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The Battle Of Pea Ridge

On the Battery On March 7th, 1862, the 10,500-man Union Army of the Southwest, under the command of Brigadier General Samuel Curtis, engages the 16,000 troops of Major General Earl Van Dorn's Confederate Army of the West near Elkhorn Tavern.

On Christmas Day, 1861, Major General Henry W. Halleck, Commander of the Department of the Missouri, appointed Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis, a West Point graduate of 1831 and a veteran of the Mexican War, to be the new Federal commander of the Southwestern District of Missouri. On the next day Curtis left St. Louis by way of the South Pacific Railroad for Rolla, Missouri, headquarters of his new command, to fulfill the Union objective of driving the Confederates from the state of Missouri. This campaign which would culminate in the Battle of Pea Ridge, March 7-8. 1862, came to be known as the Pea Ridge Campaign.

It was for the control of Missouri that the Battle of Wilson's Creek, near Springfield, Missouri, was fought on August 10, 1861, and why Federal forces were building up in southwestern Missouri in the winter of 1861-62. It was in this portion of Missouri that a "Civil War" was truly being waged. The state remained legally within the Union, but Major General Sterling Price, a very popular former state Governor and veteran of the Mexican War and at this time commanding the Missouri State Guard, endeavored to control the state for the Confederacy. Not only was there concern for the control of southwestern Missouri; both Union and Confederate forces were aiming for the control of the city of St. Louis. For the Federal forces, the city was a base for western operations; for the Confederate forces it would be a base for operations into the Upper Mississippi and the Ohio Valleys. The control of Missouri was one of the reasons the contending forces clashed at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, in March of 1862.

After arriving at Rolla, General Curtis began making preparations for carrying out his mission. His predecessors, Major Generals John C. Fremont and David Hunter, had not achieved much success along this line. From Rolla, the Federal forces pushed southwestward along the Telegraph Road toward the Missouri-Arkansas line. As the Federals advanced in this direction, the Confederates, primarily Price's Missouri State Guards, retreated along the same route. On February 13, 1862, the Northern army entered Springfield, Missouri, and took it without a battle. Upon learning of the approaching Federals, the Confederates evacuated the town. When one company of the 4th Iowa Infantry Regiment entered Springfield and found no one to contest their entry, they proceeded to the Court House and raised the Union flag. The main body of Curtis' troops left Springfield on the morning of February 14.

By February 16, Curtis' men, with the calvary under Colonel Eugene A. Carr leading, had achieved the Union objective of driving the Confederates from Missouri; but, the Confederates had not been defeated. Realizing this fact and hoping to score a major victory over the Confederates, Curtis ordered his men to pursue them into Arkansas.

The first encounter in Arkansas was a minor skirmish with the Confederate rear guard just across the state line at Cross Timber Hollow on February 16. On the next day, six miles south of here, a more serious clash resulted at Dunagin's farm near present-day Brightwater. This engagement, in which the Federals lost thirteen killed and between fifteen and twenty wounded, and in which the Confederate loss was somewhat less, was the bloodiest of Curtis' campaign thus far.

While the Confederates were retreating, Curtis was setting up a temporary headquarters near Little Sugar Creek and studying the area with the thought in mind that it would be a good site for a future battle. Upon the arrival of his First and Second Divisions under Brigadier General Franz Sigel, he planned to advance to Cross Hollow, approximately twelve miles south of Little Sugar Creek, where he thought the Confederates would concentrate for a battle. After two days at Little Sugar Creek, Curtis moved his force to Osage Springs, just south of Bentonville, and then on to Cross Hollow. On February 22, the Federals drove the Confederates from Cross Hollow, but only after the Southerners had burned the Confederate winter quarters as Camp Benjamin. Curtis maintained his headquarters at Cross Hollow from February 22 until he returned to Little Sugar Creek on the night of March 5-6.

By the time of the Confederate evacuation of Cross Hollow, Price's forces had joined ranks with the main body of Brigadier General Ben McCulloch's troops, The combined Confederate forces then moved to deep in the Boston Mountains southwest of Fayetteville. During this combined retreat Price hoped that he and McCulloch could agree to a "scorched earth" policy, that is, destroying as they moved and preventing the Federals from foraging from the land. McCulloch and Price disagreed as they had done on previous occasions. It seemed that much of the difficulty the Confederates experienced in dealing effectively with the Federals in southwestern Missouri and northwestern Arkansas stemmed from the fact that there was virtually no cooperation between Price and McCulloch. McCulloch, a regular officer of the Confederate Army and commander of the Confederate forces in Arkansas, considered his rank of Brigadier General, superior to that of Major General of the Missouri State Guard held by Price, commander of the Missouri State Guard. It was because of this lack of cooperation between the two commanders that Confederate high command becamed concerned and appointed a commander of the newly created Trans-Mississippi District. Major General Earl Van Dorn, a Mississippian and a grand nephew of Andrew Jackson ("Old Hickory"), was transferred from Virginia to this new District. It was expected that the new commander would unite the forces of McCulloch, Price, and Brigadier General Albert Pike, commander of the pro-Confederate Indian forces from the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma).

On March 3, 1862, General Van Dorn reached the Confederate headquarters on Cove Creek in the Boston Mountains and assumed active command of the combined Confederate forces. The new commander soon let it be known that he intended to wage an all out offensive against the Federal forces; thereby driving them from Arkansas. He hoped that by driving Curtis from Arkansas, it would enable the Confederates to move to St. Louis, capture the city and then get control of the entire state. With that objective in mind, he started moving his troops northward on March 4. By the evening of March 5 the Southern soldiers, weary and exhausted from the forced march through the Boston Mountains, had passed through Fayetteville, occupied by Brigadier General A. Asboth's Federal forces as late as February 23.

While this Confederate movement was taking place Curtis' troops were distributed in the following manner: Brigadier General Franz Sigel, a German emigrant of 1852, with the First and Second Divisions near McKisick's farm, four miles southwest of Bentonville: Colonel Jefferson C. Davis of Indiana with the Third Division on the bluffs above Little Sugar Creek, and Colonel Carr of Illinois with the Fourth Division at Cross Hollow.

When Curtis learned of the Confederate movement his forces were scattered from Little Sugar Creek to Cross Hollow, with detachments as far west as the Indian Territory and as far east as Huntsville. On March 5 he ordered a concentration where the Telegraph Road crossed Little Sugar Creek. Curtis arrived at this location at 2 a.m. the following day. Shortly after arriving he ordered Colonels Davis and Carr to dose the Telegraph Road with felled timbers and to prepare earthworks on the bluffs on the north side of Little Sugar Creek. These earthworks would command an approach from the south by way of the Telegraph Road and an approach from the southwest by way of Little Sugar Creek valley.

The Northern commander thought that the Confederates would advance by way of the Telegraph Road. If so, they would have to cross Little Sugar Creek in the vicinity of his entrenchments. There was no doubt in Curtis' mind that his cannon and troops situated on the high bluffs could wipe out any force Van Dorn might move along the Telegraph Road or up the valley. While Curtis was speculating as to the route Van Dorn would be using, the Southern commander was moving his army by way of Bentonville, some fourteen miles southwest of Curtis' position.

At approximately 10 a.m. on March 6, Sigel, then at Bentonville, learned that the Confederates were only a few miles south of town. Acting upon orders from General Curtis, he had sent the First and Second Divisions commanded by Colonel Peter J. Osterhaus and Brigadier General A. Asboth, respectively, to join Curtis' other forces at Little Sugar Creek. Therefore, he was faced with the Confederate advance with only about 600 men to offer resistance. Sigel had no choice but to retreat, leaving the town to be occupied immediately by the Confedertes. After several minor skirmishes in which the Federals had managed to hold their own, a more serious engagement seemed to be developing. However, before the large force of Confederates could attack the rear of Sigel's force, reinforcements under Osterhaus and Asboth had come to his assistance. Well screened by additional artillery and troops, Sigel was able to continue his march to Curtis' base without another encounter with the Confederates.

By nightfall of March 6, Van Dorn and most of his troops had arrived at Camp Stephens, a well established Confederate camp located on Little Sugar Creek, five miles west of where Curtis was entrenched. The Confederate camp was situated near the junction of a road which ran along Little Sugar Creek and connected with the Telegraph Road near Curtis' position, and the Bentonville-Keetsville Road, otherwise known as the Bentonville Detour. This road ran northeasterly from Camp Stephens and, for the most part, paralleled the Telegraph Road. The two roads joined in Cross Timber Hollow, three and one-half miles north of Elkhorn Tavern, in the direct rear of Curtis' position.

Van Dorn, realizing the futility of a frontal attack against Curtis' works, called his commanders into conference to help determine strategy. The former Texas ranger, Ben McCulloch, who had a detailed knowledge of the area, informed his commanding general that the Federal rear could be reached by making an eight mile march along the Bentonville Detour to the Telegraph Road. Then, a Confederate battle plan began to take shape. First, Van Dorn would have his men pitch their tents and build a camp fire at Camp Stephens, as if they intended to stay there for the night of March 6-7. He hoped that this would deceive General Curtis. Later in the evening he would have his forces move around the Federal right (the Federals were facing south) so as to attack from the rear. A successful attack from the rear would sever Curtis' line of communication and supply, the Telegraph Road. With Confederates squarely across the road, it would be impossible for Curtis to receive reinforcements or to retreat in the event of defeat. About 8 p.m. on the evening of March 6, Van Dorn began his flanking movement with General Price's Missourians leading.

Van Dorn hoped to reach a point in the Federal rear north of Elkhorn Tavern before daylight. He soon realized that it would be several hours later before his troops could get to that point. The men were in no condition for fast marching. They complained that their commander was not very considerate; he was riding horseback while many of the troops had to walk, some without shoes. Three days' of hard marching with very little to eat had almost exhausted the Confederate soldiers. The march around the Federals was further retarded when the Confederates had to remove the timbers which Colonel Grenville Dodge's men had felled across the road during the early part of the evening. While Van Dorn's advance troops were being confronted with felled trees to slow their march, the remainder of his army was south of Little Sugar Creek with no way to cross its icy waters. After considerable delay, two poles were secured and laid side by side to facilitate a crossing. It was almost daylight before the last of Van Dorn's rear forces had crossed the stream.

By 8 a.m. on March 7, the main portion of Price's troops had reached the junction of the Bentonville Detour and the Telegraph Road, three and one-half miles north of Elkhorn Tavern. It was about that time that Van Dorn decided upon a two-pronged attack against Curtis. Price's Missouri troops would move south along the Telegraph Road and attack the rear of Curtis' left and McCulloch's troops, consisting of the Infantry Brigade under the Louisianian, Colonel Louis Hebert; the Cavalry Brigade under the Arkansan, Brigadier General James McIntosh; three regiments of Indians under the Massachusetts native Brigadier General Albert Pike, and five artillery batteries, would move south and skirt the western edge of Pea Ridge, a 150 foot high ridge extending two and one-half miles west from Elkhorn Tavern, and attack the Federal right. Van Dorn thought that simultaneous attacks on both the Federal right and left, then closing toward the center from each side (really a pincer movement) would result in the inevitable defeat of Curtis. The Southern commander's superior number, 16,200, as opposed to Curtis' 10,500, would seem to justify Van Dorn's optimism. Rarely did the Confederates outnumber the Federals as at Pea Ridge. Van Dorn was handicapped in that it was difficult for him to coordinate the operations of McCulloch's troops north of the hamlet of Leetown and those of Price around the Tavern. The Confederate right was at least eight miles from its left, by way of the Bentonville Detour. On the other hand, General'Curtis had easy access to both wings of his force.

That Van Dorn had moved around Curtis' right and was moving toward the Telegraph Road was first reported to the Federals about 5 a.m. on March 7. By 6 a.m. there was no doubt in the Federal's minds that they were being attacked from the rear by a large force. Van Dorn's move was first made known to the Federals through Private Thomas Welch of the 3d Illinois Cavalry Regiment. The Illinois private, who was on guard duty near the Bentonville Detour, was captured about 3 a.m. by Colonel J. T. Cearnal's mounted troops, the head of Price's advance. While being taken to the rear of the Confederate line, Welch escaped and reported the Confederate move to his commander. Major Eli W. Weston, who had a Union outpost north of Elkhorn Tavern. Weston, who was the provost marshal for Curtis' army, was using Elkhorn Tavern as his headquarters. Weston soon realized that he could not hold back the Confederates and sent Captain Barbour Lewis to inform Curtis, who, at that time had his tent in the vicinity of Pratt's store.

Before Lewis informed the Federal commander of the Confederate move, Curtis had learned of the move through the reports of two of General Sigel's scouts, a Mr. Pope and a Mr. Brown, and had called his division commanders into conference. With the Confederates having made the unexpected move around his right, Curtis had to formulate a new battle plan. He must decide quickly how to meet the attack from the north. The Federal commander's immediate action involved having his troops do an "about face." Whereas they had been facing south, they would be facing north. Early in the conference, Curtis decided to send Colonel Osterhaus of General Sigel's command, with elements of the 3d Iowa Cavalry, 1st. 4th, and 5th Missouri Cavalry regiments, and two artillery batteries to strike what was thought to be the center of Van Dorn's line.

While Curtis was still in conference, he received word that Weston's troops north of the Tavern had been attacked and that a large number of Confederates were moving along the Telegraph Road. With it apparent that immediate action must be taken, Curtis broke up the conference and ordered Colonel Carr, now commanding the Federal extreme right. to send a brigade to Weston's aid. When Colonel Dodge got to the vicinity of the Tavern with his brigade, he realized that the situation was grave: Price had already started an enveloping movement northeast of the Tavern and was moving toward the Huntsville Road (the dirt road that runs eastward from the Tavern). By the time Dodge got to this area, Major Weston's force which had moved against the oncoming Confederates had been pushed back considerably by Colonel Cearnal. The Confederate cavalry officer had negotiated a movement to the left in the vicinity of the tannery and was moving along with his immediate superior, Price, toward the Huntsville Road.

With a careful placement of the troops in Dodge's brigade. Colonel Carr was able to push the Confederates back, temporarily, to Williams Hollow, through which they had advanced. Carr realized, however, that the Confederates were too great in number for him to hold off very long and sent for Colonel William Vandever, commanding one of the brigades in his division, to come to his support. While Vandever was moving his troops up the Telegraph Road Colonel Henry Little of Price's command, who had launched his thrust up Cross Timber Hollow, was approaching the neighborhood of the Tavern, which was being used as Carr's headquarters and a Federal hospital. With a fierce determination the Federals moved forward, and in a desperate hand to hand engagement forced the Confederates to fall back. Vandever ultimately, however, had to fall back because of Little's superior number and artillery fire. At the same time, Colonel Dodge was trying desperately to hold out against Price on the Federal right, about one-half mile east of the Tavern.

While Little was moving hard against the Federal center and Price was pushing hard against the Federal right, Brigadier General William Y. Slack's troops were driving the Federals from Pea Ridge. Shortly after Slack's brigade started crossing Pea Ridge, it was ambushed, by a Federal combat patrol, causing considerable confusion in the Confederate ranks. This confusion soon ended, however, and the "Yankees" were driven from their advanced position near the crest of the ridge. Prior to this clash the Federals had attempted to place one of their six-pounder guns on the ridge west of the Tavern. During the struggle the gun and several Federals were captured. Although the Confederates had forced the "Yankees" from the ridge they had suffered a great loss. One of their brigadier generals, William Y. Slack of Missouri, received a mortal wound in the hip. The wound necessitated that he be removed from the field and that Colonel Thomas H. Rosser assume command of the brigade.

The final charge of the Confederates came about 3 p.m. General Price with three divisions of the Missouri State Guard forced Colonel Dodge to relinquish his position astride the Huntsville Road; Colonel Little drove Vandever from the Tavern; and Colonel Rosser, now in command of Slack's brigade, drove the Federals from Pea Ridge.

By the time the Federals were forced to retreat, General Asboth had arrived with reinforcements. But the situation was so bad for the Federals that the additional troops could not turn the tide. The Confederate advance, however, was checked by the seven guns brought up by Asboth. While the seven guns (four on the left and three on the right of Telegraph Road) prevented further Confederate advance, they facilitated the retreat of the Federals.

By nightfall Van Dorn had ordered his men to cease their attacks. The day had brought success to the Confederate left. Van Dorn had established his headquarters at Elkhorn Tavern and a hospital had been set up in part of the building. The Confederate victory in the Elkhorn Tavern area could not be disputed. But what had happened to the Confederate right?

Engagement at Leetown

It has been noted that when General Curtis learned of Van Dorn's movement by way of the Bentonville Detour he sent a task force under Colonel Osterhaus to strike Van Dorn's center. But little did Curtis realize that Van Dorn was waging a two-pronged attack; that a large body of troops would be attacking both his (new) right and left. By 9:30 a.m., Osterhaus' force, led by Colonel Cyrus Bussey, had left the encampment area and was moving into the open field north and west of the hamlet, Leetown. Soon the Federals noticed a large body of Confederates moving on the Bentonville Detour, about two miles to the north. As the Confederates were passing along the western end of Pea Ridge three guns of the 1st Missouri Flying Battery opened fire upon them.

Brigadier General Ben McCulloch, over-all commander of the right wing of the Confederate forces, ordered Brigadier General James N. McIntosh to make a charge with his cavalry. While McIntosh's men were moving to the west of the position held by Coloney Bussey, the three Indian regiments of Brigadier General Albert Pike were moving on McIntosh's left and behind a rail fence that ran east and west along the north side of the field in which the three Federal guns were located (slightly west of Little Round Top). As McIntosh's and Pike's men were moving forward and charging the Federal battery with a wild "Rebel" yell, Colonel Bussey was endeavoring to get the 5th Missouri Cavalry to move forward and break up the Southern attack. The members of the 5th Missouri refused to obey their commander. Consequently the 4th Missouri Cavalry was pushed back and the three guns of the Flying Battery were captured by Pike's and McIntosh's men. The gun carriages then were burned by the Confederates. While the carriages were being burned, the gunpowder in the cannon tubes exploded, killing several of the Indians.

Prior to the routing of the 4th Missouri and the refusal of the 5th Missouri Cavalry to move forward. Osterhaus had ordered Captain M. Welfley to advance three of his twelvepounder howitzers to support the advance cavalry. As Welfley's men were moving forward they became involved in the confusion caused by the retreat of Bussey's troops. During the period of confusion, one of Welfley's guns broke down and had to be abandoned. Shortly, however, the gun was recaptured when Osterhaus' force was successful in pushing the Confederates back into the woods on the north side of the field.

Confusion was not confined to the Federal forces. For some twenty minutes after Pike's Indians had participated in the successful routing of the Federals and the capture of three of their guns, they milled excitedly around the captured guns, all talking, and riding this way and that, listening to no orders from any one. When several shells from the Federal guns of the 4th Ohio and Welfley's Battery fired among the Indians, they ran into the woods where they felt more comfortable. They were not accustomed to fighting against "wagons that shoot," as they called the artillery pieces. For the remainder of the day the Indians were fairly much pinned down by the fire from Osterhaus' guns and were ineffective.

While Pike was concerned with his Indians, McCulloch was leading McIntosh's men, (all dismounted except the 6th Texas Cavalry), on Pike's right. McIntosh's men were deployed into line of battle along the north edge of the field opposite Osterhaus' infantry, then made several attempts to cross the field and drive Osterhaus' men from their position, but were unsuccessful. Shortly after 2 p.m. McCulloch, conspicuously dressed in black velvet and a plumed hat, moved forward to make a reconnaissance and was slain, reportedly, by Private Peter Pelican of Company B, 36th Illinois. The new commander, McIntosh, soon met the same fate as McCulloch. There was no question; the Confederacy had lost two able leaders. There was an expression of gladness on the part of some of McCulloch's troops because he was known to be a hard commander, but even those who expressed gladness realized they had lost a good soldier.

After the death of two Confederate Generals, the job of keeping order on Van Dorn's right was a most difficult one. There still was a ray of hope for the Confederates, however. Colonel Louis Hebert's infantry had started moving to the east of "Round Top" Mountain, prior to the death of the two generals. At first Hebert's men became lost and confused in the thick woods. During this time they were subjected to heavy firing from Federal artillery. Finally they regained their composure and pushed forward, driving Davis' troops, who had just arrived on the scene, before them. The Confederate victory was short-lived, however. Davis managed to send Colonel Thomas Pattison around to the right so that he could attack Hebert from the rear. Hebert's force could not withstand the attack from two directions, thus his brigade fell apart. Hebert and Colonel M. C. Mitchell of the 14th Arkansas were among the Confederate officers captured. With two generals dead and several of the other high ranking officers captured, there was not much leadership left for the Confederates in the area north of Leetown.

At 3 p.m. Pike moved to investigate the silence on his right; only to be informed of the loss of the Confederate generals and that he was in command. After surveying the situation, he found he had only three regiments and one battalion besides his own troops. When Pike decided to take his troops and the 6th Texas and Good's Texas Battery with him to join Van Dorn on the left, Colonel E. Greer was left in command. Colonel Greer withdrew the troops to the Bentonville Detour. At 1 a.m. on the morning of March 8 he began marching his troops toward Van Dorn's position.

On the Federal side, the situation at Leetown looked promising. It had been an unquestionable victory for them. As has been noted, the Federal right had not faired so well.

Last Day's Fighting

Much of what happened on the last day of the fighting at Pea Ridge was decided by the first day's fighting. The deaths of two Confederate generals: McCulloch and McIntosh, and the mortal wounding of Slack, certainly did nothing to help Van Dorn's position. Neither did it boost the already low morale of the Confederate troops. During the night the remnants of McCulloch's and Pike's commands joined Van Dorn, but McCulloch's men were not in a fighting spirit and Pike's Indians had already proven themselves to be ineffective.

The Confederate situation was worsened by the shortage of ammunition. The supply train for the Confederate forces was held by Brigadier General Martin E. Green at Camp Stephens. This placed the Federals between Van Dorn and his supplies. At daylight on March 8, Green started moving the supply train toward Van Dorn, but when he got within a mile of Elkhorn Tavern he received orders to take the supply train to Elm Springs and await further orders.

The sending of Green with the supplies to Elm Springs proved disastrous for Van Dorn. When the Federals opened the battle of March 8 with tremendous cannon fire, the Confederate batteries would be pushed forward only to be forced back because of a depletion of ammunition. The Federals, on the other hand, had replenished their supply of ammunition. The Federal ammunition at the front, when the fighting ended on March 7 was desperately low.

During the night of March 7-8 the Federal forces concentrated for the "Showdown." When the fighting started on the morning of March 8, the Federals were distributed as follows: Immediately to the left of Telegraph Road was White's Brigade with four guns, to his left was the 1st Iowa, 4th Ohio with five guns, and the command of General Asboth with six guns. To the right of the road were Carr's troops in the following order: the 18th Indiana, 22nd Indiana, the 1st Indiana with three guns, and the 3rd Iowa. The Confederates were distributed in the following manner: Colonel Little, in command at the Tavern, had his men in the edge of the timber at the eastern base of Pea Ridge; also west of the Telegraph Road were the 1st Arkansas, the 17th Arkansas, Rosser's Brigade, 2nd Missouri; on the east of the road were Wade's Battery, 3rd Missouri, Colonel Colton Greene's 3rd Brigade (Missouri Volunteers), and the 16th Arkansas. Pike's Indians, (those who had not retreated to Camp Stephens), were placed on the hills east and west of Cross Timber Hollow.

At 9 a.m., Sigel, who had moved his men to a large field west of the Tavern and south of Pea Ridge, thought Confederate reinforcements were coming to Rosser by way of the southeast slope of Pea Ridge. The Federal officer ordered two howitzers of the Second Ohio and two guns from Asboth's' reserve to be moved forward to prevent any such reinforcement. The four guns prevented any attempt on the part of Rosser to move forward.

Before 10 a.m. Confederate firing had ceased. It was apparent to Van Dorn that he could not hold out any longer against the superior Federal artillery. Although the Confederates had sixty-two pieces of artillery at Pea Ridge and the Federals had only forty-nine, the superior number was worthless without ammunition. Thus, the Confederate commander began withdrawing his troops, first to Williams Hollow then cutting back southeast to the Huntsville Road. Sigel thought Van Dorn was retreating toward Keetsville, Missouri, and moved his troops over Pea Ridge to cut off such a retreat. There were only Confederate stragglers who moved north past Williams Hollow. These were captured by Sigel's men. Before the retreating started, however, Sigel's men did capture the colors and guns of Captain William Hart's Arkansas Battery.

By 11 a.m. the Battle of Pea Ridge, one of the most decisive engagements west of the Mississippi River, had ended with an over-all Federal victory. The casualties were high on both sides; the Federals suffered 203 killed, 980 wounded, and 201 missing, while the Confederates suffered 1,000 killed and wounded and approximately 300 captured. But, Missouri had been saved for the Union.

From Pea Ridge, the Confederates would move to Van Buren, Arkansas, and consolidate their forces. They would then move toward Shiloh in Tennessee, but would get there too late to participate in the battle. Some of the Federals remained in the area for almost a month, but most of Curtis' Army would move to the vicinity of Batesville, Arkansas.

John W. Bond, Historian. Pea Ridge National Military Park. The Battle Of Pea Ridge 1862.

Albert Castel. The Guerrilla War 1861-1865. Civil War Times Illustrated. Gettysburg, PA. 1974.

Pea Ridge Civil War Campaign in the West. Shea & Hess. This study of the battle is based on research in archives from Connecticut to California, and includes a pioneering study of the terrain of the battlefield. It also includes an examination of soldiers' personal experiences, the use of Native American troops, and the role of Pea Ridge in regional folklore. This is "destined to become a Civil War classic and a model for writing military history." - Civil War History.

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