Home : World War II : Army Air Forces :

Iron Ass And The "Combat Box"

The USAAF only flew 27 missions in 1942. There seemed to be just too many obstacles. The B-17 was vulnerable to frontal attack until development of power-driven nose turrets starting in August 1943. Even though the USAAF wasn't yet penetrating deep into Germany, there were no fighters capable of even a medium combat radius. German defenses were so formidable that crews chances of surviving twelve missions were less than 50%.

There existed no standardized formations throughout bomber command. Group commanders were free to develop whatever tactic they wished. Most were experimenting with variations on layered formations which they hoped would provide maximum protection from fighters. These were quite cumbersone. Groups had been jinking (maneuvering sharply at random) to avoid flak as they approached their targets. This jinking maneuver continued through the bomb run. The result: the bombing ballistic solution was thrown off and the bombs were going everywhere but on the target. The belief that jinking was necessary for survival was even held by more experienced group commanders like General Frank Armstrong. The poor bomb results were putting the 8th Air Force Bomber Command off to a very poor start.

New tactics had to be worked out with two principal aims: to increase bombing precision and to make the massed bomber formations more invulnerable to Luftwaffe attack. Some of the methods were devised by an irascible, cigar-chomping 36-year-old Ohioan, Colonel Curtis E. LeMay. Lt. Colonel LeMay was given command of the 305th Bombardment Group, Eighth Air Force in 1942, soon after the United States entered World War II. [When it was formed, he was the only pilot in the group to ever have flown the B-17.] LeMay was such a slave driver that his men called him Iron Ass. In their dispatches home, American correspondents softened the term to Iron Pants, only to earn LeMay's scornful charge that they feared "offending some delicate old-maid type readers."

"We paid the price of admission, it's time to play the game."

Realizing that bombers taking evasive actions were decreasing target hits, requiring repeat missions and resulting in higher losses, he ordered his pilots not to take any more evasive actions. Despite their protests, the new system resulted in more targets hit on the first mission, requiring fewer repeats, and an overall reduction of losses. Soon, "no evasive action" became the rule for the entire Eighth Air Force.

Given the lack of adequate fighter escorts early in the campaign, LeMay also ordered his bomber pilots to practice and perform tight-formation flying on combat missions as a means of defense against enemy fighters.

The "combat box"

In contrast to the loose bomber stream used in the British night missions, the Americans' choice of a daylight strategy had required their planes to be tightly bunched for effective defense against attack. LeMay's combat box further strengthened the defense. It consisted of as many as 21 planes (3 squadrons of 7 planes) staggered vertically and horizontally in such a way that the bombers' guns provided maximum firepower all around, and especially against head - on attacks. On large raids, three of these boxes were formed into a combat wing, with one box in the lead and the others stacked 1,000 feet above and below it. Designed to increase bombing accuracy, LeMay placed his most proficient crews in the lead planes of the combat box. All the planes in the box dropped their bombs simultaneously-but only on cue of the lead crew. The result, at least in theory, was a closely packed pattern of hits on the target.

Formations

To civilian observers on the ground, masses of World War II bombers flying at high altitude were an awesome site, yet they appeared to be clustered or scattered in random fashion. Any US Army Air Force veteran will tell you that the disorganized appearance was an illusion, far from the reality. The bombers flew in fixed positions within complex formations, and the Air Force was deadly serious about training and perfect formation flying.

Flying in formation was about more than just the orderly, simultaneous movement of large numbers of aircraft. It was about defense and offense, or more bluntly, about life and death. Formations were designed to concentrate firepower and maximize mutual protection from attack by enemy aircraft, to decrease the attacking time necessary to place the required number of bombs on the target, and to achieve the most destructive bombing. Pilots new to combat spent many hours in training before being "turned loose" on an operational mission. The first few hours and first few thousands of gallons of gasoline were expended at the start of every mission assembling into formation.

With the Air Force engaging different enemies in very different theaters all over the world, one formation did not fit all. Many combat units, particularly medium bombardment groups and wings, used the standard formations that pilots learned in Stateside training. But more often, Air Force commanders found it necessary to customize those basics to the theaters. Although they have distinct differences, these formations all share the same basic building blocks and purposes: Element = three ships. Flight = two elements,six ships (also called a Squadron by some). Group = 18 to 36 ships. Wing = three Groups. Division = three or four Wings.

click image to enlarge

Forming the three plane element, basic building blocks of Bomber Formations

The first step to any formation is assembling into three-ship elements. In each element there is a Leader, a Left Wingman, and a Right Wingman,and they take off in this order. In the example below, all bombers marshall on the taxi strip or perimeter track in the order in which they will take off and join their assigned elements.The ships take off at 30 second intervals, the 30 seconds begining at the moment the preceding bomber opens the throttle to begin its takeoff run.

1. After take-off the bomber in the first position, or Leader, flies straight out for one minute plus 30 seconds for each airplane, then makes a 180 degree half-needle width turn.
2. Fifteen seconds after the first bomber starts to turn, the bomber in second position, or Left Wingman, starts its turn, keeping the nose ahead of the leader, and pulling into position from below and behind the leader's outside wing.
3. Fifteen seconds after the second bomber starts to turn, the bomber in third position, or Right Wingman, starts its turn, keeping the nose ahead of the leader, pulling into position on the leader's inside wing.

The Leader will normally level off at 1000 feet and return parallel to the take-off runway at approximately two miles distance.The group assembly, typically from 18 to 30 planes, takes place at 2000 feet, with the planes circling the airdrome in a preset pattern around a low frequency radio beacon. The elements then join together into flights, the formation growing larger and more challenging to turn as the ships on the inside of the turn must throttle back,sometimes coming dangerously close to stalling speed.

U.S. Army Air Force Bomber Formations:
adapting to a global conflict

The United States Army Air Forces of World War II were engaged in bombing campaigns characterized by very different objectives in greatly diverse conditions all over the globe. They were subject to attack from an array of enemies whose unique aircraft, flying skills, aggressiveness; and adaptability varied greatly. Consequently one formation did not fit all. The commanders of each air force determined the bomber formations best suited for their theaters of operations, and continually evaluated their offensive and defensive effectiveness, making modifications if needed. Here are descriptions of the various formations and how they were employed in their respective theaters of operations follow:

Southwest Pacific (6-plane diamond formation, 9-plane formation V of Vs; Javelin Down)

These basic bombardment squadron formations utilized by the Fifth,and Thirteenth Air Forces were defensively successful against as many as fifty enemy fighters in a frontal attack without sustaining an aircraft loss. It was primarily used for bombing attacks. When no interception was anticipated, the route to the target was flown in Javelin up, a formation permitting quick closing to the defensive diamond. Group formation consisted of squadrons echeloned right or left with 500 to 1000 feet differences of altitude between squadrons.

Pacific (3-3-3-4 Box)

The B-29s of the Twentieth Air Force basically flew a box formation created by General Curtis LeMay, who was the Commanding General during most of its missions from the Mariannas. Normally about 30-32 planes made up the 3-3-3-4 arrangement, the last element having a "tail-end Charlie" in the slot position, the position directly behind and lower than the element lead.

Central Pacific (6-plane diamond formation, 9-plane formation V of Vs, Javelin Down)

The B-24s and B-25s of the Seventh Air Force fought in the campaign for the Marshall Islands, with its primary objective to neutralize Japanese fighter opposition. They flew long-range missions to strike enemy air bases and vital centers in the enemy's communications lines.

Burma, India (Javelin Down)

The Tenth Air Force very successfully employed the Javelin Down formation in its bombing campaign to cripple Japanese transportation in Burma. En route to the target, four squadrons combined in a group from formation for mutual protection. The ships formed a flat diamond pattern, wider than its depth.

China, Burma (Group defensive formation)

The heavy bomber groups of the Fourteenth Air Force utilized standard formations in this theater with the exception that each squadron consisted of seven instead of six aircraft. Assembly approach., and retirement were accomplished in group stagger formation. The standard group defensive formation, which was also used for the bombing of area targets, was a modification of the group stagger.

Alaska (9-plane formation V of Vs)

The Eleventh Air Force determined that a formation of nine aircraft provided a sufficient defense in this theater. The normal formation consisted of a "V" of "V's" with the wingmen of each flight being forward nearly in line with and slightly below their respective flight leaders. If fighters were present, the defensive formation was held for the bombing run. In the case of no fighter opposition, bombing attacks were made by flights or individual aircraft, with the defensive formation reformed immediately after the bombing run.

Africa, Mediterranean, Italy (Stagger Down, 9plane formation V of Vs)

The Ninth Air Force was begun in Cairo in mid-1942 with a single squadron of B-17s, augmented later by B-24s, P-40s, and B-25s. The Twelfth Air Force, formed in the UK from elements of the Eighth Air Force, began arriving in North Africa in November 1942. The mission in the Middle East at that time was purely tactical - destroy the enemy air force and support the British Eighth Army. The Italian Air Force was hardly equal to the challenge and simple formations worked satisfactorily for these objectives. Their use was continued in mid 1943 when the bombers supported the invasion of Sicily. The primary role of the Twelfth Air Force, initially, was to operate with and assist the Ground Forces in their penetration of Axis Europe. Support of advancing troops continued through 1944 with tactical sorties against rail yards, troop concentrations, highways, bridges, ports, and supply centers to deny the enemy his supplies and mobility.

France, Belgium, Netherlands - Tactical (Stagger Down, 9-plane farmation V of Vs, Javelin Down)

The Ninth Air Force's tactical expertise was needed to soften up German defenses for the coming Normandy invasion, and so was transferred to the UK in October 1943. All medium bomber groups serving in the Eighth Air Force at that time flew their last missions with the Eighth and joined the Ninth. During the summer and fall of 1943, the medium and light bomber groups focused on cratering the hundreds of Luftwaffe airfields throughout France, Belgium and Holland. Between December 1943 and the spring of 1944, the medium bombers were also engaged in Operation CROSSBOW, the effort to destroy flying bomb sites along the Normandy and Calais coasts. The light bomber groups continued their assaults on airfields, rail yards, bridges, roads, and communications lines.

Germany And German Occupied Countries - Strategic (ETO Combat Box)

When the first heavy bomb groups of the Eighth Air Force began operations in the European Theater, the 12-ship formations known as the Javelin Down and the Stagger Down were employed. The more missions the Eighth flew, however, the better prepared German fighters became to exploit the vulnerabilities of these basic formations. They were too long and narrow; fighters could approach either end without much exposure to firepower from the bombers. Individual ships or elements in the rear of the formation had difficulty keeping up. Elements broke formation to bomb leaving the ships even more vulnerable to fighter attack.

Air Force Command determined that these standard training formations were unsuitable for the heavy bombers in the ETO, where the bombers were encountering the heaviest opposition, flying the best equipment, and employing the most effective tactics. Something had to change.

The challenge was to devise a formation which had firepower in all directions, left no loose ends open to concentrated attack, and which provided a good compact bombing pattern. Further complicating the design of this new formation were the needs to make it flexible, maneuverable, and easy to fly while each ship maintained its position.

It was a very difficult challenge. One can almost imagine groups of generals and colonels huddled around a chalk board pitching ideas and arguing, much like a coaching staff working out the Xs and Os of a new gridiron formation. After extensive trial and error, the Group Stagger formation was modified into the Combat Box. The high and low squadrons were moved forward to line up with one another and separated vertically by an additional fifty feet. The Combat Box formation corrected the offensive and defensive inadequacies of the formations initially used by the Eighth. It became the standard heavy bomber formation in the ETO for the Eighth, and Fifteen Air Forces.

Illustrations and photo examples are in:
Bomber Legends. Volume 3 Number 1, 2006.

click image to enlarge

Eighth Air Force Heavy Bomber Formation Assembly Process

Three heavy Bomb Groups of one Combat Wing take off from neighboring airfields and assemble into formations separately, orbiting counter-clockwise around a fixed position.

The "Buncher", a low frequency radio beacon with a 25 mile broadcast range, transmits a unique Morse call-sign and long-keyed pulse once per minute for the ships to home in on. Once each Group assembles they join together in a single formation at a higher altitude, still circling on the Buncher signal.

When this process is completed, the Wing rendezvous and assembles with other Combat Wings in its Division at the "Splasher," a medium frequency radio beacon which broadcasts more vertically than the Buncher. Splashers have four transmitters broadcasting simultaneously at different frequencies but pulsing the same call-sign. Homing on the Splasher, the Wings create a mega-formation composed of as many as 400 ships before departing England to bomb targets.

Conclusion

Devising the optimum blueprint for a bomber formation was comparable to planning an infantry assault. Its architects needed a thorough understanding of the enemy and the strengths and weaknesses of their own machines and fliers. It required superior intelligence gathering, flexibility, experimentation, training, and practice, practice, practice. It took creative genius to design an effective formations; it took discipline, concentration, and buckets of sweat to fly them.

Kelsey McMillan. Formations. Bomber Legends. Volume 3 Number 1, 2006.

more »

LeMay "Finds much to admire in LeMay, a general who led his own bomber missions and was more familiar with flying equipment than his own men." - The New York Sun. This biography examines the career of USAF Gen. Curtis LeMay - known as the "Father of the Strategic Air Command" - in detail, from his design of the strategic bombing campaign in the Pacific Theater of WWII through the Berlin airlift and his reorganization of SAC during the Cold War.

---

top of page

back a page