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China's Momentum In Undersea Warfare

The PLAN’s first nuclear-powered attack submarine – of the Han class – was laid down in the mid-1960s but did not enter service until 1974. The first two of these five ships were troubled with serious propulsion defects, lacked basic weaponry and electronics, and were never entirely reliable. The latter members of the class displaced 5,550 tons submerged on a length of 295 feet, and in 1985, one of them made a submerged voyage of 84 days.

The maritime balance of power in the East Asian littoral is undergoing slow, but steady change in Beijing’s favor. Numerous indicators, including the imminent sea-trials of the first of China’s 2nd-generation nuclear submarines, the first serial production of its indigenous Song-class diesel boats, and the ongoing purchase from Russia of eight “Kilo”-class diesel submarines, all confirm PRC progress in undersea warfare across a broad front.

Because of a centuries-long history of neglect, incompetence, and defeat at sea, there is a strong tendency in Washington to rate the Chinese as poor mariners. The recent accident and loss of all hands onboard a Ming-class submarine in April 2003 only serves to reinforce these stereotypes. However, besides obvious safety lapses, the incident also shows that the submarine force of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is engaged in a vigorous program of realistic at-sea training, under battle-like conditions. Moreover, despite this recent mishap, the appointment of Admiral Zhang Dingfa – a nuclear-trained submariner – to head the PLAN suggests growing momentum in undersea warfare.

Indeed, it was the emerging “ASW problem that we have out there in the Western Pacific,” that moved Pacific Fleet Commander ADM Walter Doran to call on the U.S. Navy to “rededicate ourselves to getting back into [the ASW] business.” With undersea operations a key element of China’s emerging maritime strategy, the U.S. submarine community must learn more about this prospective competitor. Since the origins and development of any large and complex institution over time will have a strong influence on its future evolution, this article reviews the known history of the PLAN submarine force.

200 Submarines for Imperial China

Following the humiliating Opium War of the mid-19th century, China faced continual encroachment from Western nations, and total defeat at the hands of the “upstart” Japanese in 1895. The occupation of Beijing by an alliance of powers in 1900 only added insult to injury. China’s profound maritime weakness, however, encouraged surprisingly bold thinking about emerging technologies for undersea warfare. Over the last decades of the 19th century, Chinese leaders attempted vainly to gain the support of foreign powers, particularly Britain and France, for constructing a modern navy. In 1915, a former U.S. naval attaché, CDR Irvin Gillis, arranged for the visit of Vice-Admiral Wei Han and 30 Chinese student officers to Groton, Connecticut to observe submarine building and operations. According to one account, Wei Han “delighted [Electric Boat] officials by announcing that China needed a fleet of 200 submarines.” An initial purchase of 12 vessels was inked, and plans for training Chinese crews were put into place. Unfortunately for China’s navy – and for Electric Boat – these agreements collapsed as the imperial regime gradually gave way to the so-called warlord era.

Years of desultory internecine warfare among the warlords were followed by a period of growing consolidation during the late 1920s and early 1930s under the leadership of the Chinese nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek. Submarines continued to be of significant interest. Chiang attempted to purchase German submarines in 1934 and hired a German naval advisor. Although nothing materialized, Chiang did succeed in sending a number of young naval officers to Germany for training on submarine technology. Some of these officers would later rise to prominence in the PLAN. After these false starts, China finally received its first two submarines from the British after World War II, but following the Communist civil war victory in 1949, China would look to Russia for submarine assistance.

Soviet-designed "Romeo”-class conventional attack submarines were produced in significant quantities by China between 1965 and the early 1980s, and the PLAN eventually had more than 60 of these boats in service. The "Romeo”s displaced 1,319 tons surfaced and 1,712 tons submerged on a length of 252 feet. China continues to produce the Ming class, which originally was simply a wider "Romeo”, but has been continuously upgraded with advanced quieting and weaponry.

Little Brother

In fact, close cooperation with Soviet submariners predated the Communist victory in China. Stalin’s Red Army had entered northern China during the final weeks of the war against Japan in mid-1945. By 1948, a significant force of 14 Soviet submarines patrolled the Yellow Sea, operating out of Lushun at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. In the fall of 1948, Chiang
Kai-Shek’s Kuo-Min Tang (KMT) faction, fielding a number of surface combatants, attempted to blockade Manchuria and insulate central China from Communist infiltration. This effort failed, probably because of intelligence on the KMT patrols from Soviet submarines, and when the Peolples Iberation Army (PLA) also succeeded in landing large contingents of Communist organizers on the nearby Shandong Peninsula, Chiang’s armies were soon defeated in central China.

The Communist Party approved the preliminary formation of a Chinese submarine force in June 1949, four months before the official founding of the PRC.

Mao Zedong’s focus on submarines reflected both his determination to end the “Chinese nation’s total failure to create maritime defenses” and the strong influence of the Soviet “New School” approach to maritime strategy. The doctrine was encapsulated in a three-character phrase to guide the PRC’s new navy: “Qian, Kong, Kuai” – “Submarines, [Land-Based] Aircraft, and Fast [Attack Patrol Boats].” In 1951, several hundred officers were selected from the ground forces to form the nucleus of the new submarine corps. Many were sent to study with the Soviet Pacific Fleet and trained aboard Soviet submarines. However, a year later, the submarine force suffered its first major institutional setback when the extraordinary demands of the stalemated Korean conflict forced the PLA to divert funds from shipbuilding to aircraft production.

Nonetheless, step-by-step progress under Soviet tutelage continued during the 1950s. Over the course of the decade, 275 Chinese students traveled to the USSR to study submarine building and operations. In 1953, the PLAN received its first submarines, (one M-class, and three S 1-class) from the USSR and founded the submarine academy at Qingdao. The following June, the PLAN declared its first, four-ship submarine squadron operational, although some authorities believe that submarines operating in the Yellow Sea before 1954 may well have had joint Sino-Soviet crews. On the whole, China’s initial submarine efforts were concentrated in the North Sea Fleet, probably to counter U.S. forces based in Japan. Mao’s recognition of the importance of the developing submarine force was underscored by his January 1956 visit to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai, where the PRC’s very first submarine was being built from a Soviet kit. China would eventually build 21 of these Soviet “Whiskey”-class boats.

As early as 1956, even before China had produced its first diesel boat, nuclear propulsion for submarines was adopted as a national priority by Mao himself. The daunting challenge that this entailed only became fully clear after Moscow refused Beijing’s explicit request to share nuclear propulsion technology, on the grounds that it would be premature for the PLAN. Foreshadowing the imminent souring of Sino-Soviet relations, Mao reacted indignantly: “We will have to build nuclear submarines even if it takes us 10,000 years.” In July 1958, the Politburo approved an ambitious plan to develop nuclear propulsion and an SLBM simultaneously.

China’s only SSBN, the Xia, was laid down in 1971 but only entered service in 1988. Displacing approximately 7,000 tons submerged on a length of 394 feet, she carries 12 Ju Lang-1 strategic missiles. The first of a new SSBN class, which will carry 16 JL-2 missiles, is already under construction and may be at sea as early as next year. The first of the indigenously designed and produced Song-class conventionally-powered attack submarines was launched in 1994, and the ships have entered series production. They displace 1,700 tons surfaced and 2,250 tons submerged on a length of 246 feet and can launch anti-ship cruise missiles while underwater. The PLAN ordered four "Kilo”-class diesel submarines from Russian in 1993, and all were delivered by 1998. In 2002, Beijing agreed to purchase eight more "Kilos”, with delivery scheduled for 2005-07. These very capable ships displace 2,350 tons surfaced and 3,126 tons submerged on a length of 242 feet, and they may be capable of firing the Russian SS-N-X-27 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.

Problematic Adolescence

By 1957, the year that culminated a “golden age” of relatively rational governance and steady development under the Communists, the Chinese had established a strong foundation for their submarine force. However, this period was followed by the gravely-destructive Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1958 and later by the Great Cultural Revolution (GCR) of 1966-69. These periods of tumult had lasting, deleterious effects on the PLAN submarine force.

Mao’s GLF was an attempt to accelerate China’s modernization process by turning away from the Soviet model of development in favor of an effort to harness the ideological will of the Chinese people. Accordingly, Mao rejected Khrushchev’s offer to create a joint Sino-Soviet fleet in exchange for a renewed Soviet naval presence in Chinese waters. As a result, Russia was prevented from locating submarine broadcast transmitters on the Liaodong peninsula, and China lost a unique opportunity to augment the strength and operational capabilities of the PLAN undersea force.

Moreover, the fiscal chaos that resulted from numerous irrational economic methods – ranging from community dining rooms to back-yard steel furnaces – quickly led to a famine that killed millions of Chinese during 1960-61. During the “three lean years” that followed, the government diverted resources away from the military in order to stave off total economic collapse. Naturally, the production of naval vessels, including the W-class submarines, was slowed considerably. Ship-building was also hindered by the sudden evacuation of all Soviet advisors in 1960 as the Sino-Soviet rift widened. Reportedly, operational readiness also suffered after the Soviet advisors pulled out, and there may have been an increase in submarine accidents. The extreme economic duress of the early 1960s nearly liquidated China’s nascent nuclear-propulsion program, but though pared back significantly, it continued to lurch forward.

China’s relations with the United States during this time were also very tense. In addition to testing its first atomic weapon in October 1964, Beijing was actively supporting North Vietnam in its escalating war. Just before the great rift opened between China and the USSR, the PLAN had received a kit and associated plans for a “Golf”-class ballistic missile submarine from the Soviets, and it was launched at Dalian in 1964. Washington was so perturbed by this development that a serious proposal was made – but subsequently rejected – to execute a preemptive attack against this vessel on its maiden voyage.

The Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s dealt another major shock to the Chinese submarine force during its troubled adolescence. Due to its reliance on technically skilled personnel and foreign assistance, the Navy was much more vulnerable to this crusade against intellectuals and foreign influence than the dominant army. Beginning in 1966, approximately 3,800 naval officers were investigated and purged, including at least 11 senior admirals. The troubled nuclear propulsion program was also affected by the resulting chaos. In 1966, the lead designer for the PLAN’s prospective nuclear submarines, Huang Xuhua, was tried and retried by mobs of Red Guards, who accused him of being an enemy agent; only the intervention of Premier Zhou Enlai saved him from serving a sentence raising pigs. Additionally, factional violence broke out during January 1967 at the nuclear fuel plant in Baotou, interrupting research on fuel rods for submarine reactors. Given that China’s first-generation nuclear submarines were developed against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that their operational performance was considerably inferior to that of contemporary American or Russian vessels.

There were, however, significant areas of progress, perhaps the result of increasing defense expenditures during the period. In 1968, China broke ground on massive, hardened shelters for its nuclear submarine fleet not far from Qingdao and completed the installation in the mid-1970s. Of the 16 major combatants constructed during the Cultural Revolution, 12 were submarines, including the new “Romeo” class, which appeared in 1968. That same year the Chinese laid the keel for their first SSN.

But overall, the Cultural Revolution had a devastating impact on the development of China’s submarine force. In a broad assault against military education, the Qingdao submarine academy, which had 2,000 students at the time, was closed down in 1969 and did not reopen until 1973. Training and maintenance also suffered during this tumultuous period and exacted a long-lasting toll from the PLAN submarine force. As elsewhere in Chinese society, the submarine force inherited a “lost generation” that had been poorly educated and trained. Perhaps even more debilitating, the Navy was forced to commission ideologically acceptable “left-leaning” officer recruits whose incompetence would impede technical and organizational progress in the force well into the 1980s. The disaster of the Cultural Revolution for Chinese maritime power has long been recognized in PLAN publications.

Back from the Brink

China’s submarine force benefited significantly when the chaos of the Cultural Revolution was replaced by the rigid and total militarization of Chinese society in the early 1970s. This change was due partly to a growing perception of threats from the Soviet Union. Production rates of the PLAN’s “Romeo”-class submarines trebled, to approximately six per year by 1974, and by 1978, China had more than 60 of these ships. China’s first indigenous anti-ship torpedoes, the Yu-1 and Yu-2, also entered serial production at this time, to be followed a decade later by an ASW homing torpedo, the Yu-3. During the mid-1970s, Chinese submarines began to venture further afield, penetrating the first island chain (the line from the Philippine Islands, through Taiwan to the Ryukus), and even the second island chain (formed by Indonesia, the Marianas Archipelago, and the main islands of Japan) for the first time. Most significantly, the first, long-delayed Han-class SSN became operational in 1974, although its propulsion system was highly susceptible to steam and primary leaks and reportedly exposed the crew to significant radiation dangers. The ship also lacked weaponry and basic electronic systems.

Deng Xiaoping’s ascendance in the late 1970s signaled a welcome turn to more pragmatic policies in all aspects of Chinese governance. Even so, the submarine force could well have suffered from both significant reductions in China’s defense budget and a new emphasis on China’s ground forces after Vietnam successfully fought China to a bloody draw in 1979. Indeed, the nuclear propulsion program did suffer serious budget cuts during the early 1980s, but since decommissioning the oldest diesel boats increased overall efficiency, the PLAN submarine force made incremental progress. First, there was the successful submerged launch of the JL-1, China’s first SLBM from the “Golf”-class SSB in 1982. In 1985, a Han-class SSN stayed under for 20,000 nautical miles and 84 days. Taking advantage of China’s new openness to foreign technology, the PLAN bought French DUUX-5 sonars for its submarines, while initiating a major program to decrease the acoustic signatures of its existing submarine fleet. As the Soviet threat receded under Gorbachev, the PLAN’s SSBN project apparently faced the threat of termination, but the successful submerged launch of a JL-1 from the new Xia-class SSBN in 1988 kept it alive. Concurrently, major geopolitical shifts were underway that would provide new impetus to Chinese seapower as it neared the 21st century.

Today and Tomorrow

Pivotal events at that time were the Tiananmen Square Massacre in June 1989, the Persian Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These developments both eliminated the perception of a Russian threat and raised the specter of ideological and even military conflict with the increasingly powerful United States. Moreover, the ongoing Chinese economic miracle that started in 1978 created plentiful resources that could now be devoted safely to maritime defense, at a time when the poverty-stricken Russians were eager to oblige with aerospace and maritime technology at cut-rate prices.

Under the direction of submariner Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, the PLAN placed orders for four diesel submarines from the Russians in 1993: two export-version type 877 “Kilos” and two improved type 636 “Kilos,” all delivered by 1998. In 2002, Beijing agreed to purchase eight more type 636 “Kilos” with delivery to occur in 2005-07. As part of this deal, the Chinese reportedly will also acquire Russia’s lethal SS-N-X-27 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of over 100 nautical miles. Moscow is also selling its advanced Test-71 and 53-56KE wake homing
torpedoes to Beijing, and China may have acquired Skval super-cavitating torpedoes.

These efforts are complemented by domestic production. In addition to retaining approximately 30 aging “Romeos” and continuing to build the derivative Ming class – with 20 now in the force – China has begun series production of its indigenously designed and manufactured Song class, the first of which was launched in 1991. The Songs – probably at least five, with eight or more under construction – incorporate advanced foreign technology and can launch anti-ship cruise missiles while submerged. China is also building the Type 093 SSN, with the first already nearing sea trials. Beijing boasts that this submarine will have performance equal to a Los Angeles-class SSN. Also on the ways is the Type 094 SSBN, which analysts expect at sea as early as 2005 with 16 8,000-kilometer nuclear-armed missiles.

PLAN leaders are ambitiously developing the human dimension of their underwater force as well by elevating the status of their professional non-commissioned officers in an effort to enhance and retain their skills. China’s admirals have also acknowledged that they have to compete for skilled labor by increasing the pay of some ranks by 100 percent in 1999-2000 – and the PLAN is aggressively increasing the number of officers holding advanced degrees. Training in the PLAN submarine force is strongly influenced by U.S. capabilities and operations. There is significant emphasis on mine
warfare, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare – the latter a new mission for China’s undersea force. By as-signing two separate crews to train on one submarine, the PLAN is potentially laying the groundwork for a major future expansion.

Read: Joe Buff’s Public Lecture, Will China Rule The Waves? from the New York State Military Museum at Saratoga Springs, NY on 3 December 2005. Published in The Submarine Review, the January 2006 issue.

Conclusion

A group of PLAN strategists summarized their analysis of the mid-1990s revolution in military affairs (RMA) as follows: “We can conclude that during the First World War, the dominant vessel was the battleship, and in World War Two, it was the aircraft carrier. In future global wars, the most powerful weapon will be the submarine… [because] submarines will experience less impact from reconnaissance technology than other platforms.” Current developments suggest that this view reflects the dominant thinking of the PLA high command.

Even while suffering from slavish imitation, bizarre happenings, and tragic loss, the PLAN submarine force has embodied some of China’s most impressive technical achievements. Indeed, last April’s submarine accident was not the PLAN’s first nor will it be the last. However, the borrowed genesis and troubled adolescence of PLAN submarines should not obscure the fact that China has created a viable foundation for building a potent undersea fleet. Moreover, this newly-wealthy nation is well into a thorough modernization of its infrastructure for basic and applied research and its educational and management practices. China is well-positioned for rapid progress.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and China have entered an unexpected period of bilateral cooperation. But even as Washington is clearly focused on more immediate problems in Iraq and elsewhere, Beijing’s military modernization continues at a rapid pace. War between the United States and a rising China is hardly inev-itable, particularly if our diplomats find a creative solution to the Taiwan issue, but if hostilities do break out, the American submarine force will undoubtedly be in the thick of the fight.

Dr. Lyle Goldstein is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department of the U.S. Naval War College, where he specializes in Chinese and Russian security policies. Bill Murray is an associate professor in the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College. He is a retired submarine officer and served on Los Angeles-class submarines. From Humble Origins China's Submarine Force Comes of Age. Undersea Warfare The Official Magazine of the U.S. Submarine Force. Winter 2004.

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