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Keeping Our Eyes & Ears Open

It was apparent early in the Cold War, if it had not been completely apparent in World War II, that Russian progress and capabilities in warfare would not be easy to assess. They were reluctant to publish their prowess in aeronautical science or missile technology. They attended no international conferences in science or research. And a long history of national paranoia, going back to the early Czars, added to the difficulty of learning anything through open means about the Soviet military might.

Right after World War II, the United States enjoyed, if that is the right word, the atomic monopoly. Technically, U.S. aircraft were far superior to Russian types. Dealing from that strength, the intelligence gatherers decided to take advantage of the performance of American planes and use them to go look at the Russians, photograph whatever installations could be seen, and monitor electronic transmissions.

The redesignated and reactivated 72nd Reconnaissance Squadron (Very Long Range, Photographic) began operations at Ladd Field, Alaska, in October 1947. It was an unusual unit; its equipment was a dozen Boeing F-13A aircraft, the photo-reconnaissance versions of the B-29, and a half-dozen - the only halfdozen-Boeing B-29F models.

Boeing lists the B-29F as a standard model that was winterized for Arctic tests. The tests were of long-range reconnaissance, and the B-29F was quite a different airplane from the ones that had bombed Japan. In addition to being winterized, and carrying the red-tipped wings and tail Arctic markings, the F models were some 10,000 pounds lighter, and were stripped of all their defensive armament systems and bomb racks. They had additional fuel capacity, and their engines had been hand-picked by conscientious crew chiefs. They could stay in the air for 33 hours, and spent a lot of that time at altitudes around 40,000 feet.

They were among the first to fly surveillance missions near, perhaps over, the territory of the Soviet Union. And there was nothing the Russians could do about it. Their interceptors were helpless at altitude, and the Russian pilots then couldn't handle the weather problems that have plagued Arctic flying since its inception.

As electronic equipment became more capable and more discriminating, it offered an attractive complementary input to photographic reconnaissance. On days when the enemy could not be photographed because of the weather, they could be "seen" by radar, and the scope picture could be photographed. The enemy's radio message traffic could be monitored and analyzed, for further input, as could his radar transmissions.

All this had been done during World War II to some degree. As time and equipment progressed, electronic means came to be used more and more for reconnaissance. The most dangerous use of all was in ferret missions. Ferret missions are a deadly game of electronic warfare, in which real people are killed. The purpose of the game is to fly close enough to an enemy, and threateningly enough, to provoke a reaction. Generally, the first reaction is the use of search and height-finding radars. If the threat appears serious, missile-guidance or anti-aircraft radars may join in. Ground-control interception radars may be brought to bear, and all of this will be accompanied by message traffic, passing orders and observations.

The ferret airplane monitors, records and analyzes the enemy transmissions, sometimes jamming or countering them. It works both ways; the enemy, knowing the way the game is played, also may introduce deception and try to confuse or misguide the ferret. If the ferret can be lured into enemy territory, the enemy may very well try to shoot him down. That stops the missions and, by chance, delivers some new electronic warfare equipment to the enemy.

The first loss in ferret missions along the Russian coastlines was a Navy aircraft, probably a Lockheed P2V, shot down in the Baltic April 8, 1950. On October 7, 1952, a Boeing B-29, possibly from the redesignated (again) 72nd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (Photographic) was shot down six miles off Japan's northern island of Hokkaido.

These were the early casualties in the Cold War which often degenerated into a hot engagement. Not only ferret and reconnaissance aircraft were attacked; innocent commercial airliners were attacked, sometimes shot down, by Communist bloc fighters during those years. Air France, British European Airways, Cathay Pacific, El Al, KLM and Sabena all suffered losses ranging from a few casualties to the entire aircraft with passengers and crew.

In 1954 and again in 1955, Navy ferret missions were attacked. MiG-15s shot down a P2V over the Sea of Japan September 4, 1954, and attacked a second near the Bering Strait July 23, 1955. The latter got away to a forced landing in American territory. In September, 1958, the Russians apparently lured a Lockheed C-130, carrying a crew of 17, off its course in Turkey. It crossed the border into Soviet Armenia, and was shot down near Yerevan.

The Boeing RB-47E of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, Strategic Air Command, cruised high above the Barents Sea. Its usual three-man flight crew was augmented by three "Ravens" - electronic warfare specialists - in a capsule fitted in the B-47's bomb bay. The plane was on a ferret flight, probing the borders of Russian territory and monitoring the electronic transmissions from radars and communication systems.

Maj. Willard G. Palm's crew had left Brize Norton air base in England on a flight planned to parallel the coastline of the Kola peninsula, reported as the home base of Russian heavy bomber units. It was to turn northeast well off the pointed bill of Kanin peninsula, and turn northwest upon approaching Novaya Zemlya to return to base. The same area undoubtedly had been profiled earlier, and Palm's flight may have been the unlucky one that the Russians decided to use as an example.

At about 50 miles offshore, a pair of MiG-15s formed on the sweptwing Boeing, held for a minute, and then broke off to attack. Cannon fire flamed the B-47's left wing, and Palm ordered the bail-out. Co-pilot Capt. Bruce Olmstead and navigator Capt. John McKone ejected, got good chutes, landed in the sea, inflated their life rafts and were picked up later by a Russian trawler. Palm stayed with the airplane and apparently ditched; his body was recovered and returned by the Russians. The three ravens’ bodies were not found. Olmstead and McKone were released by the Russians January 25, 1961, and returned home.

That incident occured July 1, 1960; a similar incident happened again March 10, 1964, to the crew of a Douglas RB-66A. The light twin-jet reconnaissance bomber was available in at least two versions, one for photographic and the other for electronic reconnaissance.

It was operating out of a French base on a training flight and was heading toward the East German border. Its flight path was monitored by ground radar controllers, and they saw it make a feint toward the east. But it continued to fly eastward long after it should have turned back. The controllers transmitted a return code, but received no acknowledgment. Then they transmitted in the clear, adding a warning that the border was about to be crossed. That also was not acknowledged.

The plane was about 16 miles inside East Germany when it was intercepted by a fighter, probably an East German MiG-17. It hit the RB-66A on the first firing pass, and Capt. David Holland ordered the bail-out. Holland, Capt. Melvin J. Kessler and Lt. Harold W. Welch got out safely and were captured. Welch was returned March 21 because of injuries he had received; the other crewmen were returned March 28 after much negotiating between the U. S. and Russia. The crew was cleared of blame in a USAF inquiry, and the incident was officially claimed to have been caused by a faulty compass. It was a weak story; the RB-66A certainly had two, and probably three, compasses. It was being monitored and possibly directed by ground raclars. It was most probable that the Russians or East Germans, also very capable people, had jammed the communications and given the crew a false radar signal to steer by.

Of all the daring reconnaissance missions flown during those years, the best known and most remembered were the more than 400 sorties flown over the island of Cuba in late 1962. It was a time when the United States and Russia were very, very close to war.

David A. Anderton. Keeping an Eye on the Enemy. The History of the U.S. Air Force. Crescent Books. 1981.

By Any Means Necessary America's Secret Air War in the Cold War Burrows. The U.S. secretly flew missions against the Communist bloc during the Cold War in an effort to collect intelligence. Now see how these pilots were shot down, imprisoned and killed - all while their families grieved and the government looked the other way. Includes interviews with men who flew these missions, as well as with the families of those who never returned, all of whom want the story told.

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