Home : Armed Forces : Private Warriors :

US And UK Companies Dominate The Market

All but one of the world's major armed conflicts in 1996 - the longstanding dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir - were intra-state wars. Conflicts of this type are characterised by multiple agendas, blurred boundaries between civilians and combatants, unclear lines of military authority and often appalling brutality. The fact that such hostilities are almost without exception confined within the frontiers of an existing state is a persistent obstacle to resolving civil wars. Since belligerents are not separable by borders, 'one side has to get it all, or nearly so, since there cannot be two governments ruling over one country'.

Hostilities frequently involve fighters variously termed terrorists, bandits or guerrillas, whose loyalty often stems from a leader's charisma or from the promise of profit, rather than from political ideology. Warring parties frequently choose to ignore ceasefires, fail to observe basic human rights and exploit negotiations to reposition forces prior to resuming hostilities. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, one party or set of powerful individuals blocked peacesettlement efforts because, at least in part, continued hostilities were financially profitable. The armed teenagers, criminals and guerrillas that frequently comprise insurgent forces prosper from instability. Operating beyond the state-security apparatus, civilians are easy prey; illicitly traded minerals – as found in, for example, the Bong and Nimba counties in Liberia - offer access to enormous wealth. Rather than anarchic forces, the economic motivation of these groups, as David Keen has noted, is both explainable and rational." But explaining the causes of violence does not in itself prevent it from taking place, and these forces remain 'chaotic spoilers' in attempts to achieve long-term peace.

Given the complexity and frequent brutality of civil wars, and the post-Cold War decline of major-power strategic interests in, for example, Angola and Mozambique, Western armies have become reluctant to intervene. Shaped by Cold War priorities and designed to wage sophisticated, international wars, they are ill-equipped to deal with low-intensity civil conflict, in which 'the guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win' .14 War historian Martin van Creveld notes that: as low-intensity conflict rises to the dominance, much of what has passed for strategy during the last two centuries will be proven useless. The shift from conventional war to low-intensity conflict will cause many of today's weapon systems, including specifically those that are most powerful and most advanced, to be assigned to the scrap-heap.

The ill-fated US intervention in Somalia that ended in 1994 is a case in point. US forces and doctrine came to the country fresh from the 1991 Gulf War, in which the application of technology overwhelmingly defeated Iraq and kept US casualties to a minimum. In Somalia, with front lines absent and the distinction between civilians and combatants unclear, US forces were compelled to fight a war on terms more favourable to the Somalis. The scale of casualties among US forces - albeit at 30 killed significantly lower than those suffered by their opponents - evoked uncomfortable memories of Vietnam, another war fought largely without definable fronts. The Somalia experience prompted a return to principles put forward by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984, which stated that the US should not enter a war unless doing so served its national interests, and the conflict could be won. Presidential Decision Directive 25 of 1994 concluded that US support for peacekeeping operations should be contingent on a conflict's threat to international peace and security, or on 'a determination that the peace operation serves US interests'.

Enforcement action - military intervention without the consent of the parties to a conflict - now appears unlikely. Fears of casualties mean that future conflict-resolution efforts are more likely to be limited to occasions where firm consent has been secured from the warring parties.

However, consent-driven approaches are often ineffective when belligerents have no genuine interest in ending hostilities. There is empirical evidence to suggest that the majority of intra-state conflicts have been resolved by force, rather than by negotiation.

Although categorising conflicts as civil is difficult. Adherence to what is essentially a consent-based process, despite its inability to deliver a substantive outcome, may result in protracted violence.

Given the particular challenges of low-level internal conflict, it is perhaps understandable that some Western states have appeared to tolerate the activities of private military and security companies. Where these companies support the foreign-policy and commercial interests of their national governments, they are not only condoned but welcomed. US and British companies dominate the market and, although their activities appear to be those of an independent commercial enterprise, few act outside the national interests of their home states.

US companies have close links with the Department of Defense; many are suppliers to the military-industrial market. BDM International, for example, secured $1.5bn in US defence contracts in 1996. Part of its work involved supporting and evaluating ballistic-missile defence and other military programmes for the Department of Defense. Around 45% ($967m) of high-technology company Strategic Applications International's revenue in 1996 came from national-security contracts - including for the Defense Atomic Support Agency and the Department of Defense.

The primary focus of these companies is to exploit domestic defence-market opportunities, although international contracts have stemmed from existing business relationships. Because of their close affiliation with the defence sector, some companies have become involved in US foreign policy. As part of a wider strategy to protect US oil interests, US companies have been contracted to the Saudi Arabian government to strengthen Saudi forces and to ensure that the Kingdom's military profile and weaponry are compatible with those of the US. BDM has contracts to train Saudi Air Force personnel and to train and modernise Saudi land forces. BDM subsidiary Vinnell, acquired in 1992, has a $163.3m contract to modernise the Kingdom's National Guard, a force instrumental in maintaining internal security and protecting the Royal Family. Most of Vinnell's 1,000-plus employees in Saudi Arabia are former US Army and special-forces personnel. Strategic Applications International has helped to train the Saudi Navy, and consulting company Booz-Allen and Hamilton has been involved in developing the Saudi Marine Corps.

These companies are seen as a cost-effective yet secure way of providing appropriate training to enhance Saudi military capabilities in the interests of US policy. In addition, their involvement helps to deflect criticism of the US administration's support for a regime that has been accused of being undemocratic and failing to observe basic human rights.

The links between military companies and the US defence establishment have seen former senior US administration officials and military personnel become company directors, facilitating access to government decision-makers and lobbying for contracts. BDM is controlled by the Carlyle Group, an investment firm headed by former US administration officials James Baker (Secretary of State), Richard Darman (White House budget chief) and Frank Carlucci (Secretary of Defense). Two former Secretaries of Defense, William Perry and Melvin Laird, are board members at Strategic Applications International, as are two ex-Central Intelligence Agency Directors, John Deutch and Robert Gates.

Many companies have long associations with the defence establishment. Both Vinnell and Pacific Architects and Engineers were contracted to assist US forces in the Vietnam War. On the basis of its tradition of logistic and maintenance services, Pacific Architects and Engineers was awarded a contract in Liberia in 1996 to maintain and operate helicopters and vehicles given by the US administration to the West African Cease-Fire Monitoring Group peacekeeping force. The Pacific Architects and Engineers operation uses former US military personnel and former Soviet-bloc pilots.

British companies, although considerably smaller than their US counterparts, have benefited from former colonial contacts and lengthy experience of low-intensity conflict, and are prevalent in areas of instability in Africa and the smaller Middle Eastern states. British companies are more independent of their government than those in the US, are less diversified into other business areas and have fewer commercial links with the UK's defence establishment. Nevertheless, a close relationship exists: most security-company personnel are former military or government employees and informal contacts are maintained. Company activities are unlikely to diverge from British government interests.

Most security companies were established by former members of the Special Air Service, Britain's elite special-forces unit. In the 1980s, the now-defunct Keenie Meenie Services and Saladin Security shared offices in London close to the headquarters of the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment. A former Special Air Service officer now employed by a private company noted in mid-1997 that he worked much as he had before, but 'on the other side of the private-public fence'.

Most British firms acknowledge the difficulties that would ensue were their activities to conflict with government interests, and are therefore anxious not to jeopardise the relationship.

Governments can promote security firms with which they have links. An experienced British security consultant noted in July 1997: 'the Foreign Office has a list of companies that are competent in carrying out training to whatever standard, whether it be counterterrorist work or just general military training'. If a request for British military training is viewed as politically sensitive, the Foreign Office 'will say "these companies can handle it"'. In 1983, Keenie Meenie Services, which gained most of its experience in Africa and the Middle East, trained the Sri Lankan Army in counter-insurgency techniques to suppress the insurrection by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Approached for support by the Sri Lankan government, Keenie Meenie Services secured the contract with British government approval.

UK involvement in Oman is probably the best example of the way in which government and commercial interests have become entwined. Saladin Security has trained Omani government forces since the 1971-76 Dhofar rebellion, a conflict in which British forces, including Special Air Service units, fought. The UK continues to second serving British officers to Oman's military forces, and personnel are commonly contracted by the Omani government on their retirement from active service. This case demonstrates the benefits to the British government of a UK firm securing a military contract: it provides leverage over the contracting government if necessary; offers access to intelligence; and raises the possibility of materiel sales on the strength of the advice given by the company concerned.

There is therefore little incentive for either the UK or the US government to curb the activities of military companies. In many cases, these companies are either carrying out foreign policy directly, or at the least working within acceptable boundaries. Given this apparent pragmatic acceptance of the activities of at least some military companies, it is important to assess the extent to which they are effective in resolving conflicts in the areas in which they are deployed.

David Shearer. Private Armies and Military Intervention (Adelphi Papers). . Oxford University Press. 1998.

top of page

back a page