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Embedded Journalists

The relationship between the United States military and the media has been a complex one for years. Like any relationship, it can be characterized by ebbs and flows, good times and bad, from the perspective of both institutions. The military-media relationship's complexity has been the result of a clash of cultures. The glaring philosophical differences between the two institutions make them unlikely bedfellows. The military is a fundamentally closed society; arguably more conservative than most American institutions. It is accountable to civilian leadership within the United States government, and its mission focus is on the protection of American interests. The media by comparison is considerably more liberal. It is, with few exceptions, privately owned and accountable to stockholders with a mission of reporting newsworthy events that will either sell newspapers, magazines, or airtime for a monetary profit. The goal of the American media is to write or present an intriguing story. That "attention-getter" translates to money.

Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti) was the first operation to plan for merging the media into units before operations began. The NMP was briefed on the plans for the invasion and reporters were given access to combat units prior to the operation. Although accords prevented the need for the invasion, the planning process validated the need for media involvement before operations began.

In late December 1995, the Army decided to embed about two dozen reporters in the units deploying into Bosnia for Operation Joint Forge. Reporters become integral parts of their assigned units; the goal was full access to the operation for journalists and positive stories for the Army. In addition, this teaming would generate greater support from the American people and boost morale for soldiers. Despite some controversial stories publicized as a result of the close relationship of the journalist with the unit, the practice was deemed a success and continued throughout the deployment of units for stabilization force operations in Operation Joint Endeavor. In contrast, the Kosovo air campaign was marked by a gag order issued by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark. After the air campaign, journalists were allowed limited access into military units, but it was too late to change the perception of a lack of cooperation between the military and the media. This action set back the successes experienced during operations in Bosnia.

In comparison to the Gulf War of 1991, in which the Pentagon controlled the news as tightly as possible, the war in Iraq was a wide-open affair for reporters. Embedded journalists lived, ate, and traveled with the troops. They also came under enemy fire with the troops. In fact, as a group, the roughly 2,700 journalists in Iraq were more likely to be killed in combat than the quarter million American and British soldiers. Traveling with troops was generally safer and afforded better access.

A review of the changes in the relationship of the military to the media throughout history shows that the most effective means of influencing national will is to establish a close relationship between reporters and soldiers. The most effective way to do this is to embed reporters in front line units.

Media embedding - the process of putting reporters with military units during actual operations - is not a new concept or event. However OIF was the first time that the process had been used to such a large scale to cover military operations. The embedded media program is a meaningful and effective way to decipher and exploit information under favorable conditions. Open access for the media tells the real story and helps reinforce a positive attitude.

Prior to operations in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of State issued a directive that stated: We must organize for and facilitate access of national and international media to our forces, including those engaged in ground operations. Our goal is to get it right from the start, not days or weeks into the operation. We will commit communications systems and trained joint public affairs teams to facilitate the international press getting a firsthand look at coalition operations.

At the height of OIF, more than 500 news media representatives and crews (journalists and photographers) were embedded with United States and British military units. The news media representatives were selected from the top 100 media markets in the country. Prior to joining their designated units in Iraq, news media representatives underwent an intensive weeklong military media boot camp where they learned basic military procedures such as how to react to a chemical attack. They also participated in physical activities like a five mile road march. The media training camps were held at various locations throughout the United States.

Reports from both inside the Pentagon and from news media representatives indicated that media embedding went well because the media had access to military operations at an unprecedented level, and most reporters were pleased with the level of cooperation they received from commanders. A perspective shared by the media was that journalists had unusual access to military operations, especially at the tactical level and that by being with units and observing events first hand, they could challenge or confirm military briefings. This knowledge or understanding of military operations would not have been available unless media had the access afforded during embedding.

There were also criticisms of the embedded program. A troubling consequence of the media embedding program was that it created two different sets of reporters. There was the DoD embedded reporters who were credentialed and considered "official" journalists and were afforded access to information, soldiers and military events and then there were the unilateral reporters who did not have the blessing of DoD and who were not embedded with units. He said that these reporters were treated differently by the military and many were prevented from covering military operations in many of the southern cities like Basra, Umm Qasr and Nasiriyah.

Keith Garvin, an ABC reporter who was embedded with CSSB 22 (Combat Service Support Battalion) part of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (Task Force Tarawa) had no problems with the embedded media program. He said they were able to get the information they needed during military operations in southern Iraq. He said the restrictions imposed by DoD were not a problem for him or his cameraman. He and his cameraman in fact imposed their own set of restrictions on how they would operate. Their self-imposed restrictions included not showing wounded soldiers up close or footage of dead soldiers.

Through the embed process DoD exposed key audiences to military operations during OIF through the more than 500 news media representatives embedded with military units. Reporters broadcasted and reported in real time from locations throughout the AOR. The media embeds were also able to report on and in fact, counter misinformation from the Iraqi regime which was a part of the overall DoD strategy. A case that illustrates this is when the director of Iraqi information was reporting that there were no American forces in Baghdad and the American public was able to witness otherwise through embedded reporters. Because of the embed program and the 24 hour news cycle, America was able to watch as the military forces advanced throughout the area or operations and saw historic events unfold like the toppling of the large statute of Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. military also had several media issues that drew world wide attention and caused many people and especially the media community to doubt whether the United States was telling the truth about the issues. One issue was the operational pause at the beginning of operations in Iraq and the second issue was the Jessica Lynch rescue. The military had a hard time communicating what actually took place in both instances.

With the operational pause issue, there were mixed messages from DoD and commanders on the ground. The military had a difficult time explaining the concept of an "operational pause." Reporting from the embedded media showed long lines of military units stopped and at a stand still. DoD was not able to quickly explain what was occurring operationally. Because no information was coming quickly to the American public, the indications were that the United States was encountering strong Iraqi resistance.

The Jessica Lynch rescue operation drew fire because news media representatives thought this was an opportunity for DoD to plant a good news story and take attention away from how operations were really occurring. A major criticism from the news media was that there were no news media representatives on the rescue mission. DoD provided file footage of the rescue that was carried out by Special Operations Forces. Media reports criticized the military for what it called "staging" a military rescue operation to gain American support. Incidents like these hurt the military's credibility in regard to media relations and a lot of energy goes into repairing relationships and damage control. Both events demonstrated that because DoD was not quick to engage the media in a timely manner, the media filled in the "blanks" of the stories with information from other sources. DoD missed an opportunity to correct misinformation.

Media relations play a vital role in our national security strategy formulation and execution. Effective media relations can help further the aims and achievements of military, political, economic and informational objectives thereby achieving or promoting the national security strategy. It is also one of the key ways the United States can influence support and shape attitudes especially among coalition members and other international players and partners. It is just as important for building support in the United States. A governing factor in whether the United States goes to war or enters into any conflict is 'does it have the support of the American people?" Communicating our message to the American public is part of the process of building that support. The recent embedding process during OIF and its success by all accounts, both inside and outside the military, indicates that media will play a major role in future operations and national strategy. The United States can not rest entirely on the success of the embed program and must continue to engage media, especially the international media, at every opportunity if we are going to maintain or hope to maintain information dominance and superiority. Direct media engagements and press briefings must continue as they augment and clarify operations and information from other sources.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducted a public affairs campaign during Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the goal of keeping the American public and the international community informed about the U.S. strategy and conduct of operations during OIF. The program included a variety of strategies and means that attempted to clearly communicate the U.S. resolve for operations in Iraq. Effective communication strategies and the means to execute those strategies when communicating to the American public and the world will ensure that the United States continues to promote its national security strategy around the world as it continues its role as world leader in the global war on terrorism.

Perspectives on Embedded Media. DOD Public Affairs Strategies and Means During OIF: Were They Effective? Selected Papers from the U.S. Army War College.

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