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Tactical Air Power

click image to enlarge Black arrows show routes of *th AF heavy bombers in Normandy invasion. Heavy shaded corridors show those of 9th AF bombers.

Europe

On the morning of August 7 1944, two weeks after the First American Army had broken out of the Normandy beachhead at St. Lo, the front was visited by Hitler's personal representative, General Warmilont. He was undoubtedly dispatched to find out why the American forces pouring to the south had not been halted. It was a melancholy report he received from Von Kluge, commander of the German armies: Whether the enemy can be stopped at this point is still questionable. His air superiority is terrific and smothers almost all our movements. At the same time, every movement of his is prepared and protected by his air force. Our losses in men and equipment are extraordinary. The morale of our troops has suffered heavily under murderous enemy fire. Fresh troops must be brought in ... from somewhere …

General Warmilont hesitated to present the news to his chief, but it was undeniable: The Luftwaffe was nowhere to be seen, having utterly failed in its greatest crisis. Without it, a mighty Wehrmacht was being dissected by an enemy ground force no greater than itself and with considerably less battle experience, but made irresistible by the addition of tactical air power.

Born in combat, tactical air power was introduced to military doctrine in Field Manual 100-20: "Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other." That statement became a powerhouse punch wielded by air-ground teams.

Before World War II, tactical air was merely a means of augementing army artillery. Germany's belief in this old concept was a factor in the ultimate defeat of her army. Constant air-ground synchronization in North Africa dictated a new theory of applying power.

Air supremacy was to be the first priority goal, reducing enemy strength until this was accomplished. The second priority was to isolate the battlefield by cutting troop movements from flank and rear, destroying bridges, roads, vehicles, communications, and supply centers. Close cooperation with ground forces had third priority. Attack resistance and soften it for advancing ground forces; support infantry; supply armored units with food, ammo, and fuel from the air.

As the campaign in Africa drew to a close in the spring of 1943, plans for the invasion of Europe were taking shape. Headquarters staff of the Ninth Air Force, sent to England, began the feverish task of assembling a tactical air Force. There was less than a year to do the job of setting up experimental organizations, gathering and training personnel, exploring the potentialities of a new offensive weapon -radar, and establishing tactics. Above all, planes suitable for new combat tasks had to be obtained and modified, fast B-26 bombers, P-47 fighterbombers, photo reconnaissance P-38s, and P-51s for tactical reconnaissance.

The first mission of the IX Bomber Command was to hit coastal airfields, where swarms of German fighters rose against our heavy bomber formations when they crossed the Channel. As the bomb damage mounted., they abandoned the attempt to operate fields. The air over the Channel was ours. The enemy answered with numerous, strong, well concealed flying bomb sites along the Calais-Normandy coasts. They were extremely difficult targets but Allied bombers forced their abandonment and the V-bomb blitz faded out.

Typical of the pre-invasion tasks was the assignment to take low-level pictures of the formidably defended Normandy beaches. In a light, unarmed Lockheed F-5, whose camera was mounted to snap pictures ahead and to the sides of the plane, these intrepid pilots flew their "dicing missions" with their lives in their hands. But they brought back pictures that showed the strong and weak spots in the defenses of the Normandy coast.

Invasion tasks for all Britain-based aircraft were planned in April 1944, calling for maximum airground teamwork. On D-Day, when Allied Forces struck at the most vital target, the overland route to Berlin, the Luftwaffe failed to appear. The AAF and RAF had made it impossible, the Ninth Air Force alone flying more than 35,000 tactical sorties from May 1st to June 6th. They struck airfields, rail yards, transport, coastal gun positions, communications, and bridges stretching from the Netherlands to the Pyrenees. Just before Allied troops stormed the beaches, medium bombers and fighters flew 100 miles inland to disrupt efforts to bring up reinforcements. Most enemy planes stayed away.

The D-Day air plan was of great complexity and scope. It called for constant fighter cover to protect the invasion convoy, directed by a control ship in the Channel. The Ninth had already destroyed every major bridge over the Seine From Paris to LeHavre to prevent quick shuttle of troops to Normandy. On D-Day, the battle area enclosed by the Seine and Loire was sealed off. The Eighth Air Force bombed all bridges from Blois to Nantes, and the Ninth cut off the Paris-Orleans gap from Beaufency to Nantes. By this latter move, Paris was excluded from the battle area even though it was the transport hub of France.

As our ground Forces worked their way inland, every small French field became a German fortress edged with deep drainage ditches and stout hedges. Enemy troops dug in, their camouflage discipline excellent, offering few targets for fighter-bombers. By the middle of July, it was decided to resort to "carpet bombing" to break up the impenetrable German line.

On July 25th at St. Lo, in a space 7,000 yards long and 250 yards wide, 3,400 tons of HE were dropped by more than 1,500 aircraft of all types. American ground forces were brought up in strength as close as possible to the bomb line before the bombers struck, and immediately after the attack, while the Germans were dazed and unable to coordinate, the First Army had poured through the gap.

A week after the break-through, General Patton's Third Army followed the First through the gap and drove south to the bank of the Loire river. After mopping-up in Brittany, it too turned east and embarked on one of the most remarkable spearheads in modern warfare, teaming up with General Weyland's XIX TAC to protect his flank. In a month General Patton was within 60 miles of Germany.

Weyland's job was threefold. In addition to knocking down bridges on the Loire, he covered Patton's advancing tank columns, and at the same time reduced three ports in Brittany where German garrisons were holding out. The XIX TAC also forced the surrender of 30,000 Germans massed south of Loire, ready to attack Patton.

By the end of August 1944, the Ninth American Army had landed in France, and with it another TAC, the XXIX commanded by General Nugent. Throughout August and into September, the IX, XIX, and XXIX TACs operated at maximum strength. Their flexibility on employment was a valuable capability. When the bomb divisions were forbidden to attack any more bridges, as our rapidly moving ground forces expected to use them, the TACs could be used to force the Germans out into the open. They created vast pockets of enemy troops and vehicles to be crushed between British ground Forces and the First American Army, both racing toward Paris. In the Falaise pocket alone, P-47s destroyed about 1,000 vehicles.

The relation of the tactical air commands to ground army became even closer than before as the armies approached the imposing barriers of the Moselle, Meuse, Roer, Oure, Erft and Saar Rivers and the Siegfried Line. Tactical reconnaissance, flown by P-51 s, patrolled enemy territory reporting troop and rail movements, and selecting targets for fighter-bombing or strafing. P-38s took daylight pictures of the snow-blanketed enemy and showed details of roads and rivers. A-20s, equipped for night photography, revealed the movements the Germans attempted after dark.

Radar instruments were still in the infancy of development, but by the winter of 1944, they provided for the control and direction of virtually every day or night sortie flown by the IX TAC. They steered fighter planes to targets, vectored them home again, and relieved the strain on pilots by keeping them constantly informed of the presence of other aircraft.

Tactical air appeared to classic advantage during the Germans' Ardennes offensive the "battle of the Bulge." Within eight days of launching their attacks, German spearheads were 50 miles into Belgium. Then the weather cleared and hundreds of AAF planes pulverized the airfields, railways, bridges, and communication centers essential to Von Rundstedt's supply lines, and smashed stock he needed to hold his position. In one day, December 24th, tactical aircraft and the Eighth Air Force flew 5,102 tactical sorties. The advancing Allied infantrymen could see the piled up results of TAC operations.

As the advance swept eastward to the Elbe, to Czechoslovakia, and to Austria, the Ninth established airfields east of the Rhine despite opposition and adverse weather. Driven back upon a small number of fields where aircraft were heavily concentrated, the GAF made excellent targets. In the first 18 days of April, our air Forces were able to destroy 3,121 planes of all kinds, only 400-500 of them in the air. The Luftwaffe had ceased to exist as a fighting Force.

As for our air forces, all were now employed tactically. Bombers concentrated on stopping enemy rail traffic. Fighter-bombers devoted themselves to supplying air cover for armored columns and the transport planes bearing their fuel. The Ninth Air Force accomplished its triple mission: It won and maintained air supremacy; it isolated the battlefield, and linked arms with Allied ground armies for combat teamwork. Flexibility and skill in the use of its weapons enabled them to perform varied tasks with conspicuous success, leading to the unconditional surrender of the enemy on May 8, 1945.

click image to enlarge Navy: to the right of 150; Army: to left.

Pacific

In a straight line the distance between Hawaii and the Japanese mainland measures 2,544 miles. A fast plane can make the run in less than 15 hours. But our advance against the fiercely resisting Japanese military machine was anything but along a straight line. The 2,544 miles to the heart of the Japanese Empire and victory took our forces three and a half years to cover.

The Japs fought by the book. Tactics and techniques were determined at the highest levels of the military hierarchy and orders were blindly carried out " by all lower echelons. When the fight went according to plan they did a fine job. But when circumstances changed they still remained bound by outmoded principles. They were inflexible. This was their greatest weakness.

And this weakness was fully exploited by the Army Air Forces. Starting with little in the way of planes and trained aircrewmen, the growth of the AAF into the powerful giant it was to become before the end of the war was a rapid development. Our flyers were able to meet the Jap Air Force on its own terms and gain victory.

The Allied formula for island-to-island advance was simple, but effective, and it made the maximum use of air power. The first ingredient was control of the air. This meant destroying enemy planes in the air and on the ground. Further, it meant rendering inoperable all enemy airfields within range. Next, it required the cutting of enemy supply lines and by air interdiction barring the flow of supplies to the area under attack. Then began the "softening up" of enemy forces in the objective area. Supplies within his defense perimeter were destroyed end his personnel decimated from the air.

Finally the last element was added. The attack narrowed down to pin-point concentration. Beach defenses were bombed to destruction to prepare the way for airborne operations or for amphibious landing parties. By providing them with a protective cover, our ground soldiers could consolidate their advance and seize or construct new airfields as bases for future air operations.

This was the formula which, with minor variations, proved successful over and over again. The keys to the defense of Australia were New Guinea and the Solomons. On August 7,1942, U. S. Marines landed in strength at Guadalcanal in our first major offensive move. To prepare the way for the landing, 56 strikes were delivered by B-1 7s from bases in the New Hebrides. Hotly contested and distinguished by bitter fighting, the campaign in the $olomons wasn't completely won until February, 1943.

click image to enlarge Lower left, South and SW Pacific. Center, Central Pacific power drive. Left center, VLR operations from the Marianas.

No less decisive end no less bitter was the campaign being waged at the same time in the jungles and mountains of New Guinea. Before airpower could bring its full weight to bear on the New Guinea struggle a landing field had to be secured on the enemy side of the Owen Stanley mountains. The Kokoda field was taken on November 2, and the counter-offensive was intensified. New troops and supplies could be flown right up to the front. On January 16, the last pockets of Jap resistance at Buna, Sananande and Gona were won. Papua was now Allied territory.

A tactical innovation of the highest importance used during the early months of 1943 was low-level bombing. Skimming at masthead and treetop altitude over enemy installations and ships, covering their approach with heavy machine-gun fire and using five second delay fuses, our bombers were able to inflict heavy damage. In a most spectacular example of the new technique, AAF medium bombers wreaked havoc with Jap shipping in the battle of the Bismarck Sea in early March, when an enemy convoy, attempting to reinforce Lae, was practically annihilated.

In the spring and early summer of 1943, American forces recaptured Attu and Kiska. Heavy bombing attacks by the Eleventh Air Force supported the operations. The Eleventh was then able to direct its attention to harassing attacks against Paramushiro and the Kuriles, dissipating Jap forces from more vital operations elsewhere in the broad expanse of the Pacific.

Further to the south, as part of the grand strategical plan that was to draw the net tight around Japan, new attacks were being unleashed against the New Guinea area. Lae and Salamaua in Huon Gulf were the two Jap strongholds, south of Vitiaz Straits. To protect the Allied operations against Lae scheduled for September, Jap planes based on Wewak were given the strafe-bomb treatment. In one day, August 17, 1943, 200 enemy aircraft were destroyed. Lae fell on September 16th. Salamaua had already been captured on the 12th. A whirlwind airborne campaign by the Australian 7th Division up the Mackham-Ramu valley followed by the occupation of Finschhaven on September 22, 1943 by the Australian 9th Division, cleared the Japanese out of British New Guinea south of the Ramu River.

In the South Pacific area the 3rd Marines landed on the west coast of Bougainville Island on November 1, 1943, and when Gloucester on the west tip of New Britain was taken by the 1st Marine Division on December 26, 1943, we owned the Vitiaz Straits and dominated the Solomon Sea.

The next jump by-passed the strong Jap position in the Wewak area and took Aitape and Hollandia on April 22, 1944. A Jap air force of nearly 500 aircraft had been annihilated in a series of heavy bombing and strafing attacks beginning March 30, 1944, and the shore defenses had been abandoned by the Japs after being subjected to the same type of treatment.

Meanwhile the Seventh Air Force, formed from the Hawaiian Air Force which had felt the fury of the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor, was not inactive. Taking off from bases in the Gilberts, its bombers kept Wotje, Mille, Maleolap and Jaluit in the Marshalls neutralized. The capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok in the Central Pacific put the vital Marianas within range. And to further the protection of our amphibious forces preparing for the invasion of the Marianas, Thirteenth Air Force bombers operating from newly constructed fields in the Admiralties, joined those of the Seventh to keep by-passed Truk neutralized.

It was during. the battle for Saipan that Jap air power suffered one of its greatest defeats. In an operation lasting three days Jap losses totalled 428 planes, almost four times the losses sustained by our carrier aircraft. Guam and Tinian, the two important islands remaining in the Marianas group, fell soon after. In the meantime AAF engineers and Navy Seabees on Saipan were tackling the tremendous job of constructing airfields large enough to accommodate B-29s for the pending strategic attack on the Japanese home islands.

Our air strength was reaching its peak, and in July, 1944, the Fifth Air Force struck a major blow against the Halmaheras in a series of attacks that quickly drove the Jap air back to the Philippines. Landings were accomplished in the Palaus and at Morotai, in the Halmaheras, in September.

Gains made during this period were of major strategic importance. The by-passed Celebes, bombed end blockaded, cut the supply of nickel, vital to Jap war production. With the loss of Morotai, and the construction of a major air base there, the short route to raw materials in Java and Sumatra was cut, while the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Force bombers, escorted by long range P-38s and P-47s, unleashed a devastating series of raids against the Borneo oil refineries at Balikpapan.

The invasion of the Philippines, with initial landings on the east coast of Leyte on October 20, 1944, was conducted under great odds. Realizing that the loss of Leyte would presage the loss of the Philippines themselves, the Jap sent convoy after convoy of troops and supplies from Manila to the west coast of Leyte to try to hold the island. Practically every convoy came under air attack, and many of them were sunk.

In December, Fifth Air Fome units moved on to Mindoro, began an intensive blockade of the China coast, and conducted heavy raids on the Jap air force at Clark, Nichols, and Nielsen Fields in Luzon. In three months Jap shipping from the N. E. I., Malaya and Indo-China to the homeland had died away to a mere trickle. Jap air strength was practically obliterated in the Philippines by the time the task force invaded Luzon via Lingayan Gulf in January 1945. A month later an old score was settled with the capture of Corregidor by paratroopers after heavy air Force attacks.

With his back to the wall, the Jap put everything he could muster into his defense of Iwo lima and Okinawa. The bombing of Iwo Jima by B-24s of the Seventh Air Force paid off by preventing use of its heavily-cratered airfields. We expected the task of taking Okinawa to be tough. It was. Jap suicide attacks cost our Navy 34 ships sunk and about 250 damaged. During the 82-day battle enemy aircraft, often numbering in the hundreds, were dispatched almost daily against our occupying troops. The seriousness of the threat can be realized when we found it necessary to call in B-29s to help neutralize Jap air fields in Kyushu from which most of the Kamikaze attacks were coming.

With Iwo Jima and Okinawa in our hands in the closing months of the war, the Japanese home islands were at the mercy of whatever planes we chose to harass that thoroughly defeated country. One by one, the Japanese islands in our victorious path had been taken in the advancement of our bomber line. Its sea and air power impotent or destroyed, its oil stocks and aviation fuel exhausted, its industry and economy stifled by blockade and strategic bombing, complete surrender was a foregone conclusion. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was only the final catalyst. The road to Japan had been a long one. Every forward move of our forces had been preceded by air attack and covered by protecting aircraft. The enemy had finally capitulated without his homeland being invaded. It was a conclusive demonstration of the decisiveness of air power in modern war.

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