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American Privateers

Over the long span of recorded history, soldiers of fortune have practiced their profession mostly on land. However, their seafaring brothers have also added to the legacy of the mercenary. These mariners, and the vessels they sail, have become known as privateers, defined as "crewmembers of privately owned and manned armed ships commissioned by a belligerent government to attack and capture enemy ships, especially merchant vessels."

Although they have not been employed for more than a century, privateers previously operated under a "letter of marque" from a government to a captain authorizing his attacks on and capture of foreign vessels. These letters also provided provisions for how captured ships and their cargos, known as prizes, were to be sold and the proceeds split between the government and the privateer's owner, captain, and crew.

The original purpose of a letter of marque, sometimes known as a letter of reprisal, was to right a private wrong. As early as the thirteenth century, kings issued letters of permission to private citizens authorizing them to capture another country's ships to regain losses. The justification for this act was the belief that a country was responsible for the actions of its individual citizens. For example, if the French took over a Dutch vessel, the victimized captain could approach his king for permission to seek reprisal. With a letter of marque in hand, the Dutch merchant could then dispatch his own ship to capture any French vessel and cover his losses.

These acts of commercial retribution were adapted to times of war under the theory that hostilities damaged or threatened all of a kingdom's residents so they, therefore, had the right to seek reprisals. Kings who had limited resources to build navies saw the advantages of private vessels taking on the enemy. Despite the fact that no country or merchant appreciated losing assets to privateers, the legal operation of such vessels was accepted overall.

Those who crewed privateers closely resembled the crews of regular naval vessels, only their pay came from the sale of prizes rather than as wages. Privateers were, for the most part, respected and honored in their home communities and by the seats of power that issued their letters. Even those who opposed privateers usually referred to them as "gentlemen pirates."

Pirates, on the other hand, were stateless criminals who made their own rules and attacked any ship regardless of the flag it flew. These thieves of the sea were no more mercenaries than were bandits who attacked people or villages on the land. Pirates were generally condemned and pursued by all governments.

The earliest history of privateering began in the thirteenth century when England's King Henry III ordered private vessels from its southeastern ports to attack and capture French merchant ships on the condition he received half of the proceeds. The English throne also became the first to issue a formal letter of marque when it authorized ships to sail against Portugal in 1295.

Over the next two centuries other countries adopted the practice of sanctioning privateers during time of war. Because peace was a rarity during this period, privateers had little difficulty finding work. Some captains owned their own vessels, but many privateers were financed by nobles or wealthy merchants. Contributing to the war effort may have had its own merits, but most of these financial backers looked upon privateering as a sound investment.

No more powerful than armed merchantmen, privateers usually targeted only merchant vessels and avoided enemy warships altogether. While letters of marque were honored by the nation of issue and its allies, they were often not accepted as a legal declaration by any other nation. Hostile nations at times ignored the letters and executed captured privateers as pirates, and legal privateers could become illegal pirates when the war they were authorized to fight ended. In the days of limited communications, a privateer long at sea might be prosecuted when he finally returned home with prizes taken after hostilities had ended.

However, the potential for rewards far outweighed the risks, and privateers were readily available. Governments looked upon privateering as a necessary evil, a means to increase their naval presence at no cost to themselves. With the sharing of money from the sale of captured ships and their cargoes, a government could actually make money from its navy while at the same time eroding the assets and power of its enemies. When the need for privateers exceeded their availability, backing governments could adjust their part of the share to encourage more ships to put to sea. In 1544 during his war with France, King Henry VIII greatly increased his number of privateers by allowing them to keep all, rather than half, the proceeds from the sale of prizes.

In the latter part of the sixteenth century, rich cargoes of silver, gold, and jewels from Mexico and South America significantly added to the coffers of the Spanish colonizers, but England and France also benefited from the riches of the New World delivered by their privateers. The bounty was so attractive that some privateers added additional crew members as marines or foot soldiers so they could sail into enemy ports, loot its stores, and ransom its citizens.

During this period and into the seventeenth century, England was the major source of letters of marque, and its privateers sailed the seven seas in search of prizes. Privateers enriched their sponsors and the English throne, but they were looked upon as expendable when diplomacy required. When Sir Walter Raleigh continued to capture Spanish merchant ships after England and Spain agreed to peace, the highly successful sailor and explorer was executed in 1618.

For England at least, privateering peaked in the eighteenth century. By 1744, a shortage of sailors forced the country to pardon all criminals willing to put to sea.

The seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth saw an increase in privateering to its greatest numbers ever. England was added to the number of potential victims of privateers by declaring that neutrals that traded with France or its colonies were to be considered fair targets. The measure, known as the Rule of 1756, provided significant financial support for the Seven Years' War in Europe and the concurrent French and Indian War in North America. British privateers captured more than one thousand vessels and brought French wartime commerce to a virtual standstill. Not all of the prizes were taken by ships operating out of British ports. The American colonists, especially those from the seafaring coast of New England, readily joined the privateer fleet and accounted for nearly a third of the French losses.

Or consider the naval privateers, who flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They, too, were private citizens pursuing private gain and performing a public service in the process, just as the trial lawyers claim to do. In their case they raided the enemy’s commerce during wartime. It was a very dangerous business, of course, but the rewards, like those from a major lawsuit, could be staggering.

An inferior naval power, unable to match the enemy ship for ship, usually has no option but to employ a strategy of commerce raiding—what the French, who practiced it often, call “la guerre de course.” The U-boat campaigns of the two world wars show just how devastatingly effective commerce raiding can be as a naval strategy.

Earlier privately owned commerce raiders sometimes were just as effective, and, of course, didn’t cost the government anything. But many of the early privateers—Captain Kidd for instance —allowed their self-interest to lead them over the very fine line between privateering and piracy. Later privateers also sometimes turned their wartime assets into equally dubious peacetime activities.

When the United States declared its independence in 1776, its fledgling navy, comprised of vessels commissioned by the individual states, could muster only thirty warships. Funds for building naval vessels were sparse, and volunteers willing to fight against the powerful British armada were few. To give itself a head start, the United States would do what had worked so well for England and issue letters of marque to its merchant fleet.

Privateering was a necessary evil, but it was a form of warfare that many found repugnant. British naval hero Adm. Horatio Nelson best summed up these feelings in a dispatch shortly before his victory and death at Trafalgar in 1805. According to Nelson, "The conduct of all Privateering is, as far as I have seen, so near piracy, that I only wonder why any civilized nation can allow them."

Nelson and other senior naval and government leaders continued to speak out against privateering in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth. Nelson's death did nothing to end the growing opposition to what many considered legal pirating. Joining military and government leaders in the opposition to privateering were the rich and influential merchants whose ships were being lost and sold as prizes.

Although the records are far from complete, efforts by privateers certainly contributed to the success of the Americans. During the war the Americans issued about fifteen hundred letters of marque. At any one time about a third of this number were actually on a ship at sea, and these vessels captured at least two thousand enemy merchantmen. Connecticut kept fairly accurate records of its privateers, and these accounts provide a good insight into the successes as well as the dangers of privateering. In 1781, Connecticut authorized ninety-six privateers. During the year, seventy-one of these vessels captured eighty prizes while twenty-five proved unsuccessful. British warships captured nine of the Connecticut privateers, and five more sank.

Other than having possession of a ship and a crew, there was one additional requirement to securing a letter of marque in the United States. Both the Continental Congress and the state governments required the owners of privateers to post bonds of $5,000 to $10,000 to serve as insurance against possible claims from neutral merchants or other innocent noncombatants who were not subject to the letter of marque.

Letter of Marque To all who shall see these presents, greetings: Be it known that in pursuance of an act of Congress passed on the fifth day of June one thousand eight hundred and twelve, I have commissioned, and by these presents do conunission the private armed schooner named Lucy of the burden of twentyfive tons or thereabouts, owned by John Lawton in the city of Taunton state of Massachusetts mounting four carriage guns, and navigated by twenty-six men, hereby authorizing John Lawton Captain, and Perez Drinkwater Lieutenant of the said Lucy and the other officers and crew thereof to: Subdue, seize and take any armed or unarmed British vessel, public or private, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the United States or elsewhere on the high seas, or within the waters of the British dominions. And each captured vessel with her apparel, guns and appurtenances, and the goods or effects which shall be found on board the same, together with all the British persons and others who shall be found acting on board, within some port of the United States. And also to retake any vessel, goods or effects of the people of the United States, which may have been captured by any British armed vessel, in order that proceedings may be had concerning each capture or recapture in due form of law, and as to right and justice shall appertain. The said John Lawton is further authorized to detain, seize, and take all vessels and effects, to whomsoever belonging, which shall be liable thereto according to the law of Nations and the rights of the United States as a power at war, and to bring the same within some port of the United States in order that due proceeding may be had thereon. This commission to continue in force during the pleasure of the President of the United States for the time being. Given under my hand and the seal of the United States of America at the city of Washington, the twenty second day of December in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen and the independence of the said states the thirty ninth. By the President, James Madison James Monroe, Secretary of State

These bonds were important because privateers did not merely capture a vessel, sail it to a friendly port, and sell the cargo ship itself. Rather, once the captain brought a prize home, he and the owner had to appear before an admiralty court-usually found at seaside ports or along rivers at inland towns where shipyards built many of the privateers-to prove that the captured ship met the requirements as outlined in their letter of marque. Only after the court approved the request and "condemned" the captured ship and cargo could they be sold.

Experienced sailors and landlubbers alike rushed to ports that were outfitting privateers. In a time when slavery was still legal throughout the colonies, captains of privateers became color blind when accepting crew members and hired men based on spirit and experience rather than skin color. Nearly every privateer crew manifest of the period listed several men as "Negro" or "African."

When sufficient volunteers were hard to come by, captains resorted to advertising. In a Boston newspaper, one captain issued "An invitation to all brave seamen and marines who have an inclination to serve their country and make their fortunes."

The advertisement continued, "The grand privateer Deane, commanded by Elisha Hinman, Esq.; and proved to be a very capable sailor will sail on a cruise against the enemies of the United States of America, by the 20th instant. The Deane mounts thirty carriage guns, and is excellently well calculated for attacks, defense, and pursuit. This therefore is to invite all those jolly fellows, who love their country, and want to make their fortunes at one stroke, to repair immediately to the rendezvous at the head of his Excellency Governor Hancock's Wharf, where they will be received with a hearty welcome by a number of brave fellows there assembled."

Captain Hinman, after touting patriotism and fortune, added one last inducement. Upon arrival at the ship, he promised that sailors would be "treated with that excellent liquor called grog, which is allowed by all true seamen to be the liquor of life."

Despite such incentives, privateer captains still at times had difficulties filling their manifests. Crews were larger on privateers than on ordinary merchant vessels and even same warships because they had to provide manpower to sail the captured prizes back home. Another- deterrent to filling crews was past success. Veterans who had shared in the wealth of prizes were reluctant to return to sea-at least until they had spent their share of the prize money.

Once at sea, privateers relied on speed as their primary asset. Their light ships carried as much sail as possible so that they could overtake slower merchants and outrun enemy warships. Because the privateers' prey were unarmed or lightly armed merchants, they themselves did not need to be heavily armed. Usually a dozen or so 6- or 9-pound guns arrayed on each side of the privateer, with swivel guns fore and aft, provided enough firepower to convince most any captain to surrender.

Privateers also used other tactics to overtake their quarries. Most flew the colors of neutral countries until they neared an enemy vessel, at which time they hoisted the American banner.

Hinman and other privateer captains made no promises as to what the crew might earn. But while some returned home empty-handed, privateers generally could anticipate capturing from one to four vessels during a voyage. An ordinary seaman who made only about nine dollars per month during peacetime could earn a thousand or more dollars during the same period as a privateer. Officers and gunnery personnel took even larger shares of the rich prizes.

In the early months of the Revolutionary War the American privateers experienced great success. The British, unprepared for the enterprising Yankees, dispatched lone merchant vessels without naval escort from England to the ports they still controlled in the United States and Canada.

A by-product of this success was a boost to the rebel army on land. On November 25, 1775, the privateer Lee, operating under a letter of marque issued by George Washington himself, captured the British merchant Nancy. Aboard the vessel were two thousand muskets, two thousand bayonets, three thousand rounds of shot for 12-inch cannons, and hundreds of pounds of gunpowder. This latter commodity was in extremely short supply in the colonies, and the bayonets filled a void in the rebel armories.

And arms were not the privateers' only booty. In early 1776 the Lee, supported by the privateer Defense, captured several transports ferrying more than two hundred soldiers from England to the rebellious colonies. The capture of British troops at sea was not unusual. By the end of the Revolution the U.S. Navy and the privateers accounted for sixteen thousand British prisoners-a thousand more than were captured on land by the Continental Army.

On occasion several privateers sailed as part of a fleet that shared prizes. Both individual privateers and these minifieets avoided British warships, but if they found a man-of-war that was vulnerable due to storm or other damage, they would attack. Fewer than 3 percent of the prizes claimed were warships, but there were advantages to capturing man-of-wars. Although they had little cargo, their guns and the ships themselves were valuable. In addition, the American government added a bounty to the prize money for warships.

As the Revolution progressed, the British initiated efforts to protect merchants sailing for North America by adding warships as escorts. In turn, the privateers expanded their hunting grounds to waters nearer to Great Britain, where they found particular success, especially in the Irish Sea. Some British merchants and their insurance agents became so frustrated by their losses that they hired French merchants to move their goods, as American privateers would not attack a ship flying the colors of France.

After the Treaty of Paris brought an official end to the war on September 3, 1783, the contributions of the privateers during the Revolutionary War were not forgotten with the drafting of the U.S. Constitution in 1789. In Article I, Section VIII, "Powers Granted to Congress," paragraph 11, permits the Congress "To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water."

While the Americans had a few decades of peace to enjoy their newly won independence, Europe was soon back at war and again issuing letters of marque to privateers. When the French revolted against their king, other European monarchies attempted to take the throne from the French people. France, with few naval vessels, countered with privateers that captured more than two thousand British ships, significantly impacting Britain's sea commerce and ability to resupply troops on the Continent.

The Americans during this period experienced the other side of privateering when their merchants became victims to what they called "Barbary pirates" from North Africa. These so-called pirates sailed under letters of marque from various tribal chiefs and clan leaders little different from those the Americans issued during their Revolution. Eventually the United States was forced to pay ransom for some of their captured ships, but it also took military action to force the signing of treaties that ended the raids against American shipping.

John Steele Gordon. Commerce Raider. American Heritage. September 1995; Volume 46, Issue 5.

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