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Combat Support

Despite the overwhelming if self-limited success of Desert Storm, the Air Force examined itself and decided on some changes. Under the Chief of Staff, General Merrill "Tony" McPeak, the service underwent a major restructuring in June 1992 with consolidation or elimination of traditional forces. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) completed its 44-year deterrent mission and slipped into history, a victim of the Cold War that it had helped prevent from turning white hot. Meanwhile, MAC evolved into Air Mobility Command (AMC) while TAC, with new assets, became Air Combat Command (ACC). Special Operations Command (SOC) also emerged as a separate entity within the Air Force hierarchy.

There was plenty of work for the AMC airlifters that year. In 1992, the Air Force flew extensive humanitarian missions: Operation Provide Hope lifted supplies to former Soviet republics, Provide Promise aided Yugoslavian refugees, and Miami hurricane relief flights also were logged. The following year, AMC was involved in aid to Midwest cities overtaken by heavy floods. However optimistic some people may have been about the end of the Cold War, other challenges arose to fill the void. The Air Force soon found itself committed to more overseas deployments, not less, and some of them involved shooting.

In 1914, a British politician is reputed to have dismissed the start of World War I as "some damned thing in the Balkans." Eight decades later, the wheel had come full circle, although thankfully without the same extent of bloodshed. what did occur in the 1990s was bad enough.

In 1992, Yugoslavia, the most gerrymandered of all European nations, was coming apart at the seams. The collapse of communism resulted in eruption of ethnic rivalries that had simmered since the country was established after World War I. Slovenia and Croatia broke with the federal government, leading to inevitable conflict with Serbia. Yet another conflict arose in Bosnia, with Muslims subjected to "ethnic cleansing" by the hard-line Belgrade government. UN troops assigned as peacekeepers proved woefully inadequate owing to military and political constraints.

In order to limit Yugoslav action against the ethnic enclaves, NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight in April 1993. It was intended to prevent the Serbian-dominated air force from bombing with impunity, and generally succeeded. On February 28, 1994, a flight of F-16Cs from the 86th Tactical Fighter Wing intercepted six Yugoslavian Soko jets in the prohibited zone over Bosnia. An E-3 AWACS detected their takeoff from Banja Luka and, despite warnings, the Serbians reportedly attacked a hospital and a depot at Bugojno. Next they bombed a factory at Novi Travnik.

Black Section of the 526th Fighter Squadron was vectored to the scene and acquired the intruders visually. The leader, Captain Robert "Wilbur" Wright, requested permission to fire before the Super Galebs escaped and received a "weapons hot" reply. He downed three in succession with Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and Sidewinders, while his wingman took a Sidewinder shot against a hard-turning target at low level. There were reports that the intended victim may have crashed while evading the AIM-9M. In any event, Black Section was running short of fuel and disengaged.

Meanwhile, Captain Stephen L. Allen's Knight section was ordered to attack and he bagged another Super Galeb. Lieutenant Scott "Zulu" O'Grady missed a Sidewinder shot as the remaining Serbs escaped into prohibited airspace. From detection to the fourth "splash," the episode lasted 17 minutes, the engagement merely 5 minutes. Fourteen months later, O'Grady was shot down by a Yugoslavian missile battery and was rescued after six days on the ground.

Deny Flight ended in December 1995 after 100,000 NATO sorties during 983 days of operations. However, conflict continued elsewhere in the region. Following the collapse of Bosnian safe areas in 1995, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force on August 30 in response to Serbian attacks on Sarajevo. Some 3,500 sorties were flown by the U.S. Air Force and 7 other nations.

That year the Serbs and Croatians reached an accord providing for separate entities within Bosnia. Internal violence erupted four years later, resulting in further air action. Operation Allied Force was authorized in March 1999. Following 11 months of planning, Allied Force was executed in a 78-day air campaign. Air Force planes mainly operated from Aviano Air Base in northern Italy, within reasonable reach of their operating areas. The goal was to protect the Albanian majority population of Kosovo in southern Serbia. Some 30,000 sorties were flown without one NATO combat death, although a French aircrew was shot down and captured.

Again there was limited air combat. On March 26, Captain Jeff "Claw" Hwang of the 493rd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron downed two MiG-29s while squadronmates bagged two more. A fifth MiG was claimed May 4. But the air war was not wholly one-sided. On the fourth night of the campaign, March 27, Captain Ken Dwelle's Nighthawk was bagged by a Serbian SA-3 missile about 40 miles from Belgrade. After seven hours on the ground, Dwelle was scooped up by an airborne rescue team and returned to safety. His Nighthawk remained the only U.S. aircraft lost in the campaign. It was also the first F-117 combat loss; eight had been destroyed previously with three pilots killed.

In addition to the SAM battery, Yugoslavian MiG-29 pilots also claimed Dwelle's F-117, and perhaps the contradictions cannot be resolved. "Yugo" Fulcrums also claimed four F-16s and an F-15 during the short war, but no convincing evidence has been forthcoming.

The operation ended in June, although not as many airmen would have preferred. Some aviation incidents were thoroughly scrutinized by the world's media, most notably when a Strike Eagle bombed a bridge with a train upon it, leading to heavy loss of civilian life. One Air Force officer described Kosovo as "rolling thunder with PGMs," noting that the highly political nature of the endeavor recalled the 1960s era of Washington control with 1990s technology.

Some interservice feuding followed the Kosovo operation when the Air Force announced presentation of 115 Bronze Star Medals to personnel elsewhere in Europe and the United States. Because at that time the Army (with more personnel in-theater than the Air Force) had presented few medals, resentment was palpable. However, the Department of the Air Force insisted that regulations permitted presentation of medals for "combat support" functions in Allied Force. Clearly, however, medal inflation was endemic and not about to be cured. One Air Force sergeant with six rows of ribbons confessed that he had never been stationed outside the continental United States.

On the night of June 25, 1996, a truck bomb detonated with immense force at Khobar Towers near Dhaharan, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen Air Force personnel were killed and 370 people injured in the nocturnal attack by Hezbollah terrorists. The Chief of Staff, General Ron Fogleman, launched two investigations that absolved Brigadier General Terry Schwalier, the Southwest Asia area commander, of culpability. Fogleman felt that Schwalier had not been provided adequate information on the capability of truck bombs, especially since the Khobar Towers explosion was far larger than any anticipated. However, a Department of Defense investigation concluded that Schwalier was negligent in security measures.

General Fogleman felt so strongly about Schwalier's situation that the chief took early retirement in protest. Fogleman, who had previously demonstrated both support of subordinates and a willingness to fire lax generals, became one of a handful of senior officers to take a stand on principle. He felt that Khobar Towers could not have been prevented with the level of intelligence available at the time, and stood by Schwalier.

Walter J. Boyne, USAF (ret.) Series Editor, Barrett Tillman. Desert Storm and Beyond. Alpha Bravo Delta Guide to the U.S. Air Force. Alpha Books. 2003.

Consider What It Takes To Get Fuel From One Plane To Another

For almost a century now aviators have dreamed of staying in the air longer than is possible on a single tank of gasoline. Larger fuel tanks and more efficient engines can help, but only so far. The basic problem is weight. A gallon of aviation fuel weighs about six and a half pounds. That’s enough to keep the 1909 Wright Signal Corps airplane in the air for 16 minutes, a World War II B-24 for 18 seconds, and a modern F-15 fighter for about 6 seconds. Unfortunately, carrying a large fuel load makes a plane slow and sluggish; beyond a certain point, it can make the plane too heavy to take off. In any case, fuel decreases the weight available to carry cargo or bombs. To keep flying on extended missions, aircraft need to receive more fuel while they are in the air.

But consider what it takes to get fuel from one plane to another while both are flying. They must ease into a tight formation at high speed and hold their positions, even in bad weather, poor visibility, or gusting winds. Then the plane carrying the extra fuel—the tanker—must get a hose to the other plane. The crew receiving the fuel needs to connect the hose to their fuel tank in a way that will keep the flammable liquid contained. As the fuel flows, staying in formation grows more challenging because the tanker gets lighter, which makes it rise, and the receiving plane gets heavier, which makes it sink. Still the pilots must keep the planes flying close and at the same speed. Once the fuel has been delivered, the flow must be turned off before the hose is disconnected. Only then can the two planes fly off on their own.

By the end of 1950 SAC needed a faster tanker, one that could keep up with Boeing’s B-47 Stratojet bomber. At that time the aeronautics industry offered few planes that were large enough to serve as tankers and fast enough to keep up with the jet-age military. To get more tanker speed, SAC selected Boeing’s KC-97 Stratofreighter, which was based on the B-29. The KC-9 7 could outrun previous tankers, but its maximum speed when fully loaded still lagged behind a B-47’s minimum speed. Consequently, some refuelings between a KC-97 and a B-47 demanded a so-called toboggan maneuver, in which the tanker flies at a downward angle to pick up speed and the jet follows along the same path while reducing its thrust. Besides being hard to coordinate, the toboggan maneuver wasted fuel. The receiving plane could end up using half the fuel it had taken on just to get back to its former altitude.

A dramatic demonstration of the potential of refueling occurred on September 28, 1952. On that day Lt. Col. Harry W. Dorris took off from Yokota Air Force Base, in Japan, in an F-80 that was equipped with a 265-gallon fuel tank on each wingtip, and a probe to refill it. Soon after takeoff Dorris refueled at 15,000 feet because his heavy load of armaments! had demanded a light load of fuel just to get airborne. Then he flew to Kilchu, North Korea, where he dropped his two 500-pound bombs on a four-story building that contained enemy supplies. After that he refueled. Next he flew to the Onjin Peninsula and shot his four 6-inch rockets at a supply dump. Reduced to only the 50-caliber ammunition of his machine guns, he strafed a troop bivouac near Yangdok, in central North Korea. Completely out of ammunition, he flew reconnaissance. He refueled for the final time at night and ended his flight after 14 hours and 15 minutes.

In spite of successes like these, compatibility issues arose, especially when a probe-equipped fighter ran low on fuel with only a boom-equipped tanker in sight. In hopes of resolving that dilemma, SAC wanted a single system: boom or drogue. But no consensus could be reached. Pilots of fighters, which are small and maneuverable, preferred the drogue, which was simpler to use and weighed less. Pilots of large heavy bombers liked the boom, which required less attention from the receiving plane’s pilot and could pass more fuel per minute.

The most serious problem with tankers, however, continued to be speed and altitude. Early tankers could not fly as high as the improving fighters and bombers of the day. SAC needed a new tanker, something fast that could fly high, but the government did not offer any development money. Still, Boeing’s president, Bill Allen, knew that the military needed a new tanker, and he wanted to build it.

On March 26, 1952, Allen sent a memo to his division heads, asking if they thought they could fly a prototype jet transport in just two years. Jim Barton in Boeing’s cost-accounting group said it would cost $13 to $15 million. On April 22 Boeing’s board of directors unanimously approved $15 million for Project X, or the Model 367-80, better known as the Dash-80. This project posed an enormous risk, for the military had not described the specific performance details that it wanted, and the $15 million investment represented more than twice Boeing’s profits from 1951. Although the plane had civilian uses as well, if the Dash-80 failed as a tanker, Boeing could fail too.

At SAC’s Requirements Conference in November 1953, General LeMay called for 200 jet tankers. The Air Force announced a design competition for a jet tanker on May 5, 1954, and invited Boeing, Convair, Douglas, Fairchild, Lock—heed, and Martin to participate. At that point Boeing’s leaders could only forge ahead with the Dash-80, which had its first successful flight test on July 15, and pray that it would win the competition.

On August 3, 1954, with the jet-tanker design competition still in progress, the Air Force decided to buy interim tankers. The Air Force Secretary, Harold E. Talbott, announced an order to buy 29 tankers from Boeing. Less than two weeks later the Air Force said it would buy 88 more Boeing tankers. It looked as if Boeing was set to win the competition, but it didn’t. In February 1955 the Air Force announced that Lockheed had won the competition and at least one of its tankers would be funded for construction. In the very same announcement, however, Talbott said the Air Force would buy an additional 169 tankers from Boeing. Eventually it canceled Lockheed’s paper proposal.

Boeing called its Dash-80 tanker version the KC-135. It improved several capabilities over previous tankers. It carried 31,200 gallons for refueling, whereas the KC-97 (previously called the C-97) carried only 8,513. And it could refuel planes at 35,000 feet, nearly twice the altitude ceiling of the KC-97. It also used Boeing’s flying boom.

Even with the advent of the KC135, refueling battles continued. SAC used the boom, the Navy and the Marines stuck with the probe and drogue, and the Air Force used both. It could be confusing and dangerous when planes low on fuel called for a tanker and had to ask if it was a mama—meaning it had a drogue—or a papa—meaning a boom. The KC-135 could add a drogue adapter, but only when on the ground.

Despite this never-ending battle over hardware, tankers played an enormous role in Vietnam. By mid-1967 they had begun refueling helicopters in addition to planes, greatly extending the copters’ range and allowing them to support more rescues and special missions. Vietnam also saw the first aerial refueling of large numbers of planes on demand during battle. To accomplish this, the military developed Air Refueling Control Points, or ARCPs, at which tanker pilots flew around an oval at least 100 miles long. Sometimes whole fleets of tankers used the same ARCP, and 50 or more could line up. When that happened, receivers arranged themselves in cells separated by 4,000 vertical feet—essentially waiting in line for gas.

In 1966 alone, KC-135 crews received credit for saving 53 planes that would have crashed without refueling. One of the most noted saves came in June, on the so-called Peanuts flight. Four F-105s, each carrying six 750-pound bombs, took off from Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base. The length of this mission called for refueling before and after bombing. The jets got their first refueling and then hit the northeast railroad that ran from Hanoi to China. During the bombing the F-105s encountered heavy flak and then dogfighting with MiGs. They used more fuel than expected and couldn’t even climb to a safer height for return. They called for refueling, and a KC-135, which was defenseless, headed into MiG territory.

The F-105s overran the tanker and flew back for it to catch them. Then the tanker overran them, and the F-105s used afterburners to catch up. Peanuts 4, flown by Capt. Ralph Beardsley, showed only 100 pounds of fuel and got on the boom first. Regulations prohibit refueling during turns, but Beardsley needed fuel so desperately that he made contact during a 30-degree banked turn, grabbed some fuel, and got back into line. The gauge for Peanut Lead, piloted by Capt. Ray Lewis, then read zero, so he got on next. Eventually all four pilots fueled up and flew home. The pilot of Peanuts 3, Ken Kerkering, wrote: “This tanker went far beyond the call of duty by flying into hostile territory to reach us, and without him the four of us in Peanuts flight, at best, would have been running around in the jungle.”

In the mid-1970s the Air Force started looking for a replacement for the KC-135. It came from the McDonnellDouglas DC-10, which was dubbed the KC-10 in its tanker version. This new tanker joined the Air Force on March 17, 1981. It included both a boom and a probe-and-drogue system, so it could refuel any plane in the U.S. military fleet. According to Boots McCormick, “Refueling behind a KC-10 is very stable. It is so big it almost drags you.” KC-10s made possible America’s retaliatory raid on Libya following a terrorist bombing in 1986. In the longest fighter mission ever flown, 18 F-IlIs were sent 5,000 nautical miles from their base in England to Libya and back (a flight made longer when France, cooperative as usual, refused to let the planes fly through French airspace). The raid was conducted in complete radio silence, and one of the F-111 pilots had never even seen a KC-10 before, but the refuelings went off without a hitch.

Both the KC-10 and the KC-135 worked hard during the 1991 Gulf War, in which tankers completed more than 85,000 refuelings, pumping more than 1.2 billion pounds (185 million gallons) of fuel. The postwar Air Power Survey stated: “The success of the aerial attacks also depended on the ability to mass formations of aircraft, made possible by an extensive network of aerial refueling KC-135 aircraft.”

Piloting tankers remains a risky job. Early in the Afghan conflict a KC-130 Hercules tanker crashed in the mountains of Pakistan, killing all seven Marines on board. In the landlocked battles of Afghanistan and Iraq, everything moves by air, and that demands tankers to keep the planes moving. Nevertheless, U.S. forces rely on only about 60 KC-10s and 550 KC-135s, which by military standards are antiques, if not dinosaurs. In fact, as lain Murray of UPI recently wrote, “The U.S. government operates over 80 percent of the 1950s-era 707-class aircraft still flying today, largely due to the tanker fleet.”

Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche told Air Force magazine, “My fear is that our tanker fleet could be the [lost] horseshoe nail that could cause the horse to tumble, the king to fall, and the kingdom to come apart.” The Air Force plans to convert Boeing 767s for use as tankers, though the program is being held up by accusations of wasteful spending. Whatever the outcome of this debate, the durability of the current tanker fleet shows how well designed they were for an unglamorous but indispensable job that allows America to project overwhelming airpower to the remotest parts of the earth.

21st Century U.S. Air Power Veronico & Dunn. The battle to protect America's global interests is increasingly being waged from the air, as high-tech aircraft employ sophisticated radar systems and weapons to pinpoint targets and flush out the enemy. From the skies over Kosovo to the mountains of Afghanistan and the deserts of Iraq, the finest fighters, bombers, and support craft from the USAF defend our freedom.

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