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Cuban Missile Crisis

We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.

Dean Rusk, President John F. Kennedy's Secretary of State, said it softly in the tensed hush of the Cabinet Room of the White House. It was Wednesday afternoon, October 24, 1962, and the gathering had just heard that some Russian ships headed for Cuba had altered course. It was the first indication that the Russians were beginning to ease the pressure of the Cuban confrontation.

It was another of the potential head-on collisions that had marked the post-war years. But it was a far more serious crisis than any before it, because it involved the presence of Russian nuclear-tipped intermediate-range ballistic missiles sited in Cuba and capable of blanketing most of the United States. Their presence had been discovered by daring photo-reconnaissance of the island, one of the means that the U. S. had for keeping an eye on possible enemies.

Cuba had been a thorn in the side of the U. S. ever since Fidel Castro took power January 2, 1959. The United States broke diplomatic relations with the island, and in April, 1961, encouraged, supplied and then failed to support an invasion by exiles.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco loosed an avalanche of arms from Cuba's new protector, the Soviet Union. Everything from pistols to artillery, MiG-15s to MiG-21s, motor torpedo boats and coastal patrol ships had been delivered. Following a July, 1962, visit to Moscow by Raul Castro, then Defense Minister, there was a noticeable upturn in the volume of shipping reaching Cuba. The harbors of Havana and Mariel were crowded. Strangely, the Russians kept all Cubans away from the docks during the off-loading, and handled the heavy work with their own deckhands and stevedores.

Some Cuban refugees reported seeing things that looked like rockets; others, with some technical skills, were able to make sketches in sufficient detail to confirm what had been only a suspicion. The Russians had brought anti-aircraft missiles to Cuba.

Ever since the break in diplomatic relations, Cuba had been the subject for an occasional reconnaissance flight by one of the CIA's Lockheed U-2 aircraft. The Cubans were able to identify, but not intercept, the gray planes. They knew that a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers had been shot down by a Russian missile on May 1. 1960, and they probably pointed out to the Russian advisers that Cuba ought to have the same opportunity, in order to prevent further incursions of Cuban airspace and reconnaissance of the island.

A U-2 mission was routed over the suspected areas of missile deployment August 29, 1962, and it brought back the first photographic evidence of the missile sites. At least two were positively identified, and six others looked suspiciously like anti-aircraft missile batteries. In a third section of Cuba, the photos showed a short-range coastal defense missile battery, the type used against an invading force or a pro-invasion naval action.

The U-2 overflights were scheduled for September 5, 17, 26 and 29, and October 5 and 7. Each one brought back more information: Three new SAM sites and three more cruise missile sites were spotted. What the U-2s could not photograph was the arrival of offensive ballistic missiles. They reached Cuban ports about September 8, and were off-loaded and moved at night for concealment.

Photo-interpreters scanned the many U-2 pictures and discovered that the SAM sites were part of a familiar pattern. They had seen pictures of the layout before, taken over Russia. It was a launching site for mobile medium-range ballistic missiles, and the SAM sites were located to defend them. Further, the antiaircraft missiles were on launchers, ready for firing.

It was a new ball game. There was a potential risk of losing a U-2 and another Powers incident. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara made the decision to have further U-2 flights made by USAF pilots from Strategic Air Command. It was a fine distinction; the U-2 pilots employed by the CIA were all recent transfers from the military services, and ostensibly civilians.

After a quick checkout in the U-2, Majors Rudolf Anderson, Jr., and Richard S. Heyser, of SAC's 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Laughlin AFB, Texas, climbed into the polished gray airplanes October 14. They flew southeast, made their landfalls, and then crossed the island on coordinated flight paths that covered the suspect area around San Cristobal in detail and duplicate. Both were within range of the Cuban SAMs at times, but neither was fired upon.

The U-2s carried back pictures of a medium-range ballistic missile field site. Seven missiles were on parked transporters outside of shelters, and an eighth was parked next to one of the four erectors on the site. Propellant loading equipment was standing by. At a second site, the cameras caught six missile transporters that had been parked in the shade, and a Russian truck convoy moving into the site.

Now the reconnaissance task became two-fold. It had to photograph all of Cuba from high altitude, pinpointing existing sites and at the same time searching for others under construction. When specific objectives had been located by this technique, low-flying reconnaissance aircraft would be dispatched to get detailed pictures.

SAC moved the 4080th SRW to Florida, and both Navy and Tactical Air Command reconnaissance wings were alerted that their services might be required. SAC's deployment was only part of a feverish activity as bomber, reconnaissance and fighter units headed for Air Force bases in Florida. Squadrons of North American F-100s and Lockheed F-104s poured into Homestead AFB, southwest of Miami. More F-100s and the available force of Republic F-105s headed for McCoy AFB, already crowded with an operational SAC B-47 wing. Air Defense Command deployed some of its Convair F-106A strength to Patrick AFB. TAC's 4th Fighter Wing moved in its entirety from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, to MacDill AFB, near Tampa, and the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing came down from Shaw AFB, South Carolina.

The tactical fighters were ordered to stand by for a strike against Cuba, if needed. All of SAC's missile crews went on maximum alert, with 156 ICBMs cocked and ready to launch. Gen. Thomas S. Power, SAC commander, dispersed the B-47 force to 40 civilian airports, and ordered the B-52s to maintain an airborne alert. All the bombers were loaded with nuclear weapons.

SAC U-2s flew 2 sorties between October 14, the date of the first confirmation of the ballistic missile deployment, and October 22. The photography was excellent and frightening. Nine missile sites had been discovered at four separated locations. Mobile medium-range ballistic missiles armed six of those sites, and intermediate-range missiles were slated for the remaining three. The latter were still under construction, and were fixed launch pads rather than the field sites used by the mobile missiles.

Intelligence specialists concluded that the weapons had nuclear warheads, and that they could be launched in an intial salvo of 40 against targets as far west as Wyoming and Montana. They estimated that full operational capability would be reached by mid-December, 1962. Of lesser, but still significant importance, was a force of Ilyushin Il-28 light jet bombers, which had enough range to attack targets in the southeastern United States with tactical nuclear weapons.

President Kennedy spoke October 22, describing the Cuban situation and detailing the measures against the threat: a quarantine of the island, increased surveillance, and a readiness to retaliate. He announced that U. S. dependents were being evacuated from the base at Guantanamo Bay. He asked the Organization of American States and the United Nations Security Council to meet and discuss the problem.

The next day, low-level reconnaissance flights began, shared by the USAF McDonnell RF-101Cs from the 363rd TRW and Navy Vought RF-8s from Light Photographic Squadron 62. Leaving Florida, they dropped down close to the level of the Gulf waters to stay under the Cuban radar screen, the popped up at the shoreline to roar in just above the treetops, nose cameras cycling. One pilot said he surprised some Russians playing volley ball; he was so low, he insisted, that he almost collided with the ball.

Every two hours either a Navy or a USAF low-level reconnaissance flight sped across the island, photographing the missile sites. The Russian reaction was concealment and the deployment of anti-aircraft artillery. Pilots reported flak bursts, but none was wounded and essentially no damage was done to the hurtling reconnaissance planes.

High-altitude coverage continued to bring hack evidence of work progress at launch pads and field sites, and also photos of MiG-21 interceptors parked along the runway at Santa Clara airfield and on the ramp at Camilo Cienfuegos. On the 24th, the first evidence of an easing of tensions came when some of the shipping altered course. The impatient Kennedy told the Russians October 25 that if they continued to emplace the offensive missiles,” .... further action will be justified."

The action came from the Russians. At 10:15 AM October 27, Maj. Anderson was shot down and killed. His U-2 had been hit by one of the SAMs. That was bad enough; but the situation rapidly got worse. Another U-2, on what was described as a high-altitude sampling flight in the Arctic, became lost and flew into Russian airspace. Red-starred fighters were scrambled to intercept, and the USAF sent fighters from Eileson AFB in Alaska to find the errant U-2 and escort it back home. Instructions were broadcast to the U-2 in the clear, an unprecedented event, giving the pilot specific headings to steer. Fortunately, the U-2 turned back; Kennedy included an apology for the incident in his next message to Khrushchev.

Kennedy's letter was delivered personally to the Soviet Embassy by the President's brother, Robert, who took advantage of the opportunity to remind Ambassador Dobrynin that the U. S. was ready to begin military action early the next week.

An invasion force of Army and Marine Corps units had been assembled and moved to Florida and the Canal Zone. Thousands of tons of supplies and equipment had been airlifted by Tactical Air Command's combat airlift squadrons to the bases. They were manned by Air Force Reserve officers and crews, called up by McNamara to operate their 24 Troop Carrier Squadrons.

On October 28, Moscow Radio broadcast a statement that the USSR had ordered the dismantling of " . . . arms which you described as offensive . . . " beginning the following day. The next afternoon, two McDonnell RF-101Cs taxied out for takeoff. Lt. Col. Joseph M. O'Grady and wingman Capt. Jack C. Bowland, from the 29th TRS, took off at 3:00 PM, headed for San Cristobal. Two hours and ten minutes later they landed back at MacDill with pictures showing that the Russians had made good on their promise and were removing the equipment and dismantling the sites.

The missiles were trucked to the harbors and loaded on cargo ships. At-sea inspections were made from the air, as reconnaissance aircraft tracked the departing vessels and photographed their opened hatches and uncovered deck cargos. But back on the airfields, the bombers remained, and Kennedy decided to twist the screws a little harder.

So did Castro. It was clear that Khrushchev had not consulted him before agreeing to remove the missiles. The Il-28 aircraft were Cuban, Castro said, and he was not going to give them up. But on November 20, Khrushchev agreed with Kennedy and the planes were recrated and shipped as deck cargo from Cuba. By December 4, San Julian airfield had been cleared of Il-28s; they were the last remnants of Soviet offensive weaponry in Cuba. The confrontation was over.

In retrospect, it was a very close thing. The Russians, it must be said, had as much right on their side as the United States had. American Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles were emplaced in Turkey, a country sharing a border with Russia, and to Russian eyes they were just as threatening as Russian missiles in Cuba were to U. S. eyes.

Intelligence analysts had first speculated that Khrushchev was attempting to work out a trade of the Cuban-based missiles for the Turkey-based ones. But Kennedy and the administration denied any such compromise with the chairman. Yet within three months after the Russian withdrawal of their missilies, the U. S. brought back its Thor IRBMs from England, and announced that the Jupiter missiles would be leaving Italy. The Turkish government announced a few days later that Jupiters would depart from that country also.

The Cuban crisis emphasized the high value of current and continuing reconnaissance and surveillance. That was the most outstanding performance of the whole Cuban maneuver. McNamara admitted later that there was neither enough airlift capacity nor tactical fighter strength to have supported the planned invasion properly.

By November 28, the regulars had gone back to the routine of USAF life, and the Reserve units were released that day. Some time later, Congress asked McNamara for a cost estimate for the Cuban affair. The Secretary, in his inimitable fashion, put together a lengthy table, allocating so many dollars to each of the services for operations, research and development, procurement, maintenance and salaries. The total came to $183,259,048.

David A. Anderton. Keeping an Eye on the Enemy. The History of the U.S. Air Force. Crescent Books. 1981.

50 Years of the U-2 The Complete Illustrated History of Lockheed's Legendary "Dragon Lady". Pocock. From first flight in 1955, through Cold War missions over the Soviet Union and Cuba, to 21st century service over Afghanistan and Iraq, this is the complete, complex history of the unique U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Based on 250 interviews and more than 1,000 declassified documents, it even reveals how the U-2 has been improved, enlarged, and put back into production - twice!

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