Home : World War II : The Navy In WWII :The Landings
North AfricaThe invasion of North Africa, the beginning of the drive to make contact with Axis forces on continental Europe, was decided upon in July, 1942. The Allies hoped for light opposition, or none at all, from the French. There were three main objectives in the Allied plans. Casablanca, on the coast of French Morocco, was to be taken by United States Army and Naval forces, while a Naval force, primarily British, was to land U.S. Army and British Army forces for the seizure of Algiers and Oran on the coast of Algeria. D-Day was to be November 8. The U.S. Navy, except for one division of transports and other small units in the Algerian operation, saw most of its action in connection with the taking of Casablanca. The plans called for three landings, so that troops could close in on Casablanca itself from north and south, and so that the large airfield near Port Lyautey could be seized and utilized. The main landing was to be at Fedala, 14 miles north of Casablanca, just beyond range of the fixed defenses of that city. The secondary landings were at the mouth of the Sebou River, near Port Lyautey, 65 miles to the northward, and at Safi, a small port 190 miles to the southward. The capture of the latter port, with its docks, was essential to the prompt landing of tanks from the ships which carried them. (Special tank landing ships had not then become available.) The infantry division from Fedala was to advance south, and the armored force from Safi north, for the investment of Casablanca. The large convoy of transports, supply ships, supporting battleships, cruisers, carriers and escorting destroyers sailed from ports in the U.S. (principally Hampton Roads), and Bermuda, effected rendezvous at sea, and proceeded by devious routes across the Atlantic, without loss from submarine attack. Radio silence was maintained throughout. At daylight of November 7, estimate of coastal surf conditions being favorable, the decision was made to land on the scheduled date, and the various task forces separated to take their assigned stations. Zero HourThe zero hour for the landings was about three hours before daylight. All were made satisfactorily and very close to schedule. At Safi, where there was no beach outside the breakwater, two old world war destroyers, the "Cole" and the "Bernadou," with masts cut down to give a low silhouette, loaded with specially trained assault troops, dashed inside the harbor and alongside the dock or breakwater, catching the defenses completely by surprise. At the River Sebou, a similar destroyer, the "Dallas," rammed the harbor defense net and, ultimately, with the aid of a Port Lyautey pilot (who had been secretly brought to the U.S. for the purpose), proceeded up river to a point off the air field. The French, unfortunately, resisted at all points, and it was necessary to return their fire. The shore batteries at Fedala were quickly silenced by the fire of the supporting cruisers, "Augusta" and "Brooklyn," and by the pugnacious U.S. destroyers which went in to close range. The French light forces in Casablanca, under cover of smoke screens, made repeated gallant efforts to attack the transports off Fedala. They were driven off, and eventually all were destroyed or severely damaged by gunfire, or air attack, or by a combination of the two. The immobile, partially completed "Jean Bart," whose one quadruple 15" turret was used as part of the Casablanca defenses, was hit by 16" shells from the "Massachusetts," and by air bombs. She was damaged and sunk at her dock, but her turret remained in action. At 7:55 a.m., November 11th, five minutes before the opening of the final assault on Casablanca by combined sea, naval, air, and ground forces, word of an armistice was received, and hostile operations ceased. On the nights of November 11th and November 12th, before they could be brought in to the wrecked harbor of Casablanca, four transports, engaged in unloading important supplies for the troops ashore, were torpedoed and sunk in the transport area off Fedala. A tanker, a supply ship, and a destroyer were also damaged by the assembling German submarines. The U.S. Navy set up sea frontier forces (surface and air) based on Casablanca and the air station at Port Lyautey for the protection of convoys and allied shipping in the approaches to Casablanca and the western and southwestern approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar. The U.S. Navy also set up an operating base for the control of the port of Oran. Both of these activities subsequently became part of the "U.S. Naval Forces North West African Waters" when that command was established, in February 1943, with headquarters in Algiers. Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN
SicilyBy mid-May of 1943, the Germans and Italians had surrendered in North Africa, and our military forces in that area were powerful enough to justify planning a major offensive operation against "Festung Europa," the fortress Europe. Unique features of this operation were that it was to be mounted largely in North Africa from ports extending from Oran to Alexandria, and it was to employ in addition to the usual large transports with their embarked landing craft, a host of newly constructed landing ships, intermediate sized selfsustaining landing craft and support craft. All this armada had to be assembled in small North African ports, trained, organized, and rehearsed with the troop units to be landed. The whole tremendous operation, air, naval, and ground force, was planned under the aegis of Allied Force Headquarters. The combined naval force with embarked troops was commanded by Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, a British flag officer of pre-eminent record and vast experience in those waters. It was divided into Eastern and Western Naval Task Forces, commanded respectively by a British and an American vice admiral. Each of these major subdivisions was further divided into three subordinate task forces, each in turn commanded by a rear admiral. Included in the general plan were vast air forces and powerful naval covering forces, the latter for protection against the beaten, but still potentially dangerous Italian Fleet. The LandingsAll the many naval components took a preliminary staging disposition and later departed from staging ports on a vast and intricate schedule. The seamanship of the newly organized naval forces was tested severely by the rough weather encountered en route. However, the attack was delivered simultaneously and the troops were landed successfully and with complete tactical surprise during darkness of the early morning of 10 July 1943. Major landing forces were put ashore at five principal positions. Three of these objectives, Scoglitti, Gela, and Licata, on the south coast of Sicily, were attacked by the American task force (Western). The landing at Scoglitti, preceded by bombardment by our naval units, was accomplished with comparatively little opposition, the Italian troops abandoning their defense positions during the preinvasion bombardment. At Gela the troops landed exactly on scheduleand and the first waves encountered slight opposition. The second wave met stiff resistance and suffered heavy casualties until shore batteries were silenced by the naval gunfire from the U.S. cruisers "Savannah" and "Boise." At Licata the larger part of the assault infantry were transported to anchorages off the landing beaches in thirty-six new LST's which had been converted by the installation of six landing craft, each of which landed an assault platoon. Heavy opposition was encountered on the left flank, but all beaches were captured and the unloading of supplies began. After the landings, the participating naval forces were subjected to intense enemy air attack for three days. The enemy also launched violent counter-attacks on our troops, spearheaded with tanks which threatened to drive our forces near Gela into the sea. Accurate naval gunfire broke up these attacks and served as antitank fire for the men on the beaches. Had there been no naval support, these attacks might have succeeded in destroying our forces in that area. Supporting ForcesAs the combined troops drove ahead from the landing beaches they were supported, whenever possible, by our naval forces. At Porto Empedocle and Agrigento this support contributed greatly to the capture of those positions. The resistance met by our ground troops consisted mainly of small arms fire, since almost every large gun was spotted and destroyed by well directed naval fire. Destroyers and small craft took a major part in ihe protection of transports against the almost continuous German air attacks. These small craft also protected captured harbors, swept enemy mines, performed necessary salvage, and opened up ports essential for the support of the Seventh Army. This operation was a triumph of planning and an example of what can be accomplished by a generous spirit between the Army and Naval Forces and between two allies, all working enthusiastically toward the same end on approved plans. The Invasion of Sicily was the prototype of large-scale amphibious landings that were to prove so irresistibly effective throughout the ensuing campaigns of the war. Vice Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN
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