Home : America At War : The Civil War :The Guerrilla War
During the American Civil War, many Southern sympathizers formed irregular organizations to support the war effort against Union forces, operating throughout the Southern and border state areas. Irregular forces employed classic guerrilla techniques including hit and run attacks, raids, and ambushes to harass Federal forces and disrupt Federal lines of communications. They also attacked pro-Union sympathizers, destroying or seizing private property to exact revenge or gather provisions for their forces. Confederate authorities sanctioned some of the irregular forces as Partisan Rangers while other groups operated in a loose association supporting the Southern cause. The most significant contribution these guerrilla forces made to the Confederate war effort was to tie down as much as one-third of the Union Army to occupation duties at different stages of the war. President Abraham Lincoln recognized the impact of guerrilla activities when he wrote, “In no other way does the enemy give us so much trouble, at so little expense to himself.” Guerrilla operations during the American Civil War required the Federal government to expend significant effort in attempts to suppress their support for the Confederate war effort. The Federal government initially attempted to mitigate the effects of guerrilla operations with moderate policies to pacify the local populaces, thus weakening their support to irregular forces, along with the use of military force to suppress guerrilla activities. As the war progressed, Federal policies became more severe as Union forces became frustrated in their efforts to defeat the guerrilla forces. The Federal government occupied portions of Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and Western Virginia to protect pro-Union governments and citizens in the volatile border area while campaigning against Confederate regular forces. By late 1862, the most common technique employed by Union forces was to establish small posts in the major towns throughout the region supported by mobile reserve forces located in the county seats diverting troop strength away from the conventional battles. Forces committed to the counter-guerrilla effort conducted patrols, raids, and sweeps throughout the occupied areas to track and defeat guerrilla forces. Union efforts also included forces in defensive positions to secure railroads, bridges, and other points of key terrain and facilities. In addition to military efforts, commanders used policy measures to combat guerrilla activities. Major General Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Department of the Mississippi, declared in March 1862, that anyone caught conducting sabotage would be considered an outlaw and would be shot on sight. Another policy attempt to stem the effectiveness of the guerrillas was Order No. 11, issued in August 1863 by General Thomas Ewing, commander of the District of the Border between Missouri and Kansas. This order was intended to depopulate Jackson, Cass, Bates, and Vernon Counties along the Missouri border to deny sanctuary for the guerrillas. Irregular warfare in the American Civil War followed the patterns of irregular warfare in 19th century Europe. Structurally, irregular warfare can be divided into three different types conducted during the Civil War: 'People's War', 'partisan warfare', and 'raiding warfare'. The concept of 'People's war,' first described by Clausewitz in On War, was the closest example of a mass guerrilla movement in the era. In general, this type of irregular warfare was conducted in the hinterland of the Border States (Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and northwestern Virginia), and was marked by a vicious neighbor against neighbor quality. One such example was the opposing irregular forces operating in Missouri and northern Arkansas from 1862 to 1865, most of which were pro-Confederate or pro-Union in name only and preyed on civilians and isolated military forces of both sides with little regard of politics. From these semi-organized guerrillas, several groups formed and were given some measure of legitimacy by their governments. Quantrill's Raiders, who terrorized pro-Union civilians and fought Federal troops in large areas of Missouri and Kansas, was one such unit. Another notorious unit, with debatable ties to the Confederate military, was led by Champ Ferguson along the Kentucky-Tennessee border. Ferguson became one of the only figures of Confederate cause to be executed after the war. Dozens of other small, localized bands terrorized the countryside throughout the border region during the war, bringing total war to the area that lasted until the end of the Civil War and, in some areas, beyond. Partisan warfare, in contrast, more closely resembles Commando operations of the 20th century. Partisans were small units of conventional forces, controlled and organized by a military force for operations behind enemy lines. The 1862 Partisan Ranger Act passed by the Confederate Congress authorized the formation of these units and gave them legitimacy, which placed them in a different category than the common 'bushwhacker' or 'guerrilla'. John Singleton Mosby formed a partisan unit which was very effective in tying down Federal forces behind Union lines in northern Virginia in the last two years of the war. Lastly, deep raids by conventional cavalry forces were often considered 'irregular' in nature. The "Partisan Brigades" of Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan operated as part of the cavalry forces of the Confederate Army of Tennessee in 1862 and 1863. They were given specific missions to destroy logistical hubs, railroad bridges, and other strategic targets to support the greater mission of the Army of Tennessee. By mid-1863, with the destruction of Morgan's raiders during the Great Raid of 1863, the Confederacy conducted few deep cavalry raids in the latter years of the war, mostly because of the losses in experienced horsemen and the offensive operations of the Union army. Federal cavalry conducted several successful raids during the war but in general used their cavalry forces in a more conventional role. A good exception was the 1863 Grierson's Raid, which did much to set the stage for General Ulysses S. Grant's victory during the Vicksburg Campaign. Federal counter-guerrilla operations were very successful in preventing the success of Confederate guerrilla warfare. In Arkansas, Federal forces used a wide variety of strategies to defeat irregulars. These included the use of Arkansas Unionist forces as anti-guerrilla troops, the use of riverine forces such as gunboats to control the waterways, and the provost marshal military law enforcement system to spy on suspected guerrillas and to imprison those captured. Against Confederate raiders, the Federal army developed an effective cavalry themselves and reinforced that system by numerous blockhouses and fortification to defend strategic targets. However, Federal attempts to defeat Mosby's Partisan Rangers fell short of success because of Mosby's use of very small units (10 to 15 men) operating in areas considered friendly to the Rebel cause. Another regiment known as the "Thomas Legion," consisting of white and anti-Union Cherokee Indians, morphed into a guerrilla force and continued fighting in the remote mountain back-country of western North Carolina for a month after Lee's surrender at Appomattox. That unit was never completely suppressed by Union forces, but voluntarily ceased hostilities after capturing the town of Waynesville on May 10, 1865. In the late 20th century several historians have focused on the non-use of guerrilla warfare to prolong the war. Near the end of the war, there were those in the Confederate government, notably Jefferson Davis who advocated continuing the southern fight as a guerrilla conflict. He was opposed by generals such as Robert E. Lee who ultimately believed that surrender and reconciliation were better than guerrilla warfare. One of the most violent areas of guerrilla activity requiring the Federal government’s attention was along the Missouri and Kansas border. Guerrilla forces led by William Clarke Quantrill terrorized pro-Union supporters and harassed Union forces throughout the Missouri-Kansas border area. The most significant operation conducted by Quantrill was the raid on Lawrence, Kansas in August 1863. Quantrill led a force of approximately 450 guerrillas that killed over 150 inhabitants of Lawrence and destroyed much of the town during the raid. After the raid, Quantrill began to lose control of the organization, and some of his followers formed smaller organizations of their own. The most significant of these splinter groups were those formed by William “Bloody Bill” Anderson and George Todd. Anderson and Todd led irregular forces that plunged the Missouri River Valley into terror during the summer of 1864, disrupting Federal forces and lines of communication preparing the way for Price’s Raid into Missouri in September and October 1864. After successes in the Camden Expedition and the Red River Campaign in the spring of 1864, the Confederates once again attempted to secure Missouri by force. To be successful, Price needed to strike quickly by seizing key terrain and facilities before they could be adequately defended, and he would need to use all means available to defeat Federal forces in the state. During the raid, the guerrillas massed their forces in close proximity to the Confederate regular forces conducting the raid, resulting in the deaths of Todd and Anderson and many of their men. Price was defeated and retreated back to Louisiana. In the wake of his army, most of the guerrillas fled the state for winter quarters in Texas while Quantrill formed a group of 30 guerrillas and departed Missouri heading east toward Kentucky. Returning to Missouri the following summer, the guerrillas found themselves operating against Federal forces conducting aggressive counter-guerrilla operations able to disperse without the threat of a conventional Confederate attack. The guerrillas also began to lose their sanctuary in their normal area of operations. Many years of fighting and bushwhacking devastated the area that provided them little sustenance and popular support. With the surrender of the Confederate regular forces and rapidly loosing their sanctuary, many of the guerrillas surrendered, effectively ending over a decade of conflict in the border area. The success of the Confederate strategy in 1864 in the Trans-Mississippi Department depended in part on Price’s ability to employ the elements of Compound Warfare. “Compound Warfare,” as coined by Dr. Thomas Huber, “is the simultaneous use of a regular force and an irregular force against an enemy.” Compound Warfare usually occurs when a major power occupies a minor power’s territory and the minor power utilizes both a regular and irregular force to defeat the major power. To be successful, the major power must first mass against and defeat the minor power’s conventional force, then disperse to suppress the guerrilla force throughout the territory. If the minor power’s effort is well coordinated, the challenges are very difficult for the major power to overcome. For the minor power, success is measured in persistence versus predominance. The minor power must “fortify” his elements of Compound Warfare to succeed usually by securing the assistance of a powerful major ally and creating a safe haven for his conventional force. Fortified Compound Warfare allows the minor force to use the ally’s power to diffuse the major power’s force brought against him and the use of a safe haven to preserve his conventional force from destruction. The commitment or threat of commitment of this conventional force prevents the major power from dispersing to defeat the guerrilla force, while the guerrilla force prevents the major power from massing to defeat the conventional force making it almost impossible to overcome. In other words, combining the effects of both a regular or conventional force and an irregular or guerrilla force to “compound” the effects against the major power coupled with the transferred power of a major ally and the resilience provided by a safe haven to shield his conventional force allows a minor force to debilitate and defeat a major power. During Price’s Raid, Major General Sterling Price failed to properly employ the elements of Compound Warfare to bring Missouri into the Confederacy. By failing to adequately coordinate and employ the efforts of the regular and irregular forces operating in the state, Price lost the advantage he could have exploited had he employed the irregular forces to prevent Union forces from massing against his regular force during the raid. Price’s failure was also a result of the slow progress of the regular force during the raid and the irregulars massing in close proximity to the Price’s regular troops. With Price’s regular force defeated, the guerrillas were left to confront the numerically superior Union forces operating in Missouri. Several sources chronicle the events along the Kansas-Missouri border during Bleeding Kansas from 1854 to 1861 and the Civil War from 1861 to 1865, and specifically, the actions of guerrilla forces supporting Price’s Raid in 1864. Most sources either romanticize about the heroics of the guerrillas as defenders of their homes or demonize them as terrorists and privateers. One of the better early sources is written by William Connelly in 1910. It is based on first hand accounts and letters that tell of the events that shaped guerrilla warfare along the Kansas and Missouri border during the Bleeding Kansas period and into the Civil War. However, Connelly has an anti-Confederate bias, and Quantrill is depicted as a “depraved and degenerate villain.”6 Many other sources about Quantrill and the war along the Kansas- Missouri border, like The Devil Knows How to Ride written by Edward Leslie in 1996, relied on and cited Connelly’s work, but Leslie provided a more moderate assessment of Quantrill.
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