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Philadelphia Occupied

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Brandywine

In the summer of 1777 General Sir William Howe and thousands of his best troops left British-held New York and put out to sea, hound for the head of Chesapeake Bay and a major attack on Philadelphia, the capital of the new American republic. At last, after weeks of rumor and doubt, General Washington received word of Howe’s plans and hastily prepared to check him before he reached his goal. Despite the loss of New York the year before, the victories at Trenton and Princeton had spurred enlistments, and Washington was able to field an army of ten thousand men. They marched through Philadelphia late in August, shabbily dressed men sporting sprigs of leaves in their hats in a rather pathetic attempt to present a uniform appearance (opposite left is such a private soldier, from the Pennsylvania State Regiment). Against them marched fifteen thousand British soldiers, all as well equipped as the splendid grenadier shown opposite at right.

Colonel Aaron Ogden, Continental Army: On the 11th of September, 1777, the American Army … was posted near Chadsford on the Brandywinc with that river and a strong Abbatis in its front, and the enemy … was advancing from the head of Elk, apparently with an intent to cross the Brandywine at this ford and attack General Washington. … Major Carl Baurmeister, Hessian Forces: At sunrise … the army set out in two columns to march along two different roads. General Howe remained with the column on the left, which was led by General Cornwallis. Lieutenant General von Knyphausen commanded the column on the right. Captain John André, British Army: The design, it seemed was that General Knyphausen, taking Post at Chad’s Ford, should begin early to cannonade the Enemy on the opposite side, thereby to take up his attention and make him presume an attack was then intended with the whole Army, whilst the other Column should be performing the détour [around Washington’s right flank]. Joseph Townsend, a civilian witness to the battle: General Knyphausen commenced his cannonading early after daylight, and continued it the greater part of the forenoon. … Thus were the Americans amused … until information arrived that General Howe and his troops were crossing the creek at Jefferis’ Ford, which unexpected intelligence occasioned a general consternation and commotion throughout the whole of General Washington’s army. Lieutenant General William Howe, British Army: General Washington, having intelligence of this movement about noon, detached General Sullivan to his right … who took a strong position on the commanding ground … near to the Brandywind. … Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis, British Army, to a fellow officer : The damn rebels form well. Captain Enoch Anderson, Continental Army: [Cornwallis] crossed at the Forks and came down upon us rather unexpected. … The word was soon given to march to the right. … “Face to the front in line with the Maryland troops,” was the order, and the battle began. Gannon balls flew thick and many, from both sides, and small arms roared like the rolling of a drum. … Major General John Sullivan, Continental Army: … the fire was close and heavy for a long time, and soon became general … Five times did the enemy drive our troops from the hill, and as often it was regained, and the summit often disputed almost muzzle to muzzle. … The general fire of the line lasted an hour and forty minutes … in such a manner that General Conway, who has seen much service, says he never saw so close and severe a fire. General George Washington, Continental Army: In the midst of the attack on the right, that body of the enemy which remained on the other side of Chadd’s Ford, crossed it and attacked the division there under the command of General Wayne … who, after a severe conflict … retired. Major General John Sullivan, Continental Army: When we found the right and left oppressed by numbers and giving way on all quarters, we were obliged to abandon the hill we had so long contended for, but not till we had almost covered the ground … with the dead bodies of the enemy. Private Joseph Clark, Continental Army: …The enemy must have suffered very much from our people before they broke, though, indeed, our people suffered much in this action, and would have suffered more if Gen’l Green had not been detached to their assistance, by whose timely aid they made a safe retreat of the men. … Sergeant Thomas Sullivan, British Army: The … Fourth Brigade moved forward a mile … where they attacked a Gorps of the enemy that had not been before engaged, and were strongly posted to cover the retreat of their Army … which Gorps not being forced, on account of their … being somewhat determined to stand, until after it was dark … the enemy’s Army escaped a total overthrow. … Captain Enoch Anderson, Continental Army: Here then we experienced another drubbing. … But when it is taken into consideration that our army was not more than one-half the numbers of our enemy, and all things were well appointed and equipped with them, but our army not so … we did, I think, as well as could be expected. … Through all these trying times, I saw not a despairing look nor did I hear a despairing word. We had our solacing words always ready for each other, “Come boys, we shall do better another time,”—sounded throughout our little army. Had any man suggested, merely hinted the idea of giving up … he would have been knocked down. … Such was the spirit of the times. … Major General Nathanael Greene, Continental Army: We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.

On September 11 Washington deployed his troops along Brandywine Creek, most of them guarding the likely crossing of Chad’s Ford. Howe had decided to try again the trick that had won him Long Island and New York. Hc massed some of his men at Chad’s Ford but led the main body far upstream and around Washington’s right flank. Major General John Sullivan bore the brunt of the attack and put up a fierce but hopeless resistance. When Washington realized what was happening, he pulled Major General Nathanael Greene and his Virginians away from Chad’s Ford and sent them to support Sullivan. It was a four-mile march over rough ground, but Greene made it in forty-five minutes and stopped the British advance for long enough to keep Sullivan’s retreat from turning into a rout. On the left, Brigadier General Anthony Wayne pulled his troops out skillfully, and Washington’s army fell back in good order.

The Battle of the Clouds

The Battle of the Clouds (also known as the Battle of Warren, Battle of Whitehorse Tavern, or the Battle of Goshen) was fought on September 16, 1777, in the area surrounding present day Malvern, Pennsylvania). After the American defeat at the Battle of Brandywine, the British Army remain encamped near Chadds Ford. When British commander William Howe was informed that the weakened American force was less than ten miles away, he decided to press for another decisive victory. Washington learned of Howe's plans, and prepared for battle. Moments before the attack, a torrential downpour ensued. Significantly outnumbered, and with tens of thousands of cartridges ruined by the rain, Washington opted for a tactical retreat. Bogged down by rain and mud, the British allowed Washington and his army to escape.

After George Washington’s defeat at the Battle of Brandywine, he was intent on accomplishing two tasks. He wanted to protect Philadelphia from British forces under the command of Sir William Howe, and he needed to replenish the rapidly dwindling supplies and munitions which were stored in Reading, Pennsylvania. Washington withdrew behind the Schuylkill River, marched through Philadelphia, and headed northwest. Since the Schuylkill was fordable only far upstream starting at Matson's Ford (present-day Conshohocken), Washington could protect both the capital and the vital supply areas to the west from behind the river barrier. Yet he reconsidered, and re-crossed the river to face the British, who had moved little since Brandywine, probably for logistical reasons.

On September 16th, Washington's 10,000 man army was moving west through the Great Valley, bound by the North and South Valley Hills on either side. He learned from his cavalry that the British were advancing on him from the south just a few short miles away. Although moving to the North Valley Hills would have given Washington more time to deploy and possibly fortify, he ordered the army south directly toward the enemy to take up a defensive position on the South Valley Hills. The position was three miles long and was strong, especially in the center. Combating began and British forces initiated flanking movements around the American lines. Before the armies were fully engaged, however, rain began and quickly turned into a steady downpour. Powder became wet, making firearms useless. This “battle” in the clouds of rain and fog never developed.

Washington once again withdrew behind the Schuylkill on September 19th to cover both the capital and his supply area, but he left behind Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania division of 1,500 men and four guns with orders to harass the British rear. Howe’s army found it nearly impossible to follow Washington over the rutted, muddy roads. The decision was made to wait out the storm, then move toward their objective. Wayne was to be joined by militia, and together they would strike the enemy baggage train as the British advanced on Washington's main army. However his force was surprised at the Battle of Paoli, and the British were free to occupy Philadelphia.

The Battle of Paoli

The British remained in Goshen until the weather cleared, and on September 18th marched to Tredyffrin with the intention of eventually crossing the Schuylkill River. Lord Cornwallis's Division, about 6000 men, marched on the Lancaster Road past the Paoli Tavern and took up positions on the heights of Tredyffrin about two miles east of Paoli, while the rest of the British force, about 8000 strong, marched on Swedesford Road. Later that same day, Washington detached General Anthony Wayne's Division of 9 regiments numbering about 2200 men, with four cannons and three troops of dragoons, with orders to get behind the British and, if possible, cut off their baggage train as they crossed the river.

Wayne arrived at the Paoli Tavern, only two miles behind the British, early in the morning of September 19, and wrote to Washington: "Paoli ½ past 7 A.M...On the Enemies Beating the Revillee I ordered the Troops under Arms and began our March for their left flank — But when we Arrived within half a Mile of their Encampment found they had not Stired, but lay too Compact to admit of an Attack with Prudence...if they Attempt to move I shall attack them...There never was, nor never will be a finer opportunity of giving the Enemy a fatal Blow than the Present — , for Gods sake push on as fast as possible."

At 10:45, Wayne wrote a second letter to Washington from the Paoli: "The Enemy are very quiet, washing & Cooking — they will Probably Attempt to move towards Evening...I believe he knows nothing of my Situation — as I have taken every precaution to Prevent any intelligence getting to him...I have not heard from you since last night." Unbeknownst to Wayne, the courier carrying messages from Washington to him was either captured or deserted, and the British were already aware of his presence behind them.

Shortly after Wayne sent this message, the drums in the British camp beat "to arms". A British force was being sent quickly over to Valley Forge to help secure the area. Hearing the alarm, Wayne decided to pull his force back from the Paoli Tavern and took up a position about a mile and a half to the west, on top of the South Valley Hill above the Warren Tavern in some fields surrounded on three sides by woods. Here he established camp for the night of September 19, and awaited reinforcements.

The land on which Wayne's troops camped has been farmland and woodland since the mid-18th century. Ezekiel Bowen, a farmer of Welsh descent, purchased this land in 1764. County records note that he sold it to Richard Mason of Philadelphia in March, 1777, but repurchased it in April, 1778, and lived here until his death in 1804. His whereabouts at the time of the battle are unknown, but chances are he was still living here. His log home [since demolished] stood to the right rear of the camp. Ezekiel took the Oath of Allegiance to the United States in 1778 and is listed as a member of the Willistown Militia in 1780. Later legend erroneously stated that the land was owned by "a Tory named Griffith," but the Griffith family did not own the land until 1805, after Bowen's death.

Colonel Thomas Hartley, commander of the 1st Pennsylvania Brigade, gave this description of the camp site on Bowen's land: "In Part of the Front was a small wood and a Corn Field — on the Right a small wood and some open Fields — there were Roads passing the Flanks..." The term corn field was then used in a broader sense to mean "grain field" rather than maize or "Indian corn." This area of Chester County was populated largely by Welsh settlers in the early 18th century, and their farms grew a variety of crops: wheat, buckwheat, rye, oats, flax, and maize. Abundant livestock required pastures and fencing, commonly four or five-rail 'post-and-rail' fences, or zigzag 'snake' fences.

While on campaign, the armies tried to keep their baggage to a minimum, and tents required wagons. The British left most of their tents on their ships, so they built shelters called "wigwams" out of brush, leaves, cornstalks, sod, straw, and fence rails. When Wayne was ordered to move behind Howe's army, his tents were left with the main army.

American sources refer to the "wigwams" as "booths." Colonel Daniel Brodhead wrote that at 4 PM on September 20, a few hours before the attack, "We then Received Orders to prepare for a March. Accordingly the Division formed but the weather being Cloudy and threatening Rain we were Ordered to build Booths to secure our Arms & Ammunition & go to Rest." Washington had repeatedly ordered his troops not to destroy farmers' fences, so Wayne's men removed fence rails only where necessary to allow movement in and out of camp. The fences were to play a crucial role in the Battle of Paoli.

Wayne's force was his "division," which was actually General Benjamin Lincoln's Division. Wayne, a brigadier general, was acting as a major general in place of General Lincoln, who was on other service. The division was made up of the 1st and 2nd Pennsylvania Brigades There were approximately 2200 personnel in Wayne's force: 9 infantry regiments, 1 artillery battalion with four light guns, and 3 troops of dragoons, and an estimated 20-25 wagons.

The 1st Pennsylvania Brigade was commanded by Colonel Thomas Hartley of York, Pennsylvania. It was composed of the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 10th Pennsylvania Regiments, and Hartley's Additional Continental Regiment. The 2nd Pennsylvania Brigade was led by Colonel Richard Humpton, a native of Yorkshire, England, and a British army veteran. He commanded the 4th, 5th, 8th, and 11th Pennsylvania Regiments. All of these troops were regular Continental troops.

On the night of 20th September 1777 General Howe dispatched Major General Grey to deal with Wayne’s division. Grey left with his force at 10pm and marched down the Moores Hall Road to the Admiral Warren cross-roads. As the leading British light infantry approached the junction shots were fired by an American picquet. It is said that these shots alerted the Pennsylvanian camp which lay behind woods to the South of the junction.

The British forced the blacksmith whose smithy lay by the Admiral Warren to act as guide. The first wave of British troops, comprising the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry, a unit formed from the light companies of 13 battalions, rushed through the woods and attacked the American camp. The Light Infantry were followed by the 44th Foot and, in a third wave, by the 42nd Highlanders. A small group of 16th Light Dragoons accompanied the Light Infantry.

At General Grey’s direction the flints had been removed from his men’s muskets to ensure that no shots gave prior warning to the Americans. The attack was to be at the point of the bayonet. The general thereby acquired the nickname of “No flints” Grey. In the face of the British charge the Pennsylvania troops were dispersed and driven out of the camp to the West, many through a gap in a fence along the edge of the encampment. Groups of British soldiers mixed with the Americans and confused fighting continued as far as the White Horse Tavern.

General Smallwood’s force approached from the West as the attack was coming to an end and came under attack as it passed the White Horse Tavern. The inexperienced and badly organised Maryland Militia dissolved in confusion. Paoli was a severe humiliation for the Pennsylvania Continental troops but probably little more. The fight is referred to as the Paoli Massacre.

The accusation was made against Wayne that he allowed his camp to be surprised. At Wayne’s demand he was subject to a court martial which exonerated him of this allegation. Whether Wayne was taken unawares or not the attack was well executed and highly successful, enabling General Howe to take Philadelphia within a few days with little further resistance from the main American army under George Washington.

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