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American Privateers

Over the long span of recorded history, soldiers of fortune have practiced their profession mostly on land. However, their seafaring brothers have also added to the legacy of the mercenary. These mariners, and the vessels they sail, have become known as privateers, defined as "crewmembers of privately owned and manned armed ships commissioned by a belligerent government to attack and capture enemy ships, especially merchant vessels."

Although they have not been employed for more than a century, privateers previously operated under a "letter of marque" from a government to a captain authorizing his attacks on and capture of foreign vessels. These letters also provided provisions for how captured ships and their cargos, known as prizes, were to be sold and the proceeds split between the government and the privateer's owner, captain, and crew.

The original purpose of a letter of marque, sometimes known as a letter of reprisal, was to right a private wrong. As early as the thirteenth century, kings issued letters of permission to private citizens authorizing them to capture another country's ships to regain losses. The justification for this act was the belief that a country was responsible for the actions of its individual citizens. For example, if the French took over a Dutch vessel, the victimized captain could approach his king for permission to seek reprisal. With a letter of marque in hand, the Dutch merchant could then dispatch his own ship to capture any French vessel and cover his losses.

These acts of commercial retribution were adapted to times of war under the theory that hostilities damaged or threatened all of a kingdom's residents so they, therefore, had the right to seek reprisals. Kings who had limited resources to build navies saw the advantages of private vessels taking on the enemy. Despite the fact that no country or merchant appreciated losing assets to privateers, the legal operation of such vessels was accepted overall.

Those who crewed privateers closely resembled the crews of regular naval vessels, only their pay came from the sale of prizes rather than as wages. Privateers were, for the most part, respected and honored in their home communities and by the seats of power that issued their letters. Even those who opposed privateers usually referred to them as "gentlemen pirates."

Pirates, on the other hand, were stateless criminals who made their own rules and attacked any ship regardless of the flag it flew. These thieves of the sea were no more mercenaries than were bandits who attacked people or villages on the land. Pirates were generally condemned and pursued by all governments.

The earliest history of privateering began in the thirteenth century when England's King Henry III ordered private vessels from its southeastern ports to attack and capture French merchant ships on the condition he received half of the proceeds. The English throne also became the first to issue a formal letter of marque when it authorized ships to sail against Portugal in 1295.

Over the next two centuries other countries adopted the practice of sanctioning privateers during time of war. Because peace was a rarity during this period, privateers had little difficulty finding work. Some captains owned their own vessels, but many privateers were financed by nobles or wealthy merchants. Contributing to the war effort may have had its own merits, but most of these financial backers looked upon privateering as a sound investment.

No more powerful than armed merchantmen, privateers usually targeted only merchant vessels and avoided enemy warships altogether. While letters of marque were honored by the nation of issue and its allies, they were often not accepted as a legal declaration by any other nation. Hostile nations at times ignored the letters and executed captured privateers as pirates, and legal privateers could become illegal pirates when the war they were authorized to fight ended. In the days of limited communications, a privateer long at sea might be prosecuted when he finally returned home with prizes taken after hostilities had ended.

However, the potential for rewards far outweighed the risks, and privateers were readily available. Governments looked upon privateering as a necessary evil, a means to increase their naval presence at no cost to themselves. With the sharing of money from the sale of captured ships and their cargoes, a government could actually make money from its navy while at the same time eroding the assets and power of its enemies. When the need for privateers exceeded their availability, backing governments could adjust their part of the share to encourage more ships to put to sea. In 1544 during his war with France, King Henry VIII greatly increased his number of privateers by allowing them to keep all, rather than half, the proceeds from the sale of prizes.

In the latter part of the sixteenth century, rich cargoes of silver, gold, and jewels from Mexico and South America significantly added to the coffers of the Spanish colonizers, but England and France also benefited from the riches of the New World delivered by their privateers. The bounty was so attractive that some privateers added additional crew members as marines or foot soldiers so they could sail into enemy ports, loot its stores, and ransom its citizens.

During this period and into the seventeenth century, England was the major source of letters of marque, and its privateers sailed the seven seas in search of prizes. Privateers enriched their sponsors and the English throne, but they were looked upon as expendable when diplomacy required. When Sir Walter Raleigh continued to capture Spanish merchant ships after England and Spain agreed to peace, the highly successful sailor and explorer was executed in 1618.

For England at least, privateering peaked in the eighteenth century. By 1744, a shortage of sailors forced the country to pardon all criminals willing to put to sea.

The seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth saw an increase in privateering to its greatest numbers ever. England was added to the number of potential victims of privateers by declaring that neutrals that traded with France or its colonies were to be considered fair targets. The measure, known as the Rule of 1756, provided significant financial support for the Seven Years' War in Europe and the concurrent French and Indian War in North America. British privateers captured more than one thousand vessels and brought French wartime commerce to a virtual standstill. Not all of the prizes were taken by ships operating out of British ports. The American colonists, especially those from the seafaring coast of New England, readily joined the privateer fleet and accounted for nearly a third of the French losses.

Or consider the naval privateers, who flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They, too, were private citizens pursuing private gain and performing a public service in the process, just as the trial lawyers claim to do. In their case they raided the enemy’s commerce during wartime. It was a very dangerous business, of course, but the rewards, like those from a major lawsuit, could be staggering.

An inferior naval power, unable to match the enemy ship for ship, usually has no option but to employ a strategy of commerce raiding—what the French, who practiced it often, call “la guerre de course.” The U-boat campaigns of the two world wars show just how devastatingly effective commerce raiding can be as a naval strategy.

Earlier privately owned commerce raiders sometimes were just as effective, and, of course, didn’t cost the government anything. But many of the early privateers—Captain Kidd for instance —allowed their self-interest to lead them over the very fine line between privateering and piracy. Later privateers also sometimes turned their wartime assets into equally dubious peacetime activities.

When the United States declared its independence in 1776, its fledgling navy, comprised of vessels commissioned by the individual states, could muster only thirty warships. Funds for building naval vessels were sparse, and volunteers willing to fight against the powerful British armada were few. To give itself a head start, the United States would do what had worked so well for England and issue letters of marque to its merchant fleet.

Privateering was a necessary evil, but it was a form of warfare that many found repugnant. British naval hero Adm. Horatio Nelson best summed up these feelings in a dispatch shortly before his victory and death at Trafalgar in 1805. According to Nelson, "The conduct of all Privateering is, as far as I have seen, so near piracy, that I only wonder why any civilized nation can allow them."

Nelson and other senior naval and government leaders continued to speak out against privateering in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth. Nelson's death did nothing to end the growing opposition to what many considered legal pirating. Joining military and government leaders in the opposition to privateering were the rich and influential merchants whose ships were being lost and sold as prizes.

John Steele Gordon. Commerce Raider. . September 1995; Volume 46, Issue 5.

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