Home : America At War : The Civil War : The Western Theater :Nashville And Perhaps Beyond
When Gen. John Bell Hood and the Army of Tennessee departed Florence, Alabama, on November 21, 1864, the underfed, ill-supplied force of 38,000 was full of hope. For Hood, the vision of a decisive offensive to defeat the still scattered Federal forces in Tennessee, push on to Nashville and perhaps beyond, and compel Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman to abandon his march through Georgia to come after the Rebels was in keeping with his desire to emulate the daring campaigns of his idol, the late Stonewall Jackson. For the men, with many Tennesseans among them, it was a chance to go home and to avenge the series of bitter defeats the army had suffered. Hood's army crossed into the state in three columns, each consisting of a corps that, from west to east, was under the command of Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, and Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart. Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest's cavalry, whose return from the raid on Johnsonville caused a delay in Hood's departure, reinforced by William H. "Red" Jackson's division, rode in front of the infantry. At this time, Maj. Gen. John Schofield commanded two Federal corps, the IV and the XXIII, more than 22,000 strong, at Pulaski in south central Middle Tennessee. The reorganized Union cavalry, under Brig. Gen. James H. "Harry" Wilson, who had served under U. S. Grant at Vicksburg and in the Virginia "Overland Campaign," and under Philip Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley, discovered the Confederate march when they began skirmishing with Forrest's horsemen on November 22 at Lawrenceburg, Tennessee. At stake was the important crossroads at Columbia, where the railroad and turnpike to Nashville crossed Duck River. Hood's three corps were converging to march on Columbia from the southwest while, on November 22, Schofield began marching his five divisions, artillery, and wagons due north to Columbia. Schofield arrived at Columbia on November 24, just ahead of Forrest's cavalry. The Federal vanguard dug entrenchments south of Duck River while skirmishing with Forrest's horse soldiers, on November 24 and 25. Hood's infantry closed in on November 26 but did not assault. On the night of November 27-28, Schofield's army withdrew to the north bank of the river. Having been bested in the race for Columbia by the Northerners, Hood pinned Schofield's force in position by skirmishing and firing artillery shells across the river while Forrest's Confederate cavalry rode east to search for upstream crossings. A location was found for laying the Rebel pontoon bridge at Davis's Ford, three miles east of Columbia, and Hood ordered most of his army north, hoping to get behind Schofield at Spring Hill and cut him off from his escape route to Nashville. Two divisions of Lee's corps with most of the artillery remained in Columbia south of Duck River to occupy Schofield's attention. Without confirmed knowledge of Hood's plan but aware that Rebels were crossing the river, Schofield dispatched an infantry force, his reserve artillery, and a wagon train ahead to Spring Hill. Hood's flanking march, which was undertaken on a poor road, was confirmed by the morning of November 29 and by midday the remainder of Schofield's two corps—less the rear guard—were on the Franklin Pike en route to Spring Hill. One of the greatest leadership blunders to befall the ill-fated Confederate Army of Tennessee, which saw more than its share of mismanagement, was the escape of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield's two-corps army at Spring Hill, Tennessee, on November 29, 1864. Gen. John B. Hood had sent the division of Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne ahead to Spring Hill in the van of his flanking march around Schofield's position north of Duck River. Cleburne's attack, and a previous mounted attack from the east along the Mount Carmel Road by Forrest's cavalry, were checked by a defensive line thrown up covering the approaches to the village by Federal Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley. Stanley was rushed ahead to Spring Hill to augment the small garrison there, and his lead brigade under Col. Emerson Opdycke arrived in time to repulse Forrest, who, having bested and then outfoxed Harry Wilson, had headed west on Mount Carmel Road. Stanley then positioned his troops northeast and southeast of Spring Hill, protecting the wagon train, reserve artillery, and railroad west of the village. Another Union force guarded the Rutherford Creek crossing of the Columbia—Spring Hill Road. Hood was on hand for the advance of Cleburne's division, which upon encountering resistance altered the axis of its advance, but soon retired from the field to set up headquarters at the Absalom Thompson Home south of Spring Hill. As the rest of Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's Confederates arrived near Spring Hill, they were formed into a line of battle on Cleburne's right and left but an assault was never launched against the smaller Yankee infantry force and vulnerable artillery and trains parked nearby. Confusing orders and countermanded orders emanated from Hood's headquarters, while Cheatham focused his attention on the assault that never came. Stewart's corps arrived well after Hood had expected them on the field, then got lost while deploying. By the time Schofield's remaining divisions were approaching Spring Hill, the Confederates of Cheatham's and Stewart's corps were preparing rations and preparing to bed down for the night. Stephen D. Lee's corps, having crossed Duck River, was still on the march from Columbia. In Hood's defense, a fall from his horse added to the chronic pain he felt from his previous battle wounds that had withered his left arm and cost him his right leg at the hip, and exhaustion and painkillers clouded his judgment. Inaction and obstinacy among subordinates enhanced the chances for missing the opportunity to cut off and maul or destroy Schofield. Even the usually reliable Forrest failed to sustain his Franklin Pike roadblock north of Spring Hill as Hood believed he was doing. Frustration was felt by some Confederate pickets who detected the sound of Schofield's column passing north through Spring Hill on the moonless night of November 29. Some Federals accidentally stumbled into Confederate camps and were captured or allowed to leave again. No attack orders were issued to the Rebels, although an order to investigate reports of the Yankee march which Hood supposedly issued to Cheatham may or may not have reached the veteran commander. As a result, Hood and the rest of the Army of Tennessee awoke the next morning to discover the Yankees were well on their way to Franklin. On the morning of November 30, 1864, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield determined to make a defensive stand at Franklin, twenty miles south of Nashville. The problems of getting his trains and artillery across Big Harpeth River on Franklin's northern edge compelled him to turn and fight the Confederates whom his army had slipped past at Spring Hill during the previous night. Upon arriving at Franklin in the early daylight, Schofield determined to utilize the works thrown up by Union forces in the spring of 1863 when Maj. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans determined to position his left flank at Franklin. These fortifications, covering the approaches to the town from the south, were anchored on the Big Harpeth up and downstream from Franklin. General Hood, disgusted with the Confederate failure to trap and destroy Schofield's army at Spring Hill, which he blamed on subordinate commanders and the defensive-minded timidity instilled in the rank and file by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, decided to launch a frontal attack against Schofield's Franklin fortified position. Although most of his artillery and one of his three infantry corps were not yet on the field, Hood ordered the assault by 23,000 soldiers at four P.M., in the waning hours of an Indian summer's day. Schofield had two brigades under Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner in an advanced position along the Columbia Pike. Waves of Confederate soldiers streamed down from the knobs south of Franklin and routed Wagner's people. Raising the cry "Into the works with them!" the Rebels surged ahead hard on the heels of Wagner's men keeping the rest of the 20,000 entrenched Federals from firing until the Confederates were on top of them. The fire of the two-corps Federal line was deadly; still many Rebels crossed the line of entrenchments. A savage counterattack by Col. Emerson Opdycke's "Tigers," stationed in reserve north of the Carter House prevented a breakthrough. Opdycke plugged a gap in the Federal line and with soldiers of Ruger's and Reilly's divisions to the right and left held off portions of four attacking Rebel divisions. Forrest, with one of his three cavalry divisions that had forded the river upstream, clashed with Wilson's cavalry inconclusively. The flanks of the Federal line were never seriously threatened and the principal fighting ranged in front of the Union defenses anchored on the left by the Big Harpeth and on the right at the locust grove 250 yards west of the Carter House. The battle lasted well into the night and when it was over, the Rebels in the Army of Tennessee proved their mettle—Schofield withdrew north. But the price was high. The Confederates suffered more casualties than had Ulysses S. Grant at Cold Harbor on June 3, 1864, or the Army of Northern Virginia during the Pickett-Pettigrew charge at Gettysburg. Five Southern generals were killed, including the talented Patrick Cleburne, and one other died later; five were wounded and one was captured. The total Confederate casualties were more than 7,000; the Union lost 2,326. Despite staggering losses at Franklin, which reduced his effective force to a little more than 23,000, Gen. John Bell Hood marched the Army of Tennessee to the doorstep to Nashville. Even the aggressive Hood realized that a frontal assault on the Federals was futile. Union forces had occupied Nashville for thirty-three months, since shortly after the surrender of Fort Donelson, and it was one of the most fortified cities in the nation. Union engineer, Brig. Gen. James St. Clair Morton, had overseen construction of sophisticated earthworks at Nashville in 1862-63, strengthened by others, into which Union troops deployed. With Schofield's force joining his own after retreating from Franklin, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas had more than 50,000 defenders in Nashville and had had ample time to perfect the city's defenses. Hood hoped to lure Thomas into attacking him and, after repelling that assault, to counterattack. Hood hoped for reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi, but this was a bad dream because they could not pass Federal gunboats, which patrolled the Mississippi River. Hood took up a defensive position on the knobs two miles south of Nashville: a five-mile line extending from the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad in the east to the Hillsboro Pike in the west. An understrength infantry brigade and Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers's cavalry division watched the four-mile gap between the Hillsboro Pike and the Cumberland River. During the first eight days of December, the Confederates held their positions, but Thomas was in no hurry to attack. His well-known ponderous style unnerved the Washington leadership, who viewed Hood's threat as they had Jubal Early's early July advance to the gates of the nation's capital. At City Point, Virginia, Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant was also concerned. Uncharacteristically, he became unnerved after a series of telegrams to "Old Slow Trot" failed to move the Nashville commander. Grant, not fully understanding the desperate condition of Hood's army, feared the Confederates would bypass Nashville and invade Kentucky wreaking havoc, just as the Northern public was beginning to see the war was finally coming to a successful conclusion. Just as Thomas was ready to attack on December 8, a severe winter sleet and snow storm paralyzed troop movements, and he postponed his battle plan. By the evening of December 14 when the weather had moderated and the ice had melted and Thomas telegraphed the War Department that he would attack the next day, Grant had lost his nerve and had left City Point and was en route to Washington. From there he would travel west to relieve Thomas, replacing him with Maj. Gen. John A. Logan. Thomas saw flaws in the Confederate plan. The Rebels held the four primary roads approaching Nashville from the south, but their lines were too extended. Hood ordered the construction of five detached redoubts on his left flank covering approaches to the Hillsboro Pike, held by A. P. Stewart's corps, but they were not connected by rifle pits and were vulnerable themselves. Hoping to lure Thomas into leaving his fortifications, Hood ordered Forrest's cavalry to capture blockhouses guarding the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad and to attack the Federal garrison at Murfreesboro ensconced in Fortress Rosecrans. Thomas did not take the bait, feeling the Fortress Rosecrans garrison could handle the situation. The most severe consequence of this order was for the Confederates, who were without Forrest and most of the Southern troopers needed to guard the flanks of their Nashville investment line. A few remaining Rebel horsemen did spar with Union gunboats on the Cumberland River downstream from Nashville, which had a low water level at the time. The Yankee gunboats could not effectively return the fire of two ten-pounder Parrott rifles Lt. Col. David C. Kelley's men manned on shore. The Confederates blockaded the river and captured two Federal transports which the Yankees subsequently recaptured. On December 15, as Grant was in Washington preparing to leave for Tennessee, Thomas attacked with the speed of lightning and the force of thunder, though the offensive, at first had a different character. A heavy fog delayed the start, then the mostly African- American units of Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman's Chattanooga garrison, assigned to a diversionary attack on the Rebel right, met with stout resistance from hard-drinking, hard-fighting Maj. Gen. B. Frank Cheatham's Confederates. West of Nashville, Wilson's cavalry and Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's "10,000 Israelites," advancing via the Hardin Pike, brushed aside small numbers of Confederates, and, executing a left wheel, closed on the Confederates posted in the five redoubts anchoring Hood's left on the Hillsboro Pike. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood's IV Corps at noon, with Smith's "Israelites" approaching the Hillsboro redoubts, in the center advanced and seized Montgomery Hill now lightly defended following Hood's decision to concentrate his forces on defense of a line of works farther south thrown up on December 10. By the afternoon, the situation began to change. Spurred on by competition from Maj. Gen. A. J. "Whiskey" Smith's "Israelites," recently arrived from Missouri, Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch's dismounted cavalry charged the westernmost redoubt, No. 5. The Yankee troopers and Smith's infantry charged the hilltop redoubt in parallel lines and the few defenders were routed. The capture of Redoubt No. 5 led to the other redoubts falling like dominos, as other Federal brigades of Smith's command and Wood's divisions joined in the attack. Hood was unable to redeploy soldiers of Lee's corps from his center in time to prevent the collapse of Stewart's front. Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall's hard-fighting division tried to hold their ground, but the numbers in their front were overwhelming. By dusk, the Confederate left had given way. Several senior Federal officers that night expected the rout of Hood's left to signal a Confederate retreat. General Schofield, however, correctly predicted that his former West Point classmate had not abandoned the field. Dawn proved him right. Hood had formed a shorter line, his left anchored on a steep unnamed knob and his right on Overton Hill about a mile and a half south of his December 15 line. Thomas wasted no time in ordering a follow-up to the previous day's success. Again, the focus was on the Confederate left. On the Federal left, another diversionary attack went forward against Overton Hill, defended by S. D. Lee's corps. In this action the 13th U.S. Colored Troops displayed extraordinary valor in battling abatis and other obstacles to gain a toehold near the Southern line, but the Confederates in this sector stood tall and repulsed the charges of Steedman's division and Abel Streight's and P. Sidney Post's brigades. On the Federal right, subordinates dawdled and it fell upon the commander of A. J. Smith's first division, Brig. Gen. John McArthur to take the initiative as the day wore on and a light rain set in. McArthur was a distinguished fighter in western Federal campaigns since Shiloh but his independent style, like that of his superior, "Whiskey" Smith, prevented him from gaining a higher command. At four P.M. on December 16, McArthur ordered his men to storm the knob anchoring the western flank of the Rebel line. Shy's Hill, as it became known after the battle (for Confederate Col. William Shy, killed in its defense), proved to be less of an obstacle than the other Federal commanders expected. Observing the charge of McArthur's men, Thomas ordered his right wing to advance. The result was a rout. Though many of the Rebels fought gamely, they could not sustain the pressure, and the badly defeated army headed south down the Franklin Road, the one escape route through the Brentwood Hills still open. The disintegration of the Army of Tennessee came on that rainy afternoon of December 16. Many Rebels surrendered, others dropped their arms and fled. The shattered remains of Hood's army with losses in the campaign reducing their number to one third of that which started north from Florence, Alabama, were pursued by Wilson's Federal cavalry and Wood's IV Corps. Bedford Forrest, aided by a picked infantry force led by General Walthall, fought several successful rear-guard actions as the Confederate force bowed out of Tennessee, reentered Alabama, crossed the Tennessee River at Bainbridge, Alabama, on December 26-28, and ended their flight in Tupelo, Mississippi, in early January 1865. Grant, learning on the evening of December 15, of the victory at Nashville, returned to Virginia and sent a congratulatory telegram to Thomas: "The armies operating in the vicinity of Petersburg have fired two hundred guns in honor of your great victory."
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