Aspiring To Comprise A Strike Force Of Their Own

The first Merlin-engined Mustang group commenced operations under the control of VIII Fighter Command though assigned to IX Fighter Command, a policy that also embraced the Ninth's first P-47 units. Few of the 354th pilots had flown Mustangs before they arrived in England during October. Training and equipment problems delayed the first operational mission until December 1st, when Lt Col Blakeslee and Colonel K. R. Martin (Group CO) led 23 aircraft on a sweep over the Knocke area on the Belgian coast. The first escort duty came on the 5th when Blakeslee again led: the Group flew as far as Amiens on an uneventful mission. On the 11th a deeper penetration was made flying support for 1st Division Fortresses attacking Emden: enemy aircraft were seen but they evaded. The enemy fighter force was more willing during the December 16th bomber escort to Bremen and an engagement with Me109s and Ju88s brought the 354th a victory. Four days later the Mustangs were nearly attacked by Thunderbolts, whose pilots mistook them for Messerschmitt Me109s. Breaking in the Mustang took time and the aircraft was hampered by "bugs", in addition the extra fuselage fuel tank and wing drop tahk system were being installed during December, all helping to limit the scope of these early missions.

As the year waned the established Thunderbolt units still remained the chief contestant of the Luftwaffe's fighter defence. The ubiquitous Wolfpack performed yet another of its brilliant attack manoeuvres on the December Emden mission. Once again twin-engined fighters were caught preparatory to launching an attack on the rear of a bomber box. Thirty Mel10s believed to have been units from Z.G.26, were seen just off Spiekeroog Island. The 61st Ftr. Sqdn. following Major Gabreski, bore down on these in a mass dive with a turn into the attack which brought fourteen Zerstorers down. Captain R. Lamb, Lieutenants P. Conger and D. Smith all sent down three apiece.

The Me209 and Macchi 202 (Italian) types which were reported by fighters on a number of occasions during December, were in all probability FW190D models, the long nosed version of the FockeWulf that was then undergoing operational trials with J.G.3. The colours and markings of enemy aircraft were reported for identification of units and any tricks that might be afoot to confuse Allied aircrews. The average fighter pilot's assessment of colours and markings was not to be relied upon: an impression gained during high speed combat was often by a trick of light or mind.

German ground stations made a regular practice of jamming Allied fighter pilot's radio transmissions. It took the form of a whine of varying intensity and during the summer of 1943 communication between pilots had become extremely difficult. Measures were continually in hand to counter this disturbance and while it could be subdued, it was not eliminated. Radio links between fighters and the heavy bombers enabled the latter to call for help when attacked. It also allowed fighter leaders to pass on pertinent information, available to them through their more extensive radio facilities.

Radio was very much the fighter pilot's lifeline and a major factor in a safe return to England when weather conditions, combat with the enemy, or a mis-calculation, caused pilots to lose their way. When fuel supplies were low, ground control "homings" gave the pilot the nearest emergency base, as occurred on December 30th when the 56th Group was flying on withdrawal support for B-17s returning from Ludwigshafen. The relieving group, apparently late in taking over, caused the 56th to remain until fuel gauges bordered on the danger mark. The P-47s made emergency landings at a dozen different airfields along the Essex and Suffolk coast. One, flown by 2/Lt Fred J. Christensen Jr (destined to be one of the 56th's foremost aces), had faulty gauges to make matters worse, and just after crossing the coast the P-47 ran completely out of fuel. Christensen attempted a "dead stick" landing on Leiston airfield, but the plane's glide was insufficient to reach the runway and it crashed just short. True to its fashion, the rugged Thunderbolt, though severely damaged, let the pilot walk away unharmed. Some were not so lucky: others even luckier.

On a long haul to the Bordeaux region the following day — longest mission so far for Eighth fighters — cloud conditions prevailed with variable cirrus over the Channel up to 25,000 feet and 6 to 7/10s cumulus over France at 6,000 ft. The Lightnings, staying a little too long, were desperately short of fuel on return; some force-landed, others just managed to reach airfields along the south coast of England from Exeter to Ford. Lt Harold Bauer of the 55th Group did not get that far. At 14,000 ft, 15 miles off Lizard Point, his fuel gauges registered empty and he knew that in a few seconds his P-38's tanks would run dry. Bauer tried giving the "Mayday", rescue call but his radio transmitter was apparently inoperative. As he prepared to bale out he knew he had little chance of surviving long in an icy mid-winter sea below. At that moment he caught sight of an RAF rescue launch and decided to put his aircraft down on the water as close to it as possible. No-one had yet ditched a Lightning and lived to tell the tale, but although his fighter went under quickly Bauer managed to scramble out onto the wing. He was wearing extra heavy flying clothes, occasioned by the P-38s cold cockpit problem, yet the Mae West like jacket kept him afloat until the launch crew retrieved him, four minutes later, not much the worse for his experience.

Two more P-47 groups started operations on December 13th and 20th; the 359th based at East Wretham and the 358th at Leiston. Another, the 361st, arriving at the end of November and was working up at Bottisham, near Cambridge, proved to be the last group of P-47s to join VIII Fighter Command. Twelve fighter groups were now on hand (10 P-47 and 2 P-38), 3 short of the Command's total planned strength. The last of the three fighter wings, the 67th at Walcott Hall, near Stamford, became fully operational in December; the 66th Fighter Wing at Sawston Hall, seven miles from Cambridge, having achieved this status during the previous month. Each wing would ultimately control five groups.

Combat unit strength of VIII FC had trebled during the last quarter of 1943 and aircraft complements of many were double that of the previous spring. Now able to fly a force of 550 fighters, an escort of one for one could be given the heavies, whose maximum strength on missions was then around the same figure. However, the influx of new bomber groups during the opening months of 1944, would soon upset this balance. Also, the numbers of Luftwaffe fighters in the West had now risen, to approximately 1,500, as new Jagdgeschwader were being formed and others strengthened. While the Luftwaffe had achieved notable successes against the US bombers during recent month's by improved tactics and new weapons, its effort against the far-ranging escort was generally feeble and unrewarding. For despite its growing numbers, the enemy showed a marked reluctance to enage the American fighters, preferring to concentrate on such bombers as were unescorted or had weak escort. The USAAF was now painfully aware that the bombing of industry likely to affect aircraft production and the attrition presumed to have been wrought in air battles, had not weakened the opposition to the day bomber raids. Indeed, Allied intelligence agencies could supply fairly conclusive evidence of the build up of Luftwaffe fighter forces in Germany and the West. The Allies had yet to achieve air superiority, vital to the forthcoming invasion as it was to the continuation of the American strategic bombing campaign. When General Arnold sent a New Year's message to the Eighth Air Force he underlined what its commanders knew was their immediate task: "Destroy the Enemy Air Force wherever you find them, in air, on the ground and in the factories".

The fighter element of the Eighth Air Force, built up to support the bombers by escort work were, in the months directly preceding the invasion of the Continent, aspiring to comprise a strike force of their own.

On April 5th, when a completely overcast sky caused most of the Fortresses and Liberators to remain on the ground, 456 US fighters went on a mass straffing mission to France and Germany. Only 3 of the 11 groups participating were able to attack their assigned targets because of ground haze and cloud, but the resultant devastation was almost totally the work of two Mustang Groups. The 4th and 355th Group, given targets in the Berlin and Munich areas respectively, found improved weather conditions. The 4th descending on five airfields near Berlin, claimed 43 aircraft on the ground and two in the air; Don Gentile alone left 5 Ju88s wrecked at one base. The 355th, recently converted from P-47s, dealt with six airfields resulting in claims of 43 destroyed and 81 damaged, plus 8 in the air, most being obtained at Oberpfaffenhofen. Ground fire brought down four 4th and three 355th Mustangs; one of the former, Major Duane Beeson, a leading ace in Boise Bee, was able to gain sufficient height to bale out, becoming a prisoner. A few days previously the 56th had suffered the loss of two top ranking aces: Gerald Johnson's P-47 was also a victim of ground fire and crash-landed, while Walter Mahurin, master of a score of aerial battles, was shot down by the rear gunner of a Do217 bomber.

Having destroyed 88 enemy aircraft on the ground, three days later VIII FC fighters took the same number in the air. Indeed, on April 8th, it can be said the battle between the German Air Force and the US fighters reached its zenith. Including 40 ground victories the total for the mission was 128 — approximately the complement of a whole Jagdgeschwader. The Luftwaffe could not sustain such grievous losses without serious strain on its resources; yet this was not an isolated occasion, it was now losing heavily nearly every day. When 644 bombers went to Brunswick and various targets connected with aviation in North-West Germany, a force of 712 fighters went with them. The German fighters were again drawn into combat with the 4th Group's Mustangs, this time shortly after rendezvousing with a box of B-24s. Engaged with a determined and larger force of Me109s, they achieved a 31 for 4 win, a VIII FC record score for a single mission. The date marked the anniversary of the first combat sorties of the other old stagers of VIII FC, the 56th and 78th Groups, making the occasion particularly memorable for 1/Lt Charles M. Peale who had been one of the Duxford pilots on that first mission. For a year he had flown his Thunderbolt without once being able to claim an enemy plane destroyed. Then, on this his 99th combat sortie, he shot down one of the three claimed by the 78th. Peale had flown most of his early missions as a wing man; there were many such men who never once had an opportunity to fire at an enemy during their tour of combat.

April 8th also proved a memorable day for the Lightning equipped 20th Fighter Group, scheduled to escort B-17s to Oldenburg. However, the 20th's base at Kings Cliffe, several miles north-west of the general area of VIII FC bases, remained shrouded in fog until noon. Command of the Group had recently been vested in Lt Col Harold Rau, who had the rare distinction of having once been a private in the organisation he now led. Disappointed that his men had been denied this "crack at the enemy", and eager to boost morale, Rau sought permission from Wing for his Group to carry out an independent fighter sweep. The 4th Group had been allowed to do this with Mustangs — so why not Lightnings? The P-38 had always given a good account of itself at low altitudes.

The go-ahead was given to the 20th and airfields in the Salzwedel area, 80 miles west of Berlin, were selected as strafing targets. This was the first time P-38s were despatched alone to such targets deep in Germany. The 48 P-38s scheduled took off at 14.02 hrs and 112 minutes later arrived near Salzwedel where the three squadrons separated as planned. Led by Rau, the 79th Fighter Squadron attacked an airfield just north of the town and in four passes wrote off 13 aircraft, mostly bombers. As ground fire had become intense, the Squadron then moved off to strafe an army barracks that one section had found and, after giving this a good going over, two locomotives were shot up. Shortly afterwards seven Me109s bounced the Lightnings and shot one down. Rau climbed and came down on an Me109 that was preparing to attack another 79th machine. Unfortunately the Colonel's burst of fire caused the Messerschmitt to crash into the P-38 ahead and both went down in flames. Other P-38s destroyed two more Me109s during the course of this action.

Meanwhile, the 77th Squadron had gone for an airfield south-east of the town, destroying two enemy aircraft caught in the air and eight on the ground as well as damaging 21. The 55th Squadron did not locate an airfield, but went on a strafing spree leaving havoc in its wake. Both these squadrons lost a Lightning. When the Group returned to England and totted up the record, it was found that all but 2 of the 42 P-38s reaching the target area had fired their guns - 21,475 rounds of •50 and 3,850 20 mm shells had been expended on targets which included 18 locomotives, 50 rail wagons, 16 flak towers, various factory buildings, hangars and oil storage dumps.

Low altitude work of this nature suited the Lightning far better than escorting bombers at 25,000 feet and above. Their "bugs" were slowly being ironed out but the major problem, engine failure, was not easily overcome. One immediate, though rather unsatisfactory, solution for operation at low temperatures at high altitude was the blocking off of oil cooling radiators to raise the temperature of the engine oil and improve lubrication. The trouble with turbo-superchargers through exhaust condensation, was remedied by a water trap devised by members of the 55th Group and enlarged duct scoops, to convey warm air from engines to the cockpit, helped eliminate the pilots' problems of intense cold and frosted windscreens.

During the winter months hush-hush work had been in progress at Lockheed's Speke depot on an aircraft known as the "Droop Snoot". This was really an extensively modified P-38J, and principally the handiwork of Colonels Cass Hough and Don Ostrander (an armament and ordnance expert). Current activities in bombing and strafing by the fighters had led to the installation of a cabin for a bombardier and bomb sight in the nose of a Lightning, to enable it to be used as sighting aircraft for mass formation bombing by fighters. This type of bombing had first been tried out by the 56th Group's P-47s in November, when a B-24 was used but found to have many disadvantages. The Lightning conversion offered a more versatile aircraft for this purpose and better suited to operations involving fighters. Additionally, it would prove difficult for the enemy to detect the nature of the attack until bombs began to fall, and a formation able to bomb at twice the speed of heavy bombers should prove less vulnerable over heavily defended targets.

To make the conversion, ATS arranged for Lockheeds to strip the gun and ammunition compartments and fit a plexiglass nose through which a Norden bomb sight could be operated. As such aircraft were unarmed and liable to be singled out for attack once their purpose and weaknesses were known, an ingenious camouflage was devised. Each P-38 group was ordered to paint a white band around the forward section of their aircraft's noses, and to remove the paint forward of this, polishing the exposed metal. By this means it was hoped that it would be difficult to tell the plexiglass-nosed and unarmed models from the lethal variety.

The first operational use of the Droop Snoot by VIII FC units was made by the 55th Group on April 10th 1944. St Dizier airfield in France, the target selected, was to be bombed from 20,000 feet by two of the group's squadrons dropping on the Droop Snoot's signal; each of these aircraft was fitted with one drop tank and a 1,000 lb bomb. The third squadron of the group acted as escort. As St Dizier was found to be obscured by cloud, Colonel Jenkins selected Coulommiers airfield. The 28 bombs dropped appeared to be well aimed and after bombing, the Colonel led a squadron down to strafe the field. At lower altitude the Colonel was hindered by a foggy windscreen — another common affliction with the P-38 when dived — and his run was spoiled. When a second pass was made, the alerted gunners of the field brought down the leader and his wingman. Jenkins managed to belly-land and get out safely.

The 20th Group by now had also been provided with a Droop Snoot and went to attack Florennes airfield. This group also found its primary target obscured by cloud, but was unable to find an alternative target and set course for home, dropping their 1,000 pounders in the Channel. During the afternoon a second Droop Snoot mission was run by the 20th, this time to Gutersloh in Germany. Here, unhindered by cloud, the 27 aircraft attacking placed 2 x 500 lb and 25 x 1,000 lb bombs in a good concentration among airfield buildings. All in all, the employment of the P-38 as a medium high altitude fighter bomber showed considerable promise and operational experiments to determine the best procedures for Droop Snoot attacks continued.

The day following the first operational use of the Droop Snoot, none other than General Dwight Eisenhower went for a flight in this two-place version of the Lightning. It occurred during the General's visit to Debden, where he had gone to see something of the fighter force that was gradually gaining air superiority over the western area of Europe. He took the occasion to present Blakeslee, Gentile and Robert Johnson (who had flown over from Halesworth) with DSCs. The 4th Group was in high spirits that day for its combined totals of air and ground victories now stood at 405½ and surpassed that of the 56th Group. Its impressive score continued to rise rapidly during the following weeks of April for it was predominately the longer-ranged Mustangs that saw most of the action and made big claims on VIII Fighter Command missions. Even while Eisenhower inspected examples of American fighter equipment drawn up at Debden for his inspection, the Mustang's of 357th Group from Leiston were fighting the Luftwaffe on an escort to Sorau, from which they returned with 25 of the 51 victories fighters claimed.

The "Bills's Buzz Boys" strafing venture prompted the tacticians at VIII Fighter Command to draw up an ambitious plan for large scale strafing assaults on Luftwaffe airfields. The plan called for each fighter group to be assigned specific areas in Germany where it alone would be responsible for attacking airfields during such a mission. This served two main purposes first it allowed pilots of a group an opportunity to become familiar with the defences and targets in an area, putting them in a better position to formulate methods of attack. It also helped to prevent overlapping when the effect of a group arriving over an airfield which had previously been alerted by an attack by another group could be disastrous. In the plan, Germany was divided into northern and southern sections each subdivided into fairly rectangular areas of several hundred square miles, size depending on the number of airfields within the boundaries. Each group was assigned one or more of these areas in both northern ("A") and southern ("B") sections, and on receipt of the code word JACKPOT A or JACKPOT B in a Field Order was to despatch its aircraft to strafe airfield(s) in the appropriate areas.

The first full scale mission of this kind was on April 15th when the 616 fighters involved left 40 aircraft destroyed and 29 damaged on airfields in France and the Low Countries, while taking another 18 in the air. It proved a costly venture for 32 pilots failed to return, seven in P-38s of Honington's 364th Group. With heavy cloud extending to 24,000 ft weather was extremely bad and was held responsible for half the missing aircraft.

Interspersed with JACKPOT strafing, Droop Snoot attacks continued. The Lightnings of the 55th Group went out on April 20th but all feasible targets were cloud covered and the English Channel was again used as a dump. Three days later the Group was luckier and deposited 93 x 500 lb bombs on what was thought to be Laon/Athies airfield but which turned out to be nearby Laon/Couvron! The 20th was also out but its attack on a Focke-Wulf repair plant at Tours brought inconclusive results.

The Luftwaffe continued to be harried in the air. On the 22nd, the 4th inflicted a resounding defeat on a formation of Me109s that attempted to "bounce" its Mustangs. Blakeslee shot down two, John Godfrey three and another 4th Group ace, Willard Millikan, 4 of the 17 claimed by the Debden men. Two days later the 357th came home with another 22 victories from a mission where VIII FC fighters claimed a total of 66 air and 58 ground victories. The four operational Mustang groups accounted for nearly three-quarters of the enemy aircraft destroyed by the Command during April. With 348 air and 155 ground victories the 4th had passed the 500 destroyed mark by the end of April; a month in which it had destroyed 222. The 355th from Steeple Morden had a total of 153, while the newly operational 352nd at Bodney claimed 140. Mustang losses were also high. The four groups lost 67 aircraft — almost equivalent to the strength of one entire group — whereas the six Thunderbolt groups lost but 42 of their numbers. This reflects not only the extensive action seen by the Mustang but the fact that it could not sustain battle damage and return home safely to the same degree as its Republic companion. The Merlin's coolant system was particularly vulnerable and many pilots had to bale out when a punctured coolant caused the engine to overheat and seize up.

A dozen Droop Snoot bombing missions were despatched during the last week of April but many were frustrated by cloud. The 55th made its most successful attack so far on the 27th when it came down to 17,000 ft to drop on Roye/Amy airfield. On the same date the 20th Group went to Peronne but was turned away by cloud and selected Albert/Meaulte instead. VVhile the P-38s were in the process of running up on the target, P-47s of the 56th Group approached the formation causing some aircraft to jettison their bombs under the misapprehension that they were FW190s. Chateaudun was a Droop Snoot target for the 55th next day, when 49 x 1,000 lb bombs were dropped from 18,000 ft. After this the Group acted as top cover for the 56th Group which made a dive bombing attack (its first) on the same airfield. The 20th went again to the Tours target on the 28th and 30th. On the latter occasion one bomb from a P-38 struck without exploding and glanced off the port engine cowling of a lower and following aircraft. Some of the 20th's aircraft went down and tried "skip" bombing from 500 feet. Most of these raids were against enemy airfields and on some occasions, when distances from base were not too great, two 1,000 lb bombs were carried, a load comparable to that of the A-20 Havoc light bomber.

top of page

back a page