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Combat Planes

Twenty-First Century Warplanes

In the fifty-seven years since powered flight began in America, many different airplane designs have been built. From the viewpoint of their effect on world history, those intended for air combat have been the most important.

Each of these planes has its own story. The original experimental model is rolled, fresh and untried, out of the factory. Shining and new, it is the talk of the aviation world which eagerly awaits the newcomer's performance.

But on many designs, that's all you ever hear. Somewhere, something has gone wrong, and the hopeful prototype drops from sight. Sometimes a new job receives no publicity, and disappears without comment. Luckier types go into production, and then a long series of modifications fill the trade journals.

Each such design represents a response to a challenge, an invention mothered by some necessity, an actor hoping to fill a role written by forces far removed from the engineer's drawing board and often imperfectly understood by the artists of the slide rule and T square.

The value of a design depends on its mission and how well the plane fulfills it. Defective concepts of military mission have crippled as many aircraft as errors in engineering. The limited role expected of the first military plane purchased by the American, or indeed by any government, was indicated by its assignment to the Signal Corps. In December 1907, a specification was issued for a two-place aircraft with a speed of 40 mph, a range of 125 miles, "and the ability to steer in all directions without difficulty." A contract was signed on February 10, 1908, with the Wright brothers, who began testing the 25 hp aircraft that September. The first fatal airplane crash of history delayed acceptance of the aircraft until August 2, 1909.

The World's First Airplane Fatality "The aeroplane seemed to tip sharply for a fraction of a second, then it started up for about ten feet; this was followed by a short, sharp dive and a crash in the field," reported the New York Times about the crash of Orville Wright and Lt. Thomas Selfridge in Fort Myer, Virginia, on September 17, 1908. "Instantly the dust arose in a yellow, choking cloud that spread a dull pall over the great white man-made bird that had dashed to its death." A cavalry officer ordered his men to control the crowd of some 2,000, including top Army officials, who surged toward the wreckage. Rescuers pulled out the bloodied, unconscious forms of the 38-year-old Wright brother and Selfridge, a 26-year-old member of the Army Signal Corps, aeroplanist, and secretary of the Aerial Experiment Association. Three hours later, Selfridge died, giving him the dubious distinction of being the first fatality from a powered aircraft. Wright regained consciousness and survived a broken leg, along with fractured ribs and hip bones, which left him in pain for the rest of his life. Despite the crash, which resulted when a propeller split and flew into other parts of the plane, the Army remained interested in the Wright plane, and the War Department bought the invention.

Like all of the following 229 "flying machines" delivered to the U. S. Army prior to the April 6, 1917, declaration of war, the Wright brothers model B had no bloodthirsty intentions. Its capacity was only to train aviators for the work of communications and scouting done by its frail and kite-like successors. Nor were the aircraft purchased by the Navy any more militant.

Grimmer uses for aircraft had been anticipated, and H. G. Wells as early as 1908 had portrayed aerial attacks on New York in his novel The War in the Air. Weapons were experimentally fired from Army aircraft: a rifle on August 20, 1910, live bombs dropped in January 1911, and a Lewis machine gun fired on June 7, 1912.

Nevertheless, when the U.S. declared war on Germany, the Army possessed but 55 aircraft, all unarmed and primitive trainers. But if youthful American aviation had no weapons, and no deadly purposes, less than three years of warfare in Europe had already defined the basic roles of today's combat planes.

When the war opened on July 28, 1914, Europe's airplanes were as naked of weapons as America's, but existed in much larger numbers. The initial mission of these aircraft was reconnaissance, and however violent the ground fighting, the soldiers of the skies found their flights across the lines relatively peaceful. For such purposes unarmed single-engined, two-place air craft were adequate.

But the temptation to use the advantage of flight for purposes of attack was too strong. On August 14, 1914, a pair of French biplanes dropped artillery shells on hangars at Metz, and on November 21, three British Avros bombed Zeppelin sheds. A German plane dropped the first bomb on English soil on December 19, 1914. Zeppelins began raids in January 1915, and warfare had truly entered a new dimension.

Single-engined, two seat observation biplanes were fitted with bomb racks under the wings and became light bombers. Smaller single-seaters with a machine gun became avions de chasse, or pursuit ships, for attacking enemy aircraft, while larger multiengined machines were built for long-range bombing. Naval aviation developed its own specialties; flying boats to patrol the sea and torpedo carrying seaplanes to attack enemy shipping were joined by fighters carried by the fleet on vessels with flight decks.

The airplane as a scout had developed into the airplane as a bomber and as a destroyer of other aircraft, but this development was European, not American, and happened without any comparable activity on this side of the Atlantic. Although the United States had produced the world's first successful powered plane, and purchased the first military plane, it had not participated in the wartime development of the air weapon. Not even a prototype of up-to-date pattern was available when we entered the war.

In June 1917 an Aircraft Production Board was established, and the Bolling Mission sailed for Europe to gain information for an American aircraft program. Samples of several Allied warplanes were selected and shipped to the U.S. for reproduction here, while orders were placed in France and Britain for planes to be given to our airmen as they arrived.

United States production of training planes aided the dispatch of fliers to France, but of the combat types selected, only the DH-4 was produced in quantity. The American squadrons at the front depended principally on French equipment. The 36 squadrons at the front on November 1, 1918; included 15 with the Spad and one with the SE-5A single-seater, and 10 with the Salmson, eight with the U.S.-built DH-4, and two with the Breguet two-seaters. None had twin-engined equipment. During the war, the Army received a total of 16,831 planes; 6287 were delivered to the A.E.F. before the Armistice, including 2696 trainers and 3591 service types. On Armistice Day the A.E.F. had 740 planes at the front.

The Navy's air arm at the opening of the war included 45 training seaplanes, six flying boats, and three landplanes, none of them armed or designed for combat. Experience had been obtained in operating aircraft at sea, and Britain supplied information on her use of planes over the North Sea.

U-boats were the war's chief naval threat, so when a British flying boat sank one for the first time on May 20, 1917, the immediate role for naval aircraft was written. Orders were placed for hundreds of flying boats for shore-based antisub patrol.

Because of the difficulty encountered getting enough planes, the government built its own Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia. States a Navy text: The Army's requirements for an enormous quantity of planes created a decided lack of interest among aircraft manufacturers in the Navy's requirements for a comparatively small quantity of machines. The Navy Department therefore concluded that it was necessary to build and put into production an aircraft factory to be owned by the Navy, in order, first, to assure a part, at least, of its aircraft supply; second, to obtain cost data for the Department's guidance in its dealings with private manufacturers; and third, to have under its own control a factory capable of producing experimental work.

While the flying boats proved of great value in spotting submarines, it was seen that a more direct attack could be made by bombing the sub bases. For this purpose, the Northern Bombing Croup was organized, with DH-4, DH-9, and Caproni landplanes obtained from the Army and the Allies.

Unlike the A.E.F., the Navy obtained most of its planes at home. Only 142 of the Navy's 2705 machines were procured abroad. U.S.-built were 1444 service types, 1084 training planes, and 36 experimentals, as well as 155 DH-4s and 144 trainers transferred from the Army.

The Armistice left the United States with a stockpile of aircraft, some limited experience in air warfare, and the rudiments of a theory of air power. The major item in the Army's stock of airplanes was the thousands of DH-4s designed for day bombing. and observation, together with several hundred pursuits of foreign origin, and a few night bombers. Just what should be done to replace this rapidly aging armada? Viewpoints on this depended in part on viewpoints on the role of air power.

The existing organization of the Army Air Service reflected the conservative view that aviation existed primarily to assist the ground army, and that bombing and pursuit aircraft in themselves were unlikely to affect the course of war. (An example of this thinking is the lengthy World War I history that mentions only scouting as a wartime aviation activity.) The view once expressed that "the duty of the aviator is to see, not to fight" seemed to be reflected in the dispersal of air force strength into observation squadrons attached to various ground units.

Subordination of the Air Service to the Army had a bad effect on both morale and equipment. Of 517 Air Service crash deaths from January 1919 to June 1925, all but 12 were in aging aircraft built before the end of the war. The lack of improved and safer replacements was criticized, and a long debate on the control of air power ensued. Since this argument centered around the use of the bomber, it is discussed in that weapon's chapters.

The organizational impasse of the period was reflected in the relatively slow technical advance. Most of the aviation headlines were made by the skill of individual aviators, rather than by a startling advance in performance. Compare the service aircraft of 1930, a dozen years after the Armistice, with those of the war period. Still we see the same open cockpit, fabric covered biplanes dragging struts and exposed undercarriages. Advances in top speed were modest. Fighters had gone from the 135 mph of the Spad to 166 mph for the P-12B, bombers from 94 mph for the Handley-Page to 114 mph for the B-3A, two-seaters from 124 mph for the DH-4 to 139 mph for the A-3B.

Naval aviation in the 1920s made progress by beginning the organization of a carrier-based striking force. In 1918, most operational Navy service planes were shore-based flying boats, plus some Marine DH-4s. A small postwar force, including fighting, observation, and torpedo planes, was established to operate on wheels or floats from shore bases. The next step was obviously to perfect means by which these aircraft could accompany the fleet to sea, and the Bureau of Aeronautics, established in 1921, devoted itself to that problem.

Early shipboard operations were by seaplanes catapulted from battleships and cruisers, and lifted back by cranes after landing on the sea. There were disadvantages to this method: only a few seaplanes could be carried without impairing the ship's fighting ability, it was difficult to recover the launched aircraft, and most important, the seaplanes were inferior in performance to land planes.

As early as July 1917, the British Royal Navy had commissioned HMS Furious, which answered the problem by adding to the fleet a specialized aircraft carrier which could launch and recover landplanes from a large flight deck. In 1922, the U.S. completed the conversion of the carrier Langley from a collier, and on October 17, a Vought VE-7-SF made the first take-off from a Navy carrier. Conventional landplanes were thus able to begin operations with the fleet, modified by strengthened landing gear and arresting hooks.

Spurred by the sinking of battleships in the 1921-23 bombing tests, the Navy had the battle-cruisers Lexington and Saratoga finished as carriers. In March 1925, the Navy called upon designers for new aircraft to fit the fine new ships, and the industry responded with the Curtiss F6C fighter, the Vought O2U scout, and the Martin T3M torpedo plane.

In 1928 the two carriers began operations, each with two squadrons of fighters, two of torpedo bombers, and one of observation planes. Their operational success soon relegated seaplanes from the status of combat planes to that of gun spotters for individual warships.

The relatively slow-paced aviation progress of the '20s contrasts sharply with the changes that took place in the air forces during the '30s. The depression knocked the bottom from the private plane market, although U.S. expenditures on military aircraft rose from $25,000,000 in fiscal 1925 to $69,000,000 in fiscal 1931. This circumstance, together with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the beginnings of German rearmament, and an administration friendlier to new ideas, gave a new impetus to the design of combat aircraft.

A complete change in the appearance of the combat plane took place in this period. Beginning in 1931 with the XA-7, XA-8, XB-7, XB-8, XB-9, and YP-24, and in 1932 with the XB-10, we see the sudden replacement of the biplane with the all-metal monoplane. Retractable landing gear, enclosed cockpits, and controllable-pitch propellers became standard on combat planes.

And in 1935, the year that Mussolini attacked Ethiopia, Hitler officially announced the formation of his air force, and Congress passed a vast legislative program of social reforms, was also a big year in combat aviation. The Baker Board (aviation had become the most investigated service) had had a majority of ground officers, but had recommended an Air Corps of 2320 planes and a General Headquarters Air Force for operations free of dependence on particular ground armies. Officially begun in March 1935, the GHQ Air Force could be concentrated for a blow in any direction.

The new air force was also presented with some brand-new planes. Their newness enhanced by the elimination of traditional blue-yellow paint for the bare metal, the prototypes of the Curtiss pursuits and the Boeing B-17 bomber were a complete departure from the traditional pattern of aircraft design. Naval aviation also began an expansion around three new carriers, and new monoplanes replaced the traditional carrier-based biplanes.

By the time the first bombs of the Second World War crashed on Spain and China, the combat plane had lost its World War One aspect. As airplanes became more numerous, they also became more elaborate and expensive, and the aircraft industry got to be really big business. When, in 1939, Orville Wright inspected the Douglas DC-4, the old man of aviation commented not on its size, or speed, but on its cost. "I can't believe that there is so much money wrapped up in a plane of this size - more than $2,000,000."

The B-17 was the most successful of all the prototypes which appeared in the '30s, and together with developments of its contemporaries, provided the basic air weapons to fight the Second World War. Both two and four-engined bomber designs were available, and tactical support to ground forces would be offered through Attack units (later renamed Light Bombardment). Leadership in Pursuit ships (renamed now Fighters) was not as marked as in the case of the big bombers, for it took a long time for America's aeronautical engineers to catch up to the Spitfire's speed and firepower.

The Army and Navy had some 2400 and 1700 planes respectively when the 1939 expansion program proposed an Army Air Corps of 5500 planes in 24 groups, and a Naval Air Service with 3000. This expansion had hardly gotten under way when German successes in Europe led President Roosevelt in May 1940 to call for 50,000 service planes. The figure seemed preposterous, but was authorized - 13,500 for the Navy, and 36,500 for the Army in 54 groups.

In 1941, still another plan called for 84 groups by mid-1942, seemed hardly realistic in view of lend-lease commitments. Although by December 7, 1941, 70 groups had been organized in the now virtually autonomous "Army Air Forces" (the name replacing Air Corps in 1941), the 25 fighter, 14 heavy bomber, 9 medium bomber, 5 light bomber, 11 observation, and 6 transport groups had only 3305 combat planes plus 7024 other types. Navy aviation had expanded in 1941 from 2553 planes in January to 5260 in December.

Foreign countries bought U.S. combat types in large quantities even before the war began in 1939. On March 25, 1940, permission was granted for the sale of Army and Navy service types as soon as a newer type was available, while a year later lend-lease took over the cost of thousands of planes built for our Allies.

By 1945, the U.S. had the largest air force ever built in history, with 245 groups and 72,726 aircraft (41,961 combat) in the Army Air Force on January l, and 41,180 naval aircraft (28,032 combat) on June 30. Great air armadas were assembled for the major battles of the war. For Overlord, the cross-Channel invasion of Europe, the AAF alone assembled 10,637 planes (8351 combat) in 98 groups: 40 heavy bomber, 8 medium bomber, 3 light bomber, 33 fighter, and 14 troop carrier. The Navy assaulted Okinawa with the support of 919 planes on fast carriers and 564 planes on escort carriers. Navy combat planes on hand in mid-1945 included 13,940 fighters, 5101 scout bombers, 4937 torpedo bombers, and 4054 patrol bombers, operating from 28 large carriers, 72 escort carriers, and numerous land bases. What these planes did in the war has been described in detail in official histories. Air power, both carrier and land-based, was the largest single factor in Japan's defeat. More controversial is the role of air power against Germany, although it is significant that no Allied victories were won until after Germany's early control of the air was smashed.

In any case, the role of aviation in war was vindicated beyond the boldest claims of its advocates. The Congress passed an act creating a National Military Establishment with Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air co-equal under the Secretary of Defense. Established in September 1947, the United States Air Force has three basic combat missions: air defense, strategic air bombardment, and tactical air support for ground forces.

In the postwar international situation, Soviet-American conflicts gave the Air Force an opportunity to assert itself as the leading military element. Since the U. S. Navy was already larger than all other navies of the world put together, while Soviet ground strength could not soon be matched, national policy made strategic atomic bombing the central element and prime priority of the armed forces. To this end, the Finletter Commission had endorsed, in January 1948, an Air Force of 70 groups: 20 strategic bomber, 5 light bomber, 22 day fighter, 3 all-weather fighter, 4 tactical and 6 strategic reconnaissance, and 10 troop carrier.

Resistance arose to the program as the Navy demanded renewed recognition for carrier and antisub aviation, the Army charged neglect of tactical air, and development of Soviet atomic weapons raised concern over continental defense. Skyrocketing cost of air weapons limited procurement, and thus the Air Force on January 1, 1950, had 48 groups with some 17,000 aircraft (8000 combat), about half of which were Second World War types held in storage. Naval Air had 4900 planes attached to the fleet, plus 1900 in the Reserve and 550 in storage.

Outbreak of war in Korea led to the new rearmament program, from which by 1956 the Air Force had 134 wings with 26,000 planes, while the Navy had 12,548 planes in 17 carrier groups, three Marine air wings, and 19 shore-based antisub squadrons. Debate over the relative value of carriers and strategic bombers continued, but aircraft production reached new heights.

Since 1957 the actual number of combat aircraft in the Air Force and Navy has steadily declined. Aircraft have become more expensive, and a stockpile of thermonuclear weapons, even for fighters, seemed to make such large numbers unnecessary. Ballistic missiles were superseding bombers. Yet non-nuclear, "limited" warfare, might require more aircraft than the all-out "final" conflict feared.

By this time, the role of the combat plane in American history is clear. Even if it is still questionable whether air power alone will decide a future war, a nation's position in the twentieth century will depend more on the quality of its weapons than on any other single material military factor. When history poses problems for weapons, solutions must be found from the background of existing technology.

Ray Wagner. . Doubleday and Company, Garden City, New York. 1968.

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