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Private Warriors

Private military forces cannot be defined in absolute terms: they occupy a grey area that challenges the liberal conscience. Moral judgements on the use of mercenaries are usually passed at a distance from the situations in which these forces are involved. Those facing conflict and defeat have fewer moral compunctions. A mercenary usually has to be someone who:

1. is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
2. does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities;
3. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised, or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party;
4. is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
5. is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
6. has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of the armed forces.

The use of paid foreign force has historically attracted little attention because it was accepted as normal practice. The Ancient Greeks employed Macedonians; Rome hired one Germanic tribe to defend its Imperial borders against another. Throughout the Middle Ages in Europe, mercenaries were considered important components of fighting forces and were often employed as elite units or as advisers.

Foreign forces or mercenaries tended to prosper in unstable conditions, or following a change in the existing order. Increases in private military forces have also often coincided with the end of a period of conflict which saw standing armies reduced. Both conditions prevail after the end of the Cold War, as they did in mid-fourteenth-century Europe, when mercenary activity expanded rapidly at the end of the first phase of The Hundred Years' War. Demobilised troops formed themselves into so-called 'free companies' and entered the service of feudal lords, notably in France.

The period was characterised by instability. France was weak and divided, Italy volatile. As with the post-Cold War era, the loosening of a rigidly defined order - the feudal system - and the absence of firm central control created an atmosphere conducive to the 'privatised' soldier.' Condottieri - named after the condotta or contracts they signed - recruited ex-soldiers and hired them out to warring Italian principalities. The Swiss soldiers that defended the early cantons of the fifteenth century were so impressive in battle that other principalities and kingdoms were eager to hire them. They were recruited as a papal police corps by Julius II (the Swiss Guards persist to this day). Mercenaries showed little discrimination in whom they fought for, but their usefulness to a monarch or lord made them generally accepted. Contracting out military functions was seen, then as now, as a useful way to avoid the obligations of a state towards its 'native' troops: mercenaries 'left no troublesome widows and orphans; at the end of the campaign, they could be sent away unlike a country's own men'.

By the late eighteenth century, conscript and standing armies had largely replaced ad hoc military formations. As a result, the use of mercenaries declined markedly. The concept remained widely accepted, although not without question. Lord Camden condemned the British government's proposal to send troops from Hesse in Germany to fight in the American War of Independence in 1775, calling it a 'mere mercenary bargain'. Parliament backed their dispatch by a comfortable margin nonetheless.' Later, tolerance of 'privatised' military force and the freedom to contract out fighting services also chimed with the nineteenth century's embrace of economic liberalism.

Through the ages Historically, the concept of a private soldier, often called a mercenary, is nothing new. It dates to biblical times. Since the rise of the modern nation-state four centuries ago, the job of providing security has belonged to the government. Now, with the birth of the private military industry, that could be changing. 1300 B.C. Pharaoh Ramses II of Egypt chases the escaping Israelites with an army including hired foreigners. 480 B.C. Xerxes I, king of Persia, uses Greek mercenaries in his invasion of Greece. A.D. 4th century The Roman Empire contracts with bands of barbarians for its legions. Middle Ages (500-1500) “Free companies,” sometimes called “free lances,” hire themselves out for combat in European wars. 1607 Capt. John Smith is hired by the Virginia Company to provide security and conduct military operations for the English settlers at Jamestown. Various Native American allies, who provided invaluable help in battles ranging from Jamestown to Wounded Knee. Revolutionary War (1776-81) Foreigners participate on both sides: Hessians for the British; Lafayette, Pulaski and von Steuben for the colonists. The privateers who harassed British shipping during both the War of Independence and the War of 1812. John Paul Jones, who, after the American Revolution, was an admiral in the Russian navy. Civil War (1861-65) The Pinkerton National Detective Agency, which provided intelligence for the Union, and personal protection for President Lincoln. European soldiers fight on both sides. World War I The Lafayette Escadrille, a squadron of the French air force composed of Americans. Douglas MacArthur, who in the 1930’s, after stepping down as Army chief of staff, became a field marshal in the Philippines armed forces. World War II (1941-42) The Eagle Squadron, a unit of the Royal Air Force composed of American pilots. American Claire Chennault’s Flying Tigers fly fighter planes for China against the Japanese. Vietnam War The Montagnards, the tribesmen who were recruited and organized into an armed force by the CIA and Army Special Forces to fight the Communists. 1993-95 Executive Outcomes, a private military company with roots in apartheid-era South Africa, is hired to put down insurgencies in Angola and Sierra Leone. 2003-present Tens of thousands of private soldiers are hired for security work on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Mercenaries all, and yet they are all heroes of history, American history included. Why is it impossible to imagine that mercenaries today could be equally useful, and sometimes even heroic? Sources: World Book, Encyclopedia Americana, Peter Singer, Jonathan Phillips

Attitudes towards warfare - and hence employing mercenaries - were to alter dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century. Although some limitations on the unilateral use of force existed under customary law and international conventions prior to the Second World War, a state's right to wage war as a permissible means of producing change remained generally accepted. The role and legal status of mercenaries during conflicts were little examined.

Skeptics say that it is somehow “un-American” to rely on hired hands to do your fighting. Often cited is the fact that Americans have long hated the Hessians (actually, they came from all over Germany, not just from Hesse-Kassel) hired by the British to fight the American rebellion that began in 1776. Well, of course, any nation will hate foreign troops who fight particularly hard and even viciously, as the “Hessians” did. But that’s hardly an argument against employing them. Quite the contrary. In fact, the U.S. has a long tradition of celebrated mercenaries.

However, the bloodshed of the Second World War, following hard upon the losses of 1914-18, engendered a strong belief that the right of states to wage war upon each other should be strictly curtailed. Mercenaries were seen as flouting both the spirit and philosophy of this new order by profiting from - and possibly encouraging - conflict. Critics also viewed them as a threat to the stability of sovereign states, the building blocks of the post-war era. This new perspective, however, applied only to inter-state conflicts. Civil wars continued to be perceived as terrorism or insurgency, the internal business of the state concerned.

By the 1960s, the activities of foreign troops in Africa had established an image of the mercenary as an agent of the colonial powers and therefore a reactionary symbol of racism and opposition to self-determination. This perception took hold despite a general absence of loyalty to a cause or side. Mercenaries gained particular notoriety in the Belgian Congo, where individuals such as Dublin-born 'Mad' Mike Hoare, Frenchman Bob Denard and Belgian Jean Schramme - nicknamed les affreux, the 'terrible ones' - led Katanganese Gendarmerie rebels. Members of the mercenary force later fought alongside Prime Minister Moise Tshombe's new government. Mercenaries showed a similar lack of ideological concern in Nigeria's break-away Biafra province, fighting both with separatists and with the Nigerian government in the 1967-70 war.

In Benin, Denard was involved in a failed coup attempt against President Mathieu Kerekou in January 1977; he was also implicated in successful coups in the Comoros Islands in 1975 and 1978, and in 1995 led a failed attempt to oust Comoros President Said Mohammed Djohar. Hoare overthrew Seychelles Chief Minister James Mancham in 1977 and returned to the country in 1982 in an unsuccessful bid to topple Mancham's successor, France-Albert Rene.

Although the activities of individual mercenaries were condemned, states continued to deploy foreign troops. Moroccan forces were contracted by Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1977 to quell an uprising in Katanga province, now Shaba in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Cuban troops fought Somali forces in the disputed Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1978 and also backed the socialist Movimento Popular para a Libertacado de Angola. France continued its practice - begun in 1831 - of recruiting foreign soldiers to fight abroad in the Foreign Legion. The UK established Gurkha regiments of Nepalese nationals in 1947 to participate in international conflicts on London's behalf. Although foreign and motivated principally by financial gain - the basic characteristics of mercenaries - these forces were considered legitimate since they were integrated into national armies. Moral questions surrounding their use were rarely asked.

The absence of relevant international law places emphasis on domestic legislation covering mercenary activity. Such laws exist, but are largely ignored. In the US, the Neutrality Act of 1794 made it a misdemeanour for an individual to prepare or depart for a conflict abroad. A new Neutrality Act was introduced in 1937, but is interpreted as only prohibiting the recruitment of mercenaries within the US - being a mercenary is not in itself a criminal offence. The US position would appear to be that mercenary activity is not a crime under international law, and that mercenaries should be granted the same status and protection as other combatants. Australia's approach is similar: under the Australian Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act of 1978, it is an offence to recruit mercenaries within Australia, but enlisting them abroad is not prohibited. The UK's Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 - applicable to international as well as intra-state conflicts - makes enlisting or engaging mercenaries both within and outside the UK an offence. Nevertheless, former British military personnel have a long history of fighting in the wars of other nations. The 'Diplock Report' of 1976 noted that no prosecutions had been brought in the loo years since the Foreign Enlistment Act was promulgated, and recommended that, while recruiting mercenaries within the UK should be prohibited, mercenary activity itself should not be criminalised.

Western countries have thus either not acted on their legislation, or have not introduced adequate laws to curtail mercenary activity. Veteran mercenary Bob Denard received only a five-year suspended sentence from a French court in 1993 for his part in the failed coup in Benin in 1977 that left seven people dead." The 11 states that have ratified the international convention include Angola, Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all of which have employed either mercenaries or military companies since the convention was framed.

Both personnel employed by military companies and mercenaries have military origins, are foreign to the country in which they operate and are paid for their services. Beyond these shared characteristics, there are observable differences. Unlike a mercenary, a military company advertises its services and is legally registered (often in an offshore tax haven). Personnel are employed within a defined structure, with established terms and conditions, and work with a degree of organisation and accountability to the company. The company, in turn, is answerable to its client, often under a legally binding contract.

Recruiting foreign soldiers of the 1960s mould has been a more covert and impromptu operation, resulting in a collection of individuals rather than a corporate entity. At best, the level of organisation employed resembles a 'network' or recruitment agency. Recruits are often poorly disciplined, yet, despite the divergence of style from a military company, both may draw from the same labour pool to fill vacancies.

The mercenaries employed by Mobutu in what was then Zaire in early 1997 highlight these operational distinctions. Zairean middle-men were recruiting via veteran operators such as Denard and Belgian-born Christian Tavernier. Faced with a disintegrating Zairean Army and hampered by disparate military experience, the resultant international force lacked cohesion and met with little success. Respected Zairean commander General Mahele Bokongu called its performance 'militarily incompetent and lacking professionalism'.

This ad hoc pattern has become an increasing feature of civil wars. A similar mercenary network recruited soldiers to fight against Russian forces in the Chechen conflict of 1994-96. During the 1992-95 Yugoslav civil war, the Bosnian Serb army attracted troops from Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Yugoslav National Army. Bosnian Muslim forces included Middle Eastern Islamists, many of whom were veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The assumption that military companies merely comprise modern-day mercenaries is simplistic. Legal definitions established in the wake of mercenary activity in the 1960s cannot be usefully applied to the type of military company emerging in the 1990s, while operational distinctions further distinguish the military company from the mercenary. When a country's vital interests are threatened, the need for outside help outweighs the uncertain moral arguments against it. Whether a military company is classified as a mercenary force matters to prospective clients only in as much as it threatens to attract international opprobrium. Despite public misgivings over their use, Western governments have taken few steps to curtail the activities of military companies.

The expansion of the private military sector since the end of the Cold War stems partly from Western military-force reductions. The US armed forces employ one-third fewer personnel than at their Cold War peak, while the British Army's current head count, at 112,000, is the lowest since the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Total French armed forces numbered 381,000 in 1997, against 547,000 ten years earlier. Demobilisation has released former soldiers on to the job market, while indirectly the contraction of a state's armed forces has narrowed opportunities for promotion and advancement and encouraged others to leave. The net result is a sharp increase in expertise in the private sector.

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