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The Navy SEALs

Today's Navy SEALs proudly carry forward the traditions laid down before them in the deserts of the Middle East, the swamps od Vietnam, the frozen wastes of Korea, and the beaches of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

The serious development of the U.S. military's ability to combat the worldwide increase in Communist-supported guerrilla warfare began in the late 1950s during the Eisenhower administration. De velopment of these capabilities was slow and consisted of little more than studies and discussions among high-level military officers, politicians, and political appointees. It was not until the 1960s and the Kennedy administration that the development of these capabilities was pushed forward. Under President Kennedy, the military received the stimulus necessary to actively create unconventional warfare units.

On 11 July 1960, Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, directed Deputy CNO (Fleet ops and readiness) Admiral Wallace Beakley to study possible contributions by the Navy to unconventional warfare. Admiral Beakley responded to the CNO's directive by August 12 and included his suggestion that, because of their extensive training in small-unit actions of this type, the Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams and Marine reconnaissance units were the logical organizations for expanding the Navy's capability in unconventional warfare.

Four weeks after Admiral Beakley's response to the CNO, the Unconventional Activities Working Group was established within the Office of the CNO under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (plans and policy). The group was to consider "naval unconventional activity methods, techniques, and concepts which may be employed effectively against Sino-Soviet interests under conditions of cold war." This group was later succeeded by the Unconventional Activities Committee, which turned in the final report.

The year 1961 brought a large number of changes for the world in general and the United States military in particular. President Eisenhower was replaced by a new, young President who thought differently than others had and had experienced war in a very up-close and personal way. There was also a serious threat to world peace in the form of the Soviet Union, which was aggressively seeking to export its style of Communism to the rest of the world.

On 6 January 1961, Nikita Khrushchev, the premier of the Soviet Union, publicly announced that his country would "support just wars of liberation and popular uprisings ... wholeheartedly and without reservations." The developing struggle in Vietnam was mentioned as an example of such a just war. A few weeks later, on 29 January, John E Kennedy became the thirty-fifth President of the United States. At the age of forty-three he was also the youngest person ever to hold that office.

Admiral Burke maintained his advocacy of unconventional warfare in a response to Admiral John Sides (CINCPACFLT). In correspondence, Admiral Burke stated that unconventional warfare did constitute a proper mission for the Navy. In another memo issued in early February, he again suggested that the Navy "do as much as we can in guerrilla warfare ... even if it is not our primary business." Burke proposed emphasizing UDT groups, escape and survival training, and the creation of a nucleus of young naval officers trained by the Army in guerrilla warfare. At that time the Army Special Forces at Fort Bragg were the only experienced guerrilla warfare group in the U.S. military.

President Kennedy met with the joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 February. The President stressed the importance of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare responses to Communist actions. He wanted present capabilities increased and new counterguerrilla warfare concepts established and put into place as quickly as was practicable. On March 10, Rear Admiral William Gentner Jr., the director of the Strategic Plans Division, approved the preliminary recommendations of the Unconventional Activities Committee. The recommendations were to involve the Navy more directly in the lower levels (direct action) of counterguerrilla actions.

Navy Special Warfare Seal Badge A gold metal pin with an eagle holding a trident and a handgun, in front of an anchor. Note: Originally this insignia was gold for officers and silver for enlisted, but was approved in gold for enlisted personnel in 1972. The only outward sign of a uniformed Navy man being a SEAL, besides his high level of fitness and air of cool assuredness, is the Navy Special Warfare Breast Insignia he wears on the left breast of his uniform. The Trident, as it is called by the men who wear it, can be properly worn only by an individual who has completed the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) course of instruction or the earlier Underwater Demolition Team Replacement (UDTR) course and a six-month probationary tour with a SEAL Team. Receiving their Trident is a significant moment for all of the men of the SEAL Teams. Some of these men can put their feelings into words, while others have a hard time expressing their emotion at such an event. And a very few others can describe the Trident in very proper SEAL terms understandable to all members of the Teams.

Specific proposals of the group included the recommendation that new units be established, one for the Atlantic and another for the Pacific command. The proposed units would be known by the acronym SEAL, "a contraction of SEA, AIR, LAND ... indicating an all-around, universal capability." Initially, the units would consist of 20 to 24 officers and 50 to 75 men. Each detachment would have a three-faceted mission: 1.) develop a specialized Navy capability in guerrilla/counterguerrilla operations to include training of selected personnel in a wide variety of skills; 2.) development of doctrinal tactics, and 3.) development of special support equipment. It was during that March 10 meeting that the name SEALs was used for the first time. The acronym was coined in Admiral Gentner's office. It is not known if the term originated with the admiral himself or one of his staff.

President Kennedy continued a CIA-run operation against the Communist government of Cuba that had begun during the Eisenhower administration. The CIA had been arming and training Cuban exiles to return to Cuba and lead a revolt to oust Fidel Castro. This would have removed a major Soviet-backed Communist threat from U.S. shores and Caribbean waters. Some of the personnel the CIA used as trainers had been recruited from UDT 21. From 17 to 19 April 1961, the Bay of Pigs operation took place as Cuban expatriates tried to take back their country from Fidel Castro and his Communist regime. Without proper support from U.S. military and clandestine forces, the Cuban invaders were stopped almost at the shoreline of the Bay of Pigs. The invasion was a complete failure.

Secretary of Defense McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian heads of the military services on 21 April, only a few days after the Bay of Pigs debacle. The meeting was to discuss the implica tions of the Cuban situation. During the meeting, McNamara suggested that "what is required is a new idea on counteraggression [guerrilla warfare] of the type we are seeing around the world."

Within a day or two of this statement, President Kennedy directed General Taylor of the Army to head the Cuban Study Group, which included Admiral Burke, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and CIA Director Allen Dulles. The objective of the group was to determine what lessons were to be learned from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Additionally, the group was to explore ways the United States could strengthen its capabilities in military, paramilitary, guerrilla, and antiguerrilla activities without going on to an active war standing.

By the end of April, the CNO's office had begun to seriously consider the direct participation of the Navy in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare and the creation of units specially trained and suited to that type of conflict. The first week of May Admiral Burke issued a directive calling for an increase in the training of naval personnel in guerrilla warfare. The directive also announced an appraisal of the Navy's equipment to determine what would be suited to operations to be conducted in the swamps and rivers of South Vietnam.

In mid-May, Admiral Beakley reiterated the 10 March proposal by the Strategic Plans Division that the Special Operations Teams (SEALs) be established as separate components of the Atlantic and Pacific UDT commands. The SEAL mission statement was enlarged to include greater emphasis on conducting actual combat operations rather than training and support for them. Admiral Arleigh Burke decided to retire from active duty in the summer of 1961 prior to the implementation of his idea for the SEAL teams. His successor as CNO, Admiral George Anderson Jr., was not the proponent of unconventional warfare that Admiral Burke had been.

On 1 August 1961, Admiral George Anderson Jr. was sworn in as the new Chief of Naval Operations. He replaced Admiral Arleigh Burke, who had held the office for six years. By the end of August, Admiral Anderson was questioning the creation of the new SEAL Teams. Studying the plan for their creation with the intention of curtailing the program, Admiral Anderson felt that the manning requirements (20 officers and 100 men total) for the new Teams could not be immediately met. Encouragement was given by the CNO's office to "enhance and augment present naval support capabilities in the area of paramilitary operations by developing the existing capabilities within the Underwater Demolition Teams for demolition, sabotage and other clandestine activities …"

In the fall of 1961, tensions between the Soviets and the United States increased rapidly with the Berlin Crisis in East Germany. The building of the Berlin Wall and additional actions by the Soviets and the Soviet-backed East German government distracted the Kennedy administration from Southeast Asia. This too retarded the establishment of the Navy SEAL teams.

During that time, specialized training for naval officers in unconventional warfare was not being well implemented. At the end of October, only four Navy officers, two from Underwater Demolition Team 21, were attending courses in unconventional warfare at the Army's Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The push to create the SEAL Teams was now getting more emphasis from the CNO's office. On 13 November, a letter was written at the CNO's office outlining the size and organization of the two proposed SEAL Teams. A month later, on 11 December 1961, Admiral George W Anderson Jr. signed CNO Speedletter Serial # 697P30. The letter activated SEAL Teams One and Two and UDT 22 on 1 January 1962. The document also contained the intended mission statement for the SEALs as well as a description of their organization, command, and logistical support.

On 27 December 1961, Rear Admiral Allan Reed issued "SEAL Teams in Naval Special Warfare," Naval Warfare Information Publication 29-1 (NWIP 29-1). Based on the experience gained in South Vietnam and elsewhere during 1961, the report was the basic SEAL directive for operations during most of the Vietnam War. The following is a declassified excerpt from the still-classified Naval Warfare Information Publication. This forty-plus page document listed for the first time the capabilities of the new SEAL Teams and their mission statement.

The SEAL Mission Profile (NWIP 29-1)

1 January 1962 is the official date of the commissioning of SEAL Teams One and Two. On 8 January, SEAL Team One, at NAB Coronado, California, and SEAL Team Two, at NAB Little Creek, Virginia, mustered for the first time at 1300 hours local time. The official commissioning date for the two Teams was eight days earlier, but there were no main actions until the first muster. This has caused some confusion as to the actual date of the SEALs commissioning. The date of 1 January is the official paperwork date. The 8 January date was the practical day that work actually began.

SEAL Team One was placed under the command of Lieutenant David Del Guidice and took its personnel as volunteers from UDTs 11 and 12. Lieutenant John E Callahan was put in command of SEAL Team Two, which took the majority of its personnel from the ranks of UDT 21. Thirty-seven men and officers of the initial complement for SEAL Team Two were at the 1300 muster on 8 January. The balance of the ten officers and fifty enlisted men would arrive over the next several months as they completed training or were released from previous commands.

Lieutenant Roy Boehm was the officer-in-charge of SEAL Team Two prior to its commissioning and was responsible for selecting the initial complement of men and setting up their training and equipment. He was given the assignment to make the first SEAL Team and has earned the name "First SEAL."

The Vietnam War was to prove to be the crucible that would test the SEAL Team concept. All that had gone before with the UDTs, the actions in Korea, WWII, the Scouts and Raiders, and finally the NCDUs on Normandy Beach laid the groundwork for the SEALs. Vietnam would prove what they had become, the finest unconventional fighting force of the United States military.

Every skill the SEALs had would be tested to the utmost in the rivers, streams, and canals of a small country at the outermost edge of the Southeast Asian mainland. They would soon prove worthy of the legend that grew up around their actions during seven years of active combat.

Kevin Dockery. . Berkley Books, New York. 2001.

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