Home : America At War : The Civil War : North And South :Transportation
Transportation during the Civil War was often a quartermaster's nightmare. Armies fought through swamp, forest, coastal marshes, mountains, and tangled, second-growth underbrush. They expended enormous quantities of food and ammunition, speedily wore out clothing, and called constantly for medical supplies. Quartermasters learned early to develop and exploit every known means of transportation. Railroads were vital. The Confederacy had 9,000 miles of railroad but lacked steel and factory facilities to replace rolling stock and rails. The Union was fortunate. It controlled 22,000 miles of track, had a great industrial potential, and a transportation genius in Brigadier General Herman Haupt, head of the United States Military Railroad Construction Corps. Before Haupt there had been chaos. Under him, trains met schedules while repair and new construction went on constantly. Men of both the Railroad Corps and Engineer Corps became expert at bridge reconstruction. Lincoln, on one of his field trips, paused in open-mouthed astonishment before a rebuilt railroad bridge and reported: "I have just seen the most remarkable structure that human eyes eyes rested upon. That man, Haupt, has built a bridge across Potomac Creek, about four hundred feet long and nearly a hundred feet high, over which loaded trains are running every hour, and, upon my word . . . there is nothing in it but bean-poles and corn-stalks."
Ingenuity marked the efforts of railway men throughout the four years of conflict. To protect construction gangs repairing bridges on the Philadelphia, Wilmington, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Union engineers put together an armored railroad battery carrying riflemen and a pivot-mounted cannon. Western troops were no less inventive. At Vicksburg, soldiers operating under an officer of General McPherson's staff built five locomotives for the United States Military Railroad. Operating on exterior lines of communication, Union soldiers traveled long distances and found military-run rail lines essential to efficient operation. In 1863, Colonel C. C. McCallum, who took over after Haupt's resignation, saw his trains move two corps, about 22,000 men, over 1,200 miles in 11 1/2 days. General Sherman reported that a single-track railroad 473 miles long supplied his army of 100,000 men and 35,000 animals for 196 days during the drive on Atlanta, and that the campaign would have been impossible without rail facilities. Waterways offered great opportunities for troop movement during the Civil War. The eastern seaboard was laced with rivers running into the Atlantic. In the west, rivers such as the Ohio, Tennessee, or Cumberland were used by armies in transit. The ocean and the Gulf of Mexico also served as sea roads to battle and more than once played a part in large-scale amphibious operations. The serious shipping shortage that plagued both sides when war began limited water transport. Ship construction was carried on at fever pitch in the South wherever possible, but, except for a few ironclads, most vessels produced were small ones. Ships purchased abroad were used as commerce raiders and blockade runners, so that Confederate soldiers seldom knew the dubious comforts of troop transports. The two-part program of construction and purchase soon gave the North a variety of surface craft. Gingerbread-laden river boats from the Hudson and Mississippi, New York ferries, Great Lakes cargo carriers, and various tugs, barges, and trawlers were pressed into service. Assorted armadas carried regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps up and down river and along the shelving slopes of the Atlantic coast and the Gulf. Transatlantic packets, ignominiously reduced to coastal runs, accommodated Yankee soldiers, in gilded salons. The gambling rooms of the fabulous river boats were turned into bivouac areas and hospitals for the men aboard.
Probably the greatest water-borne troop movement of the War was the one that inaugurated General McClellan's Peninsular Campaign in 1862. The forces embarked in the Washington-Alexandria area, then dropped down the Potomac and through Chesapeake Bay to land on the peninsula formed by the York and James rivers. In the course of this operation, some 300 ships carried over 100,000 men, more than 14,000 horses and mules, 343 guns, 1,150 wagons, and tons of auxiliary equipment more than 200 miles in two to three weeks without the loss of a man. Once McClellan reached the peninsula, he remained dependent on shipping for food, ammunition, and forage. A swarming flotilla transfered troops, livestock, and supplies to the site chosen by McClellan as a new base for offensive operations. River boats, transports, and railroad trains were comparative luxuries to the average Yankee or Rebel soldier. Most of the time, he reached his objective on foot. The speed of marching infantry was controlled by the nature of the ground it crossed. On hard-topped Pennsylvania highways, troops could make 30 miles per day. In swamp and forest, 10 miles was good. Traveling under his own power, the infantry soldier was expected to average 16 to 20 miles per day under normal conditions, and be ready for battle when he got to his destination. In crucial periods, troops hit the roads day after day with no protracted rest. During the Shenandoah Valley Campaign in 1862, Stonewall Jackson's "foot cavalry" marched the length of the valley five times in three months. In November, 1863, Sherman's men made 400 miles on foot and went into action the day after reaching their goal. Completely at the mercy of weather, Southern roads were often in miserable condition. Spring rains made rivers overflow their banks, flooding the already muddy highways. Marching troops were accompanied by wagon trains carrying rations, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, and forage for the draft animals. The usual Army wagon was about 120 inches long inside, 43 wide, and 22 high. It could carry 2,500 pounds, or 1,500 rations of bread, coffee, sugar, and salt. Under ideal conditions, it was drawn by four horses or six mules. By rule of thumb, commanders counted on 25 wagons for each 1,000 men. Sherman, one of the Union's logistics experts, felt that 600 wagons should accompany a corps, 300 for food and 300 for ammunition, clothing, and other essentials. In mountain operations, trains of sure-footed pack mules were occasionally employed in place of the cumbersome wagons. A few hundred yards of open water could halt an army and its supply train. Bridging operations, of the utmost importance, were the responsibility of engineers in Northern and Southern armies.
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