It hard to imagine a worse place to go to war in then the ball turret position. Isolated from the rest of the crew, the ball turret was extremely cramped quarters and required a man with a slight build. In almost every case, there was not enough room for the ball turret gunner to wear a parachute. Ironically, post war analysis of crew fatality records revealed that the ball turret gunner had the safest job on the plane (with the pilot having the most dangerous).
The RAF considered it impossible for a man to remain in the ball turret for an entire mission but 8th AF ball turret gunners routinely spent 10-12 hours in the ball while over enemy territory.
Beginning with B-24D-140-CO serial number 42-41164, the tunnel gun mount in the rear ventral fuselage was replaced by a manned Sperry ball turret similar to that mounted on the B-17E. It carried a pair of 0.50-inch machine guns, with all the ammunition being carried inside the turret. Like the ball turret in the B-17, the gunner sat entirely inside the turret to operate the guns. Unlike the ball turret in the B-17, was fully-retractable into the fuselage, which made landings much easier and less hair-raising. The turret could rotate a full 360 degrees and the guns could depress between 0 and 90 degrees. The armament was now eleven guns (three in the nose, two in upper dorsal turret, two in tail turret, two in belly turret, and two in the waist positions). (APO-Army Post Office)
HEADQUARTERS 2D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
AAF 147 APO 558
21 MAY 1944
SUBJECT: Removal of Lower Ball Turret in B-24 Aircraft TO : Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, AAF Station 101, APO 634
1. Operational experience in B-24 aircraft in this Division has increased the belief that under present combat conditions, the benefit derived from the Sperry ball turret may not be commensurate with the weight and parasite drag involved in this installation. Many of the group commanders wish to have the opportunity of removing this turret in at least some of the aircraft in each formation to improve the performance and the ability to maintain tactical formation with improved altitude performance, gas consumption, engine performance, etc.
2. This Headquarters concurs with this belief and is of the definite opinion that increased overall efficiency in operations may be achieved through the removal of the ball turret.
3. Some of the facts pertinent to the decision to remove the ball turret are submitted:
a. An estimate of the weight eliminated and of the effect of the C.G. on B-24H and B-24J aircraft is as follows:
TYPICAL LANDING CONDITIONS
(Navigator and bombardier on flight deck, tail gunner at waist position, 6,000 rounds ammunition and 500 gallons fuel)
With Ball Turret
46,245
29.7
Without Ball Turret
44,745
24.9
Weight saved
1,500
Note: The ammunition expended has not been considered in the above calculations, because of its variable aspect. It is assumed, however, that this will not materially affect C.G. since uniform expenditure throughout the ship may be assumed.
b. A statistical analysis of the combat activity of the defensive armament in this Division is as follows:
(1.) 6 MONTHS - NOVEMBER 1943-APRIL 1944
TOTAL
% OF
DESTROYED
PROB. DEST.
DAMAGED
N0. CLAIM
GUN POSITION
ENCS.
TOTAL ENCS.
N0.
%
N0.
%
N0.
%
N0.
%
NOSE
164
16.0
72
15.1
18
18.0
25
15.6
49
17.2
TOP TURRET
177
17.2
75
15.6
20
20.0
31
19.4
51
18.0
BALL TURRET
53
5.1
30
6.3
3
3.0
7
4.4
13
4.6
LEFT WAIST
158
15.6
85
17.8
13
13.0
24
15.0
36
12.7
RIGHT WAIST
158
15.6
66
13.8
19
19.0
24
15.0
49
17.2
TAIL TURRET
312
30.5
150
31.4
27
27.0
49
30.6
86
30.3
TOTAL
1022
100.0
478
100.0
100
100.0
160
100.0
284
100.0
(2.) MONTH OF APRIL 1944
TOTAL
% OF
DESTROYED
PROB. DEST.
DAMAGED
N0. CLAIM
GUN POSITION
ENCS.
TOTAL ENCS.
N0.
%
N0.
%
N0.
%
N0.
%
NOSE
74
20.5
31
19.0
8
25.0
9
15.8
26
23.8
TOP TURRET
75
20.7
32
19.6
8
25.0
13
22.8
22
20.2
BALL TURRET
13
3.7
5
3.1
1
3.0
2
3.5
5
4.6
LEFT WAIST
53
14.6
30
18.4
3
9.4
9
15.8
11
10.1
RIGHT WAIST
48
13.3
19
11.7
3
9.4
9
15.8
17
15.6
TAIL TURRET
98
27.2
46
28.2
9
28.2
15
26.3
28
25.7
TOTAL
361
100.0
163
100.0
32
100.0
57
100.0
109
100.0
4. Removal of the ball turret will require that the well be covered both at the skin and in the interior of the aircraft.
5. A preliminary survey to determine the extent to which the group commanders wish to remove the ball turret reveals that of the fourteen (14) groups in this Division,
a. Five (5) wish to remove all ball turrets,
b. Two (2) wish to remove ball turrets in some of their aircraft (36 in one group and 13 in another), and
c. Seven (7) do not wish to remove any ball turrets at this time but may desire to do so at a later date.
6. In accordance with the above, it is requested that permission be granted to this Headquarters to remove Sperry ball turrets in any B-24 aircraft as may be determined from time to time by policy set by this Headquarters.
7. If the request in paragraph 6 above is granted, it is further suggested that the following corollary policies be adopted:
a. Inasmuch as it is possible that it may become necessary to replace ball turrets in aircraft upon relatively short notice, it is suggested that the policy of storage be adopted which will require the storage of ball turrets on stations to the number necessary to equip all aircraft on each station. When the attrition rate of aircraft operates to the point where surpluses begin to appear, it is suggested that such surpluses of ball turrets be returned to Strategic Air Depots for storage by elements of the Air Service Command.
b. It is suggested that no request be made on the Zone of Interior for the elimination of the ball turret until such time as the surplus storage in Air Service Command indicates that any aircraft dispatched to this theater minus the ball turret may be adequately provided for by the storage in the Theater.
c. As it is not feasible to determine in advance the group to which any individual replacement aircraft is to be assigned, and as the production line methods of modification as practiced in the base depots is relatively inflexible, it is suggested that the removal of the ball turret should not be considered as part of the modification program to be performed at the base depots. The ball turret may be removed from any replacement ships without loss of time during the period of the acceptance check of any aircraft on the station.
For the Commanding General
GEORGE L. PAUL
MAJOR - AGD.
Adjutant General
The Army Air Force, like all branches of the service, produced the best trained soldiers in the world. Training was long and thorough as the cadets went from base to base getting training in all aspects of the job. Most of the cadets who wanted to be pilots wanted to be fighter pilots. Those who did not make the cut for pilot, bombardier, or navigator were trained as flight engineers, radiomen, and gunners. The radioman and engineer doubled as gunners, the engineer operating the top turret and the radioman a waist gun.
Some student bombardiers and navigators still were sent to gunnery school, but, in the rush to get crews into combat, many graduated without gunnery training. They were expected to learn to shoot during crew training, but there was little time for it there, either. Officers, for example, spent one day on the gunnery range. Each shot one clip from his .45, a few rounds from a carbine, and a short burst from a truck-mounted turret.
Enlisted crew members received far better training. The typical gunnery course ran for six weeks and covered ballistics, turret operation, gun repair, and target recognition. Students fired flexible guns from North American AT-6s. Turret training was conducted in Lockheed AT-18s until actual bombers became available to the schools.
Shooting remained a difficult task, more art than science. The speed of aircraft had tripled between wars, but the rate of fire for machine guns remained at about 800 rounds per minute. When a 450-mile-per-hour fighter attacked a 300-mile-per-hour bomber head on, the rate of closure was close to the speed of sound. In one second, the fighter's relative position changed by 1,100 feet while a gunner was able to get off only about a dozen rounds. A nose gunner barely had time to spot an attacking aircraft and fire before it was gone. Waist and tail gunners had more time to aim but still little time to track targets. The solution was to put more guns on each plane and to use a defensive technique similar to the old Lufbery circle. Based on his plane's position in the formation, each gunner was assigned a specific, narrow area to cover. None had to move his guns more than a few degrees in any direction in order for the formation to confront an attacker with a daunting array of firepower.
