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Standard Operating Procedures

On his eightieth birthday, Maurice Chevalier is supposed to have been asked how it felt to reach that advanced milestone. "Not bad," was the quick reply, "especially when I consider the alternative." We have a good many years to go before reaching eighty but not quite as many, alas, as have passed since we were twenty years of age.

We have been led to these chronological thoughts, of course, through our pondering of the twenty-five years that have passed since the end of World War Il, the years that are examined in some detail in this special issue of AIR FORCE Magazine. What really shook us was the realization that a youngster born on V-J Day could very well be a captain today.

All this is not to indicate any deep worry about approaching senility on our part. It is rather the result of suddenly realizing that the past quarter of a century has been a truly momentous one, with the pace of change accelerating at a rate that one neither noticed nor assessed at the time events actually were occurring. Take technology alone. The revolution began with nuclear fission, which ended the war. Then in rapid succession came the transition from a piston-powered Air Force to jet propulsion, air-to-air refueling on a mss scale, supersonic flight as a part of daily oporational routine, intercontinental ballistic missiles and space exploration - all these along with incredibly giant leaps in electronics, communications, computerization, materials, fabrication, and all of the technological underpinning that transforms the minor miracles of yesterday into tomorrow's standard operating procedures.

The lesson is, of course. that we cannot predict with confidence where new technology will take us. We can be sure only that it will be further, in different directions, and at a wildly faster pace than we ever could conceive at any given point in time. And in recognizing this truth, we cannot forget that technology is apolitical. It follows no flags; it owes no ideological allegiances. It cares not which master it serves, nor whether it be bent toward good or toward evil ends. It will work for anyone who has the wit, the will, and the resources to employ it.

Even less susceptible to forecasting are the operational exigencies of the years ahead. In looking back, as we are, over twenty-five years, we observe with some trepidation that the big plays were never in the game plan. The Berlin Airlift was an improvisation - although admittedly a masterly one. The Korean War was another "play-it-by-ear" affair. And Vietnam - well, it was no sudden shock but a slow and unforeseen enwebment. And, while it is all well and good to blame the politicians for bad decisions, or to credit the Communists with superior cunning and dedication, the fact remains that thinking about the unthinkable is a sine qua non for the future because it very often is the unthinkable that happens. The only certainty is uncertainty or, to quote the famous Murphy's Law, "Anything that can go wrong, will."

Where, then, can one look for a constant in the equation? Perhaps it is man himself, the human element. But is this really true? With due respect to all of us relics of World War II vintage, a strong case can be made that today's crop of Americans generally is of higher quality than that of our generation. Certainly they are better educated, or at least more educated. They are harder working intellectually and, if not physically, it is because our generation has reduced the requirement. They are more dedicated, although not always to the kinds of causes we would like them to follow. They may be less obedient, less susceptible to discipline, but at the same time are more inquisitive, more demandim-, of new and better reasons for obedicnce and discipline. These attitudes may pose new problems for those charged with weaving this new breed into a military framework, but we should remember that in both World Wars the independent nature of the American soldier was put forth as a great military benefit, and there is no reason this cannot continue to be true.

Fortunately. the intellectual capabilities of the professional Air Force officer corps have progressed along with the accumulation of new challenges and more complicated requirements. Once again, no derogation of past leadership is implied or intended. It was more than sufficient for its time. But the new crop of leaders, with its higher educational levels and great reservoir of operational experience, should be able to close any generation gap that presently may exist.

We older types, therefore, have no reason to be up tight about the future of our Air Force. In 1799 a philosopher named G. C. Lichtenbera wrote: "How do we spend our old age? In defending opinions, not because we believe them to be true, but simply because we once said they were." We must resolve never to let this be said about us.

John F. Loosbrock, Editor. The Only Certainty Is Uncertainty. Air Force Magazine. September 1970.

Necessary, Accepted, Honored

Despite the hardships of life in the operational units, people did stay on year after year, and there was public recognition of the sacrifices made by our airmen. They were a necessary, accepted, and honored part of American society during the hottest days of the cold war. Those also were the days of military construction projects that staggered the imagination: the SAC bases in Morocco, the DEW Line radar sites in the far north, and construction of the ICBM sites - the greatest earthmoving project of all time.

The need for instant combat readiness, efficient management of very expensive equipment, and the responsibility that goes with vastly destructive nuclear weapons, brought about far-reaching changes in organizational and command arrangements. Support functions were consolidated rather than decentralized at squadron level as they had once been. Standardization was a watchword, and the position of squadron commander in most units became principally that of a scheduler of aircraft and crews. The number of command assignments, in the traditional sense of the word, decreased proportionately, and the potential for seasoning a young officer by rotation through duties in squadron supply, maintenance, mess, and so on, largely disappeared. It became an age of specialization. Broadening experience was gained to a great extent vicariously through professional schools, though Tactical Air Command's return to the self-contained squadron may make this less true for some Air Force people.

The requirement for operational efficiency also tended to keep many Air Force people in the same command year after year. To some indeterminable degree this "professionalism within a profession" encouraged compartmentalized thinking about the uses of aerospace power, though that never appeared to create a serious problem. In any event, the buildup of TAC and MAC forces after 1961, and the concurrent reduction of ADC squadron and SAC bomber units as missile forces grew in size, has resulted in a rather thorough shuffling of Air Force people among the operational commands.

As both total capital investment and unit value grew (the cost of a bomber has increased by at least 800 percent since the end of World War II) the old management practices would no longer do. The Air Force became a pioneer in the use of computers to manage everything from supplies to maintenance schedules. It innovated, borrowed from business and industry, and in turn contributed much to civilian management practices. The comptroller became as indispensable to a ccmmander as was his director of operations. The Air Foice grew more businesslike and in a sense more like business. But it has not made the mistake of looking at itself as a business rather than as a unique profession, an instrument of both national defense and international diplomacy.

A Cosmopolitan Character

With the growth of American commitments since 1949, Air Force life took on a cosmopolitan character that it had not known before. Prior to World War II, "overseas" meant the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, or Alaska. Later it came to mean any of nearly 100 countries where Air Force people were stationed. There is hardly an Air Force family that has not had at least one tour of duty in Europe or the Far East.

Finally, the overcentralization of decision-making and the downgrading of military advice that were characteristic of the McNamara era appear to have ended. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has strongly supported decentralization of management. By allowing the military a voice in determining where painfully deep cuts will be taken, Mr. Laird has achieved the not inconsiderable feat of retaining the willing support of the military while reducing the defense budget to a level that most military men believe to be risky, at best.

With the passage of time, the Air Force as a whole has attained the maturity of outlook, the responsible professionalism shown by its early leaders - a professionalism that befits the principal custodians of the nation's greatest aggregate of military power. Gone is some of the fire and early, unbridled enthusiasm that were important ingredients in creating the world's most powerful military force out of the shambles that followed World War Il. Gone are some of the amenities that made military life peculiarly attractive. Gone is the exclusiveness of the long-ago airmen who fired the imagination of an earlier generation. But who would say that the judgment, experience, and staying power of the professional is a lesser asset to the country than the faith and visions of the pioneer?

In September 1970, the Air Force, along with other military services, faces another period of uncertainty. While the US has been preoccupied by Vietnam, the wide margin of strategic nuclear superiority we held in the mid-1960s has been allowed to slip away. As the value of the US strategic deterrent in any situation except a direct attack on the United States has shrunk, the USSR becomes increasingly aggressive in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and North Africa.

Concurrently, domestic problems of crisis proportion have diverted public attention from the growing Soviet and Red Chinese threats, and resources from the defense area. This situation has grown more serious, since heavy Soviet investment in research and development threatens to give USSR technological superiority within the next few years. The whole of this is exacerbated by antimilitary sentiment that springs largely from the frustrations of the long and unpopular war in Vietnam.

Unanswered Questions

Several questions that bear on the future of the Air Force cannot be answered now. Will the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks bring about a neutralization of the strategic nuclear forces of both sides? If so, will that serve as a further stimulus to Soviet expansion, backed by conventional forces, or prosecuted by Communist proxies? How much further will US defense budgets be cut? Will there be enough military resources available to fulfill our international commitments? If not, must we look forward to a gradual decline of US influence and to abrogation of our position as a superpower, with all that implies for the economic, political, and cultural future of this nation?

And finally, what is to be the position of the Air Force in the American political/social structure? What will be the impact of the Fitzhugh Committee report on organization of the Department of Defense, and on Air Force relationship to the other services? Will it be regarded as a necessary evil - or as an essential good? This question is much in the minds of American airmen who have held an honored position in a society that believed its secure and prosperous condition was largely attributable to the power and readiness of its aerospace forces and to the dedication of its military men and women.

One thing, at least, is certain. The Air Force of 1970 stands at a level of professional competence unequaled in its history. The members of this Association, who have supported the Air Force through good times and bad for nearly a quarter of a century, can look back with pride and satisfaction on their part in building the aerospace power of the United States Air Force.

John L. Frisbee, Senior Editor, Plans and Policy. The Panorama Unfolds. Air Force Magazine. September 1970.

Into the Wild Blue Yonder: My Life in the Air Force In 1943, the author left college for Lackland Air Field to learn to fly. By the time he retired as a lieutenant colonel in 1969, he had flown everything from BT-13s and B-24s to B-52s and C-47s. Here, he recalls running an AT-17 into a dry lakebed, a B-25 crashing into a stockade and a B-47 mission that almost ended tragically. In short, this is an account of a typical career as an air force officer, complete with frustrations, moral dilemmas, and the occasional harrowing experience.

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