring tactics than those advocated by his fleet commanders. Prime examples are the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In the former, his strike late on the day of 11 June (rather than a morning strike, which the enemy could expect) gained aerial supremacy over the Marianas. Spruance followed orders to defend the beachhead on Saipan and vetoed his recommendation to sail westward to engage the enemy fleet, even if at night." That he did all possible to save pilots he sent out late on 19 June to destroy the enemy fleet commanded by Vice Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa was proved by his risking attack by submarines and having his fleet turn on its lights. That he had great respect for higher authority was evident when he ordered softened criticism of Spruance included in the battle report Burke wrote. In its finest hour to date, TF 58 had destroyed Ozawa's air and one of his carriers, and submarines accounted for two others, yet six carriers escaped to fight another day. Debate still flourishes over whether Spruance had been correct in tying Mitscher's carriers to the beachhead, yet by doing so he fulfilled his mission of defending the amphibious forces involved." Similar debate continues over Halsey's actions in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but, again, Mitscher refused to criticize him. After a short visit Stateside, Mitscher returned to Pearl Harbor and resumed command of the fast carriers. Now under Spruance, TF 38 became TF 58. In seizing their next objectives, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, they would engage in the longest and supreme Naval effort in the Western Pacific. To isolate Iwo Jima, Mitscher struck Japan on 16 and 17 February 1945, then covered invading forces from the 19th to the 21st. On the latter day he committed one of the worst errors in his career by sending the night carrier Saratoga, escorted by only three destroyers, to cover Iwo. Regular and Kamikaze planes so damaged her that she had to return home for three months of repairs. He then struck Japan again on the 25th. With the newly formed British TF 57 guarding the area from Formosa to Okinawa, he could concentrate on the latter and on islands to the northward and also on Kyushu. To defend the forces invading Okinawa he had to take on the entire Japanese tactical air force and all that remained of the Japanese Navy. Most dangerous were Kamikazes, but there was also the force containing the super battleship Yamato force that sought to reach the beachhead on 7 April. Mitscher's planes had destroyed the Yamoto's sister ship, the Mushashi, in the battle of the Sibuyan Sea against Vice Adm. Takeo Kurita during the Leyte campaign. In destroying the Yamato, his pilots again proved the superiority of the airplane over the battleship. However, on 11 May, Kamikazes severely damaged his flagship, the Bunker Hill, and on the 14th also the Enterprise, to which he had transferred. Because the Army had not yet built airfields on Okinawa, he could do nothing but stick it out and, as he put it, serve as a stationary target for Kamikazes.Z° When he told Spruance on 18 May that his force was of doubtful value and should be released, Spruance vetoed the suggestion. Thus, it was not until the 27th that Spruance was relieved by Halsey and Vice Adm. John S. "Slew" McCain relieved him. His having kept his force in action for 92 days set a new record for unequaled endurance. He would now return home to serve as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), a billet he disliked because it was a desk job and also involved politics. Among the politics Mitscher intensely disliked were those the War Department and Army Air Forces used to obtain independence for the latter and a single Department of Defense. Holding that carriers had made a unique contribution to the defeat of Japan, he spoke publicly against these steps until President Harry Truman ordered that criticism of them stop. When he sought to resign, Admiral Nimitz, now the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), refused the offer. That Naval Secretary James V. Forrestal had offered him the CNO billet is doubtful, but he was pleased when Forrestal admitted aviators to serve in three of the six key positions as Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations and chose him to form a new Eighth Fleet. On 1 January 1946, now an Admiral, the second pioneer Naval aviator to achieve that grade, Mitscher cleaned out his desk and prepared for sea. With Burke again his Chief of Staff, he sailed the Caribbean and in exercises showed President Truman the power of Naval aviation. Soon after returning home he became the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. He visited England, where he made arrangements to cooperate with the British in the Mediterranean against Soviet expansionism, and at Malta underwent an appendicitis operation. In addition he began to show the effects of World War II, with Burke, at least, suspecting that he knew he was dying. When Burke refused to burn his papers, arguing that they contained valuable historical information, he burned them himself. On 26 January 1947, when he felt ill, he was taken to the Naval hospital in Norfolk. Rather than having bronchitis, he had had a heart attack. A massive attack on his 60th birthday, 3 February, caused him, as Burke put it, to "slip his chain."
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